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ABSTRACT  
 
THEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR AN ETHICS OF COSMOCENTRIC 
TRANSFIGURATION: NAVIGATING THE ECO-THEOLOGICAL POLES OF 
CONSERVATION, TRANSFIGURATION, ANTHROPOCENTRISM, AND 
COSMOCENTRISM WITH REGARD TO THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
HUMANS AND INDIVIDUAL NONHUMAN ANIMALS 
By 
Ryan Patrick McLaughlin 
May 2013 
 
Dissertation supervised by Daniel Scheid, Ph.D. 
In the past forty years, there has been an unprecedented explosion of theological 
writings regarding the place of the nonhuman creation in ethics.  The purpose of this 
dissertation is to propose a taxonomy of four paradigms of eco-theological thought that 
will categorize these writings and facilitate the identification, situation, and constructive 
development of the paradigm of cosmocentric transfiguration.  This taxonomy takes 
shape within the tensions of three theological foundations: cosmology, anthropology, and 
eschatology.  These tensions establish two categorical distinctions between, on the one 
hand, conservation and transfiguration, and, on the other, anthropocentrism and 
cosmocentrism.  The variations within these poles yield the four paradigms.   
The first paradigm is anthropocentric conservation, represented by Thomas 
Aquinas.  It maintains that humanity bears an essentially unique dignity and 
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eschatological telos that renders the nonhuman creation resources for human use in via 
toward that telos.  The second is cosmocentric conservation, represented by Thomas 
Berry.  It maintains that humanity is part of a cosmic community of intrinsic worth that 
demands protection and preservation, not human manipulation or eschatological 
redemption.  The third is anthropocentric transfiguration, represented by Orthodox 
theologians such as Dumitru Staniloae.  It maintains that humans are priests of creation 
charged with the task of recognizing the cosmos as the eternal sacrament of divine love 
and using it to facilitate communion among themselves and with God.  The fourth is 
cosmocentric transfiguration, represented by both Jürgen Moltmann and Andrew Linzey.  
It maintains that humans are called to become proleptic witnesses to an eschatological 
hope for peace that includes the intrinsically valuable members of the cosmic community.   
Cosmocentric transfiguration, while under-represented and underdeveloped, 
provides a unique opportunity to affirm both scientific claims about the nature of the 
cosmos and the theological hope for redemption.  In addition, it offers a powerful vision 
to address the current ecological crisis with regard to humanity’s relationship to both 
individual nonhuman life forms and the cosmos at large.  This vision calls for humans to 
protest the mechanisms of death, suffering, and predation by living at peace, to whatever 
extent context permits, with all individual creatures while at the same time preserving the 
very system they protest by protecting the integrity of species, eco-systems, and the 
environment at large.  These findings warrant further research regarding the viability of 
cosmocentric transfiguration, in particular its exegetical warrant in scripture, its 
foundations in traditional voices of Christian thought, its interdisciplinary potential for 
integration of the sciences, and its internal coherency.    
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INTRODUCTION 
In the late twentieth century, many accusations have been leveled against 
Christianity regarding its ecological viability.  In his now ubiquitous essay, Lynn White 
writes that Western Christianity is dominantly disparaging to the nonhuman creation and 
largely to blame for modern abuses of it.
1
  Peter Singer lays at the feet of Christianity the 
dismissive attitude toward sentient nonhuman life forms.
2
  Others concur, at least in part, 
with these accusations.
3
   
In response to such claims, theologians have sought to retrieve the more 
promising aspects of Christian history with regard to ecological concern.  Numerous 
writers have offered detailed defenses of thinkers like Augustine and Aquinas against 
indictments that they are callously anthropocentric.
4
  Eastern Orthodox theologians have 
                                               
1 Lynn White, “The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis,” reprinted in The Care of Creation: 
Focusing Concern and Action, R. J. Berry, editor (Downers Grove, IL: Inter-varsity Press, 2000), 31-42. 
2 See Peter Singer, Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for Our Treatment of Animals (New York, 
NY: Avon Books, 1975), 197-209. 
3 For example, though Richard Ryder notes the potential for Christianity to espouse concern for 
nonhuman animals and the traces of this potential in the lives of certain saints, he ultimately criticizes 
Western Christianity’s anthropocentric tendencies. See Richard D. Ryder, Animal Revolution: Changing 
Attitudes towards Speciesism (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1989), chapter 3. Paul Waldau, while 
acknowledging the complexity of the Christian tradition, still maintains that its dominant position has been 
that of speciesism. See Paul Waldau, The Specter of Speciesism: Buddhist and Christian Views of Animals 
(New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2002), chapters 8 and 9. Robert Wennberg, while 
acknowledging the diversity of opinion regarding nonhuman animals in the early church, nonetheless 
claims that Augustine establishes a legacy of anthropocentrism that continues to dominate today. Robert N. 
Wennberg, God, Humans, and Animals: An Invitation to Enlarge Our Moral Universe (Grand Rapids, MI: 
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2003), 302-7. See also Charles Birch, “Christian Obligation for 
the Liberation of Nature,” in Liberating Life; Contemporary Approaches to Ecological Theology, Charles 
Birch, William Eakin, and Jay McDaniel, editors (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1991); John Passmore, 
“The Treatment of Animals,” Journal of the History of Ideas 36, 2 (1975), 195-218. 
4 Medieval thinkers, and most commonly Aquinas, have often received from modern scholars 
critique regarding their view of the cosmos. On this point, see my discussion of Aquinas in chapter 1. 
Roger D. Sorrell argues that the complexities of the views of medieval thinkers concerning nature “have 
been subjected to a very great deal of partisan distortion and mythologizing.” He maintains that “the legacy 
of this treatment is very much with us.” See Roger D. Sorrell, St. Francis of Assisi and Nature: Tradition 
and Innovation in Western Christian Attitudes toward the Environment (New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press, 1988), 3. Sorrell traces this history of misreading to the work of Edward Gibbon, who denigrated 
monasticism with the accusation of the demonization of nature. Ibid., 3-4. For his part, Sorrell attempts to 
draw out the complexity of the medieval view of the corporeal world, noting the wide diversity of views 
both within and without the monastic tradition. See ibid., 9-38. While certain aspects of these views do 
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re-emphasized the historical notion of creation’s sacramentality.5  This position has 
gained favor among contemporary Western theologians as well.
6
  Other modern writers 
have acknowledged the less favorable aspects of Christian history while critically 
retrieving its positive ecological features.
7
    
Collectively, these responses have yielded an unprecedented explosion of 
theological writings regarding the place of the nonhuman creation in ethics over the last 
forty years.  Within this context, the purpose of this dissertation is two-fold.  First, it 
proposes a taxonomy consisting of four paradigms of eco-theological ethics that will 
categorize these writings.  Second, in conjunction with this taxonomy, it aims to facilitate 
the identification, situation, and constructive development of one of these paradigms, 
which remains under-engaged in the field.    
 
                                                                                                                                            
betray an attitude that today is widely perceived as negative (ibid., 9) one of the more constant themes 
within this array of views is an appreciation for the beauty of creation. In an even stronger fashion than 
Sorrell, Elizabeth Johnson maintains that “appreciation of the natural world in Christian thought reached its 
zenith in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries” when “medieval theologians applied themselves to 
constructing an all-embracing view of the world.” Elizabeth A. Johnson, “Losing and Finding Creation in 
the Christian Tradition,” in Christianity and Ecology: Seeking the Well-Being of Earth and Humans, Dieter 
T. Hessel and Rosemary Radford Ruether, editors (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 6. In 
Johnson’s view, it was in the wake of the Enlightenment that the doctrine of creation slipped out of 
theological focus. Ibid., 8-11.  
5 For considerations, see Alexander Schmemann, For the Life of the World: Sacraments and 
Orthodoxy (Crestwood, NY: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1973); Mathai Kadavil, The World as 
Sacrament: Sacramentality of Creation from the Perspectives of Leonardo Boff, Alexander Schmemann and 
Saint Ephrem (Leuven: Peeters, 2005); John Chryssavgis, “The Earth as Sacrament: Insights from 
Orthodox Christian Theology and Spirituality,” in The Orthodox Handbook of Religion and Ecology, Roger 
S. Gottlieb, editor (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2006), 92-114. 
6 See, for instance, John Hart, Sacramental Commons: Christian Ecological Ethics (New York, 
NY: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006); Kevin Irwin, “Sacramentality and the Theology of Creation: 
A Recovered Paradigm for Sacramental Theology,” Louvain Studies, 23 (1998), 159-79; Dorothy 
McDougal, The Cosmos as the Primary Sacrament: The Horizon for an Ecological Sacramental Theology 
(New York, NY: Peter Lang, 2003); Theodore Runyon, “The World as the Original Sacrament,” Worship 
54 6 (1980), 495-511. 
7 See, for instance, Paul Santmire, The Travail of Nature: The Ambiguous Ecological Promise of 
Christian Theology (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1985); David Kinsley, Ecology and Religion: 
Ecological Spirituality in Cross-Cultural Perspective (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1995), 
chapters 8 and 9. Jame Schaefer offers an historical consideration along these lines—though far less critical 
than Santmire. See Jame Schaefer, Theological Foundations for Environmental Ethics: Reconstructing 
Patristic & Medieval Concepts (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2009).  
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SITUATING THE PROJECT 
Before delineating my own categorical paradigms, it is pertinent to explore other 
existing classifications and divisions.  This exploration will include both ecological and 
animal theologies.
8
  It will summarize the state of the question by examining current 
voices in these fields.  In doing so, it will both establish a basic framework for the 
discussion of eco- and animal theologies and provide an opportunity to justify this 
project’s aims within that framework.   
CLASSIFICATIONS OF ECO-THEOLOGICAL ETHICS 
In their student-focused text on environmental ethics, Susan J. Armstrong and 
Richard G. Botzler explore four categories of ecological thought based primarily on the 
criteria of value and moral consideration.
9
  The first category is anthropocentrism, which 
intimates the chief or sole relegation of intrinsic value to humans.  This category is 
represented first and foremost by René Descartes, who solidified a sharp and essential 
dividing line between human life and all nonhuman entities by defining the latter as mere 
machines.  The second category is individualism, which entails the rejection of the 
relegation of ethical import to species, ecosystems, or the cosmos at large.  This category 
is represented by animal rights advocates such as Tom Regan.  The third category is 
ecocentrism, which places both the earth and the land into the category of intrinsic value.  
Armstrong and Botzler include both Aldo Leopold’s land ethic and Arne Naess’s deep 
ecology here.  The fourth category is ecofeminism, which includes the political 
dismantling of hierarchical claims in favor of an egalitarian view of the cosmos.   
                                               
8 This claim already adumbrates one major divide in the field. Scholars typically differentiate 
between environmental/ecological theologians and animals theologies. See below.  
9 The following is taken from Susan J. Armstrong and Richard G. Botzler, Environmental Ethics: 
Divergence and Convergence, third edition (New York, NY: McGraw Hill, 2003), 271-463. 
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A similar centric and value-based distinction is offered by William French in his 
categorization of contemporary Catholic thought.
10
  French highlights two basic 
categories: subject-centered and creation-centered approaches to ecological ethics.  
Subject-centered approaches emphasize the significance of both human subjects 
(including the capacities of their being) and human history.
11
  French categorizes Pierre 
Teilhard de Chardin in this category for his optimistic evaluation of human progress in 
the evolutionary emergence of the universe.
12
 He also includes the writings of Vatican II, 
stating that “the council follows the generally anthropocentric scale of the natural law 
tradition.”13  Finally, he includes both the political theologian Johannes Baptist Metz and 
Pope John Paul II on account of their interest in transforming the world for common 
human benefit.
14
   
While there are variations within this category (French distinguishes between 
Chardin’s “sovereignty-within” model and the “sovereignty-over” model of the other 
voices), French draws out a basic commonality: both models bear  
(1) A processive, eschatological focus, (2) a homo faber anthropology, (3) a wide-
ranging endorsement of technology, industry, and science, and (4) a buoyant 
optimism regarding our possibilities for progress.
15
 
 
Though he recognizes the value of an affirmation of individual human subjects, French 
ultimately criticizes the subject-centered approach for its “triumphalist endorsement of 
technology, economic development, and historical transformation.”16 
                                               
10 See William C. French, “Subject-centered and Creation-centered Paradigms in Recent Catholic 
Thought,” The Journal of Religion, 70/1 (January 1990), 48-72. 
11 Ibid., 48-49. 
12 Ibid., 53-54. While French acknowledges that Chardin is “a creation-centered thinker,” he 
maintains that he is the “dean of Catholic subject-centered theology because of his insistence that humanity 
is called to further the ‘personalization’ of the planet by ‘building the earth.’” Ibid., 53. 
13 Ibid., 54. 
14 Ibid., 55-57. 
15 Ibid., 58. 
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Creation-centered theologies “do not dispense with emphasizing subjectivity and 
history; rather, they highlight their interrelation with embodiment and creation.”17  Under 
this category, French includes the creation spirituality of Thomas Berry, the feminism of 
Rosemary Radford Ruether, and the liberation theology evident in the Filipino bishops’ 
“Pastoral Letter on Ecology.”18  Berry replaces a homo faber (“human as creator”) 
anthropology with one in which humans must live with, rather than transform, the earth.  
Ruether replaces an anthropocentric hierarchy of value with a holistically cosmic 
egalitarianism.  The Filipino bishops call for preservation of the earth rather than its 
transformation.  Again, French detects two sub-categories: the stewardship model of the 
Filipino bishops and the “ecological egalitarian” models of Berry and Ruether.19   
Not all classifications center on value.  Willis Jenkins offers a soteriological 
approach.  He suggests that Lynn White’s essay regarding Christianity’s culpability for 
ecological degradation rests on three assumptions concerning religious worldviews: “that 
they generate social practices, that they should be measured by the criteria of intrinsic 
value and anthropocentrism, and that salvation stories threaten environmentally benign 
worldviews.”20  This “remarkably generative thesis set the agenda for Christian 
environmental theologies in the following decades,”21 an agenda that focused on either 
recovering nonanthropocentric cosmologies or constructing new cosmologies.
22
  For 
Jenkins, such an agenda is problematic as it encourages eco-theologians “to downplay 
                                                                                                                                            
16 Ibid., 61. 
17 Ibid., 50. 
18 Ibid., 62-68. 
19 Ibid., 69. French opts for the stewardship model.  
20 Willis Jenkins, Ecologies of Grace: Environmental Ethics and Christian Theology (New York, 
NY: Oxford University Press, 2008), 11. 
21 Ibid., 11. 
22 Says Jenkins: “By casting suspicion on salvation and organizing debate around criteria of 
anthropocentrism and nature’s value, White’s assumptions keep the focus away from soteriological roots 
while at the same time determining the acceptable content of decent worldviews.” Ibid., 12. 
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talk about salvation” in order to avoid the stigma of anthropocentricism.  In response to 
this problem, Jenkins maps the field of eco-theological thought according to 
soteriological concepts of grace.  In doing so, he seeks to avoid the common use of 
anthropocentrism as the sole litmus test for viable environmental contributions.   
Jenkins employs the notions of sanctification, redemption, and deification to 
classify eco-theological thought.  Drawing on the taxonomical work of the sociologist 
Laurel Kearns, he traces these soteriological terms to three strategies for environmental 
ethics.  These three strategies are ecojustice, stewardship, and creation spirituality, each 
of which loosely corresponds to ecclesial traditions.
23
   
Sanctification corresponds to the strategy of ecojustice, most typically practiced 
by Roman Catholicism.
24
  This strategy predicates human duty to the environment on 
account of its being God’s creation.25  Ecojustice theologians emphasize the integrity of 
creation, claiming that God’s designed cosmos demands respect from humanity.26  
However, it is unclear what respecting creation’s integrity means.  Does that integrity 
include mechanisms of evolution such as predation, suffering, and death?  Or are these 
evils that occur in nature?
27
  Ultimately, Jenkins seems concerned that ecojustice replaces 
                                               
23 Ibid., 18-19. 
24 Among the advocates of this view, Jenkins lists the Lutherans Larry Rasmussen and Jürgen 
Moltmann and the Episcopalian Michael Northcott. See Jenkins, Ecologies of Grace, 66-75. Given this 
choice of interlocutors, it may seem odd that Jenkins links sanctification and ecojustice to Catholicism. 
However, he argues that Thomas Aquinas provides the best foundation for ecojustice on account of his 
understanding of the significance of biological diversity. See Jenkins, Ecologies of Grace, chapters 6 and 7. 
I will engage these chapters of Jenkins’s work in chapter 1. 
25 Ibid., 64-66. 
26 See ibid., 64-70. 
27 On this point, see Jenkins’s discussion on natural evil. Ibid., 70-71. See also Paul W. Taylor, 
Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 8-
9.  
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justice to nature (i.e., creation as it is exists in its present state) with justice to what we 
hope nature will become (i.e., a protological Eden or an eschatological new creation).
28
      
Sanctification corresponds to the strategy of stewardship, most typically 
emphasized in Protestant circles.
29
  Whereas ecojustice emphasizes creation’s integrity, 
advocates of stewardship emphasize God’s command to humanity to care for the earth.  
Humanity is responsible for the earth before God.  Jenkins notes that critics of 
stewardship worry that this responsibility “amounts to religious license for 
anthropocentric domination.”30  This anthropocentrism takes on a functional dimension, 
frequently linked to the imago Dei, taking forms such as obedience to Christ’s 
commands, following Christ’s example of kenotic love, or living up to Christ’s salvific 
work.
31
  For Jenkins, this approach risks the same issue as ecojustice; namely, it must 
answer the question: “does stewardship aim to establish the Kingdom’s shalom or to, say, 
manage for healthy patterns of predation?”32     
Deification corresponds to the strategy of creation spiritualism, most typically 
embodied in Eastern Orthodoxy.
33
  This strategy locates environmental concern in both 
                                               
28 Jenkins, Ecologies of Grace, 70-74. 
29 See Ibid., 78-80. Jenkins cites thinkers like Calvin DeWitt, Wendell Berry, and John Douglas 
Hall as advocates of this strategy. He also engages Anabaptist thought. Ibid., chapter 4. He spends most of 
his time, in later chapters, focusing on the work of Karl Barth. Ibid., chapters 8 and 9.  
30 Ibid., 80. 
31 Ibid., 85-86. 
32 Ibid., 89. 
33 Jenkins spends most of his initial discussion of this strategy focusing on creation spiritualists 
like Matthew Fox, Thomas Berry, and Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. See Jenkins, Ecologies of Grace, 93-
108. He does engage Orthodox thought, initially mostly through Maximus the Confessor, Patriarch Ignatius 
IV of Antioch, John Zizioulas, and a musing on the sophiologists. See ibid., 108-111. This emphasis 
continues in his later chapters, one devoted to Maximus and the other to Sergei Bulgakov. I remain 
unconvinced that most Orthodox theologians would accept either the cosmocentric outlook or the 
affirmation of a nature unfallen or not in need of actual eschatological (by this claim I mean more than 
existential) transfiguration. It is rather odd that Jenkins notes how ecojustice and stewardship advocates risk 
longing for something other than nature as it currently exists but makes no mention of Orthodoxy’s nearly 
ubiquitous claim that the cosmos requires eschatological redemption from its fallenness. I also remain 
unconvinced that Thomas Berry would accept the salvific term deification if it meant anything more than 
8 
 
the communion within the cosmos and between the cosmos and God.  Said differently, it 
is in the relationality—the in between of one and another in a “fully Christian 
personhood”—that environmental issues arise.34  Says Jenkins, “Environmental laments 
and redress begin from a primary spiritual communion of humanity and earth, assumed 
into personal experience with God.”35  This strategy formally arose out of dissatisfaction 
with the anthropocentric leanings of ecojustice and stewardship.
36
  Jenkins points to 
sacramental ecology as an example of this dissatisfaction, noting that it draws the 
nonhuman creation into liturgical communion.
37
  
Michael Northcott begins tracing the post-Enlightenment rise of secular 
environmental ethics with the Romantics.  From here, he delineates three common paths 
and advocates the superiority of a fourth.  The first is consequentialism, evident in the 
work of both the animal liberationist Peter Singer and the environmental ethicist Robin 
Attfield.
38
  The second path is deontology, evident in the work of the aesthetics 
environmentalist Eugene Hargrove, the animal rights activist Tom Regan, and the 
environmental ethicist Holmes Rolston III.
39
  The third path is ecocentrism, which 
attempts to establish, through a more mystical approach, the “total integrity of the land, 
and…the moral significance of ecosystems considered as total communities of 
                                                                                                                                            
the already existent divine infusion into nature. He would certainly not accept the notion that humans have 
a salvific role for nature.  
34 Ibid., 93. 
35 Ibid., 93; also 100-101. 
36 Ibid., 96. 
37 Ibid., 99-100. 
38 Michael Northcott, The Environment and Christian Ethics (New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 93-97. This approach is unsatisfactory in Northcott’s estimation because it is 
unable to provide a non-subjective valuation of natural systems (e.g., ecosystems). That is, the adjudication 
of consequences is predicated fully on human estimation. Ibid., 92-93. 
39 Ibid., 98-105. Like Singer’s utilitarianism, Northcott argues that Regan’s deontology fails to 
account for non-sentient life forms and the whole that is comprised of individuals. Ibid., 101-102. Rolston 
fares better because he emphasizes will and teleology, which allows him to account for more than sentient 
individuals. Ibid., 103-104. 
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interdependent life including both humans and non-humans.”40  Northcott lists four main 
advocates and forms of this path: Aldo Leopold and his land ethic, James Lovelock and 
his Gaia hypothesis, Arne Naess and his deep ecology, and ecofeminism.
41
   
Northcott’s dissatisfaction with modern and mystical ethical approaches leads him 
to affirm, in line with the work of the Australian ecofeminist Val Plumwood, a relational 
ontology in conjunction with a virtue ethics.
42
  The feminist emphasis on relationality fits 
well within both the Hebrew worldview and the Christian doctrine of the Trinity.
43
  An 
ethics of virtue places the conversation in the realm of character and being as opposed to 
act and consequence.  Northcott maintains that, together, these views will aid humans to  
recover a deeper sense for the relationality of human life to particular ecosystems 
and parts of the biosphere, and where communities of place foster those virtues of 
justice and compassion, of care and respect for life, human and non-human, of 
temperance and prudence in our appetites and desires, which characterise to this 
day many of those surviving indigenous communities on the last frontiers of the 
juggernaut of modernity.
44
   
 
Regarding the classification of eco-theological thought, Northcott establishes 
three fluid terms: humanocentric, theocentric, and ecocentric.
45
 For Northcott, these terms 
are not about value but rather framework.  A humanocentric framework is one that 
approaches ecological issues with an emphasis on human issues and needs.  A theocentric 
framework considers environmental concerns vis-à-vis God’s relation to the cosmos, 
emphasizing the import of creation for God and the ethical ramification of this import.  
                                               
40 Ibid., 106. 
41 Ibid., 106-114. Northcott is critical of these mystical approaches because of their “emphasis on 
self-realisation and the extension of the self to the Whole of nature.” Ibid., 115.  
42 Ibid., 116-123. 
43 Ibid., 120-121. 
44 Ibid., 122-123. 
45 See Ibid., chapter 4. Northcott describes the terms as fluid because ethicists and theologians 
shift back and forth between them. Ibid., 124. 
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An ecocentric framework develops around the cosmos itself, emphasizing the nonhuman 
creation in its own right.   
  Under “humanocentric,” Northcott lists Teilhard de Chardin’s vision of 
humanity as the pinnacle of evolutionary development, Francis Schaeffer’s evangelical 
emphasis on humanity as imago Dei, Robin Attfield’s accentuation of human stewardship 
over nature, Eastern Orthodoxy’s understanding as humans as priests of creation, Pope 
John Paul II’s link between the ecological crisis and human sin, and finally Rosemary 
Radford Ruether’s ecological critique of patriarchy.46  He also links humanocentric 
approaches with the notion of stewardship.
47
  Under the term “theocentric,” Northcott 
categorizes Jürgen Moltmann’s emphasis on pneumatological immanence in the cosmos, 
James Nash’s vision of God’s love that establishes the intrinsic value of the cosmos, 
Stephen Clark’s incarnational understanding of God’s intimacy with the world, and 
Andrew Linzey’s emphasis on God’s relation to sentient creatures as the foundation for 
animal rights.
48
  Lastly, under the term ecocentric, Northcott lists the process theologies 
of John Cobb and Jay McDaniel, the pantheistic creation spirituality of Matthew Fox, and 
the divine embodiment metaphor of Sallie McFague.
49
 
Another important classification of eco-theological thought is offered by Celia 
Deane-Drummond.
50
  Her taxonomy is couched within a geographical framework in 
which she explores and evaluates voices from the North, South, East, and West.  She then 
draws from this array of views to explore pertinent facets of eco-theological thought 
                                               
46 Ibid., 125-141. 
47 See Ibid., 128. 
48 See Ibid., 141-147. 
49 Ibid., 147-161. I am unclear as to why Northcott labels McFague’s eco-theology as eco-centric. 
By his criteria, it seems she could more easily be classified as theocentric.  
50 Celia Deane-Drummond, Eco-Theology (Winona, MN: Anselm Academic, 2008). 
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(biblical studies, christology, theodicy, pneumatology, eco-feminism, and eschatology) 
that enable her to begin the construction of her own contribution to the field.  Here, my 
interest is her review of the literature.    
Drummond explores three forms of ecological ethics from the Northern 
hemisphere (which includes “most notably the United States”).51  These forms include 
Aldo Leopold’s land ethic; Arne Naess’s deep ecology; and the creation spirituality of 
Teilhard de Chardin, Matthew Fox, and Thomas Berry.
52
  Drummond’s evaluation of 
these voices ultimately suggests that they all “fail to consider adequately the issue of 
global poverty and oppression, alongside the suffering of the planet earth.”53   
Leopold’s land ethic “was one that stressed stability, harmony and interdependent 
relationships.”  He thus emphasizes the whole over the individual.54  Yet Drummond 
notes the short-comings and dangers of Leopold’s ethic, including the derivation of an 
“ought from an is,” the failure to account for the dynamism of cosmic processes in the 
call to preserve what currently exists, and the risked dissolution of the individual into the 
cosmic whole.
55
   
Deep ecology, which Drummond traces back to Naess, emphasizes the “ultimate 
norm” of “self-realisation and biocentric equality,” which intimate respectively an 
acceptance of one’s relational identity within the cosmic community and the affirmation 
that “all organisms have equal weight and intrinsic value.”56  For Drummond such 
                                               
51 Ibid., 32. 
52 Ibid., 32-42. 
53 Ibid., 43. 
54 Ibid., 33. 
55 Ibid., 33-34. 
56 Ibid., 36. 
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“sweeping claims…are too hard to endorse” within a cosmos that requires competition 
amongst various interests.
57
   
Creation spirituality, under which Drummond includes Teilhard de Chardin, 
Matthew Fox, and Thomas Berry, tends toward the affirmation of the natural processes of 
the cosmos in its emerging existence.  Human beings exist only as part of these unfolding 
processes, as members of the creation community.  Critically, Drummond notes that the 
cosmic affirmation of creation spirituality tends to embrace too easily the violence of 
evolutionary emergence.
58
 
With regard to voices from the South, Drummond admittedly only scratches the 
surface.  Her two basic explorations engage liberation theologians and indigenous 
thought.  She first considers Leonardo Boff’s appropriation of the Gaia hypothesis in 
conjunction with his critique of Western consumerism.  While in his earlier works Boff 
focused almost exclusively on human needs, his later work establishes the import of 
human beings in the context of a larger cosmic community.
59
  Even so, Drummond notes 
that Boff continues to prioritize human needs, a facet of his thought that leaves him open 
to the ongoing charge of anthropocentrism.
60
  Drummond next examines indigenous ways 
of thinking, which in her view “seek to stress primarily identification with the land, rather 
than radical economic critique of capitalism through socialist ideology.”61  Such views 
tend to emphasize the import of the cosmic whole, including natural cycles.  However, 
they also place human development, including culture, within the scope of those cycles.  
                                               
57 Ibid., 37. Drummond also suggests that deep ecology risks abstraction with its syncretistic 
combination of religious principles. 
58 See, for instance, Ibid., 42. 
59 Ibid., 47-48. 
60 Ibid., 49. 
61 Here Drummond is obviously comparing this strand of thought to liberation theology. Ibid., 50. 
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Thus, humans are to participate actively with creation in creation—a slightly different 
perspective from a stark conservationist policy.
62
  Drummond’s only critique of 
indigenous views is their uncritical syncretism and lack of systemization.
63
 
In her examination of contributions from Eastern thought, Drummond basically 
delineates approaches of Eastern Orthodox eco-theology.  She includes the liturgical 
emphasis of Elizabeth Theokritoff, John Zizioulas’s vision of humans as the priests of 
creation, the revelatory value of the cosmos as expressed in the work of Kallistos Ware, 
the sophiology of Sergii Bulgakov, and the monastic and ascetic tradition of Saint 
Symeon.
64
  Many of these approaches emphasize the sacramentality of the cosmos in 
which humanity is brought to communion with each other and God.
65
  Drummond’s 
critique of Orthodox thought tends to focus on certain ambiguities regarding the manner 
that nonhumans participate in the divine.   
Drummond limits her initial engagement with Western thinkers to socio-political 
writers.
66
  She very briefly explores Northcott’s natural law critique of modernity, 
Murray Bookchin’s social ecology that critiques capitalistic hierarchies in both human 
and nonhuman realms in favor of “eco-anarchy,” and Peter Scott’s theological (and more 
specifically, trinitarian) appropriation of Bookchin’s work.67  
CLASSIFICATIONS OF ANIMAL ETHICS 
In his work, God, Animals, and Humans, Robert Wennberg limits the focus of his 
thesis:   
                                               
62 Ibid., 53. 
63 Ibid., 54. 
64 Ibid., 57-66. 
65 E.g., as priests, humans offer the cosmos to God, and, in that offering, experience the divine. 
Ibid., 60. Or again, the expression of divine reason in the order of the cosmos reflects the divine to human 
intellect. Ibid., 61-62.  
66 Ibid., 69. 
67 Ibid., 69-74. 
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This is a book on animal advocacy.  It is not a book on ecology nor is it an 
attempt to construct an environmental ethic, for animal advocacy and 
environmentalism are not the same thing.  Indeed, according to some, they are not 
only not the same thing, but they are seriously at odds with each other, so much so 
that ultimately one will have to choose between the agenda of the animal advocate 
and that of the environmentalist.
68
 
 
Wennberg is not alone in noting this difference within the larger field of 
nonhuman ethics,
69
 one which is exacerbated by his acknowledgment that “the 
environmentalist has a higher standing in the community, both inside and outside the 
church, than does the animal advocate, who is often viewed with suspicion.”70  For 
Wennberg, the main difference between an environmentalist and an animal advocate 
pertains to the unit of primary moral concern—more specifically, whether the individual 
animal has any moral claims.
71
 
Under the category “animal advocate,” Wennberg notes two general divisions, 
and subdivisions within each.
72
  The general division is between direct or indirect moral 
concern.
73
  The latter category includes Immanuel Kant’s emphasis on personhood, 
Aquinas’s moral hierarchy, and social contract theory.74  The former category includes 
                                               
68 Wennberg, God, Animals, and Humans, 29. 
69 See, for instance, Lisa H. Sideris, Environmental Ethics, Ecological Theology, and Natural 
Selection (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2003), 13; Stephen Webb, “Ecology vs. The 
Peaceable Kingdom: Toward a Better Theology of Nature,” Soundings 79/1-2 (Spring/Summer 1996), 239-
52; Andrew Linzey, Creatures of the Same God: Explorations in Animal Theology (New York, NY: 
Lantern Books, 2009), 29-44. 
70 Wennberg, God, Animals, and Humans, 30. Wennberg offers three reasons for this difference. 
First, animal advocacy is linked in the minds of many to violence. Second, “animal advocacy is viewed as 
anti-scientific.” And third, animal advocacy is always anti-anthropocentrism. Ibid., 30-32. 
71 See ibid., 32-36. Also, Sideris, Environmental Ethics, 21 I will address this point in detail 
below. It is important to note, as Linzey does, that “not all ecologists are anti-animals and vice versa.” 
Linzey, Creatures of the Same God, 37.  
72 Wennberg also distinguishes amongst three kinds of environmental ethics. The first is 
anthropocentric. The second is “sentientism,” which entails that “whatever is sentient, but only what is 
sentient, has moral standing.” The third is deep ecology. See Wennberg, God, Humans, and Animals, 36-
42. 
73 Regan also makes this general distinction. See Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, chapters 5 
and 6. 
74 Wennberg, God, Humans, and Animals, 119-37. 
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Regan’s animal rights approach, Singer’s utilitarianism, Linzey’s theos-rights, Hall’s 
vision of stewardship, and various virtue theory approaches.
75
     
In the Encyclopedia of Animal Rights and Animal Welfare, three entries delineate 
the difference between animal welfare (welfarism) and the animal rights movement.  
Tom Regan addresses the general difference.  “Animal welfare holds that humans do 
nothing wrong when they use nonhuman animals…if the overall benefits of engaging in 
these activities outweigh the harms these animals endure.”76  Animal rights, on the other 
hand, maintain that “human utilization of nonhuman animals…is wrong in principle and 
should be abolished in practice.”77  Regan further connects welfarism to utilitarianism 
and rights to deontology.
78
  David Sztybel differentiates various welfarist approaches.  
These variations include efforts to keep exploitative practices humane, the 
“commonsense animal welfare” in which people offer vague concerns for animal well-
being, a more specific and disciplined call for some abolition and some humane 
exploitation, Peter Singer’s liberationist view, the “new welfarism” of many 
contemporary rights activists, and finally Richard Ryder’s refusal to distinguish between 
rights and welfare.
79
  Gary Francione examines the “new welfarism” of many modern 
                                               
75 Ibid., 137-79. It seems to me that both stewardship and virtue could both fall under direct or 
indirect moral concern.  
76 Tom Regan, “Animal Rights,” in Encyclopedia of Animal Rights and Animal Welfare, Marc 
Bekoff and Carron A. Meaney, editors (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1998), 42. 
77 Ibid.. 
78 For Regan’s detailed thoughts on these divisions, see The Case for Animal Rights, chapters 3, 4, 
7, and 8.  
79 David Sztybel, “Distinguishing Animal Rights from Animal Welfare,” in Encyclopedia of 
Animal Rights and Animal Welfare, Marc Bekoff and Carron A. Meaney, editors (Westport, CT: 
Greenwood Press, 1998), 44.  
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rights advocates who promote a progressive approach that begins with welfare and aims 
(only idealistically) toward rights.
80
     
In his work, The Moral Menagerie, Marc R. Fellenz traces extensionist animal 
ethics by categorizing their development within the framework of traditional Western 
ethical categories.  He thus devises a taxonomy of animal ethics by delineating utilitarian, 
deontological, virtue, and contractual approaches.
81
  Utilitarian approaches include the 
work of Jeremy Bentham and Peter Singer.
82
  Fellenz explores the work of Tom Regan—
because he seeks to establish animal rights—as a deontological approach.83  As an 
example of a virtue approach to animal ethics, Fellenz considers Bernard Rollin’s 
retrieval of Aristotle and Lawrence Becker’s systematic virtue ethics for animals.84  
Fellenz’s engagement with contractualism focuses on developments of Johns Rawls’s 
veil of ignorance and the meaning it might have for animal ethics.
85
  
Fellenz juxtaposes these approaches to those of continental philosophy, deep 
ecology, and ecofeminism, suggesting that these alternatives provide a superior 
framework to account for the excess with which the animal accosts human thought.
86
  
The continental philosophies, for example that of Jacques Derrida, “embody the enigma 
that the animal presents to philosophy.”87  Deep ecologists such as Aldo Leopold, Arne 
Naess, and Holmes Rolston III provide nuanced visions of reverential living within the 
                                               
80 Gary L. Francione, “Animal Rights and New Welfarism,” in Encyclopedia of Animal Rights and 
Animal Welfare, Marc Bekoff and Carron A. Meaney (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1998), 45. 
81 Marc R. Fellenz, The Moral Menagerie: Philosophy and Animal Rights (Chicago, IL: University 
of Illinois Press, 2007), 57-117.  
82 Ibid., 57-67. 
83 Ibid., 82-87. 
84 Ibid., 92-102. 
85 Ibid., 108-116 
86 The term “excess” entails that the subject—in this case a nonhuman animal—cannot be 
conceptually exhausted or mastered by human thought. Such a view is a direct challenge to a Cartesian 
reduction of the nonhuman animal to a machine. 
87 Fellenz, The Moral Menagerie, 155. 
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mysteriousness of relational and embodied existence.
88
  Ecofeminists augment deep 
ecology by providing nuanced visions of an eco-egalitarian worldview that replaces 
androcentric hierarchies, which remain even in deep ecology.
89
 
AIM AND SCOPE OF THIS PROJECT WITHIN THE FIELD OF ECO-THEOLOGICAL ETHICS 
Between general classifications of eco-theological and animal ethics, there exists 
a great host of alternatives regarding human engagement with the nonhuman creation.  
While contemporary authors have offered various means of categorizing these 
alternatives, there remains a level of ambiguity regarding central tensions in the field.  
For example, while Jenkins emphasizes soteriology in his erudite classification and 
French emphasizes the question of intrinsic value in terms of centrism, neither approach 
engages both dimensions of soteriological telos and intrinsic value.  Oddly, French seems 
to equate subject-centered paradigms with transformation and creation-centered 
paradigms with preservation.
90
  Northcott’s approach is helpful in terms of framework, 
but is somewhat misleading in terms of content (e.g., the common categorization of 
Ruether and Pope John Paul II as humanocentric).  Drummond’s survey of the field is 
also helpful, but does not really offer a taxonomy in terms of comparative ethics.  The 
contrast between ecological ethics and animal ethics with regard to the emphasis of 
individuals or species/ecosystems makes classification all the more difficult.   
What is needed is a taxonomy that accounts for these difficulties.  This project 
aims to address the central tensions I have detected in surveying various theologies of the 
nonhuman creation and the ethics that these theologies ground.  These tensions exist at 
the level of cosmology (i.e., the status and purpose of the nonhuman creation), 
                                               
88 See Ibid., 161-173. 
89 See Ibid., 173-183. 
90 See French, “Subject-centered and Creation-centered Paradigms,” 58-59. 
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anthropology (i.e., the status and purpose of human beings), and eschatology (i.e., the 
extent of God’s redemptive aim for the created order).  Collectively, these three 
theological facets address issues of both salvation and value.  They include (and surpass) 
the somewhat narrow (though still valuable) approaches of Jenkins and French.  They 
furthermore help bridge the gap between ecological ethics and animal ethics within a 
theological framework.  On account of these benefits, this new taxonomy is warranted in 
the face of an ever-growing corpus of eco-theological writings.     
THREE THEOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS FOR A NEW TAXONOMY OF ECO-THEOLOGICAL 
ETHICS 
Here I intend to explain why I find cosmology, anthropology, and eschatology 
useful for constructing a taxonomy of eco-theological ethics.  First, I will explain why I 
emphasize these particular dimensions.  I will then explore each one, focusing on its 
import for this project.  
WHY THESE THEOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS? 
In his effort to develop an eco-theology that is at once faithful to the history of 
Christian thought and pertinent to the contemporary environmental crisis, Stephen 
Bouma-Prediger explores the theological and philosophical loci of anthropology, 
ontology, and theology proper.
91
  To facilitate this exploration, he examines the 
theologies of Rosemary Radford Ruether, Joseph Sittler, and Jürgen Moltmann.  This 
examination supports Bouma-Prediger’s three-fold theological vision.  First, 
anthropology must reflect a non-dualistic worldview, especially with regard to nature and 
                                               
91 See Steven Bouma-Prediger, The Greening of Theology: The Ecological Models of Rosemary 
Radford Ruether, Joseph Sittler, and Jürgen Moltmann (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1995). 
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history.
92
  Second, ontology must be conceived relationally and theocentrically for both 
human and nonhuman components of the cosmos.
93
  Third, theology proper must take the 
form of a doctrine of the social Trinity that rejects both androcentric and anthropocentric 
hierarchies and recovers the immanence of the divine in the created order.
94
     
There are similarities between Bouma-Prediger’s book and this project.  The most 
important of these is the use of three theological categories to frame the discussion.  We 
both engage anthropology.  His exploration of ontology is not that dissimilar from my use 
of cosmology—especially with regard to an emphasis on relationality and various centric 
possibilities.  His third category is theology proper.  While the doctrine of God does not 
constitute a specific category of exploration in his project, it is nonetheless a ubiquitous 
theme.  For all theology is related to theology proper—that is, the doctrine of God.  As 
this project unfolds, it is important for the reader to know that my categories of 
cosmology, anthropology, and eschatology should be understood as theological 
categories (i.e., categories within a larger framework that implies theology proper).  My 
engagement of Jürgen Moltmann and Andrew Linzey, as well as my own constructive 
work in the final chapter, will evince the significance of theology proper.  
I noted above that Jenkins avoids classifying eco-theological thought according to 
centric value systems and instead employs a soteriological categorization.  While 
soteriology is not one of the three theological dimensions of this project, it is present at 
the intersection of cosmology, anthropology, and eschatology.  Theological cosmology 
expresses fundamentally what the created order was and is in relation to both God and 
itself.  Theological anthropology expresses fundamentally what humanity was and is 
                                               
92 Ibid., 266-74. 
93 Ibid., 274-83. 
94 Ibid., 284-301. 
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within the framework of theological cosmology.  Eschatology expresses fundamentally 
what the cosmos (including humans) is becoming and will, in a final sense, be in relation 
to both God and itself.
95
   
The theological dimensions of cosmology, anthropology, and eschatology thus 
embrace the entire temporal and spatial scope of the Trinity’s history with the cosmos 
and therefore include both theology proper and soteriology.  They furthermore account 
for the relationality of the cosmos both spatially (each part of the cosmos in relation to 
others and each part and the cosmic whole in relation to God) and temporally (the 
relation among protological claims about the cosmos, the present condition of the 
cosmos, and the future God desires for the cosmos).  Lastly, these theological dimensions 
are dominant driving forces (even when they are excluded from a theological framework) 
of eco-theological ethics. It is for these reasons that I adopt these three dimensions as the 
framework within which to from a taxonomy of eco-theological thought.      
COSMOLOGY 
Traditionally, the term creation refers to all that is not God.  Yet in most 
explorations of cosmology, anthropology is relegated to a seemingly separate category 
(or at least essentially distinct sub-category).  I am here honoring that distinction for the 
sake of clarity.  Inasmuch as cosmology is the doctrine of the Creator’s creation, it is also 
the doctrine of human beings.  There can be no sharp partition here.
96
  Anthropology can 
only be the doctrine of human beings in, with, and as the Creator’s creation.   
                                               
95 Thus eschatology bears similar themes to Jenkins’s soteriological focus. 
96 See Anne M. Clifford, “Creation,” in Systematic Theology: Roman Catholic Perspectives, 
Francis Schüssler Fiorenza and John P. Galvin, editors (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2011), 202. As 
Stephen Webb notes, conservationist efforts that call for a strict absence of human presence from nature 
ironically maintain—if only in some sense—this division. Webb, “Ecology vs. The Peaceable Kingdom,” 
239-40, 248-49.  
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The Christian doctrine of creation has always been influenced by the historical 
context of theologians.  Early Christian cosmologies reflect both a milieu of blended 
Jewish and Greek thought and challenges raised by groups like the Gnostics and 
Manicheans.
97
  Within this general context, they address questions concerning the 
goodness of creation, the fallenness/distortion of the cosmos, the purpose of the created 
order, and the relationship between God and the world.  Questions concerning these 
facets of cosmology continue to be central in modern Christian thought.  However, 
contemporary theologians are influenced by new contexts, most particularly the findings 
of science and the earth’s present ecological disposition.98  I here aim to delineate and 
explicate the broad dimensions of cosmology pertinent to the purpose of this project.  
These dimensions are the goodness of creation and the order of the cosmos in tension 
with the doctrine of the Fall and the hope for eschatological redemption.
99
   
                                               
97 For a brief historical consideration from patristic to medieval thought, see Clifford, “Creation,” 
214-23. 
98 For a summary of the various dimensions of this disposition, see The Worldwatch Institute, 
Vital Signs 2012: The Trends That Are Shaping Our Future (Washington DC: Worldwatch Institute, 2012). 
On the contextual influence of this disposition on theology, see Northcott, The Environment and Christian 
Ethics, 1-32; Drummond, Eco-Theology, 1-31. The rise of eco-theological thought from the 1960s to the 
present has led, in the words of Mary Evelyn Tucker and John Grim, to an awareness of the need for “an 
ecological reformation, or eco-justice reorientation, of Christian theology and ethics.” “Introduction,” 
Christianity and Ecology: Seeking the Well-Being of Earth and Humans, Dieter T. Hessel and Rosemary 
Radford Ruether, editors (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), xxxvii. On the significance of 
the context of the ecological crisis, see xxxiii-xxxix.  
99 Another dimension of cosmology that will arise, especially with reference to Moltmann, is 
nature of the ontological relationship between God and the cosmos. Typically, this relationship is 
established along a spectrum between divine transcendence and divine immanence. In their work 
delineating recent trends in theology, Stanley Grenz and Roger Olson use this spectrum to categorize 
various theological approaches. Stanley J. Grenz and Roger E. Olson, 20th Century Theology: God and the 
World in a Transitional Age (Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 1992). Theologically speaking, the 
most extreme form of transcendence is Deism. Ibid., 23. However, in more conventional theological 
circles, an emphasis on transcendence can be found in the works of giants like Karl Barth, whose emphasis 
on God as wholly other denies even the possibility of natural revelation. Ibid., 65-77. On the other side of 
the spectrum is pantheism, the convolution of God and the world. Grenz and Olson note that process 
theology moves in the direction of pantheism, yet retains a level of divine transcendence inasmuch as “the 
divine being is logically, not chronologically, prior to the world” (137). Even so, within process thought, 
“one cannot conceive of God apart from the world” (142). This nuance places process theology in a 
category between a Barthian emphasis on transcendence and the extreme immanence of pantheism. This 
category is the broad space of panentheism. Here one frequently finds the work of Eastern thinkers—and 
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The Goodness of Creation 
A strong affirmation of the goodness of the cosmos has rarely, if ever, been absent 
in Christian history.  The biblical claim of the creation’s goodness is firmly imbedded in 
the first creation narrative.
100
  In the second century, Irenaeus of Lyons defended 
creation’s goodness against the criticisms of Gnosticism, which viewed matter as a 
degradation of spirit.
101
  In the fifth century, Augustine maintained the goodness of the 
entire created order against his once fellow Manicheans, who believed that the physical 
creation represented a fundamental barrier to the spiritual (i.e., incorporeal) telos of 
humanity.
102
  In the thirteenth century, Thomas Aquinas preserved the notion of cosmic 
goodness, arguing that the creation’s hierarchical order evinces God’s fundamental 
concern for human beings.
103
  These three examples are among many in the Christian 
narrative.
104
  Each of them maintains that the creation is good inasmuch as it is the 
creation of a good Creator.
105
  The physical world is not the mistake of some lesser God, 
as the Gnostics and Manicheans held.
106
  It is rather the mode of existence in which 
                                                                                                                                            
those influenced by them. Hence, concerning the Orthodox view, Kallistos Ware states, “As Christians we 
affirm not pantheism but ‘panentheism.’ God is in all things yet also beyond and above all things.” 
Kallistos Ware, The Orthodox Way, Revised Edition (Crestwood: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1995), 46. 
Ware cites Gregory Palamas in favor of this claim. Andrew Linzey tends to maintain an emphasis on 
transcendence, disavowing any claim that the created order is sacred. Linzey, Creatures of the Same God, 
51-53. Moltmann, on the other hand, maintains a balance by reinterpreting the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo 
in a panentheistic manner. Jürgen Moltmann, God in Creation: A New Theology of Creation and the Spirit 
of God, translated by Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), 86-89. 
100 E.g., Genesis 1: 4, 10, 12, 18, 21, 25, and 31. 
101 See Irenaeus of Lyons, Irenaeus: Against Heresies, Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson, 
editors. Vol. 1, Ante-Nicene Fathers (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1996), Book 1. For a concise 
exploration, see Matthew Craig Steenberg, Irenaeus on Creation: The Cosmic Christ and the Saga of 
Redepmtion (Boston, MA: Brill, 2008), 1-15, 21-38. 
102 On Augustine’s position, see Schaefer, Theological Foundations, 18-27. 
103 Ibid.. On this point, see also chapter two of the present work. 
104 For a more detailed consideration of the names mentioned, among others, see Schaefer, 
Theological Foundations, 17-42. 
105 See, for instance, Augustine, The Enchiridion: On Faith, Hope and Love, translated by J. F. 
Shaw, Henry Paolucci, editor (Chicago, IL: Regnery Gateway, 1961), 10:10-11. 
106 See Steenberg, Irenaeus on Creation, 22-38. 
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humanity comes to communion with God.
107
  In modern contexts of ecological concern, 
an affirmation of the goodness of creation is strongly emphasized in ecclesial statements 
of Roman Catholic, Orthodox, and Protestant theology.
108
   
The dominant theological claim in Christian history concerning creation’s 
goodness signifies that Christianity is not necessarily an unfriendly voice with regard to 
environmental issues.  While certain strands of Christian thought may indeed be partly to 
blame for the development of an anthropocentric and utilitarian view of nature, it is not 
without viable retrievable strands that suggest a contrary worldview.  At the same time, 
the claim that creation is good highlights one of the main tensions in eco- and animal 
theology thought regarding nature.  Namely, are all aspects of creation—e.g., 
evolutionary mechanisms that require gratuitous suffering and predation—good?  Or is 
there something not good about the cosmos?
109
 
The Fallenness/Incompleteness of Creation 
Nearly as common as the claim concerning creation’s goodness in Christian 
history is the notion that the created order is in some manner fallen, distorted, and/or 
                                               
107 In his sermons on the gospel of John, Augustine even defended the existence of apparently 
“useless” creatures like frogs and flies by preaching that it is “because of pride, in fact, God made this 
smallest, most useless of creatures to torment us.” Homilies on the Gospel of John 1-40, translated by 
Edmund Hill, ed. Allan D. Fitzgerald (New York: New City Press, 2009, 1.15 (pp. 50-51).  
108 See, for instance, Pope John Paul II and Patriarch Bartholomew I, Common Declaration on 
Environmental Ethics. 2002. Available online at 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/speeches/2002/ june/ index.htm. Internet; accessed 
September, 2009; Pope John Paul II, Peace with God the Creator, Peace with all of Creation, Message on 
World Day of Peace, 1990. Available online at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_ 
paul_ii/messages/peace/index.htm. Internet; accessed September 2009; “An Evangelical Declaration on the 
Care of Creation,” printed in The Care of Creation: Focusing Our Concern and Action, R. J. Berry, editor 
(Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 2000), 18-22. 
109 Consider Wolfhart Pannenberg’s eschatological remark concerning creation’s goodness: “The 
verdict of ‘very good’ does not apply simply to the world of creation in its state at any given time. It is true, 
rather, of the whole course of history in which God is present with his creatures in incursions of love that 
will finally lead it through the hazards and sufferings of finitude to participation in his glory.” Wolfhart 
Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, volume 3, translated by Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids: William 
B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1991), 645.  
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incomplete.
110
  Irenaeus maintains the historicity of Eden and the cosmic effects of Adam 
and Eve’s sin.111  Theophilus of Antioch argues that predation among nonhuman animals 
evinces that they followed humanity into sin.
112
  Ephrem the Syrian writes that the 
relationship between humans and the nonhuman world—and within the nonhuman world 
itself—was greatly harmed by sin.113  Regarding Adam’s naming of the animals before 
the Fall, he writes that the animals “were neither afraid of him [Adam] nor were they 
afraid of each other.  A species of predatory animals would pass by with a species of 
animal that is preyed upon following safely right behind.”114 These thinkers, among 
others, maintain that the nonhuman creation, while remaining in some sense good, is at 
once in some sense fallen.   
Yet the creation’s fallenness is by no means unambiguously affirmed in Christian 
history.  One of the most dominant voices of Western Christianity, Thomas Aquinas, for 
instance, maintains that the nonhuman creation is not fallen.
115
  Predation among animals 
is part of the divine order of the nonhuman cosmos—though, he does maintain that 
animal aggression toward humans is a result of human sin.
116
  Thus, while the goodness 
                                               
110 The ambiguity in Christian history regarding the state of the cosmos after human sin is further 
evident in the question of redemption. I will explore this issue below under the heading of Eschatology. 
111 See Irenaeus, Against Heresies, 5.33.4. 
112 Theophilus states that “when man transgressed, they [i.e., nonhuman animals] also transgressed 
with him.” Theophilus of Antioch, Letter to Autolycus, in Ante-Nicene Christian Library: Translations of 
the Writings of the Fathers, Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson, editors, volume III (Edinburgh: T & 
T Clark, 1880), II.16-17 (83-84). 
113 Compare, for instance, Ephrem, Commentary on Genesis, in St. Ephrem the Syrian: Selected 
Prose Works, Kathleen McVey, editor, translated by Edward G. Mathews and Joseph P Amar (Washingon 
DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1994), 2.9.3 (103) and 6.9.3 (139).  
114 Ibid., 2.9.3 (103). 
115 See Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, translated by Fathers of the English Dominican 
Province (Benziger Brothers, 1947), 1.96.1. 
116 Ibid., 1.72.6. 
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of the cosmos was rarely challenged in Christian thought, the notion of cosmic fallenness 
is less consistent.
117
   
This ambiguity is further complicated in contemporary thought by the natural 
sciences’ dismantling of the validity of an historical Eden.118  That is, it is scientifically 
problematic to hold onto the biblical/theological notion that there was an historical period 
in which predation, death, and violence did not exist.
119
  Scientifically speaking, human 
sin cannot be the cause of a cosmic Fall that introduces predation and death into 
existence.
120
  Furthermore, theologians have noted that without facets of evolutionary 
emergence such as the violent destruction of stars, the competition and predation among 
species, and ultimately the death of all that are alive, there could not be the complexity 
and diversity of life that exists.
121
  In fact, as John Polkinghorne notes, it was only 
because of the destruction of the dinosaurs that “little furry mammals, who are our 
ancestors, were given their evolutionary opportunity.”122  Based on such claims, Neil 
Ormerod claims that evolutionary suffering is not synonymous with evil but rather “has 
an intrinsic relationship to finitude.”123     
The question of cosmic fallenness stands alongside the issue of what exactly 
creation was at the beginning.  Origen’s vision of creation and the Fall takes the form of a 
                                               
117 Holmes Rolston notes this point. Holmes Rolston III, “Does Nature Need to be Redeemed?” 
Zygon 29 (1994), 208.  
118 For their part, biblical scholars have questioned whether or not the notion of a “Fall” is actually 
present in the early narrative of Genesis. See, for instance, Patricia Williams, Doing Without Adam and 
Eve: Sociobiology and Original Sin (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2001). 
119 See Christopher Southgate in The Groaning of Creation: God, Evolution, and the Problem of 
Evil (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2008), 5, 28-29; Arthur Peacocke, Theology for a 
Scientific Age: Being and Becoming—Natural, Divine and Human (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 
1993), 222-23. 
120 After all, human sin cannot have caused the extinction of the dinosaurs. Ibid., 28. 
121 See Southgate, the Groaning of Creation, 29;  
122 John Polkinghorne, The God of Hope and the End of the World (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 2002), 6. 
123 Neil Ormerod, Creation, Grace, and Redemption (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2007), 14. 
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Platonic distortion of static perfection.
124
  Irenaeus’s vision is starkly different, 
suggesting rather that the creation was made in a state of dynamism that required growth.  
Adam and Eve were created as children whom God intended would grow into 
adulthood.
125
  Thus, for Irenaeus, the Fall is more a straying from the path to the proper 
telos of the cosmos than a loss of perfection.   
Irenaeus’s cosmology has been taken up, whether purposefully or not, by modern 
thinkers who want to emphasize the dynamism and relational nature of the cosmos, a 
vision more generally consummate with science than that of Origen.
126
  David Fergusson 
maintains that both scripture and science witness to the dynamism of the cosmos.  In both 
accounts, “the good creation is not one which is already perfect.  It is fit for its purpose 
and displays the constant love of God for creatures…Yet its destiny awaits it in the 
future.”127  Theologically, Vladimir Lossky states that “the primitive beatitude was not a 
state of deification, but a condition of order, a perfection of the creature which was 
ordained and tending towards its end.”128   
Yet many of these appropriations of Irenaeus’s cosmology separate his 
understanding of the Fall from his vision of the eschatological dynamism of creation.  
Thus his protology and eschatology are carved away, leaving only his development view 
of creation.  The main reason is that Irenaeus’s protology does not square with biological 
                                               
124 On this point, see Colin E. Gunton, “Between Allegory and Myth: The Legacy of the 
Spiritualising of Genesis,” in The Doctrine of Creation: Essays in Dogmatics, History and Philosophy, 
Colin E. Gunton, editor (New York, NY: T&T Clark International, 2004), 53-58. 
125 See Irenaeus of Lyons, Irenaeus’ Demonstration of the Apostolic Preaching: A Theological 
Commentary and Translation, Iain M. Mackenzie with the translation of the text of the Demonstration by J. 
Armitage Robinson (Burlington: Ashgate, 2002), 12, 14. 
126 See John Polkinghorne, “The Demise of Democritus,” in The Trinity and an Entangled World: 
Relationality in Physical Science and Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing 
Company, 2010), 15-31; Peacocke, Theology for a Scientific Age, 41-70. 
127 David Fergusson, “Creation,” in The Oxford Handbook of Systematic Theology, John Webster, 
Kathryn Tanner, and Iain Torrance, editors (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2007), 76. 
128 Vladimir Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church (Crestwood, NY: St. 
Vladimir’s Press, 1976), 99. 
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evolution.  Yet evolution presents its own problems, both biblically and theologically.  In 
the words of Northcott,  
The vision of nature’s original goodness and harmony in the first chapters of 
Genesis contrasts with other Ancient Near Eastern myths of origin, and it 
contrasts significantly with modern scientific accounts of human society and the 
non-human world.
129
 
 
What is at stake in this protological tension is the very character of God.  To 
express this point, consider the first creation narrative (Genesis 1:1 – 2:3).  Conventional 
wisdom in biblical scholarship suggests that the narrative draws on a milieu of myths 
from the Ancient Near East.
130
  One such myth is the Enuma Elish.
131
  This cosmogony is 
of import because it belongs to the Babylonians by whom Israel was taken into exile in 
the 6
th
 century BCE.  The earliest form of the Enuma Elish comes as seven stone tablets 
that were once part of the library of Asshurbanipal, an Assyrian king.
132
  The narrative 
has the gods at war with each other prior to the creation of humanity.  In a final battle, 
Marduk, the Babylonian God, defeats his rival, Tiamat.  He splits her body and uses it to 
create the world.  With the cosmos in place, Marduk creates human beings as slaves so 
that they might facilitate divine ease.133   
The significance of this point for Genesis 1 is the juxtaposition of Elohim with 
Marduk.  Ellen van Wolde points out that the Genesis account does not present human 
beings as slaves of the gods, but rather as a royal representation of God on earth.
134
  
Similarly, J. Richard Middleton skillfully argues that Genesis 1 does not fit the category 
                                               
129 Northcott, The Environment and Christian Ethics, 174. 
130 See John J. Collins, Introduction to the Hebrew Bible (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2004), 
25-45. 
131 A translation of the Enuma Elish is available in Ellen van Wolde, Stories of the Beginning: 
Genesis 1-11 and Other Creation Stories (Ridgefield: Morehouse Publishing, 1995), 189-194.  
132 Wolde, Stories of the Beginning, 188. 
133 See ibid., 193.  
134 Ibid., 28.  
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of chaoskampf (denoting creation through a struggle with chaos) as does the Enuma 
Elish.  Indeed, whereas Marduk must pursue and defeat the dragon Tiamat, Elohim sets 
the sea dragons (Hebrew tannînîm) free.
135
  Whereas Marduk creates by overcoming 
others with power, Elohim creates by empowering others to be.
136
  Marduk creates slaves; 
Elohim shares his image and likeness.  Marduk engages in war; Elohim creates harmony 
devoid of even natural predation.   
The process and realization of Marduk’s creation reflects Marduk’s character.  
The same is true for Elohim.  This juxtaposition is theological in the most proper sense, 
for it addresses the very nature of the divine.  Consider this juxtaposition alongside an 
evolutionary—and more specifically, Darwinian—worldview evident in Table I – 1:  
TABLE I – 1 
 Divine Identity Creative Action Cosmic Identity 
Narrative/Myth “A” 
(Genesis 1:1 – 2:3) 
Elohim 
Creates through peaceful 
divine fiat 
A world of empowered 
creatures absent of 
predation 
Narrative/Myth “B” 
(Enuma Elish) 
Marduk 
Creates out of a divine war 
for existence 
An enslaved and 
competitive world for divine 
benefit 
Narrative/Theory 
“C” (Darwinian 
Worldview) 
??? ??? 
A world that, while 
displaying high levels of 
cooperation among species, 
nonetheless requires 
suffering, predation, and 
death in order to function137 
 
                                               
135 Middleton says they are “part of God’s peaceable kingdom.” The Liberating Image, 264. 
Ruether offers a similar assessment regarding the relationship between God and matter (at least in the eyes 
of the priestly writers). Less similarly, she interprets the Genesis 1 as emphasizing divine sovereignty over 
the world. See Ruether, Gaia and God: An Ecofeminist Theology of Earth Healing (New York, NY: 
HarperCollins, 1992), 19-22. An even greater disparity exists in the work of Catherine Keller, who argues 
for the centrality of the creation from chaos motif in Genesis 1. See Catherine Keller, The Face of the 
Deep: A Theology of Becoming (New York, NY: Routledge, 2003).  
136 See J. Richard Middleton, “Created in the Image of Violent God? The Ethical Problem of the 
Conquest of Chaos in Biblical Creation Narratives,” in Interpretation 58/4 (October 2004): 341-55; also 
Middleton, The Liberating Image, chapter 6. See also Clifford, “Creation,” 204-205. 
137 I intend here Sideris’s claim that, “despite disagreements about the details of evolution, few 
scientists would deny that suffering and struggle play an important role in evolution.” Sideris, 
Environmental Ethics, 19. Or again, Rolston’s claim that biologists “find nature stark and full of suffering, 
sometimes dreadful.” Rolston, “Does Nature Need Redeemed?” 207. 
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The theologians of Israel differentiate Elohim (“God A”) from Marduk (“God B”) by 
juxtaposing both the process of creation and nature of the world they created (“World A” 
versus “World B”). “God A” (Elohim), through peaceful means (“Act A”), creates a 
world that reflects “God A”: a peaceful world (“World A”).138  “God B” (Marduk), 
through chaotic struggle, murder, and death (“Act B”), creates a world that reflects “God 
B”: a world of struggle and slavery (“World B”). 
But if there has never been a “World A,” but only a “World C,” which reflects 
more elements of “World B” than “World A,” how can one affirm the theological vision 
of Genesis 1?
139
  Yet arguing that there was in fact an historical “World A” predating 
what we now experience (“World C”) does not match the findings of science.140  In my 
                                               
138 On this peaceful world, see Claus Westermann, Genesis 1-11: A Commentary (Minneapolis, 
MN: Augsburg), 164. 
139 Concerning what I describe as World C, Denis Edwards writes: “Loss and death on an 
unthinkable scale are built into the way things are in an evolutionary world.” Denis Edwards, “Every 
Sparrow that Falls to the Ground: The Cost of Evolution and the Christ-Event,” Ecotheology 11/1 (2006), 
104. 
140 Rolston writes that the Genesis creation myths are “rather congenial with the evolutionary 
genesis. The real problem is with the Fall, when a once-paradisiacal nature becomes recalcitrant as a 
punishment for human sin.” Rolston, “Does Nature Need Redeemed?” 205. Northcott explores the 
difference between the creation accounts of primeval history in Genesis and the Enuma Elish—which is 
representative of a milieu of Ancient Near Eastern accounts that present the creation of the cosmos in the 
form of a war. He notes that, in the Enuma Elish, “the order of the world is not established by the peaceable 
word of God but by the chaotic disorder of war between the gods. Reality is fundamentally chaotic, and 
order only attainable through violence.” Michael Northcott, The Environment and Christian Ethics (New 
York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 174. He compares this etiological vision to “modern 
scientific myths of origin,” which “have been utilised to characterise the origins and nature of life, both 
non-human and human, as essentially violent, aggressive and competitive, ‘red in tooth and claw.’” Ibid., 
175. Northcott’s ultimate position is that humans can (and ought to) live in harmony with the cycles of 
nonhuman nature, which are more cooperative than competitive. See ibid., 196-198. See also chapters 
seven and eight in which Northcott attempts to recover the import of natural law for ecological ethics. I find 
Northcott’s proposal unsatisfying for two reasons. First, in line with the critique offered by Lisa Sideris, his 
understanding of nature overemphasizes the cooperative dimensions against the competitive ones. See Lisa 
H. Sideris, Environmental Ethics, Ecological Theology, and Natural Selection (New York, NY: Columbia 
University Press, 2003), 84-89. Second, Northcott’s ethics tends toward conservationism despite his claim 
that the significance of the resurrection anticipates “the ultimate transformation of created order into the 
Hebrew prophet’s vision of the peaceable kingdom of justice where enmity and violence will be no more.” 
Northcott, The Environment and Christian Ethics, 202. Not only does the resurrection anticipate this peace, 
it reveals creation’s true form—its proper telos to which it is even now, in the historical realm, directed and 
drawn by God’s redemptive activity. Ibid.. It seems to me that his conservationist ethics stands in a stark 
tension with his transfigurative theology. See ibid., 196-98. 
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opinion, this tension represents the crux of the issue of protology and the Fall.  That is, 
one is all but forced by scientific evidence to reject the historicity of “World A.”  At the 
same time it is unclear how such a rejection does not at the same time necessitate the 
theological rejection of “God A.”141  For, as David Hull writes, “The God of Galapagos is 
careless, wasteful, indifferent, and almost diabolical.”142 Or, in the worlds of James 
Rachels: “Countless animals have suffered terribly in the millions of years that preceded 
the emergence of man, and the traditional theistic rejoinders do not even come close to 
justifying that evil.”143 Said differently, “World C” is more commensurable with Marduk 
than Elohim.  Furthermore, how does God create this world that requires suffering, 
predation, and death?  By divine fiat?  Through some struggle with primordial chaos?  By 
necessity?  At any rate, this divinity is no Elohim, as least according to Genesis 1.   
How can this theological tension be relieved?  There are three prominent options: 
(1) Reinterpret the doctrine of the Fall in a manner that takes scientific evidence seriously 
and thereby maintains in some sense the identity of both “World A” and “God A”; (2) 
Interpret the doctrine of God in such a way as to lessen divine culpability; and (3) 
Interpret the Hebrew worldview of Genesis 1 so that “World C” and “God A” are not 
incompatible.
144
   
The first option is taken in the approaches of Moltmann and Linzey.  Thus, I will 
explore it in detail in chapters two, three, and four.  The second option is significant and 
                                               
141 The force of this point is captured well by Southgate, The Groaning of Creation, 1-10. 
142 David L. Hull, “God of the Galapagos,” Nature 352 (August 1992), 486. 
143 James Rachel, Created from Animals: The Moral Implications of Darwinism (New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press, 1990), 105. 
144 For instance, Northcott suggests that the “heuristic function of the Genesis myth” is to reveal 
that neither human nor nonhuman nature is essentially violent. Northcott, The Environment and Christian 
Ethics, 179. See also Wennberg’s discussion of deep ecology in Wennberg, God, Humans, and Animals, 
43-49.  
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utilized to varying degrees by a host of theologians.
145
  Here, however, it is the third route 
I wish to explore.   
Creation spiritualists, for instance Matthew Fox and Thomas Berry, maintain that 
the mechanisms that facilitate the emerging of the universe are not only not fallen, but 
good.  Fox’s “Eucharistic Law of the Universe” suggests that the great law of existence 
consists of evolutionary transformation through sacrifice—more specifically, by “eating 
and being eaten.”  Thus he contends, “We too will be food one day for other generations 
of living things.  So we might as well begin today by letting go of hoarding and entering 
the chain of beings as food for one another.”146  Berry, whom I will engage in much 
greater detail in chapter 1, maintains that the violent episodes of evolutionary emergence 
are “cosmological moments of grace.”147    
Certain ecofeminists, for instance Ruether, maintain that death ought to be 
embraced as part of the beautiful cycle of life rather than an enemy resulting from some 
cosmic Fall from grace.  One living thing dies while another receives life.  Thus, when an 
individual dies, his or her “existence ceases as individuated ego/organism and dissolves 
back into the cosmic matrix of matter/energy, from which new centers of the 
                                               
145 Such is the approach of process theologians and relational theologians. See, for instance, John 
B. Cobb and David Ray Griffin, Process Theology: An Introductory Exposition (Philadelphia: The 
Westminster Press, 1976); David Ray Griffin, God, Power, and Evil (Louisville: Westminster John Knox 
Press, 2004); John Sanders, The God Who Risks: A Theology of Providence (Downers Grove: Intervarsity 
Press, 1998). 
146 Matthew Fox, Creation Spirituality: Liberating Gifts for the Peoples of the Earth (San 
Francisco, CA: HarperCollins, 1991), 51. This position is similar to that of Wendell Berry, who writes that 
“to live, we must daily break the body and shed the blood of creation.” Wendell Berry, The Gift of Good 
Land: Further Essays Cultural and Agricultural (San Francisco, CA: North Point Press, 1981), 281. 
147 Thomas Berry, “Wisdom of the Cross,” in The Christian Future and the Fate of the Earth, 
Mary Evelyn Tucker and John Grim, editors (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2009), 89. 
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individuation arise.”148  Death is an “essential component” of cosmic existence and is 
therefore “a friend of the life process.”149  
Lisa Sideris critiques certain theologians, most especially Ruether, Sallie 
McFague, and Northcott, for overemphasizing the cooperative aspects of nature while 
downplaying the competitive aspects.
150
  Sideris maintains, critically, that  
there is a tendency, especially among some Christian environmentalists, to invoke 
a model of nature as a harmonious, interconnected, and interdependent 
community.  This ‘ecological community,’ as it is often called, resonates more 
with pre-Darwinian, non-Darwinian, and Romantic views of nature than it does 
with evolutionary accounts.
151
 
 
Taking his lead from Sideris’s critique of ecological thought, Jenkins writes,  
It is not just the religious right voicing skepticism of the natural sciences.  
Whenever a theological ethicist privileges interdependence, balance, and 
cooperation in nature over evolution, predation, or death, she appears to let 
theological criteria determine her view of the natural world, in the face of credible 
scientific reports.
152
  
 
In doing so, “a number of environmental theologians rewrite descriptions of the natural 
world even as they call Christians to respect creation on its own principles.”153  Thus, a 
number of eco-theologians have sought to remedy the disparity between “God A” and 
“World C” by re-envisioning the latter in a manner that it is less offensive to the former.  
Yet, as Sideris notes regarding the tension between the affirmation of God’s goodness 
and the reality of evolution, “Something must be given up: either the traditional 
                                               
148 Rosemary Radford Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk: Toward A Feminist Theology (Boston, MA: 
Beacon Press, 1983), 257. 
149 Ruether, Gaia and God, 53. On this claim, see also Edwards, “Every Sparrow that Falls,” 106-
107; Southgate, The Groaning of Creation, 8. 
150 See Sideris, Environmental Ethics, 45-90.  
151 Ibid., 2. Sideris goes on to claim that “many eco-theologians do not take seriously that the so-
called balances within nature “are maintained at great cost to individual animal lives.” Said differently, “the 
ecological community…does not aim toward the good of each individual within that community, as 
(ideally) human communities do.” Ibid., 81.  
152 Jenkins, Ecologies of Grace, 70-71. 
153 Ibid.. 
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understanding of God must be altered or the processes of evolution must be reinterpreted 
along less Darwinian lines.”154  Thus, an “ecological” emphasis at the expense of the 
reality of suffering, predation, and death, does not hold the scientific high ground—even 
though its advocates often make such a claim.
155
    
Approaches like that of Christopher Southgate are better balanced.  He explicitly 
rejects appealing to the doctrine of the Fall.  Yet at the same time he is more honest and 
troubled than other eco-theologians concerning the elements of predation and suffering in 
the created order.
156
  He opts for the position that  
the sort of universe we have, in which complexity emerges in a process governed 
by thermodynamic necessity and Darwinian natural selection, and therefore death, 
pain, predation, and self-assertion, is the only sort of universe that could give rise 
to the range, beauty, complexity, and diversity of creatures the Earth has 
produced.
157
   
 
Regardless of the solution, the import of the cosmological tension surrounding the 
notion of the Fall for eco-theology can hardly be overstated.  At its heart is the question 
of what we understand as tragic.  In the words of Wennberg:  
What we view as sad or regrettable or deplorable or tragic, or, for that matter, 
wonderful or admirable or praiseworthy, goes some considerable way to defining 
our moral character, determining who we are as more and spiritual beings.
158
 
 
Phrased differently, the question is whether or not the world as we experience it, and 
most notably the darker dimensions of evolution, is the way God desires it to be.  If so, 
                                               
154 Sideris, Environmental Ethics, 279, n. 19.  
155 However, Sideris affirms the struggle in creation as good. She concurs with J. Baird Callicott’s 
positive estimation of the “the biotic pyramid” because while “individual organisms live and die 
continually…the species line continues. There is a certain stability to this structure but not harmony.” 
Sideris, Environmental Ethics, 175. Furthermore, in holistic systems (e.g., ecosystems), “the hierarchal 
structure of the system is sustained by the deaths of its individual members.” Ibid., 176. 
156 Southgate, The Groaning of Creation, 28-35. 
157 Ibid., 29. While Southgate is influenced by process thought, his position, like my own, is 
disparate from this framework primarily on account of his dismissal of the “Whiteheadian metaphysic,” 
which emphasizes “the primacy of creativity and openness of process over even the will of God.” See ibid., 
22-25. Said differently, the cosmos is not co-eternal with God. Nor is God under a compulsion to create. 
158 Wennberg, God, Humans, and Animals, 48. 
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how does one make sense of God’s eternal goodness?159  Of Christ’s victory over death?  
If not, how are these mechanisms of evolution set into motion, if not by God?
160
  
Furthermore, if certain facets of creation, such as predation, are not good, then Christians 
cannot justify their participation in those facets by an appeal to cosmic goodness. 
ANTHROPOLOGY 
Multiple issues surrounding theological anthropology arise with regard to eco-
theology.  Are humans essentially unique creatures in the cosmos?  If so, does that 
uniqueness constitute the exclusion of other creatures from direct moral concern, as 
anthropocentric worldviews tend to maintain?  Does the nonhuman cosmos, by divine 
design, exist solely for the sake of human well-being?  How do these questions align with 
the theological claim that humans were created in the imago Dei (“image of God”) and 
that the first verb used to describe their relationship with nonhuman life is radah (“rule” 
or “have dominion over”)?  How does the new creation story, and most specifically its 
evolutionary dimensions, reshape theological anthropology—especially with regard to 
the above questions?    
It is proper to begin approaching these questions with an investigation of the 
doctrine of the imago Dei.  This phrase actually receives very little explicit attention in 
the Hebrew Scriptures.
161
  Nonetheless, it has received a great deal of interest in Christian 
                                               
159 For considerations on theodicy and the plight of nonhumans, see Wennberg, God, Humans, and 
Animals, 46-51; Southgate, The Groaning of Creation, 1-15; Drummond, Eco-Theology, 114-28. 
160 Haught is adamant that “a theology of evolution maintains that whatever the immediate causes 
and mechanisms operative in Darwinian process may be, the ultimate explanation of evolution and of the 
cosmic process that sponsors it is God.” Haught, God after Darwin, 173. 
161 The only explicit appearances of “image” in the context of “image of God” are Genesis 1:26, 
28; 9:6 (in deuterocanonical works, both Wisdom of Solomon 2:23 and Ecclesiasticus 17:3 make mention 
of selem in this context).  
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history.  This interest has resulted in multiple interpretations.
162
  Authors such as J. 
Richard Middleton identify three major categories for these interpretations: substantive, 
relational, and functional.
163
  
The substantive interpretation is the dominant view, historically.  Stanley Grenz 
provides a good overview of its rise and perpetuation.  He begins by noting its Hellenistic 
influence:  
Although most Christians today would be likely to assume that this view arises 
directly out of the Bible, the idea was actually introduced into Christian thought 
by those church fathers who were influenced by and grappled with the Greek 
philosophical tradition.
164
  
 
Grenz notes the propensity toward the substantive view in Irenaeus, which provides a 
path for subsequent thinkers.
165
  In the East, these include Clement of Alexandria, 
                                               
162 For some considerations on the history of the interpretation of the imago, see David Cairns, The 
Image of God in Man, revised edition (London, UK: Collins Press, 1973); J. Richard Middleton, The 
Liberating Image: The Imago Dei in Genesis 1 (Grand Rapids: Brazos Press, 2005), 15-29; F. LeRon 
Shults, Reforming Theological Anthropology: After the Philosophical Turn to Relationality (Grand Rapids: 
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2003), 220-42; W. Sibley Towner, “Clones of God: Genesis 
1:26-28 and the Image of God in the Hebrew Bible,” Interpretation 59 (October 2005), 343-49. 
163 See Middleton, The Liberating Image. These categories are also evident in the work of Douglas 
John Hall in Imaging God: Dominion as Stewardship (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing 
Company, 1986). For theological considerations from Protestants, note the introductory text, Don Thorsen, 
An Exploration of Christian Theology (Peabody: Hendrickson Publishers, 2008), 130-33; also Millard J. 
Erickson, Christian Theology, second edition (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1998), 520-29. It is worth 
noting that Grenz identifies only the substantive and relational as major categories of interpretation. See 
Stanley J. Grenz, The Social God and the Relational Self: A Trinitarian Theology of the Imago Dei 
(Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2001), 142; however, elsewhere he includes the functional 
reading as a major interpretation. See Stanley Grenz, “Jesus as the Imago Dei: Image-of-God Christology 
and the Non-Linear Linearity of Theology,” JETS 47 4 (Dec 2004): 617-28. While those of the Orthodox 
tradition do not seem to make explicit use of these categories, they are implicit in Orthodox discussions of 
imago Dei. However, most Orthodox theologians are careful to view the categories not as necessarily 
separate interpretations but as complimentary dimensions of a single interpretation. See Nonna Verna 
Harrison, “The Human Person as the Image and Likeness of God” in The Cambridge Companion to 
Orthodox Christian Theology, edited by Mary B. Cunningham and Elizabeth Theokritoff (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008), 178-86; see also Constantine N. Tsirpanlis, Introduction to Eastern 
Patristic Thought and Orthodox Theology (Collegeville: The Liturgical Press, 1991), 44-47; John 
Meyendorff, Byzantine Theology: Historical Trends (New York: Fordham University Press, 1974), 138-49. 
The documents of Vatican II also blend these categories as dimensions. See Gaudium et Spes 12, 19, and 
34 (available at http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_ councils/ ii_vatican_council/index.htm; Internet, 
accessed April, 2009).  
164 Grenz, The Social God, 143. 
165 Ibid., 144-48. 
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Gregory of Nyssa, and finally John of Damascus.  In the West, Augustine sets a firm 
groundwork for a substantive view of the imago.  He argues that the imago includes 
rationality and sets humans over the nonhuman creation.
166
  Grenz traces Augustine’s 
influence through Aquinas, who ascribes at least an aspect of the imago to all humans on 
account of the mind.
167
  After a lull in this interpretation with early Reformers like Luther 
and Calvin, subsequent Protestants returned to it.
168
          
Advocates of the substantive interpretation of the imago view it as primarily a 
declaration about human essence.  More specifically, human nature bears a substantial 
commonality with the divine.
169
  Frequently, those who emphasize this approach express 
the substantial commonality in terms of the rational human soul and freedom of the 
will.
170
  These characteristics not only constitute an ontological similarity between 
humanity and God, but also—at least in the view of many advocates of the substantive 
view—a discontinuity between humanity and the rest of creation.  As Augustine states, 
“God, then, made man in His own image.  For He created for him a soul endowed with 
reason and intelligence so that he might excel all the creatures of the earth, air, and sea, 
which were not so gifted.”171   
Hence, concerning the substantive interpretation, Middleton states, “Most 
patristic, medieval, and modern interpreters typically asked not an exegetical, but a 
                                               
166 Ibid., 149-52. 
167 Ibid., 158. 
168 Ibid., 170-73. 
169 Hall, Imaging God, 89. 
170 For historical considerations, see Grenz, Social God, 142-61; Shults, Theological 
Anthropology, 221-26; Alister E. McGrath, Christian Theology: An Introduction (Cambridge: Blackwell, 
1994), 369-70. The Catechism states, “Created in the image of the one God and equally endowed with 
rational souls, all men have the same nature and the same origin.” The Catechism of the Catholic Church: 
With Modifications from the Editio Typica (New York: Doubleday, 1995), 1934. Also, Gaudium et Spes, 
17. While the image is not exhausted by substantive concerns for the Catholic Church, it remains partly 
defined by them. 
171 Augustine, City of God, 12:24, in Basic Writings of Saint Augustine, volume II, ed. Whitney J. 
Oates (New York: Random House, 1948). 
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speculative, question: In what way are humans like God and unlike animals?”172  
Middleton’s comment is not without warrant.173  Douglas John Hall’s assessment is 
similar.  He states,  
It can readily appear—if one follows the history of the interpretation of this 
symbol closely—that the whole enterprise of defining the imago Dei in our 
Christian conventions centers on the apparent need to show that human beings are 
different from all other creatures.
174
   
 
In this sense, the imago has served as a tool to demarcate boundaries.  Its use is primarily 
for the purpose of exclusion.
175
  This use has led to realized dangers in the substantive 
approach.  Hall notes two in particular.  First, that the boundaries created by the imago 
necessarily denote a difference between greater and lesser creatures in which 
‘different’ almost invariably implies ‘higher,’ ‘nobler,’ ‘loftier,’ ‘better’; for it is 
hardly possible to adopt the kind of inherently comparative language involved in 
this approach without placing strong value judgments on the characteristics that 
are singled out as constituting the locus of the imago in the human creature.
176
   
 
Second—and related to the first danger—ascribing greater worth to humanity on account 
on nonmaterial qualities seems to serve as a polemic against physicality.
177
    
                                               
172 Middleton, The Liberating Image, 18-19 (emphasis original).  
173 This anxiety about maintaining a sharp distinction between humans and animals is evident in 
the Catechism, which draws heavily upon the documents of Vatican II. Humanity, as the image of God, 
“occupies a unique place in creation” (355) because only the human can “know and love” God and is 
created by God “for his own sake” (both quoted in the Catechism 356 from Gaudium et Spes, 12 and 24). 
Moreover, as this uniqueness is “the fundamental reason for [humanity’s] dignity,” animals are necessarily 
excluded from this dignity. The imago places humanity in the category of person, apart from all other 
things, including animals (357). 
174 Hall, Imaging God, 90.  
175 This exclusion has affected women as well. For considerations, see the essays in The Image of 
God: Gender Models in Judaeo-Christian Tradition, ed. Kari Elisabeth Borresen (Minneapolis: Fortress 
Press, 1995). 
176 Hall, Imaging God, 90. For considerations on Augustine, Chrysostom, and Aquinas, see Jame 
Schaefer, “Valuing Earth Intrinsically and Instrumentally: A Theological Framework for Environmental 
Ethics,” Theological Studies 66 (2005): 783-815. Schaefer argues that, though hierarchal, these thinkers 
viewed the creation as intrinsically valuable as it reveals God to humanity and also because each aspect of 
creation fulfills the created order according to God’s purpose. Even so, “the higher type of creature is 
considered more valuable than the lower, primarily because of the higher’s innate capabilities.” In this 
sense, “The lower and less capable exist for the sake of the next higher type of being in the hierarchy…and 
all are needed to internally maintain the universe.” Ibid., 791.  
177 Hall, Imaging God, 90.  
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In the relational interpretation, favored in contemporary theology, the imago 
denotes humanity’s relational capacity.  Humans, as imago Dei, have the ability to relate 
to each other and respond to God.
178
  Hall links this view to Luther and Calvin, both of 
whom view the imago not as a substance intrinsic to humanity but a reality derived from 
a proper relationship with God.
179
  In this sense, the imago depends on the relationship 
between God and humans.  Without that relationship, it is not realized.
180
  Thus the imago 
is not an intrinsic possession of all humans, but rather a calling to response in the face of 
divine openness to the cosmos.   
This relational interpretation is evident in the work of Karl Barth.  As the image 
of God, humanity is fundamentally relational, evident in the “male and female” of 
Genesis 1.  This relationality reflects the relationality in the Trinity, the “I and the Thou 
of God Himself.”181  Emil Brunner makes comparable claims in his systematic 
theology.
182
  Hence, similar to the early Reformers, for Barth and Brunner humans cannot 
                                               
178 In some cases, the horizontal element of the imago includes a relationship to the nonhuman 
creation as well. I provide examples below. 
179 One stark difference between the Reformers and other theologians who preceded them is that 
they did not differentiate between “image” and “likeness.” Many contemporary theologians today, 
following fathers such as Irenaeus, maintain a distinction between the “image,” which denotes a permanent 
fixture to human being, and “likeness,” which is a calling to live up to the existence of the image. For 
instance, the Catechism of the Catholic Church states: “Disfigured by sin and death, man remains ‘in the 
image of God,’ in the image of the Son, but is deprived ‘of the glory of God,’ of his ‘likeness’” (705). 
180 See Hall, Imaging God, 98-108. 
181 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, III/1, G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance, editors (Edinburgh: 
T&T Clark, 1958), 191-96. In sum, he states, “We have argued…that it [the prototype of the imago] is in 
the relationships and differentiation between the I and the Thou in God Himself. Man is created by God in 
correspondence with this relationship and differentiation in God Himself: created as a Thou that can be 
addressed by God but also as an I responsible to God; in the relationship of man and woman in which man 
is a Thou to his fellow and therefore himself and I in responsibility to this claim.” Ibid., 198. 
182 See Emil Brunner, Church Dogmatics II: The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption 
(Cambridge, UK: James Clark and Company, 1952), 55-61. Brunner rejects any distinction between 
“image” and “likeness” and, along the same lines, the identification of “image” with a substantive quality 
such as rationality. He also rejects Barth’s identification with the imago with sexual differentiation. As a 
sort of via media, Brunner differentiates the Old Testament imago (which rests in humanity’s call and 
ability to respond to God as a genuine “I”) and the New Testament imago (which is lost in sinful man and 
is only regained through redemption in which humanity responds appropriately to the original call). Thus, 
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lose the image as it is not a possession natural to humanity.
183
  However, humans can fail 
to inhabit or fully realize it.
184
   
Modern biblical scholars tend to favor the functional interpretation of the imago, 
as exegetical factors of Genesis 1 substantiate it.
185
  In this reading, the imago places 
humans in a relationship to the nonhuman creation.  Specifically, God calls all humans to 
a position of both royal dignity and responsibility as co-regents in the created order.  
Advocates of this position claim that the human responsibility denoted by the imago is 
representational.  Humans represent the presence of God in the created order.  As 
Middleton states,  
The imago Dei designates the royal office or calling of human beings as God’s 
representatives and agents in the world, granted authorized power to share in 
God’s rule or administration of the earth’s resources and creatures.186   
 
Even more concise is Ellen van Wolde’s statement: “The human being is created to make 
God present in his creation.”187            
These three interpretations highlight the dominant voices in the field.
188
  With 
regard to eco-theology, each presents unique opportunities and problems.  The 
                                                                                                                                            
for Brunner, the imago is thoroughly relational (as it can only exist in relation to God) but is never fully lost 
because God remains open to and seeks this relationship.  
183 Because Barth holds that the imago has no essential bearing for the human, he argues that the 
prohibition against murder in Genesis 9:6 does not reflect a belief of intrinsic human dignity. Rather, 
murder of another human is an affront on divine dignity as the murderer disrupts God’s “intention and 
action in the creation of man.” Barth, Dogmatics, III/1, 198.  
184 Barth does not delineate how the Fall affects the imago specifically. See Barth, Dogmatics, 
III/1, 200. See also on this point Shults, Reforming Theological Anthropology, 234.  
185 For instance, one finds a functional interpretation of the imago Dei in Middleton, The 
Liberating Image; Hall, Dominion As Stewardship; Towner, “Clones of God”; Terrance Fretheim, God and 
World in the Old Testament: A Relational Theology of Creation (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2005), 48-53; 
Walter Brueggemann, Genesis, Interpretation, ed. James L. Mays (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1982), 32; see 
also E. H. Merrill, “Image of God” in Dictionary of the Old Testament: Pentateuch, eds. T. Desmond 
Alexander and David W. Baker (Downers Grove: Intervarsity Press, 2003), 441-45.  
186 Middleton, The Liberating Image, 27. 
187 Wolde, Stories of the Beginning, 28.  
188 However, one other interpretation warrants mention—though it can be subsumed into other 
interpretations. It is the christological/eschatological interpretation. Grenz presents just such a view in his 
work, The Social God and the Relational Self. He maintains that the imago Dei is an eschatological calling 
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substantive interpretation, as already noted, tends toward an emphasis on the essential 
and incorporeal uniqueness of human beings, which in turns grounds the exclusion of all 
nonhuman life from anything akin to direct moral concern.
189
  This position is 
furthermore problematic when juxtaposed with evolutionary biology.  For instance, in 
Humani Generis, Pope Pius XII maintains that the human soul cannot be the result of 
evolutionary development.
190
  Such a concession would weaken essential human 
uniqueness, a result that scholars such as Hoggard Creegan accept.
191
   
The relational interpretation renders the ontological difference between humans 
and nonhumans less important.  The anxiety of separating “us” from “them”—at least in 
theory—diminishes.  However, at times this view altogether separates the nonhuman 
creation from the discussion of the imago.  The focus becomes the relationship between 
humans and God and humans and each other to the exclusion or at least diminishment of 
                                                                                                                                            
(representative/functional) concretized in Jesus Christ, the true imago Dei, and enabled in the present by the 
Spirit (relational), by which humanity becomes “new humanity,” or more specifically, the imago Christi. 
This present imperative, deriving from a christological future indicative, establishes an ethical dimension to 
the imago in which humanity is called to true humanity (true self-hood) via community, or, for Grenz, the 
Church. Thus the self is ultimately the ecclesial self in via. Elsewhere, Grenz combines the 
christological/eschatological interpretation with the functional one, suggesting that Jesus is the image of 
God because Jesus fulfills the eschatological vocation of humanity. See Grenz, “Jesus as the Imago Dei,” 
617-628.  
189 See Fergusson, “Creation,” 84. In Theodore Hiebert’s view, Origen and Augustine read the 
priesthood and dominion imagery of Genesis 1 within a Hellenistic framework and thereby grounded a 
legacy of ontological hierarchy in Christian thought: “The view of the human position in the world 
constructed by Origen and Augustine, based on the priestly perspective of Genesis 1 and amplified by a 
philosophical dualism that distinguished spirit from matter, has become Christianity’s prevailing legacy.” 
Theodore Hiebert, “The Human Vocation: Origins and Transformations in Christian Traditions,” in 
Christianity and Ecology: Seeking the Well- Being of Earth and Humans, Dieter T Hessel and Rosemary 
Radford Ruether, editors (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), 142. 
190 Clifford, “Creation,” 233. This point is later reiterated by John Paul II. Ibid., 234. 
191 On this point, see Hoggard Creegan, “Being an Animal and Being Made in the Image of God,” 
Colloqium 39/2 (November 2007), 185-203. While most investigations into the imago have delineated the 
boundary between the divine and the human, frequently highlighting the substantive similarity, Creegan 
considers the “shadow of the imago Dei” that stretches back into the evolutionary development of 
humanity. Said differently, Creegan balances the faith recognition of human spirituality and the scientific 
recognition of evolutionary contingency in the human creature. For Creegan, this approach recognizes the 
traces of the imago in the nonhuman creation and grounds concern for animals in a manner that the sharp 
divisions of the past have failed to do. 
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nonhumans.
192
  While this possible danger exists, it is not instantiated by all proponents 
of the relational view.
193
 
Positively, the functional interpretation directly places human beings in relation to 
the nonhuman creation.  It is quite anthropocentric with regard to the environmental role 
of humanity—though not necessarily with regard to value.194  This interpretation also, 
following Genesis 1, tends to define humanity’s role in terms of “dominion.”  Even so, 
modern advocates of the functional interpretation, including those who understand 
dominion in terms of stewardship and those, like myself, who view humanity’s role as 
rendering present in history the eschatological peaceable kingdom, tend to dismantle the 
notion that the nonhuman creation exists for humanity.
195
  In fact, some such interpreters 
maintain the opposite: humans exist, at least in part, for the sake of cosmic well-being.     
Collectively, these three interpretative strands highlight two fundamental 
anthropological questions.  First, what is the nature of the constitution of the human being 
(substance)?  Second, what meaning does this constitution bear for human activity in the 
cosmos (function/relation) vis-à-vis the human disposition before the divine (relation)?  
These questions highlight the contributions theological anthropology will make to the 
exploratory framework of this project.   
                                               
192 For example, in his consideration of the imago Barth tends to focus exclusively on the 
relationships among humans and between humans and God. Barth, Dogmatics, III/1, 194-96. Hence, 
Middleton is not even certain how to include the nonhuman creation in his diagram of the relational 
interpretation. Middleton, The Liberating Image, 23.     
193 See, for example, Bradley C. Hanson, Introduction to Christian Theology (Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 1997), 84-85. David Kelsey approaches the imago strictly in terms of the human community 
and God. David H. Kelsey, “Human Being” in Christian Theology: An Introduction to Its Traditions and 
Tasks, edited by Peter C. Hodgson and Robert H. King (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1994), 176-78. 
However, he also claims that “human nature has a teleological dimension.” Specifically, “we have a 
calling, a role to play in creation,” which he connects to stewardship. Kelsey, Christian Theology, 175. See 
also Shirley C. Guthrie, Christian Doctrine, revised edition (Louisville, KY: John Knox Press, 1994), 196-
197, 197-210.   
194 See, for instance, Hall, Dominion as Stewardship. 
195 On stewardship, see Hall, Dominion as Stewardship. On eschatological perspectives, see 
Andrew Linzey, Animal Theology (Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1994), 72. 
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ESCHATOLOGY 
Eschatology has perhaps received more attention than any other doctrine in the 
twentieth century.  This vigorous exploration is due largely the work of Johannes Weiss 
and Albert Schweitzer, both of whom highlighted the significance of eschatology for 
Jesus’s life and ministry.196  While the claims of both scholars have been widely 
contested with regard to their christological implications, my interest here consists of 
other issues that have arisen in their wake—namely, the scope of the community for 
which eschatological redemption bears significance, the interplay between eschatology 
and history, and the extent of both the continuality and discontinuity of the present 
creation and the new creation.
197
 
The Scope of the Eschatological Community 
The question of what parts of the cosmos will persist in the eschaton yields a wide 
variety of answers in Christian history, which can be expressed in the form of expanding 
circles of inclusion.
198
  The first circle is the inclusion of the individual human soul/spirit.  
Yet modern theologians tend to decry an exclusively spiritualized eschatology by 
emphasizing the importance of the resurrection of the flesh over and against the Platonic 
immortality of the soul.
199
  The future of humanity is an embodied one, not simply a 
                                               
196 See Hans Schwarz, Eschatology (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 
2000), 107-115. For an overview of the interplay between explorations of apocalyptic christology and 
modern eschatology, see Benedict T. Viviano, “Eschatology and the Quest for the Historical Jesus,” in The 
Orthodox Handbook of Eschatology, Jerry L. Walls, editor (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 
2008), 73-90. 
197 Apart from the significance of the resurrection of the flesh and its cosmic implications, I am 
here leaving aside the anthropological question in eschatology concerning the constitution of the human 
person and the so-called intermediate state because I have already explored the issue of dualism above. I 
am also omitting a detailed exploration of the traditional four “last things” (i.e., death, judgment, heaven, 
and hell).  
198 This imagery is my own. 
199 See, for instance, Oscar Cullman’s classic work: The Resurrection of the Dead or the 
Immortality of the Soul?: The Witness of the New Testament (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock Publishers, 2010). 
For a survey and consideration of this trend, see Joseph Ratzinger, Eschatology: Death and Eternal Life, 
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spiritual one.
200
  Thus, the second circle of inclusion is the individual human body—the 
flesh.
201
  
The third circle of inclusion is exemplified in Joseph Ratzinger’s Eschatology, in 
which he explicitly works to highlight the communal dimension of eschatology.
202
  He 
rejects, for instance, the possibility of an instant resurrection of the dead upon the death 
of the individual through an appeal to eternity as diachronic time, because such 
downplays the communal significance of history’s unfolding.203  While Ratzinger thus 
moves beyond individualistic eschatologies to include the human community, he is less 
developed in his cosmic eschatology.
204
  This limited focus is evident in his description 
of the “task of contemporary eschatology,” which is “to marry perspectives, so that 
person and community, present and future, are seen in their unity.”205 
                                                                                                                                            
second edition, translated by Michael Waldstein (Washington DC: The Catholic University of America 
Press, 1988), 104-61. Ratzinger’s own view is that the dilemma between a Hellenistic immortality and a 
Judeo-Christian resurrection is largely overstated as most orthodox Christian interpretations of the 
immortality of the soul emphasize not simply humanity’s intrinsic quality, but humanity’s being before 
God. See ibid., 150-61. Wolfhart Pannenberg takes a similar line in Systematic Theology, 3:570-73.  
200 This claim corresponds to an anthropological view in which human beings are fundamentally 
embodied creatures. See, for example, John Polkinghorne, Scientists as Theologians: A Comparison of the 
Writings of Ian Barbour, Arthur Peacocke and John Polkinghorne (London, UK: SPCK, 1996), chapter 3. 
See also his discussion of embodiment, continuity of identity, and the soul. Ibid., 54.  
201 The inclusion of human flesh opens the door for the participation of the cosmos in human 
redemption, a point which Aquinas had already maintained. See Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, 
Joseph Kenny, editor (New York: Hanover House, 1955–57), IV.97.5. This position also appears in 
Ratzinger’s text. See Ratzinger, Eschatology, 168-94. However, this inclusion is not without difficulties. 
Karl Rahner notes one such difficultly when he examines the scientific knowledge concerning the rate of 
human metabolism and the replacing of cells. He maintains, in a Thomistic fashion, that the form (i.e., soul) 
of the person can take on any matter (i.e., flesh), such that the resurrection is the imposition of a person’s 
form onto transfigured matter. See Karl Rahner, “The Resurrection of the Body,” Theological 
Investigations, volume II (Man in the Church), translated by Karl Kruger (Baltimore, MA: Helicon Press, 
1963), 203-216. In this manner, the inclusion of cosmic matter in the eschaton becomes primarily, if not 
exclusively, about the resurrection of human individuals. 
202 Ratzinger, Eschatology.  
203 Ibid., 251-55. Wolfhart Pannenberg makes a similar claim in Systematic Theology, 3: 546-47.  
204 Moltmann critiques Ratzinger (Pope Benedict XVI) for failing to address adequately the 
question of the salvation of the nonhuman creation in his encyclical Spe Salvi. See Jürgen Moltmann, 
“Horizons of Hope,” The Christian Century, May 20 (2009), 31-33.  
205 Ratzinger, Eschatology, 12. 
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The cosmic dimension of eschatology, which constitutes the fourth inclusive 
circle, is the beginning of the most important dividing marks with regard to this study.  
Cosmic eschatology is strongly present in thinkers influenced by Eastern thought.  This 
geographical distinction traces back through Christian history as well.  In the East, 
Irenaeus explicitly includes nonhuman animals in his eschatological purview, adamantly 
insisting on a literal translation of Isaiah’s peaceable kingdom.206  Likewise, Ephrem the 
Syrian contends that the earth will share in the redemptive movement of God.
207
  
Contemporary Eastern Orthodox theologians tend to maintain consistently that the entire 
cosmos will be included in eschatological redemption through divine transfiguration.
208
  
Contrarily, in the West theological giants such as Augustine and Aquinas reserve 
eschatological redemption for humans (and inanimate elements).
209
  In modern times, 
however, some theologians in the West have taken up a more cosmic eschatology.
210
   
Yet often cosmic eschatologies are vague in the exact nature of the nonhuman 
creation’s participation in the eschaton.  They are unclear if eschatological community 
includes simply cosmic matter and energy, or an earth-like environment, or plants, or 
                                               
206 See Irenaeus, Against Heresies, 5.33.4.  
207 Ephrem the Syrian, Hymns on Paradise, introduction and translation by Sebastian Brock 
(Crestwood: St. Vladimir’s Press, 1989), IX.1.  
208 See, for instance, Ware, The Orthodox Way, 136-137; Andrew Louth, “Eastern Orthodox 
Eschatology,” in The Orthodox Handbook of Eschatology, Jerry L. Walls, editor (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2008,) 237-238.  
209 See Augustine, Miscellany of Eighty-Three Questions, The Works of Saint Augustine, Part I 
Volume 12, ed. Raymond Canning, introduction, translation, and notes by Boniface Ramsey (New York 
City Press, 2008), XXX; Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, IV.97.5.  
210 For example, see John Wesley, “The General Deliverance,” available online at 
http://new.gbgm-umc.org/umhistory/wesley/sermons; Internet, accessed March, 2010; Linzey, “C. S. 
Lewis’s Theology of Animals,” Anglican Theological Review, 80 (Winter 1998), 60-81; Pannenberg, 
Systematic Theology, 3:551; Linzey, Animal Theology, especially chapters 4-5; Stephen H. Webb, Good 
Eating (Grand Rapids: Brazos Press, 2001), chapter 3; Stanley Hauerwas and John Berkman, “A Trinitarian 
Theology of the ‘Chief End’ of ‘All Flesh’” in Good News for Animals? Christian Approaches to Animal 
Well-Being, Charles Pinches and Jay B. McDaniel, editors (New York: Orbis Books, 1993), 62-74; Sallie 
McFague, The Body of God: An Ecological Theology (Fortress Press: Minneapolis, 1993), 198-202. For a 
collection of writings (including Wesley’s sermon) addressing the general issue of an eternal telos for 
particular nonhumans, see Animals and Christianity: A Book of Readings, Andrew Linzey and Tom Regan, 
editors (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 1990), Part 3 (81-109).  
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nonhuman animals.  Furthermore, they remain unclear—regarding plants and animals 
especially—if there is a bodily resurrection of those entities that existed during history—
whether some or all—or a generic eschatological representation of each species.211   
One of the reasons I find Moltmann to be an important voice on this issue is 
because of his claim that every single living creature will be resurrected.
212
  His is 
perhaps the most inclusive eschatology in the field.
213
 Even so, as we will see, 
Moltmann’s ethic does not properly align with the scope of his eschatological 
community.    
Eschatology and History 
A cosmic eschatology bears significance for eco-theological ethics only to the 
extent that eschatology bears meaning for how humans live within the flow of history.  
This point raises the question: what is the relationship between the present and the 
eschatological future?
214
  In contemporary theology, I detect five general approaches: 
existentially-oriented, future-oriented, present-oriented, hope-oriented, and politically-
oriented.
215
   
Ratzinger suggests that Karl Barth’s transcendental eschatology paves the way for 
the existentially-oriented approach inasmuch as it renders eschatology fully transcendent 
                                               
211 Polkinghorne permits that all kinds of nonhuman life/creation may participate in the 
eschatological consummation, but not that every instantiation of life will. See Polkinghorne, The God of 
Hope, 122-23.  
212 Jürgen Moltmann, The Coming of God: Christian Eschatology, translated by Margaret Kohl 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996), 69-70.  
213 Linzey tends to advocate for the resurrection of sentient creatures and is thus less inclusive than 
Moltmann. See Linzey, Creatures of the Same God, 133, n. 13. 
214 Ratzinger suggests that this relation may be the issue in contemporary eschatology. As 
Ratzinger states, “It is…possible in our day to write an eschatology which would be nothing but a 
dialogue…with the theology of futurity, the theology of hope and the theology of liberation.” Ratzinger, 
Eschatology, 4. Ratzinger’s task is to recover the contributions of the eschatology in Christian history, 
including the Middle Ages, and place these contributions in dialogue with contemporary concerns. See 
Ratzinger, Eschatology, 1-15.  
215 I am here combining into my own categories insights from Ratzinger, Schwarz, and Moltmann. 
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to time and immanent to existence, facilitating the crisis of encounter between humanity 
and God.
216
  This emphasis on encounter is taken up by Rudolph Bultmann, in whom 
“eschatology is stripped of any temporal component” and defined essentially as “an act of 
self-abandonment.”217   
In juxtaposition to existential approaches that emphasize encounter at the expense 
of temporality stands future-oriented approaches, which place temporality at the heart of 
eschatology.
218
  An example is Oscar Cullman’s “salvation history” approach to 
eschatology in which time is divided into the pre-Christ-event, the already/not yet of the 
Christ-event, and the future hope to come—the “not yet”.219 In this schema, “Faith means 
entering into solidarity with salvation history, taking up its ‘already’ and, on that basis, 
working towards the ‘not yet.’”220 
Present eschatologies bear a semblance to existential ones in their application of 
eschatology to the here and now.  The difference is between “here” and the “now.”  
Whereas existential eschatologies emphasize personal encounter (the “here”), present 
eschatologies emphasize the presence of the future in history (the “now”).  There is 
overlap here with both Cullman’s futurist approach and theologies of hope.  However, C. 
H. Dodd’s “realized eschatology” warrants a separate category.  For Dodd, the Christ-
event accomplished the work of rendering God’s kingdom present on earth.221  Thus, the 
                                               
216 Ratzinger, Eschatology, 47-48.  
217 Ibid., 48-49. For a good summary of Bultmann, including his exegetical approach to 
eschatology, see Schwarz, Eschatology, 120-27. In Moltmann’s view, both Barth and Bultmann transport 
eschatology into a transcendent eternity. Moltmann, The Coming of God, 13-16, 19-22. 
218 Ratzinger, Eschatology, 51. 
219 See Ratzinger, Eschatology, 53-55; Schwarz, Eschatology, 136-37. 
220 Ratzinger, Eschatology, 54. 
221 Schwarz, Eschatology, 130. There is a stark difference here between Dodd and Barth. For 
Barth, the Christ-event—as Parousia—is still awaiting its final completion. See Karl Barth, Church 
Dogmatics, volume IV (The Doctrine of Reconciliation), translated by G. W. Bromiley (Edinburgh: T&T 
Clark, 1962), 3/2, 903-905.  
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Church’s celebration is less a looking forward and more a looking back.222  For “in Jesus 
the eternal entered decisively into history,” forcing the “hour of decision.”223  Hans 
Schwarz classifies Dodd’s approach as transcendentalist because history has already 
witnessed the coming of the kingdom.  Therefore, the future hope is not at all future, but 
beyond history altogether.
224
   
In Moltmann’s view, whereas Barth transported eschatology into eternity, 
rendering it wholly other than time and history, future-oriented approaches mistakenly 
subsume eschatology into time.
225
  Thus Moltmann, along with Wolfhart Pannenberg, 
advocates a different approach—one oriented around hope.  Moltmann’s earlier work, 
especially Theology of Hope, has been greatly influential in the rise of political 
theology.
226
  Yet there is a distinct difference between both Moltmann and Pannenberg 
and strictly political theologies that transport eschatology into time in an effort to 
construct utopian societies.
227
  There is also a difference between Moltmann’s 
eschatology and the future-oriented eschatology of Cullman;
228
 for Moltmann 
differentiates between the phenomenological future (the irreversible time of history) and 
the eschatological future, which “is God’s coming and his arrival.”229  Thus, for 
Moltmann, God’s coming is the presence of the eschatological future, which is the source 
of phenomenological time, within history.  This coming transforms time (and history) 
                                               
222 Ratzinger, Eschatology, 55-56. 
223 Schwarz, Eschatology, 130. 
224 Ibid., 132. 
225 Moltmann, The Coming of God, 10-12.  
226 Ratzinger, Eschatology, 58. 
227 See Moltmann, The Coming of God, 195; Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, 3:585-86. 
228 See ibid., 12-13. I therefore think Schwarz incorrectly labels Moltmann under “future-oriented” 
eschatologies. Only if Moltmann’s novel understanding of the eschatological future is taken into account 
can such a claim be made. 
229 Ibid., 22. 
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itself.  Thus, the eschaton is both transcendent and immanent—it is present in history 
while at the same time being history’s horizon.230   
Finally, there are the politically-oriented eschatologies of liberation theology.
231
  
These forms are influenced by the work of Johann Baptist Metz.
232
  Many of them 
furthermore bear some affinity with existential approaches in that they tend to 
demythologize eschatology, rendering it more a call to work toward social utopias that 
are possible within the flow of history.
233
  Said differently, eschatology is often deprived 
of its transcendence.
234
  It becomes a fully historical, political, and ethical endeavor.  This 
tendency is also evident in certain feminist approaches to eschatology, most notably that 
of Ruether.
235
   
Eschatology and Ethics 
Intimately connected to the question concerning the relationship between history 
and eschatology—and equally important for this project—is the relationship between 
eschatology and ethics.
236
  To what extent does eschatology inform morality within the 
unfolding of history?  It is just at this point that Ratzinger is critical of political 
theologies; for “the realization of God’s Kingdom is not itself a political process.”237  
Even more harshly, to make eschatological hope an achievable goal within history entails 
                                               
230 Christologically, this vision is different from Pannenberg, who maintains that God’s coming in 
Christ is the prolepsis of the still future kingdom. Schwarz, Eschatology, 145. While this difference is 
significant, there is a practical overlap between Moltmann and Pannenberg in which eschatology vastly 
affects human activity in the flow of history. Pannenberg states that “By the Spirit the eschatological future 
is present already in the hearts of believers. His dynamic is the basis of anticipations of eschatological 
salvation already in the as yet incomplete history of the world.” Pannenberg, Sysmatic Theology, 3:552. 
231 For an overview, see Schwarz, Eschatology, 152-66. 
232 See ibid., 152-53. 
233 See Ratzinger, Eschatology, 57-59. Ratzinger, in my view, wrongly classifies Moltmann here. 
234 See Schwarz’s engagement with Gustavo Gutierrez in Eschatology, 159-60. 
235 See, for instance, her mixture of agnosticism (about the future) and existentialism regarding 
personal eschatology in Sexism and God Talk, 257-58.  
236 Moltmann addresses this issue, along with the question of the continuity of the present and 
future creation, within the context of millenarianism. See Moltmann, The Coming of God, 129-202. 
237 Ratzinger, Eschatology, 58. 
49 
 
“the emasculation of Christian hope.”238  For Ratzinger, the kingdom of God bears 
meaning for politics, but not by way of eschatology.  Thus he maintains that “the setting 
asunder of eschatology and politics is one of the fundamental tasks of Christian 
theology.”239  To the extent that eschatology ought not to become a political program in 
which the full realization of eschatological hope is transported into history and realized 
through human effort, I concur with Ratzinger’s position.  However, if he intends to 
claim that eschatology has no bearing on moral theology, his stance is much less tenable.   
On the other hand, a complete relegation of eschatology into ethics and politics—
which is what Ratzinger seems to fear—is also problematic.  In the words of Barth, the 
undeniable “not yet” of history is the shattering of “the great Constantinian illusion.”240  
For Barth, Christians are called to hope for the future kingdom in the midst of inevitable 
conflict.
241
  This vision leans toward the approaches of Moltmann and Pannenberg.  
Schwarz summarizes Pannenberg’s eschatological ethics well: “Since we are able to 
participate proleptically in the promised future, we are encouraged to anticipate this 
future proleptically.”242   
Continuity and Discontinuity between the Present and the New Creation 
Also connected to the question of the relationship between history and 
eschatology is the issue concerning the level of continuity (and discontinuity) between 
the present creation and the new creation.  This issue is further complicated, however, by 
the introduction of an inbreaking eschatological future in which the radically new accosts 
                                               
238 Ibid., 59. 
239 Ibid.. 
240 Barth, Church Dogmatics, IV/3/2: 918. 
241 Ibid., 917-19. 
242 Schwarz, Eschatology, 145. This position is consummate with Schwarz’s own constructive 
proposal. See ibid., chapter 7. 
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history—for example the resurrection of Jesus within history.  The question, then, is two-
fold.  First, to what extent will the new creation be continuous with the present creation?  
Second, to what extent does the Christ-event, including the ongoing work of the Spirit, 
enable the new to break into history?  These questions will be of great significance in my 
discussion of Moltmann and Linzey and in my constructive work in chapter four.     
At stake in these questions are both the object and nature of eschatological 
salvation.  Is the present cosmos the object of salvation?  Phrased differently, will the 
“new creation” be numerically identical—and thus continuous—with the present 
creation?  Or, will the “new creation” replace the present one?  If there is numerical 
identity between the present creation and the new creation, will the new creation be 
genuinely new—and thus discontinuous—or a mere evolutionary development of the 
present creation?
243
 
In Sum 
I have explored the following dimensions of eschatology:  
1.) The scope of the community of eschatological redemption 
2.) The nature of the relationship between eschatology and history. 
3.) The nature of the relationship between eschatology and ethics.  
4.) The degree of continuity and discontinuity between the present and new creation  
 
Collectively, these dimensions reveal much about one’s eco-theology.244  Non-cosmic 
eschatologies tend to render the nonhuman creation less important—or important only 
                                               
243 These questions are important to John Polkinghorne, who offers his scientific expertise as a 
framework to address them. For Polkinghorne, “It is the element of discontinuity—the expectation of the 
unexpected—that distinguishes theological eschatology from a secular futurology.” Polkinghorne, God of 
Hope, xxiv. These elements include freedom transience, suffering, and death for all individual humans 
who, through the continuity of their soul, are re-embodied at the resurrection. Yet there is also continuity. 
Here, Polkinghorne draws on his scientific roots as a physicist to emphasize the eternal significance of 
physicality, process, and temporality. See, Polkinghorne, God of Hope, 14-26; John Polkinghorne, Science 
and the Trinity: The Christian Encounter with Reality (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004), 143-
69. For a summary of Polkinghorne’s view, see Southgate, The Groaning of Creation, 81. 
244 On this point, see Santmire, The Travail of Nature, 216-18. 
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insofar as it contributes to human well-being.  Yet a cosmic eschatology that includes 
even the resurrection of individual creatures holds meaning for moral practice in history 
only if eschatology is not purely transcendent.  Furthermore, existentially and politically 
oriented eschatologies tend to work toward only that which is achievable in the natural 
evolution of history.  They are thus open to the restructuring of human communities.  But 
they cannot logically bear the strain of the transfiguration of nature itself.  If, however, an 
eschatology contains a cosmic scope (thus including nature), a transcendent dimension 
(thus offering hope for future beyond what the natural unfolding of history can provide), 
and a manner in which the “future” is somehow present within history (thus rendering the 
hope for the kingdom impactful for human practice within history), then it becomes 
cosmically significant to history without being completely subsumed in history.  It is just 
such a vision that both Moltmann and Linzey offer.  
FUNDAMENTAL TENSIONS AMONG COSMOLOGY, ANTHROPOLOGY, AND 
ESCHATOLOGY 
At the intersection of the theological dimensions of cosmology, anthropology, and 
eschatology, two fundamental tensions arise.  The first burgeons out of the interplay 
between the historical telos of the nonhuman creation and that of the human creation.
245
  
Why does each exist?  Does the nonhuman find its meaning and value only in the human?  
Or, does it have, each part or creature according to its capacity, some relation with God in 
and of itself?  Has God endowed the nonhuman cosmos with any meaning or value apart 
from its being in relation to humanity?  I use the terms anthropocentrism and 
cosmocentrism to refer to this tension.   
                                               
245 By “historical telos,” I intimate the purpose of a thing or groups of things within the unfolding 
of the present creation. The term stands in juxtaposition to an “eternal” or “ultimate” telos, which denotes 
the eschatological destiny of a thing or group of things.  
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The second tension derives from the divine intent for the created order (both 
human and nonhuman), the eternal telos of the nonhuman creation, and the manner in 
which these factors shape how humanity ought to engage the nonhuman world.  Is the 
nonhuman world the way God desires it to be?  Or, is it in some sense fallen or 
incomplete?  What is the ultimate end God desires for the nonhuman world?  Does it 
have place in eternity or is it exhausted in the temporal realm?  If it has a place, how 
much of the nonhuman creation will that place accommodate?  Individuals?  Species?  
Simple building blocks of matter?  Time?  For this tension I use the terms conservation 
and transfiguration.   
ANTHROPOCENTRISM VERSUS COSMOCENTRISM 
Jenkins rightly notes that anthropocentrism has been the dominant taxonomical 
divider for eco-theological thought.  He is furthermore correct, in my view, that it should 
not be the only one employed in mapping the field of eco-theological thought or 
adjudicating the potential contributions of voices within that field.  However, 
anthropocentrism is an important categorical marker in that it highlights significant 
divergences in eco-theological theory and practice.  It is for want of his use of this 
categorical marker that Jenkins’s taxonomy of grace faces its own challenges.246  
Namely, Jenkins categorizes voices together that share little in common.  Indeed, he notes 
that there are wide variations within ecojustice regarding natural evil.
247
  These 
differences are not inconsequential—a point of which Jenkins is well aware.  
Furthermore, the stark distinction between Moltmann and Aquinas ought to elicit 
                                               
246 To be fair, Jenkins never claims that his map of the field is absolute or exhaustive. 
247 See Jenkins, Ecologies of Grace, 70-71. 
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curiosity at their common categorization.
248
  The reason I will continue to distinguish 
between these centrisms is because I believe the question of intrinsic value, while not the 
only pertinent distinction in eco-theological thought, remains a key one in establishing 
common eco-theological categories.  Adding this key establishes clearer classifications 
than Jenkins achieves without it. 
Defining the Terms 
There are multiple ways to use terms like “anthropocentric” and “cosmocentric.”  
For instance, Northcott uses the term “humanocentric” to denote a conversational 
framework and a methodology of engaging ecological issues.  For example, Ruether 
approaches ecological issues within the framework of a sociological and theological 
critique of patriarchy.  Because she starts with this critique of human thought, Northcott 
labels her humanocentric.
249
  Pope John Paul II approaches ecological issues from a 
concern for universal human dignity—also a human-based category.  It is this 
commonality that leads Northcott to place Ruether and the Pope in the same category.  
Similarly, Northcott categorizes Moltmann as theocentric because his “doctrine of 
creation is derived primarily from a new reading of the doctrine of God as Trinity.”250  
Thus, Northcott uses centric terms to describe method as opposed to value. 
                                               
248 To be fair, Jenkins’s taxonomy has more to do with strategies that correspond to theological 
notions of grace than theological principles themselves. That is, his starting point is the manner in which 
theological notions are taken into practical strategies. This method explains why such divergent theological 
foundations are grouped together. I believe that an at least equally helpful method involves combining the 
question of centrisms that Jenkins wants to avoid with the issue of eschatological salvation. At any rate, I 
question Jenkins’s categorization of Moltmann under ecojustice. My reading of Moltmann suggests he 
would fit better in the Orthodox camp of creation spirituality and deification. This possible misreading of 
Moltmann may be why Jenkins sees his view as problematic for ecojustice. See Jenkins, Ecologies of 
Grace, 73-74.  
249 Northcott, The Environment and Christian Ethics, 137. 
250 Ibid., 350, n. 53. 
54 
 
Another use—which tends to have theological connotations—of anthropocentrism 
is concerned with functional roles.  For instance, anthropocentrism can mean that humans 
bear a central role in the preservation and/or development of the cosmos, whether as 
stewards or co-creators.
251
  Some of the thinkers that are cosmocentric with regard to 
value are anthropocentric with regard the functional role of humanity.
252
  This form of 
anthropocentrism stands in contrast to an anthropocosmic view.
253
   
                                               
251 The stewardship model tends to take up the functional role of human as preserver. However, it 
is also possible for this model to emphasize humanity’s role of transforming nature alongside the role of 
conservation. See Hall, Imaging God, 53-60, 198-201. On the whole, though, the Orthodox notion of 
human as priest and co-creator takes up the form as developer. See John Meyendorff, Christ in Eastern 
Christian Thought (Washington DC: Corpus Books, 1969), 105; Ware, The Orthodox Way, 49-50. The 
notion of human as developer is furthermore taken up by certain Catholic thinkers, including Teilhard de 
Chardin, Johannes Baptist Metz, and Pope John Paul II. On this point see French, “Subject-centered and 
Creation-centered Paradigms in Recent Catholic Thought,” 51-57. For an extreme example of functional 
anthropocentrism, see Webb, “Ecology vs. The Peaceable Kingdom.” Paul Santmire is critical of an 
overemphasis on the functional role of humanity in the cosmos. See his critique of stewardship in H. Paul 
Santmire, “Partnership with Nature According to the Scriptures: Beyond the Theology of Stewardship,” 
Christian Scholar’s Review 32/4 (Summer 2003), 381-412.  
252 This is mainly true of Moltmann and Linzey, as I will show in chapters two and three. My 
constructive proposal in chapter four also bears this form of anthropocentrism. Sideris, following Rolston 
and Gustafson, offers a kind of middle way between the functional anthropocentrism of stewardship models 
and the complete dissolution of a unique human role in nature. Human beings, for Sideris, are neither the 
co-creators nor co-redeemers of nature. They are not its steward, defender, or its priest. See Sideris, 
Environmental Ethics, 245. Rather, humans are participants in nature. They are in dependent upon it and 
interdependent with it. Thus, Sideris maintains that “it is not our place to intervene in order to control 
nature or to prevent the destruction of life that occurs naturally, no matter how distasteful it may seem.” 
Ibid., 225. But humanity does have a participatory role in the cosmos. Humans are to love the created 
order. Sideris acknowledges that “it is often impossible for us to preserve the wildness that is loved by 
doing nothing, because our previous actions have already compromised natural values. Therefore, loving 
wild nature is not simply letting it be. A general response of love requires specific actions.” Ibid., 254. In 
particular, humans have to reflect upon their difficult decisions regarding how best to participate in nature. 
This concept is very similar to my discussion of Berry’s emphasis on “living-with” nature.  
253 Anthropocosmism denotes the mutuality between humans (anthropos) and the world (cosmos). 
For a good summary, including a consideration of the etiology of the word, see Sam Mickey, 
“Contributions to Anthropocosmic Environmental Ethics,” Worldviews 11 (2007), 226-47. Says Mickey: 
“Rather than placing value on a particular center (e.g., anthropocentric, biocentric, ecocentric) and thus 
excluding and marginalizing something of peripheral value, an anthropocosmic approach to ethics seeks to 
facilitate the mutual implication of humanity and the natural world, thereby affirming the 
interconnectedness and mutual constitution of central and peripheral value.” As I will show, my use of 
cosmocentrism includes mutuality in that it refuses to separate humanity from the cosmos—thus, the 
“cosmos” of cosmocentrism includes both humans and nonhumans. That is, humans and nonhumans are 
part of the same cosmic community and are therefore interconnected. Suggesting, as I do, that humans bear 
an important role in the redemption of the nonhuman creation is not to suggest that there is no reciprocity in 
this matter. For these reasons—and for the sake of continuity in terms—at this point I remain focused on 
the term cosmocentric (with my qualifications) as opposed to anthropocosmic.  
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Yet another form of centric terms is offered by Lisa Sideris.
254
  She writes that 
“The distinction between an ethic derived from nature and one extended to nature 
becomes blurred in the writings of some ecotheologians.”255 This statement highlights the 
crux of Sideris’s understanding of various -centrisms.  For her, a -centrism is defined by 
its frame of reference for the establishment of value.  In conjunction with James 
Gustafson, she states that “anthropocentrism constitutes a refusal to accept and respect a 
natural ordering that is neither of our own making nor completely under our control.”256  
An anthropocentric ethic is thus one in which humans apply their subjective values and 
hopes to nature.
257
  She thus defines any failure to affirm the goodness of the natural 
order, any reading of the natural order in an anthropomorphic sense, and any hope for an 
eschatological transfiguration of nature as anthropocentric.
258
   
 An ecocentric ethic, which Sideris strongly favors, is one in which humans allow 
nature to reveal its own set of principles and formulate from this revelation an ethic that 
respects those principles.  Says Sideris: “an ecocentric ethic demands that we value the 
                                               
254 Though, Sideris seems either unconvinced or unaware that she is using the terms differently. 
But that such is the case seems likely in the face of her disagreement with the way these authors categorize 
theologians in their terms. She does not find Gustafson’s claim that process theology can be essentially 
theocentric to be true. Sideris, Environmental Ethics, 206. She furthermore approves of Northcott’s labeling 
of Ruether as “humanocentric” but does not engage his labeling of Moltmann as theocentric. Ibid., 212-13. 
255 Ibid., 46. 
256 Ibid., 201. 
257 For instance, Ruether is anthropocentric “insofar as her ecological ethic is filtered through the 
experiences and claims of women as an oppressed group.” Sideris, Environmental Ethics, 85. Northcott 
does not avoid the brand of anthropocentrism because his “desire for peace, harmony, and justice in the 
natural realm constitutes a human agenda imposed on nature as much as (if not more than) Ruether’s efforts 
to understand nature through the lens of women’s oppression.” Ibid., 88. Advocates of process theology 
(namely, Birch and Cobb) are anthropocentric because they maintain that “value in nonhuman life is 
assessed in terms of categorical experiences…that take human experience as their reference point.” Ibid., 
207. Lastly, Sideris is adamant that Moltmann is anthropocentric but acknowledges, in light of works like 
God in Creation, that his theology has a cosmic scope. But she maintains that he remains anthropocentric 
because, while he includes the cosmos into his theological framework and even acknowledges it has value 
beyond its purpose vis-à-vis humanity, “his theology retains the basic goal of eliminating those conditions 
of life (both human and animal life) that generate suffering and conflict.” Ibid., 213-14. 
258 Sideris includes a wide variety of thinkers in this camp, including Ruether, McFague, 
Northcott, Moltmann, Charles Birch, and John Cobb. 
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processes that generate species, even when this process does not suit human moral 
preferences.”259  Sideris thus highlights the possible difference between ecocentric and 
biocentric ethics.
260
   
In Sideris’s view, a theocentric ethics (by which she seems to mean the particular 
theocentric ethics of Gustafson) is one in which humans permit the order God has 
established in nature to reveal the framework for human engagement with nature.  Such a 
perspective “fosters a sense of dependence, awe, and gratitude…for powers that sustain 
human life and life as a whole.”261  It thus does not denigrate the natural order, which is 
divinely established.  Nor does it seek a better world: “However unappealing the 
perspective may be at times, a theocentric construal does not force God and nature into 
roles that better suit our own preferences for harmony and justice.”262   
In the absence of any validity to an historical Fall from an edenic paradise, Sideris 
maintains that this divinely-established order must include the mechanisms of 
evolutionary emergence, including suffering, predation, and death.  Therefore, any eco-
theological ethic that fails to affirm the goodness of these mechanisms cannot ultimately 
be ecocentric as it denies the order revealed in nature.  Nor can it be theocentric as it also 
denies the divine intent inherent in that order.  Such an ethic—whether in emphasizing 
cooperation over and against competition or in hoping for an eschatological redemption 
                                               
259 Sideris, Environmental Ethics, 175. 
260 “Although some environmental ethicists use the terms ecocentric and biocentric 
interchangeably, I give preference to the former term throughout this work. A biocentric, or ‘life-centered,’ 
approach may take into account characteristics of nonhuman life (and locate values in those characteristics) 
yet fail to understand these values in a holistic or systemic fashion. In Respect for Nature Paul Taylor, for 
example, understands organisms as ‘teleological centers’ with inherent value of their own, but his ethic 
remains focused on individual lives and more biocentric than ecocentric.” Sideris, Environmental Ethics, 
270, n. 5. 
261 Ibid., 201. 
262 Ibid., 214. 
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of some cosmic fallenness—is for Sideris ultimately and inevitably anthropocentric 
because it replaces the values inherent in nature with human values and hopes. 
Most commonly, however, terms like anthropocentrism, biocentrism, 
androcentrism, and cosmocentrism refer to the issue of intrinsic value.
263
  For example, 
Paul Taylor distinguishes between two kinds of environmental ethics: anthropocentric 
and biocentric.
264
  He maintains that an anthropocentric approach “holds that our moral 
duties with respect to the natural world are all ultimately derived from the duties we owe 
to one another as human beings.”265  Such a view makes ecological conservation a moral 
issue because of both the present and future human community.  Contrarily, a biocentric 
approach maintains that  
our duties toward nature do not stem from the duties we owe to humans…the 
natural world is not there simply as an object to be exploited by us, nor are its 
living creatures to be regarded as nothing more than resources for our use and 
consumption.  On the contrary, wild communities of life are understood to be 
deserving of our moral concern and consideration because they have a kind of 
value that belongs to them inherently.
266
 
 
Thus, centric terms differentiate between direct and indirect moral concern for the 
nonhuman cosmos—between viewing nonhumans primarily as creatures of value in their 
own right and nonhumans viewing them primarily or exclusively as resources, the telos 
of which is realized in the facilitation of human well-being.  
In this project, I have Taylor’s value-based understanding of these terms in mind.  
I specifically use cosmocentrism as opposed to biocentrism in order to maximize moral 
inclusiveness—that is, not only living creatures but non-living matter and the cosmos 
                                               
263 In the words of Armstrong and Botzler, “Anthropocentrism is the philosophical perspective that 
ethical principles apply to humans only and that human needs and interests are of the highest, and even 
exclusive, value and importance.” Armstrong and Botzler, Environmental Ethics, 271.  
264 Taylor, Respect for Nature, 10-11. 
265 Ibid., 11. 
266 Ibid., 12-13. 
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itself.
267
  However, by the term cosmocentrism I do not intend that only the cosmos as a 
whole has value or even that the cosmos as a whole has primary value.
268
  I thus seek to 
avoid the critique labeled against “nonanthropocentric ethics” noted by Sam Mickey:  
While anthropocentric ethics foster exploitative and manipulative attitudes toward 
the environment, nonanthropocentric ethics like eco- and bio-centrism threaten to 
become misanthropic and socially irresponsible as they marginalize problems 
faced by disenfranchised economic classes and ethnicities.
269
   
 
By cosmocentrism I mean that both the cosmos as a whole and all of its 
individual components (including ecosystems, species, and individual creatures, both 
human and nonhuman) have intrinsic value.
270
  It thus entails the moral recognition of the 
nonhuman creation for its own sake.
271
  Contrarily, by anthropocentrism I intimate that 
humans bear intrinsic value and the value of the nonhuman creation is derivative of both 
the temporal (i.e., historical) and ultimate (i.e., eschatological) import of humanity.  
Why not Theocentrism? 
Referring to Joseph Sittler’s eco-theological ethics, Bouma-Prediger maintains 
that  
only such a theocentrism in which God is affirmed as the source of being and 
existence of ultimate meaning and value is able both to preserve human 
uniqueness and affirm the interdependence of creation and thereby avoid both an 
anthropocentrism that fails to acknowledge the commonality of humans with 
other creatures and a cosmocentrism that refuses to admit human 
distinctiveness.
272
   
 
                                               
267 For instance, Andrew Linzey is times better understood as sentiocentric as opposed to 
cosmocentric.  
268 See below my discussion on the primary unit of moral consideration. 
269 Mickey, “Contributions to Anthropocosmic Ethics,” 227. 
270 I will address the question of whether or not all the cosmos and its separate components can 
together occupy center (thus rendering nothing peripheral and the center somewhat meaningless altogether) 
in chapter four.  
271 Concerning animals, Wennberg defines “moral recognition” as follows: “There are things we 
are not to do to animals even when it is in our interest to do them.” Wennberg, God, Animals, and Humans, 
xii. 
272 Bouma-Prediger, The Greening of Theology, 278. 
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Bouma-Prediger is not alone in this sentiment.  The notion that a theocentric 
worldview shatters both anthropocentrism and cosmocentrism is quite common.  
Defenders of Aquinas’s contribution to eco-theological ethics argue his theocentrism 
trumps charges that he is anthropocentric.
273
  The Orthodox theologian Radu Bordeianu 
critiques Thomas Berry for being cosmocentric as opposed to theocentric.
274
  Other 
theologians, such as Moltmann and Linzey, define themselves as theocentric rather than 
cosmocentric or biocentric.
275
   
Yet it is unclear why theocentrism should be categorized with anthropocentrism 
or cosmocentrism for many of these thinkers.  This world is God’s world.  God is its 
source of value and meaning.  If these claims are what is meant by theocentrism—which 
seems most often to be the case—then they have done little to stymie the practical 
anthropocentrism of many theologians in history.  In fact, theocentrism sanctions such 
praxis.  If God is indeed the source of value and meaning for creation, and God orders the 
creation such that the nonhuman exists for the human, then theocentrism has in fact 
grounded anthropocentrism within the cosmos.   
Thus, with regard to the issue of intrinsic value, theocentrism is not one option 
among anthropocentrism or cosmocentrism.  Theocentrism deals with the foundation—or 
                                               
273 See, for instance, John Berkman, “Towards a Thomistic Theology of Animality,” in Creaturely 
Theology: On God, Humans and Other Animals, Celia Deane-Drummond and David Clough, editors 
(London: SCM Press, 2009), 24; Mark Wynn, “Thomas Aquinas: Reading the Idea of Dominion in the 
Light of the Doctrine of Creation” in Ecological Hermeneutics: Biblical, Historical and Theological 
Perspectives, David G. Horrell, Cherryl Hunt, Christopher Southgate and Francesca Stavrakopoulou, 
editors (New York, NY: T & T Clark, 2010), 156–162.  
274 See Radu Bordeianu, “Maximus and Ecology: The Relevance of Maximus the Confessor’s 
Theology of Creation for the Present Ecological Crisis,” Downside Review 127/447 (2009), 115. 
275 See chapters two and three of the present work. 
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lack thereof—for the value and meaning of creatures.276  It is thus the framework within 
which either anthropocentrism or cosmocentrism is justified.  Michael Hauskeller makes 
just this point:  
Both anthropocentrism and biocentrism (in a strong sense) require some sort of 
theocentric background.  One cannot really believe that humans are at the centre 
of the universe (that is, that we matter or our existence has intrinsic value while 
nothing else does) if one does not believe (however vaguely) that we have been 
put there by some higher, cosmic authority.  Similarly, one cannot really believe 
that all living beings matter and deserve moral consideration if one does not 
believe (again, however vaguely) that there is something in the universe that gives 
weight to those beings and to what is being done to them.  Thus theocentrism is 
actually not a third position in addition to anthropocentrism and biocentrism but a 
background presupposition of intelligibility for both of them.
277
 
 
Thomas Aquinas’s anthropocentric hierarchy of creation is couched within a 
theocentrism as is Thomas Berry’s biocentrism.  The question, then, is not: Should 
theology be theocentric, cosmocentric, or anthropocentric?  The question is: does 
theocentrism ground an anthropocentric or cosmocentric worldview?   
In my reading, this critique of theocentrism is actually conducive to the work of 
James Gustafson.  Regarding the context of his own work, Gustafson states that 
“culturally, religiously, theologically, and ethically, man, the human species, has become 
the measure of all things; all things have been put in the service of man.”278  This 
statement expresses what Gustafson intimates with the term anthropocentrism.  He 
contends that “the dominant strand of Western ethics, whether religious or secular, argues 
that the material considerations for morality are to be derived from purely human points 
                                               
276 For instance, in the case of Sideris it seems to me that what she actually praises is not 
theocentrism, but the possibility that theocentrism can ground—as it does in Gustafson—a holistic 
ecocentric ethics. See, for instance, Sideris, Environmental Ethics, 254. 
277 Michael Hauskeller, Biotechnology and the Integrity of Life: Taking Public Fears Seriously 
(Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2007), 88-89. On this point see also Steiner, Anthropocentrism and Its 
Discontents, 1–2. 
278 James Gustafson, Ethics from a Theocentric Perspective (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago 
Press, 1981), 1:82. 
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of reference.”  In other words, the foundational question for morality is “What is good for 
man?”279  Gustafson notes that alternative strands have also developed.  These 
alternatives ask “What is good for the whole of creation?”  Furthermore, these 
alternatives “have been stated in purely religious terms: God, rather than man, ought to be 
the measure of all things.”280   
In my view, Gustafson here acknowledges that what I intimate with the term 
cosmocentrism is compatible (as opposed to contrary) with his notion of theocentrism.  
Indeed, he acknowledges that one can maintain even an anthropocentric worldview in 
which “what God wills is what is good for man” within theocentrism if “the good of 
human beings coincides with the ultimate divine purpose.”281  Thus, theocentrism and 
practical anthropocentrism are not necessarily at odds with one another.  They are not, in 
theory, mutually exclusive.   
Gustafson’s goal is thus one of reinterpreting what a theocentric world should 
look like—which is quite different from the anthropocentrism of the past.  A more proper 
theocentrism, in Gustafson’s view, accepts that “all things are ‘good,’ and not just good 
for [humans].”282  It accepts such a view because “what is right for man has to be 
determined in relation to man’s place in the universe and, indeed, in relation to the will of 
God for all things as that might dimly be discerned.”283  Furthermore, an 
anthropocentrism in which human beings are the measure of all things “implies a denial 
of God as God—as the power and ordering of life in nature and history which sustains 
                                               
279 Ibid., 1:88. 
280 Ibid.. 
281 Ibid., 1:91. 
282 Ibid., 1:109. 
283 Ibid., 1:99. 
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and limits human activity, which ‘demands’ recognition of principles and boundaries of 
activities for the sake of man and of the whole of life.”284   
At any rate, Gustafson’s aim is a redirecting of methodology285—a de-centering 
of human beings as the measure of all value.  He describes this aim as “the turn from 
anthropocentrism to a more theocentric focus of attention.”  The word “more” here 
further acknowledges that what Gustafson proposes is something he understands to better 
correspond to the notion of theocentrism, which actually tends toward a cosmocentric or 
ecocentric worldview.  Thus, again, the question is not between anthropocentrism and 
theocentrism, but rather what kind of ethical centrism theocentrism grounds.
286
   
CONSERVATION VERSUS TRANSFIGURATION 
The juxtaposition of conservation and transfiguration may appear odd at first.  
Conservation is a very common term in both secular and theological ethics.  
Transfiguration is not.  Whereas my use of anthropocentrism and cosmocentrism pertains 
fundamentally to the question of intrinsic value and moral worth, my use of conservation 
and transfiguration pertains fundamentally to the question regarding the nature of human 
interaction with the nonhuman creation.  Said differently, these latter terms denote how 
                                               
284 Ibid., 1:84. 
285 On methodology, Gustafson is adamant about acknowledging the limits of knowledge on 
account of human finitude. “What one sees and does not see is related to where one stands.” Gustafson, 
Ethics from a Theocentric Perspective, 3. This limit ought to engender caution in all theological endeavors. 
“A theology has to be careful to avoid making excessive claims for the knowledge it proposes; it must be 
worded in such a way that this fundamental character of the human experience of God is not oversimplified 
or essentially violated.” Ibid., 35.  
286 Sideris argues that, in an attempt to decentralize humans, Gustafson “proposes that ethics and 
theology…attempt to discern what is good for a larger whole: the human species, other species, or nature 
broadly construed.” Sideris, Environmental Ethics, 203. This vision of theocentrism is not necessarily at 
odds with my definition of cosmocentrism. I thus think Sideris in error when she suggests a direct 
equivalence between theocentric ethics and Gustafson’s delineation of this ethics (and then suggests that a 
theocentric ethics overlaps, apparently merely by being theocentric, with ecocentric ethics). See Sideris, 
Environmental Ethics, chapter 6.   
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humans ought to engage the nonhuman dimensions of the cosmos.  The former terms 
denote why humans ought to do so. 
By conservation, I intimate the notion that the proper human interaction with the 
nonhuman creation is preservation of what exists, including the elements of evolutionary 
emergence.  In this view, the natural cycles of the cosmos, including those like predation, 
are typically envisioned as good—theologically speaking, unfallen with regard at least to 
the nonhuman cosmos—and therefore not in need of redemption.  Humans bear the role 
of living within these cycles in such a manner as to permit the continued facilitation of 
nature’s integrity.287  Humans must limit their actions so that their presence does not 
disrupt the natural cycles of the cosmos.  Perpetuation, not redemption, is the mantra of 
conservation.   
In his delineation of Orthodox eco-theology, Andrew Louth draws out the 
meaning of transfiguration for the cosmos.  “To speak of the transfiguration as the goal 
and purpose of creation is to suggest a genuine transformation, but not a transformation 
into something else, rather it is a transformation that reveals the true reality of what is 
transfigured.”288  In Christ’s transfiguration, he “is revealed as he really is.”289  So also, 
“to see the cosmos as transfigured is to see it as it really is.”290   
                                               
287 By “nature,” I intend something akin to Taylor’s definition of the “the natural world”: “the 
entire set of natural ecosystems on our planet, along with the populations of animals and plants that make 
up the biotic communities of those ecosystems.” Taylor, Respect for Nature, 3. I prefer this definition 
initially because it is descriptive and amoral. As will become evident, the definition of nature is a 
contentious point in relation to creation theology. For instance, Moltmann differentiates between “nature,” 
which denotes the present state of the cosmos, which is in some sense distorted and in some sense 
incomplete, and “creation,” which entails the entire scope of the cosmic narrative, including it 
eschatological future. See Moltmann, God in Creation, 37-40. Linzey maintains that an understanding and 
interpretation is one of the stark differences between “animal theologians and ecological theologians,” who 
“do not see the same things when they peer into ‘nature,’ or even if they see them, they ‘count’ them in 
different ways.” Linzey, Creatures of the Same God, 30. 
288 Andrew Louth, “Between Creation and Transfiguration: The Environment in the Eastern 
Orthodox Tradition,” Ecological Hermeneutics: Biblical, Historical and Theological Perspectives (David 
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In line with this view, by transfiguration, I intimate the notion that proper human 
interaction with the nonhuman creation is defined not by what is, but rather but what will 
be, eschatologically.  In this view, parts of nature’s cycle, including evolutionary 
dimensions such as predation, suffering, and death, are often viewed as fallen (or 
evidence of creation’s incompleteness) and in need of redemption.  Humans bear the role 
of being counter-natural with regard to such dimensions, if only by means of witness 
within the evolutionary process.  Humans ought not to live according to the “rule of 
nature,” but rather in a manner than witnesses to creation’s eschatological destiny.  
Prolepsis protest, not mere preservation, is the mantra of transfiguration.         
FOUR PARADIGMS OF ECO-THEOLOGICAL ETHICS 
Having established the import for the three theological dimensions and defined 
the terms involved within the poles of tension that these dimensions facilitate, I am now 
able to construct, in basic form, the four paradigms of eco-theological ethics.  Here, my 
aim is merely to establish the manner in which these paradigms take shape within the 
tensions outlined above.  With this basic framework in place, I will then address the 
question of the primary unit of eco-theological concern (i.e., individual animals, species, 
eco-systems, or the cosmos as a whole) and why this question is not presented as one of 
the fundamental tensions in this project.  
THE FOUR PARADIGMS IN OUTLINE 
The tensions between anthropocentrism and cosmocentrism, on the one hand, and 
conservation and transfiguration, on the other, provide a framework to establish four 
                                                                                                                                            
G. Horrell, Cherryl Hunt, Christopher Southgate and Francesca Stavrakopoulou, editors (New York, NY: T 
& T Clark, 2010), 216. 
289 Ibid.. 
290 Ibid., 217. 
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paradigms of eco-theological ethics.  This framework is evident in Illustration I – 1, a 
Cartesian coordinate diagram in which the X-axis represents the tension between 
conservation and transfiguration and the Y-axis represents the tension between 
anthropocentrism and cosmocentrism.   
Illustration I – 1: 
 
 
With this coordinate plane, a position can be charted according to where it falls 
with regard to these to tensions.  If, for instance, a thinker advocates a conservationist 
viewpoint as opposed to one of transfiguration (and thus falls in the [-X] dimension) 
while at the same time advocating a cosmocentric worldview as opposed to an 
anthropocentric one (and thus falls in the [+Y] dimension), that thinker would then 
occupy the quarter of the coordinate plane that represents one of the paradigms, 
cosmocentric conservation.  There are thus four possibilities, evident in Illustration I – 
2: 
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Illustration I – 2 
 
 
For the sake of clarity, I label each paradigm according to its location on the 
plane.  Thus, the (-X, -Y) coordinates are anthropocentric conservationism, a view which 
I will establish through an engagement with the work of Saint Thomas Aquinas.  The (-X, 
+Y) coordinates are cosmocentric conservationism.  To present this view, I will examine 
the work of the Passionist priest, Thomas Berry.  The (X, -Y) coordinates are 
anthropocentric transfiguration, a view which is best represented in the work of Orthodox 
theologians like Dumitru Staniloae and John Meyendorff.  Lastly, the (X, Y) coordinates 
are cosmocentric transfiguration.   
I delineate the first three paradigms in chapter one.  It is the last paradigm—
cosmocentric transfiguration—I seek to develop constructively in chapter four.  To do so, 
I will engage the work of both Jürgen Moltmann (chapter two) and Andrew Linzey 
(chapter three).    
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THE PRIMARY UNIT OF MORAL CONSIDERATION: PARTICULAR-CENTRIC VS. GENERAL-
CENTRIC
291
  
One final issue that is implicitly evident in this project is the tension between an 
emphasis on the moral standing of individuals and the moral standing of the system or 
community of which individuals are a part.  As Daniel Cowdin states, the question of 
whether or not the nonhuman world bears moral worth 
has been explored along a spectrum ranging from individual organisms as 
exclusively considerable, on the one side, to species, ecosystems, and natural 
processes as exclusively considerable, on the other.  Animal welfare as well as 
broader reverence for life approaches fall on the individualistic side of the 
spectrum, while a land ethic approach falls on the systematic side.
292
   
 
The central question in this issue is whether, in making ethical decisions, moral 
priority should rest with a particular individual life or the larger system that makes 
possible the existence of all individual lives.
293
  More basically still, what is the primary 
unit of moral consideration?  Individuals?  A species?  Ecosystems?  The cosmos as a 
whole?  Should practices be considered morally illicit if they violate the life of a single 
living organism?  In that case, hunting could have no moral grounds.  Or, should 
practices be considered morally illicit if they interfere with either natural processes or 
endangered ecosystems?  In this case, hunting is morally licit provided it does not 
endanger a species or vital part of an eco-system.       
                                               
291 The terms “particular-centric” and “general-centric” are my own. I use them to highlight that 
the issue in the consideration of the primary unit of moral consideration is not an either/or, but rather one of 
emphasis. In short, which demand—and thus occupies the center of—moral priority, the particular or the 
general? 
292 Daniel Cowdin, “The Moral Status of Otherkind in Christian Ethics,” in Christianity and 
Ecology: Seeking the Well-Being of Earth and Humans, Dieter T. Hessel and Rosemary Radford Ruether, 
editors (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 268. 
293 Says Sideris: “Perhaps the most important question is whether individuals—as opposed to a 
collective entity such as species, populations, or biotic communities—are or ought to be the unit of moral 
consideration in environmental ethics.” Sideris, Environmental Ethics, 21. 
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This issue raises a host of other considerations, perhaps the most significant of 
which is the shift to dynamic and relational ontology.  In science, philosophy, and 
theology, there is heavy emphasis on the importance of the interrelatedness of individual 
aspects of the cosmos with one another.  Scientifically, this claim bears both micro- and 
macroscopic dimensions.  In the introduction to his edited volume concerning the 
relational turn in scientific inquiry in conjunction with trinitarian theology, John 
Polkinghorne writes, “The history of twentieth-century physics can be read as the story of 
the discovery of many levels of intrinsic relationality present in the structure of the 
universe.”294  All life is constructed of atoms formed at the origin of the universe and in 
the destruction of stars.  In this sense, life is only possible because of the interrelatedness 
of microscopic atoms which form various chemicals, which in turn is only possible 
because of the interrelatedness of macroscopic entities and forces like stars, gravity, dark 
matter, etc.  At the biotic level, appropriations of Charles Darwin’s evolutionary thought 
suggest that human beings are relatives of other species—one particular form of 
evolutionary development among many.  Thus the essential uniqueness of humanity is 
replaced with a difference of degree as humans are placed firmly within the matrix of the 
biotic community.  Furthermore, the interactions, both competitive and cooperative, 
among species within ecosystems and across the planet make the both cyclical and 
dynamic development and sustenance of the biosphere possible.  In short, science has 
revealed the irreducibly relational nature of the cosmos, including human life.  
                                               
294 John Polkinghorne, “Introduction,” in The Trinity and an Entangled World: Relationality in 
Physical Science and Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2010), vii. 
Polkinghorne continues to draw out this insight, which grinds against atomistic and mechanistic visions of 
the cosmos, in his essay in the same volume: “The Demise of Democritus,” in The Trinity and an 
Entangled World: Relationality in Physical Science and Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. 
Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2010), 15-31. 
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Philosophically, the shift takes the form of a rejection of a static and substance-based 
ontology to a dynamic and relational-based one.
295
  Theologically, the relational turn is 
most evident in the contemporary re-emphasis on trinitarian thought and renewed 
explorations of the imago Dei.
296
  
This shift to relationality is important because it provides the possible—though by 
no means necessary—grounds for an emphasis on the cosmos as a whole over its 
individual members.
297
  And it is this emphasis that forms one of, if not the, fundamental 
distinctions between many eco-theologians and animals rights activists.  Marc Fellenz 
notes this distinction:   
Whereas ecocentric criterion requires deep ecologists to place a prima facie 
higher value on the lives and interests of members of endangered species, animal 
advocates, while not insensitive to the issues of species extinction, generally have 
been hesitant to follow suit for fear of violating principles of moral quality.
298
 
 
There is thus a divide between animal advocates and deep ecologists—and most 
eco-theologians in general.  Cowdin favors the systematic side over the individual side.
299
  
                                               
295 See Shults, Reforming Theological Anthropology.  
296 For considerations, see Northcott, The Environment and Christian Ethics, 116-121.Shults 
addresses how the turn to relationality permits a rethinking of theological anthropology. See Shults, 
Reforming Theological Anthropology. Of course, one cannot discuss this theological turn to relationality 
without mentioning John Zizioulas. See his classic work, John Zizioulas, Being as Communion: Studies in 
Personhood and the Church (New York: Crestwood, 1985). Based on his relational ontology, Zizioulas 
states elsewhere, “There is no model for the proper relation between communion and otherness either for 
the Church or for the human being other than the Trinitarian God.” John D. Zizioulas, Communion and 
Otherness: Further Studies in Personhood and the Church, Paul McPartlan, editor (New York: T&T Clark, 
2006), 4. Also, in his work on the Trinity in contemporary theology, Stanley Grenz devotes an entire 
chapter to what he calls the “Triumph of Relationality.” Stanley Grenz, Rediscovering the Triune God: The 
Trinity in Contemporary Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2004), chapter 4. Grenz explores the work 
of Leonardo Boff, Zizioulas, and Catherine Mowry LaCugna. Other examples of the relational 
interpretation of imago Dei include Mark S. Medley, Imago Trinitas: Toward a Relational Understanding 
of Becoming Human (New York: University Press of America, 2002); Guthrie, Christian Doctrine, 197-
210; Daniel Migliore, Faith Seeking Understanding: An Introduction to Christian Theology, second edition 
(Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2004), 141; David H. Kelsey, “Human Being,” 
177; Hanson, Introduction to Christian Theology, 84-85.  
297 Though, this move is by no means necessary. See, for instance, Webb, “Ecology vs. The 
Peaceable Kingdom,” 239-40. 
298 Fellenz, The Moral Menagerie, 163. 
299 Cowdin, “The Moral Status of Otherkind in Christian Ethics,” 268. 
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He is thus critical of animal rights thinkers like Linzey who emphasize the moral standing 
of individual creatures.  For Cowdin, “exclusive moral concern for individual animals 
becomes incoherent at the level of land management.”300  
The import of this distinction for the formulation of ethical principles can hardly 
be overstated.
301
  For instance, Drummond writes that Leopold’s ethic  
began to challenge the focus on the individuals’ needs…His focus on the 
ecological whole showed an underlying philosophical holism, so that hunting and 
other activities were still permitted as long as the ecology was not disturbed.
302
   
 
While Leopold’s land ethic emphasizes the import of considering a violation of “the 
integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community” as morally illicit,303 there is no 
inherent wrong in taking the life of an individual in that community.  Thus, Wennberg 
rightly notes that the  
environmentalist is fundamentally concerned with the preservation of animal 
species and with the role of animals in delicately functioning ecosystems, whereas 
the fundamental concern of the animal advocate is with the individual animal and 
its welfare.
304
  
 
Northcott argues that the tension concerning the primary unit of moral concern 
establishes a divide between rights advocates, who tend to “privilege competition over 
co-operation, individuals over collectivities and moral claims over moral relationships 
and responsibilities,” and other forms of ecological ethics.305  Thus, whereas Leopold 
                                               
300 Ibid., 271. 
301 See, on this point, Wennberg, God, Humans, and Animals, 32-57. 
302 Drummond, Eco-Theology, 33. 
303 Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac—and Sketches Here and There (New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press, 1987), 224. 
304 Wennberg, God, Humans, and Animals, 32-33. 
305 Northcott, The Environment and Christian Ethics, 102. 
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emphasizes the group or the system, animal rights activists like Tom Regan emphasize 
the individual “subject of a life” as the basic unit of moral concern.306   
Lisa Sideris wavers on this division.  She notes that  
ecotheologians tend to speak in broad terms of liberating and healing ‘life’ in 
general or ‘nature’ as a whole, whereas Singer and Regan typically focus on 
animals only, and often their concern if directed toward the plight of animals in 
very particular circumstances.  Ecotheologians express much greater interest in, 
and concern for, the well-being of a large, ecological ‘community’ of organisms 
or as a ‘web of life’ (although they fail to understand why this focus is 
inconsistent with an ethic of liberation or care for each individual ‘subject’ within 
that community).
307
  
 
This claim by Sideris seems to be at odds with her assessment only a few pages later in 
which she states that ecotheologians ignore the debate regarding the ethical primacy of 
the individual versus that of the whole and “continue to concern themselves with issues 
of animal suffering, sentience, and liberation.”308  Is Sideris suggesting that an 
environmental holism cannot concern itself with the suffering of individual animals?  Or 
is she saying that ecotheologians give primacy to individuals?  She seems to suggest just 
this point later, writing that “many ecotheologians view ecosystems as subordinate to the 
needs of the individual members (human and nonhuman) of the community.”309  But does 
not this claim contradict her earlier claim about eco-theology’s holistic emphasis?  This 
inconsistency aside, it seems to me her critique is that eco-theology is, on the whole, 
unaware that there is a tension here at all.  That is, they write as if there were no conflict 
between the interests of individuals and the interest of the whole.  That said, most 
ecotheologians still write in a manner that emphasizes the whole, even if this emphasis is 
                                               
306 See Tom Regan, The Case for Animals Rights, second edition (Berkley, CA: University of 
California Press, 2004), 243-50. 
307 Sideris, Environmental Ethics, 132. 
308 Ibid., 135. 
309 Ibid., 227. 
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ultimately inconsistent.  Furthermore, they tend to promote a conservationist ethics, 
which favors the whole over the individual. As Sideris herself notes, both Ruether and 
McFague shy away from vegetarianism, which seems a logical outcome of their radically 
egalitarian claims.
310
  
It ought to be noted that there is not an “either/or” with regard to the question of 
value.  One can value intrinsically individuals, species, eco-systems, the land, and natural 
processes.
311
  The issue is not one of intrinsic value, but of the primary unit of value—the 
“locus of rights or value.”312 For one cannot hold both the individual creature and the 
species/ecosystem/cosmos to be the primary unit of moral value and concern, since the 
good of individuals and the good of the whole are at least often at odds with one 
another.
313
 
Given this divide in the field, should there not be another dimension added to my 
coordinate plane?  It would contain a Z-axis—evident in Illustration I – 3—representing 
the tension between the general (e.g., species, eco-systems, etc.) and the particular (e.g., 
individual nonhuman plants and animals). 
 
 
 
 
                                               
310 Ibid., 78. 
311 Wennberg, God, Humans, and Animals, 35-36. 
312 Ibid., 35. 
313 Ibid., 36. For many eco-theologians, the notion of interdependence holds together the good of 
the system with the good of its individual members, as if there were no longer a conflict between the 
general and the particular. Gustafson is critical of this view. See Gustafson, Ethics from a Theocentric 
Perspective, 2:239-43. Sideris is critical of such views, noting that “ecosystem interdependence is seen as a 
solution to a set of problems—the problem of suffering, power asymmetries, and domination that have 
attended our efforts to abstract ourselves from the web of life…but for Darwin struggle and competition 
were the very strands out of which the web of life was woven. In this sense interdependence is not so much 
a solution to strife and suffering as it is a source of it.” Sideris, Environmental Ethics, 221. This critique is, 
in my view, a good one. Its corollary is the recognition that “ecotheologians’ interpretation of 
interdependence fails to recognize that the good of the parts and the good of the whole cannot be 
harmonized.” Sideris, Environmental Ethics, 265. 
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Illustration I – 3 
 
 
It seems that this three-dimensional plane should elicit eight, as opposed to four, 
paradigms of eco-theological ethics.  The reason I do not find it necessary to present this 
project within such a framework is that my research has yielded, with regard to the 
question of the primary unit of moral concern within the nonhuman creation, certain 
tendencies among the already existing paradigms with regard to this tension.
314
   
With regard to the nonhuman creation, anthropocentric worldviews tend to 
emphasize the general.  When the central concern is the well-being of human individuals, 
it is not all that important whether an individual cow lives or dies.  However, the cow as a 
                                               
314 I emphasize here the nonhuman creation because, with regard to humans, anthropocentric 
paradigms tend to emphasize the individual. It is only with regard to nonhumans that the general 
overshadows the particular in ethical matters. Wennberg touches on this point when he juxtaposes deep 
ecology, sentientism, and traditional (anthropocentric) moral frameworks. For the latter, “ethical 
individualism applies to humans and ethical holism applies to animals.” For sentientism, “ethical 
individualism applies to both humans and animals.” For deep ecology, “ethical holism applies to both 
humans and animals.” Wennberg, God, Humans, and Animals, 44-45.  
This point is qualified in Roman Catholicism with its emphasis on the common good. See David 
Hollenbach, The Common Good and Christian Ethics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
Even so, the magisterial position of the Roman Catholic Church remains that each individual human’s 
dignity is inviolable in all cases. For example, the second Vatican council affirms the “growing awareness 
of the exalted dignity proper to the human person, since he stands above all things, and his rights and duties 
are universal and inviolable.” Gaudium et Spes, 26 (emphasis added). Thus, there is a stark differentiation 
between the individual human in relation to the human community and the individual nonhuman in relation 
to the species, ecosystem, or cosmos.  
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species out to be protected because it provides sustenance for the present human 
community (and will continue to do so for future generations).  Likewise, a beautiful 
creature that is endangered will be protected so that future generations can appreciate the 
beauty of that species.   
In a similar manner, conservationist worldviews emphasize the general.  The 
mechanisms of evolutionary emergence, after all, do not evince much concern for 
individual creatures, which die all the time—and often in horrific deaths.  Even so, the 
system as a whole trudges forward in all its complexity and diversity.  Hence, the 
conservationist tends to accept the loss of the nonhuman individual for the sake of the 
species, the eco-system, or the cosmos as a whole.
315
  This position reflects the 
evolutionary process itself, as Daniel Deffenbaugh notes:  
From an evolutionary perspective, the isolated organism is merely a token, a 
representative, which plays a small part in the propagation of a living historical 
form: the species. This is the real unity of evolution and therefore the more 
significant reality which demands human respect.
316
 
 
Theologically speaking, only the combination of cosmocentrism and 
transfiguration tends to emphasize the particular, positing individual creatures as the 
basic unit of moral concern.  This point will become further evident in chapters two 
through four.  For now, it suffices to note that the introduction of the tension between the 
general and particular (the Z-axis) does not necessarily change the four paradigms, as 
each tends strongly toward one direction of that axis (as displayed in Illustration I – 4 
                                               
315 A conservationist might be inclined to respond that individuals can only exist within the 
system. Thus, protecting the system is the best means of protecting its individual inhabitants. After all, if 
one saves an individual but wrecks an eco-system in the process, countless other individuals will die. This 
point must be conceded. But it still stands that the loss of a particular individual (e.g., this elephant) is 
acceptable (and indeed inevitable) for the sake of the system.   
316 Daniel G. Deffenbaugh, “Toward Thinking Like a Mountain: The Evolution of an Ecological 
Conscience,” Soundings 78/2 (Summer 1995), 255. 
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below).  For this reason, I will maintain the four paradigms while noting each paradigm’s 
tendency concerning the primary unit of moral concern. 
Illustration I – 4 
 
 
RATIONALE FOR ENGAGING PARTICULAR THEOLOGIANS AND PROJECT OUTLINE 
Here, I seek to explain why I have chosen certain theological voices as 
representatives of these paradigms as opposed to other voices.  This point is mainly 
methodological as it pertains to the scope and nature of my research.  Next, I provide a 
brief outline of this project.   
WHY THESE THEOLOGIANS? 
I have already noted which theologians I will engage for each paradigm.  My 
choice of these theologians has mainly to do with my previous research.  This project is 
the culmination of years of exploration through various voices with regard to eco-
theological ethics, particularly concerning nonhuman animals.  As I explored the work of 
those like Aquinas, Moltmann, and Linzey, I began to note what I perceived to be the 
most important differences between them.  The discovery of Aquinas’s value for 
conservation helped me to distinguish between approaches commensurable with Aquinas 
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and those that emphasize the transfigurative dimension of Christian thought.  Aquinas 
also taught me that practical anthropocentrism (within a theocentric framework) is not 
incompatible with a strong eco-theological ethics of conservation.   
As I explored the work of creation spiritualists and other cosmocentric thinkers, I 
felt unsettled by their ecological ethics that sought only to preserve the integrity of the 
natural order.
317
  Such a view seemed to me to overlook the central import of eschatology 
for Christian theology.  It was in these encounters that I came to the personal conclusion 
that a shift to cosmocentrism was not theologically sufficient.  As I read the work of 
Thomas Berry, I saw a clear expression of the issues that had only partially formed in my 
mind up to that point.   
At first, I intended only three paradigms of eco-theological ethics.  I expected to 
include all Orthodox thought in a large category of transfiguration that stood in tension 
with conservationist paradigms.  When I began to read the work of Maximus the 
Confessor, Dumitru Staniloae, and John Meyendorff, however, I realized that 
transfiguration and anthropocentrism were not mutually exclusive terms.  It was then that 
I included a fourth paradigm.   
Finally, my first interactions with both Moltmann and Linzey occurred early in 
my explorations into animal theology and ethics.  I found both of them important 
expressions of my own theological and ethical leanings.  Yet it was only when I was able 
to juxtapose them to the aforementioned thinkers that I understood the potential 
significance of their contributions.   
                                               
317 One important development for me was hearing Calvin DeWitt give a series of talks years ago. 
He was a conservationist, marveling at the predatory nature of the cosmos. I felt quite unsettled by his 
position. It was during this experience that I first realized the extent to which eco-theological ethics could 
differ from one another.  
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This brief rationale reveals that my proposed categories of eco-theological ethics 
arose from inductive searches into individual theologians.  After having moved from 
individual examples to the general paradigms, I thought it best to return to the thinkers 
who most influenced this generalization.  Such a return would enable me to take the 
reader on a similar journey that I experienced.  It is for this reason that I emphasize these 
particular theologians.   
PROJECT OUTLINE 
In chapter one of this work, I delineate three of the four eco-theological 
paradigms, using the dimensions of cosmology, anthropology, and eschatology explored 
above as an interpretive key.  The first paradigm is anthropocentric conservation.  It is 
skillfully represented in the work of Thomas Aquinas and constitutes the dominant strand 
of eco-theological ethics in Western Christianity.  With regard to anthropocentrism, this 
ethics maintains that humans possess an essentially unique dignity.  The entire nonhuman 
creation, lacking this unique dignity, constitutes a good and ordered network of resources 
that has been gifted by God for the well-being of the entire human community, including 
future generations.  Ethically, then, humans must conserve the nonhuman network of 
resources for the sake of all humans.   
The second eco-theological paradigm is cosmocentric conservation.  It is 
powerfully represented in the writings of the Passionist priest, Thomas Berry.  With 
regard to conservation, this ethics de-emphasizes the need for eschatological redemption 
by claiming that the current order of the nonhuman world, including its continuing 
evolutionary emergence, is fully good.  With regard to cosmocentrism, all living 
creatures—and indeed the earth itself—constitute the community of creation that God 
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values intrinsically.  Hence, conservation is not merely for human benefit.  Ethically, 
humans must engage in both a gracious “letting be” of the world and a reverential “living 
with” all of its inhabitants.   
The third paradigm is anthropocentric transfiguration.  It is most evident in the 
writings of certain Eastern Orthodox writers, including the Romanian priest Dumitru 
Staniloae.  In this view, the telos of the entire creation is transfiguration, which, in light 
of the Fall, entails eschatological redemption.  However, the role of the nonhuman 
creation in the eschaton is to be the eternal sacrament for the divine-human drama.  The 
paradigm is thus anthropocentric in that the transfiguration of the nonhuman creation is 
for the sake of humanity in relation to God.  In the present, humans bear the ethical 
responsibility to act as priests over the sacramental world by offering it back to God 
through reverential use.   
These three paradigms of eco-theological ethics point toward the possibility of a 
fourth: cosmocentric transfiguration.  In chapters two and three I engage (respectively) 
Moltmann and Linzey, in order to highlight the broad parameters of this paradigm.  
Chapter two is devoted to Moltmann, whose work provides theological foundations for 
this ethics by advocating hope for an eschatological panentheism in which the Trinity and 
the world, including every individual creature, will interpenetrate one another in eternity.  
Thus every instantiation of life will experience God’s eternal peace.  Furthermore, this 
future is, on the one hand, realized concretely in the incarnation, in which Christ becomes 
the redeemer of evolution, and, on the other hand, cosmically inaugurated through the 
presence of the Spirit.  Hope for this future motivates humans to witness proleptically to 
it in the present.  Chapter three is devoted to Linzey, whose work provides theological 
79 
 
foundations for cosmocentric transfiguration by appealing to the dominant view in 
Christian history that the cosmos is in disarray.  For Linzey, all sentient creatures endure 
the consequences of sin, in particular suffering, and therefore long for redemption.  In 
Christ, God reveals a willingness to suffer with and for all creatures by taking on flesh, 
suffering, and death.  In doing so God dies the death of all sentient beings.  Yet his 
resurrection adumbrates their eschatological resurrection and thus their freedom from the 
effects of sin.  For Linzey, Christians who live peacefully toward individual animals, 
especially by engaging in vegetarianism, approximate the eschaton through their witness.   
Having delineated fully the taxonomy of eco-theological ethics and emphasized 
the contours of cosmocentric transfiguration, in chapter four I engage in a critical 
comparison of Moltmann and Linzey, both theologically and ethically.  At the 
intersection of their eco-theological frameworks, I constructively develop the paradigm 
of cosmocentric transfiguration. In this, I attempt to take seriously insights from the 
natural sciences—particularly a Darwinian evolution—and theology—particularly 
cosmic eschatology.  I also apologetically defend this paradigm against potential 
critiques.  Ultimately, the vision that emerges from this paradigm is one in which humans 
bear responsibility to witness proleptically to the maximally inclusive eschatological 
hope of the cosmos.  Such a witness entails increasing practices of peace and diminishing 
practices that elicit suffering for both the earth and its human and nonhuman inhabitants. 
OTHER METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
In this final section, I aim to address other issues regarding this project.  I begin 
with a consideration of terminology.  Next, I offer a word of caution concerning the 
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endeavor of categorization.  Finally, I present a methodological caveat regarding my 
constructive work in comparison to the other paradigms.   
ANIMAL-TALK 
In Andrew Linzey’s view, terminology for nonhuman animals (e.g., brutes, pests, 
beasts, etc.) has perpetuated abuse.  Even the term “animal” “is itself a term of abuse” 
because it “hides the reality of what it purports to describe, namely, a range of 
differentiated beings of startling variety and complexity.”318  Linzey sees one of the 
challenges of the animal theology/rights movement as the advancement of terms that do 
not perpetuate oversimplification or denigration to nonhuman creatures.  Similarly, 
Northcott suggests that both deep ecology and process theology run the risk of “a 
homogenising view of the natural world” that “undermines the legitimate difference and 
otherness of the different orders of matter and life in the cosmos.”319  Such a danger has 
also been highlighted by the continental philosopher Jacques Derrida.
320
 
It is thus important to address the language I will use concerning animals in this 
project.
321
  I use terms such as “nonhuman creation” and “nonhuman animal.”  While I 
acknowledge that these terms run the risk of downplaying the differences among 
nonhumans, I use them mainly to highlight the traditional separation between the two 
categories of corporeal creation: human and nonhuman.  The use of “nonhuman” is meant 
mainly to express the reality that human beings are part of creation, and more specifically 
of the animal kingdom.  I am not aiming at the homogenization of the nonhuman 
                                               
318 Linzey, Why Animal Suffering Matters, 44-45. 
319 Northcott, The Environment and Christian Ethics, 150. 
320 Jacques Derrida, “The Animal That Therefore I Am,” printed in The Animal That Therefore I 
Am, Marie-Louise Mallet, editor, translated by David Wills (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), 
29-35, 47-48. 
321 For an enlightening discussion on this topic, see Wennberg, God, Animals, and Humans, 23-26. 
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creation.  As evidence, I will at times consider more specifically the role of sentience, 
consciousness, and life, as differentiating elements within the nonhuman cosmos.  Most 
often, however, I use more generalized terms in order to participate in traditional 
conversations.  The reader should be aware of my intention with these uses.    
THE DANGERS (AND PROMISES) OF PROPOSING A TAXONOMY 
Categories always risk (and perhaps inevitably end in) oversimplification.  They 
furthermore hazard inadequacies and inaccuracies.  I want here to highlight my 
awareness of these dangers.  What I offer in this project is my interpretation of particular 
theologians and my categorization of those interpretations into a taxonomy of paradigms 
that I have constructed.  Whether or not the individual theologians (or those who have 
spent many years studying their work) would agree with my categorization is open to 
debate.  For this reason, I offer this project not as the “final word” but as a beginning 
word—the opening for a clearer dialogue concerning eco-theological ethics.  Said more 
frankly, I do not harbor the hubris of thinking I have perfectly and without remainder 
defined all eco-theological possibilities.  
These issues notwithstanding, taxonomies such as the one I am proposing offer 
promise to the field.  For even if other scholars disagree with my classification, the act of 
classifying itself opens the door for further dialogue regarding the criteria used to 
structure the taxonomy.  Furthermore, it allows to other thinkers in the field to examine 
their own positions vis-à-vis the new taxonomy.  In this sense, a well-structured 
taxonomy aids in the clarification of the field.    
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THE SUPERIORITY OF COSMOCENTRIC TRANSFIGURATION? 
Lastly, I want to acknowledge my experiential bias.  I find the paradigm of 
cosmocentric transfiguration to be the most satisfying of those presented here.  However, 
that does not mean that I find the other paradigms to be objectively wrong or inadequate.  
While in my conclusion I will make a case that cosmocentric transfiguration offers a 
vision that accounts for both theological doctrines and scientific evidence, I do not 
maintain that it is in any sense the only—or even the obvious—choice for Christian eco-
theological ethics.   
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CHAPTER 1 
SITUATING COSMOCENTRIC TRANSFIGURATION:  
EXPLORING THE OTHER PARADIGMS 
 
In order to situate the paradigm of eco-theological ethics of cosmocentric 
transfiguration, I must first delineate the fundamental tenets of its counterparts.  It is my 
aim, in doing so, to avoid fully abstract presentations of the theological foundations of 
these alternate ethics.  Thus, my approach for each paradigm will begin by identifying, in 
an introductory fashion, the overall schema of these views with regard to anthropology, 
cosmology, and eschatology.  Then, I will spend the majority of my effort engaging 
particular theologians in order to present concretized examples of the paradigms. 
ANTHROPOCENTRIC CONSERVATION: HUMAN COMMUNITY AND NONHUMAN 
RESOURCES 
Three core principles inform anthropocentric conservation.  First, the nonhuman 
creation exists, in the temporal realm, for the sake of humanity.  Second, the nonhuman 
creation exists, in the temporal realm, for the entire human community, both present and 
future.  Third, the eschatological telos of sharing in God’s own life is reserved for 
rational creatures (and the elements/matter necessary to facilitate this telos).   
In this schema, the role of the human creature is to use properly the gift of the 
cosmos, which entails taking account of both the telos of that cosmos (temporally, as an 
ordered source of sustenance and divine revelation for the entire human community) and 
the human creature (temporally, a life of virtue in community before God, and ultimately, 
a sharing in God’s own eternal life).  Thus the role of the nonhuman creation is that of a 
good and ordered network of resources or gifts that exist for the well-being of all humans 
on their journey toward their essentially unique and ultimate telos.   
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THOMAS AQUINAS’S ECO-THEOLOGICAL ETHICS OF ANTHROPOCENTRIC CONSERVATION 
The various foundations of this view have numerous representatives in the 
Christian tradition
 
.
1
  However, it is Thomas Aquinas who gives this theological ethics 
one of its clearest expressions.  Aquinas’s monumental genius commands respect.  His 
appropriation of Aristotelian philosophy; his heavy reliance on major Christian thinkers 
like Augustine, Dionysius, and Peter Lombard; his mastery of Christian scripture; and his 
engagement with medieval Jewish (e.g., Maimonides) and Muslim (e.g., Avicenna) 
philosophers provides a coherent framework of faith and practice from his historical 
context.
2
   
Given Thomas’s lasting and significant impact on Christian thought, his work has 
elicited a large corpus of secondary literature, even with regard to focused issues like 
eco-theological ethics.  Hence, establishing Aquinas as a concrete example of 
anthropocentric conservation requires first situating his theological framework within this 
corpus.  This move will allow me to dialogue with the secondary literature as I engage 
Aquinas’s writings.   
The Controversy over Aquinas’s Eco-Theological Contribution 
When it comes to Aquinas’s potential contribution for widening concern for 
ecological issues, scholars provide a diverse interpretative spectrum.  Many of these 
interpretations follow Lynn White’s 1967 essay in which he posits the accusation that 
                                               
1 See Gary Steiner, Anthropocentrism and Its Discontents: The Moral Status of Animals in the 
History of Western Philosophy (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005), 116-123; Morwenna 
Ludlow, “Power and Dominion: Patristic Interpretations of Genesis 1,” in Ecological Hermeneutics: 
Biblical, Historical and Theological Perspectives, edited by David G. Horrell, Cherryl Hunt, Christopher 
Southgate and Francesca Stavrakopoulou (New York, NY: T & T Clark, 2010), 140-153. 
2 An appreciation of Aquinas’s historical context is important for appreciating the nuances on his 
theological framework. For considerations, see Servais-Théodore Pinckaers, “The Source of Ethics of St. 
Thomas Aquinas,” in The Ethics of Aquinas, Stephen J. Pope, editor (Washington DC: Georgetown 
University Press, 2002), 17-28. 
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“Christianity is the most anthropocentric religion the world has seen.”3  In the wake of 
White’s contribution, “anthropocentrism” has become an inherently pejorative term.  This 
climate framed one of the central debates concerning Aquinas: Is his theological 
framework anthropocentric?   
Many within the animal rights movement accuse Aquinas of contributing to an 
abusive human attitude toward nonhuman animals.  Peter Singer, in his seminal Animal 
Liberation, claims that Aquinas excludes nonhuman animals from the realm of morality 
with the one exception in which harming them may result in harm to humanity.  Says 
Singer: “No argument could reveal the essence of speciesism more clearly.”4  In The 
Encyclopedia of Animal Rights and Animal Welfare, Joyce Salisbury argues that, for 
Aquinas, “here on earth there [is] no need to preserve animals that [are] seen as 
‘useless.’”5  In Richard Ryder’s estimation, Aquinas’s thought has provided the 
justification for “several centuries of outstanding cruelty” toward animals.6  In his book 
arguing for a widened scope of moral concern from within Christianity, Robert 
Wennberg claims that Aquinas adheres to a moral theory “that has no place for animals.”7     
Andrew Linzey, perhaps the leading voice in the field of animal theology, is also 
rather critical of Aquinas.  In his earlier Christianity and the Rights of Animals, Linzey 
cites Aquinas in conjunction with the “deeply anthropocentric” nature of contemporary 
                                               
3 Lynn White, “The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis,” reprinted in This Sacred Earth: 
Religion, Nature, Environment, Roger S. Gottlieb, editor (New York: NY: Routledge), 189. 
4 Peter Singer, Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for Our Treatment of Animals (New York, NY: 
Avon Books, 1975), 203-204. 
5 Joyce E. Salisbury, “Attitudes toward Animals: Changing Attitudes throughout History,” 
Encyclopedia of Animal Rights and Animal Welfare (EARW), Marc Bekoff and Carron A. Meaney, editors 
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1998), 78. On my critique of this claim, see below. 
6 Richard D. Ryder, Animal Revolution: Changing Attitudes towards Speciesism (Cambridge, MA: 
Basil Blackwell, 1989), 43. 
7 Robert N. Wennberg, God, Humans, and Animals: An Invitation to Enlarge Our Moral Universe 
(Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2003), 121.  
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Christianity.
8
  In Animal Theology, he summarizes Aquinas as follows: “Considered in 
themselves animals have no reason and no rights, and humans no responsibility to them.”9  
In Linzey’s view, Aquinas’s speciesist viewpoint “has left a bitter legacy in Christian 
theology.”10   
Other theologians have also critiqued Aquinas.  Paul Santmire balances negative 
and positive views of Christianity’s potential contribution to ecological sensitivity by 
exploring both harmful and promising voices in Christian history.
11
  He labels Aquinas’s 
theological framework as an “intramundane anthropocentrism” in which “nature is seen 
more as an object for human use, which satisfies biological needs and serves spiritual 
knowledge, than as a subject in its own right.”12   
Voices from other perspectives also depict Aquinas negatively with regard to 
animals and the environment.  David Kinsley, in his cross-cultural exploration regarding 
the convergence of the intersection of nature and spirituality, places Aquinas in the 
chapter entitled “Christianity as Ecologically Harmful.”13 Kinsley critiques Aquinas’s 
hierarchical view of the world, in which the natures of nonhuman animals “are defined in 
terms of their subservience to human beings.”14  J. Claude Evans claims that Aquinas 
represents the “classic statements of anthropocentrism.”15  Similarly, Gary Steiner, in his 
                                               
8 Andrew Linzey, Christianity and the Rights of Animals (New York, NY: Crossroad, 1987), 22. 
9 Andrew Linzey, Animal Theology (Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1995), 15. In this 
work, Linzey goes as far as to suggest that Aquinas permits humans to cause unnecessary pain to animals. 
See Linzey’s comparison of Aquinas and Humphry Primatt (17). 
10 Ibid.., 19. On Aquinas’s influence, see also 64–65.  
11 Paul Santmire, The Travail of Nature: The Ambiguous Ecological Promise of Christian 
Theology (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1985). 
12 Ibid.., 91–92. Here Santmire contrasts Aquinas with his more positive reading of Augustine. 
13 See David Kinsley, Ecology and Religion: Ecological Spirituality in Cross-Cultural Perspective 
(Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1995), 103–107. 
14 Ibid.., 109–110. Given this critique, it is not overly clear how Kinsley so effortlessly classifies 
Augustine as a positive ecological voice in Christianity (118–120).  
15 J. Claude Evans, With Respect for Nature: Living as Part of the Natural World (Albany, NY: 
State University of New York Press, 2005), viii. 
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work tracing the dominance of anthropocentrism in Western philosophy, categorizes 
Aquinas as “the apex of medieval anthropocentrism.”16  His legacy is an essential 
distinction between humans and nonhuman animals that establishes an ethics of dominion 
in which humans have no direct duties to animals.
17
   
These critiques of Aquinas tend towards the claim that he contributes to a milieu 
enabling ecological degradation by advocating an anthropocentrism that renders the 
nonhuman world a resource for human benefit.  In response to such accusations, 
defenders of Aquinas have sought to highlight his cosmological theocentrism.  This 
response challenges simplistic charges of anthropocentrism in Aquinas’s theological 
framework.   
In the introduction to Creaturely Theology, Celia Deane-Drummond and David 
Clough critique Linzey’s edited volume Animals on the Agenda because, in their view, its 
historical investigations are structured only “to set up certain theologians as instigators 
and culprits of a negative attitude toward animals.”18  This critique is no doubt aimed in 
part at Dorothy Yamamoto’s essay on Aquinas.19  As a remedy to such allegedly biased 
interpretations of Thomas, Drummond and Clough turn to John Berkman’s essay in their 
                                               
16 Steiner, Anthropocentrism and Its Discontents, 126. 
17 Ibid.., 130–131.  
18 See Celia Deane-Drummond and David Clough, “Introduction,” in Creaturely Theology: On 
God, Humans and Other Animals, Celia Deane-Drummond and David Clough, editors (London: SCM 
Press, 2009), 6–7. See Dorothy Yamamoto, “Aquinas and Animals: Patrolling the Boundary?” in Animals 
on the Agenda: Questions about Animal Ethics for Theology and Ethics, Andrew Linzey and Dorothy 
Yamamoto, editors (Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1998), 80–89.     
19 Yamamoto attempts to critique presuppositions in Aquinas’s thought on two fronts: (1) the 
ability to observe nature purely and objectively and thereby derive universal moral principles and (2) the 
establishment of an essential and unproblematic line of demarcation between all humans and all 
nonhumans. Yamamoto critiques the first presupposition from a consideration of the historically-located 
observing subject. She critiques the second by acknowledging again the location of the observing subject, 
the ambiguity in the larger tradition, and deeper understandings of animal life in modern thought. See 
Yamamoto, “Aquinas and Animals,” 80–89. 
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text as a “critical, but far more sensitive, reading of Aquinas.”20  Berkman acknowledges 
Aquinas’s justification of human utility of the nonhuman creation in the temporal order.  
But he quickly qualifies this acknowledgement with an affirmation of Aquinas’s 
theocentrism.  Berkman ultimately argues that, for Aquinas, “God’s plan in creation…is 
by no means anthropocentric.”21      
In Anne Clifford’s view, “a major part of Aquinas’s legacy to the Roman Catholic 
tradition is his sacramental view of material creation.”22  In light of this view, Clifford 
argues that critiques of Aquinas’s anthropocentrism are viable only when passages from 
his writings are “read in total isolation from other passages in which he affirms the 
inherent goodness of all creatures as unique manifestations of the Trinity and if his 
theology is interpreted ahistorically.”23   
Drummond claims that Aquinas’s affirmation that “creation is an expression of 
God’s wisdom” suggests that God’s wisdom is still at work in the ongoing processes of 
the created order.
24
  She acknowledges that his understanding of the cosmos requires 
adjustment in light of evolutionary biology.
25
  Even so, Drummond defends Aquinas 
against “simplistic” views that criticize his damaging influence on eco-theological 
thought by acknowledging the interplay between grace and nature in his theology.
26
 
                                               
20 Drummond and Clough, “Introduction,” 7. 
21 John Berkman, “Towards a Thomistic Theology of Animality,” in Creaturely Theology: On 
God, Humans and Other Animals, Celia Deane-Drummond and David Clough, editors (London: SCM 
Press, 2009), 24. Berkman goes on to offer a fine exploration of Aquinas’s understanding of nonhuman 
animal capacities (25–33).  
22 Anne Clifford, “Foundations for a Catholic Ecological Theology of God,” in “And God Saw 
That It Was Good”: Catholic Theology and the Environment, Drew Christiansen and Walter Grazer, editors 
(Washington, DC: United States Catholic Conference, 1996), 38. 
23 Clifford, “Foundations,” 40. Clifford’s critique is specifically aimed at Santmire (see 46, n. 44).  
24 Celia Deane-Drummond, Eco-Theology (Winona, MN: Anselm Academic, 2008), 159. 
25 Ibid.. 
26 See Ibid.., 103–104, 213–214, n. 23. 
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Jame Schaefer acknowledges and concedes accusations of anthropocentrism in 
Aquinas’s theology.27  However, she also criticizes such accusations, claiming that they 
“have not been explored sufficiently from several perspectives,” the dominant of which is 
contextual differences between modern readers and ancient writers.  Schaefer continues: 
“Nor do these criticisms take into consideration the constraints that patristic and medieval 
theologians imposed on human use of Earth’s constituents and their teachings about the 
faithful’s responsibility to their neighbors and to God for how they regard and use other 
creatures.”28    
William French is also a qualified defender of Aquinas.
29
  French concedes that 
Aquinas’s instrumental view of animals in conjunction with his refusal to extend to them 
direct moral concern “helped establish a tradition of misnaming which has plagued 
Catholic moral theology until only very recently.”30  Even so, French laments simplistic 
critiques of Aquinas that miss his cosmological theocentrism.  He sees in Aquinas’s 
theological framework an interconnected cosmos in which each part contributes to the 
good of the whole, which has God as its final telos.
31
   
In a collection of essays deriving from a research project at the University of 
Exeter, Mark Wynn begins by examining both critical (e.g. Linzey) and sympathetic (e.g. 
Drummond) readings of Aquinas.
32
  Wynn contextualizes Aquinas’s anthropocentrism 
                                               
27 Jame Schaefer, Theological Foundations for Environmental Ethics: Reconstructing Patristic & 
Medieval Concepts (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2009), 8–9. 
28 Ibid.., 9. 
29 See, for instance, William French, “Catholicism and the Common Good,” in An Ecology of the 
Spirit, ed. Michael Barnes, (University Press of America Press, 1993), 182–83, 191; French, “Beast 
Machines and the Technocratic Reduction of Life,” in Good News for Animals? Christian Approaches to 
Animal Well-Being, eds. Charles Pinches and Jay B. McDaniel (New York: Orbis Books, 1993), 24–43. 
30 French, “Beast-Machines,” 37.  
31 Ibid.., 37–38. 
32 Mark Wynn, “Thomas Aquinas: Reading the Idea of Dominion in the Light of the Doctrine of 
Creation” in Ecological Hermeneutics: Biblical, Historical and Theological Perspectives, David G. 
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within his cosmological theocentrism.
33
  Creatures, in their variety of being, reflect God’s 
subsistent existence (i.e., that God is being itself).  This reflection constitutes the good of 
the cosmos as a holistic system, of which all things are integrally a part and nothing is 
without meaning.  Hence, the individual parts of the created order have a good telos that, 
in Wynn’s estimation, “cannot simply consist in their service to human beings.”34  
Rather, Wynn claims that “the fulfilment of the nature of ‘lesser’ creatures, and even of 
non-animate creatures, can count as a good, even when this results in a human being 
suffering some deprivation of good.”35   
Willis Jenkins also laments overly simplistic critiques of Aquinas.  From the 
perspective of soteriology—as opposed to cosmology—Jenkins offers Aquinas as an 
influential foundation for ecojustice, a view which he claims is dominant in the Roman 
Catholic tradition and draws on the notion of sanctifying grace.
36
  Ultimately, Jenkins 
seeks to  
demonstrate that [Aquinas] escapes facile categorization by cosmological 
centrisms.  Instead he harmonizes (or resists the use of) anthropocentrism, 
theocentrism, and ecocentrism, precisely because he sees that God chooses to 
move creation to Godself by inviting humans into a friendship shaped by their 
intimacy with all creation.
37
   
 
In Jenkins’s view, “those who think that Thomas’s anthropocentrism offers only 
problems for environmental theology miss the way he sets humans within a cosmos of 
creatures bearing their own integrity.”38  Within this integrity, all creatures bear a 
                                                                                                                                            
Horrell, Cherryl Hunt, Christopher Southgate and Francesca Stavrakopoulou, editors (New York, NY: T & 
T Clark, 2010), 154–167. 
33 Ibid.., 156–162. 
34 Ibid.., 157. 
35 Ibid.., 162. 
36 Willis Jenkins, Ecologies of Grace: Environmental Ethics and Christian Theology (New York, 
NY: Oxford University Press, 2008), 16–17. 
37 Ibid.., 150. 
38 Ibid.., 118. 
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“common dignity” inasmuch as they seek the good together as a whole.39  For humans, 
unique in the created order, desire for God includes knowing the world and using it 
properly, primarily in the contemplative sense.
40
  Thus humanity acquires, through grace, 
an “ecological literacy.”41  Such literacy requires a genuine engagement with the created 
order—which Jenkins defines as charity.  Thus, for Jenkins, charity qualifies Aquinas’s 
anthropocentrism with a theocentrism in that virtuous humans will view creation as an 
invitation to divine friendship.
42
   
In my view, almost all of the interpretations of Aquinas’s eco-theological 
potential bear some dimension of truth.  At the same time, most of them also contain a 
certain lack of clarity.
43
  Aquinas’s critics tend to miss his sacramental understanding of 
the nonhuman world and the impact this understanding has for human behavior.  
Aquinas’s defenders often too easily sidestep his anthropocentric tendencies and sanctify 
his work with an appeal to either context or theocentrism.
44
  In what follows, I will 
engage Thomas’s writings, particular his summas, to provide an example for the 
theological foundations for anthropocentric conservation.  When necessary, I will defend 
where my interpretation clashes with voices in the secondary literature.  
Theological Foundations for Aquinas’s Anthropocentrism  
                                               
39 Ibid.., 123. 
40 Ibid.., 125–127. 
41 Ibid.., 127. 
42 Ibid.., 142. 
43 Perhaps the greatest exception to this lack of clarity is the work of Francisco Benzoni. He quite 
brilliantly examines the foundations for Aquinas’s exclusion of the nonhuman creation from direct moral 
concern and critiques one of the central pillars of this foundation, anthropology. See Francisco J. Benzoni, 
Ecological Ethics and the Human Soul: Aquinas, Whitehead, and the Metaphysics of Value (Notre Dame, 
IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), parts I and II. 
44 As with all great thinkers, the tradition that follows Aquinas (i.e., the Thomistic tradition) is not 
necessarily the same as his original thought. Thus, a contemporary expression of eco-theological ethics 
could draw on the Thomistic tradition while at once not accounting for every dimension of Aquinas’s 
thought. My evaluations of the aforementioned positions are with reference to Aquinas’s original thought, 
not necessarily the tradition that follows.  
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For Aquinas, the multiplicity of formal distinctions in the created order is an 
aspect of the goodness of the cosmos.
45
  However, “formal distinction always requires 
inequality” (ST, 1.47.2).  Thus Aquinas affirms a hierarchical order within the cosmos.  
Within this hierarchy, Aquinas posits three classifications of soul: vegetative, sensitive, 
and rational.
46
  Connected to these souls are the attributes of nutrition, sentience, and 
reason, respectively.
47
  The human soul possesses the qualities of both the vegetative and 
sensitive souls; but it augments and excels them on account of rationality.
48
  For Aquinas, 
it is this unique rational dimension of the human creature that constitutes the imago Dei.
49
   
Aquinas’s delineation of the hierarchical order of creation translates into a hierarchy 
of teloi.
50
  The human has a two-fold telos.
51
  The first pertains to temporal matters.  The 
second is the ultimate telos of humanity, which Aquinas defines as “happiness” (ST, 
1ǀ2.1.8).52  For Aquinas, “God alone constitutes man’s happiness” (ST, 1ǀ2.2.8).  Thus, 
God is the ultimate telos of the human creature.  Moreover, God is the end of every 
individual human creature in a manner unique to humanity’s nature.  For the rational 
                                               
45 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica (hereafter ST), Translated by Fathers of the English 
Dominican Province (Benziger Brothers, 1947), 1.5.3 (subsequent quote references will appear in the text 
in parentheses). Furthermore, creatures are good (and indeed have being) only by participating in God’s 
own goodness (and therefore God’s own being). However, for Aquinas all beings participate in God’s 
goodness in diverse ways. This participation determines the level of their perfection. See ST, 1.44.1; 47.2.   
46 See ST, 1.78.1. See also Judith Barad, Aquinas on the Nature and Treatment of Animals (San 
Francisco: International Scholars Publication, 1995), 29–30.  
47 Aquinas ascribes three types of power to the vegetative soul: nutritive, augmentative, and 
generative. See ST, 1.79.2. On the lack of rationality of all nonhuman animals, see ST, 1.78.1; Summa 
Contra Gentiles (hereafter SCG), Joseph Kenny, editor (New York: Hanover House, 1955–57), II.66.  
48 On the difference of animal capacities in both animals and humans see ST, 1.78.4; 1.79.6; 
1.81.3. The human contains all dimensions of the soul because she is both corporeal and incorporeal, a 
microcosmic being that “is in a manner composed of all things” (1.91.1; also 1.96.2). And for Aquinas, 
“what belongs to the inferior nature pre-exists more perfectly in the superior” (1.76.5).      
49 Aquinas claims that all creatures bear a likeness to God in that they reveal a trace of God’s 
design. See ST, 1.45.7. Even humans, in their physical bodies, bear this trace. For nonhuman animals, the 
trace is the limit of their likeness to God. In humans, only the rational component—the mind—bears the 
likeness of God as image. See ST, 1.93.6.    
50 Concerning the link here, Benzoni states that “it is only in light of Thomas’ teleology that the 
moral import of his ontology becomes clear.” Benzoni, Ecological Ethics and the Human Soul, 41. 
51 ST, 1ǀ2.62.1. 
52 Ibid.., 1ǀ2.1.8.  
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creature, happiness is a shared life with God in which the rational soul contemplates the 
divine.
53
  Says Aquinas, “Final and perfect happiness can consist in nothing else than the 
vision of the Divine Essence” (ST, 1ǀ2.3.8).54  In short, for Aquinas, the ultimate telos 
appropriate for humans is the Beatific Vision.   
Regarding the temporal telos of humanity, Aquinas posits that an imperfect 
happiness is possible in the temporal realm.  This happiness “depends, in a way, on the 
body” (ST, 1ǀ2.4.5).  Furthermore, “For imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this 
life, external goods are necessary, not as belonging to the essence of happiness, but by 
serving as instruments to happiness, which consists in an operation of virtue” (ST, 
1ǀ2.4.7).55  This passage indicates that the temporal ends of humans (1) include care for 
the body
56
 and (2) are directed toward their ultimate end.
57
  It also reveals the centrality 
of teleology in Aquinas’s understanding of virtue.58  For a human to live virtuously in the 
temporal realm is for her to live toward her proper telos, whether temporal or ultimate.
59
  
This point will bear significance when we consider whether or not humanity’s ultimate 
telos is shared with nonhuman animals.     
                                               
53 On the communal dimension of happiness, see Bonnie Kent, “Habits and Virtues (Ia IIae, qq. 
49–70)” in The Ethics of Aquinas, Stephen J. Pope, editor (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 
2002), 126. 
54 Aquinas goes on to link happiness to “union with God.”  
55 Happiness in the temporal realm is always imperfect for Aquinas. See SCG, III.48. 
56 This dependence stems from humanity’s possession of nutritive and sentient souls. See ST, 
1.79.2.   
57 See ST, 1ǀ2.1.6. 
58 Stephen J. Pope, “Overview of the Ethics of Thomas Aquinas,” in The Ethics of Aquinas, 
Stephen J. Pope, editor (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2002), 32. Alasdair MacIntyre has 
provided important contributions to the recognition of Aquinas’s teleological view of virtue. See Alasdair 
MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, third edition (University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), 
53, 185. 
59 Like Aristotle, Aquinas understands the cardinal virtues as directed toward temporal ends. 
Aquinas, SCG, III.34–35. For Aquinas, perfection of the cardinal virtues occurs when, with and by the 
theological virtues, they are redirected to humanity’s ultimate telos. See Kent, “Habits and Virtues,” 118; 
David Hollenbach, The Common Good and Christian Ethics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2002), 123.  
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What of the telos of the nonhuman world?  For Aquinas, all life is teleological.
60
  
The telos of a creature is its good.
61
  And God is the ultimate good for the entire 
creation.
62
  Therefore, the entire creation has God as its end.  In this teleological sense, 
there is a commonality between humans and nonhumans.
63
  But God is not the telos of a 
flower in the same way that God is the telos of a human being.
64
  The foundation of this 
difference is predicated upon the formal distinctions within nature.
65
  Thus, “Reasonable 
creatures…have in some special and higher manner God as their end, since they can 
attain to Him by their own operations, by knowing and loving Him.”66   
The nonhuman creation glorifies God by acting according to the multiplicity of 
the variegated natures that compose it as a whole.
67
  Says Aquinas,   
For He brought things into being in order that His goodness might be 
communicated to creatures, and be represented by them; and because His 
goodness could not be adequately represented by one creature alone, He produced 
many and diverse creatures, that what was wanting to one in the representation of 
the divine goodness might be supplied by another.  For goodness, which in God is 
simple and uniform, in creatures is manifold and divided and hence the whole 
universe together participates the divine goodness more perfectly, and represents 
it better than any single creature whatever (ST, 1.47.1). 
 
For Aquinas, then, God is the ultimate good of the entire creation because God provides 
creatures with variegated natures predisposing them toward the appropriate teloi for 
which they live.  In living thus, the created order, in the multiplicity of its formal 
distinctions, reveals the goodness of God.
68
  Thus all life is derived from and directed 
                                               
60 ST, 1.2; SCG, III.2. See also Pope, “Overview of the Ethics of Thomas Aquinas,” 32. 
61 ST, 1.5.1.  
62
 SCG, III.17. 
63 See SCG, III.18-19; also ST, 1.4.3; 1ǀ2.1.8.  
64 See ST, 1ǀ2.1.8; SCG, III.18. 
65 See ST, 1.91.3; SCG, III.22. See also Schaefer, Theological Foundations, 22–24. 
66 ST, 1.65.2; also, 1ǀ2.1.8. 
67 ST, 1.47.2; 1.65.2. 
68 See Benzoni, Ecological Ethics and the Human Soul, 42-43. 
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toward God.  But the manner in which God is the end of nonhumans is predicated upon 
their natures.    
Of the three classes of souls Aquinas delineates (vegetative, sensitive, and 
rational), he applies greater goodness to the creatures with the capacities entailed by the 
higher souls.
69
  These creatures are more perfect than those below them; and for Aquinas, 
“the imperfect are for the use of the perfect” (ST, 1.96.1).  Because of their lower 
disposition in the hierarchy of the created order, non-rational animals are “naturally under 
slavery” (SCG, III.112).70  Thus Aquinas follows Aristotle in claiming that humans can 
hunt nonhuman animals as a “natural right” qua humans.71   
It is here that many defenders of Aquinas’s theocentrism too easily rescue him on 
account of his affirmation that the entire nonhuman creation has God as its end.  This 
claim is only true inasmuch as the nonhuman creation has God as its end for the sake of 
humanity.
72
  Thus I take issue with Berkman’s claim that, “for Aquinas, God’s plan in 
creation, while hierarchical, is by no means anthropocentric.”73  Says Aquinas, “The 
intellectual nature is the only one that is required in the universe, for its own sake, while 
all others are for its sake” (SCG, III.112.3).74  In short, the nonhuman creation is for God, 
                                               
69 SCG, III.20.3. 
70 Thomas’s view of slavery denotes that nonhuman animals are, by nature, at the disposal of 
humanity’s pursuit of the good. This pursuit must, of course, be informed by the virtues. 
71 See ST, 1.96.1. Aquinas also grounds this view in scripture. See ST, 1.91.4. 
72 See Santmire, Travail of Nature, 91; Kinsley, Religion and Ecology, 109. Benzoni qualifies this 
claim by noting a tension in Aquinas’s thought. According to Benzoni, Aquinas holds—contra Origen—
that the multiplicity of the life in the cosmos is for the perfection of the cosmos itself, as opposed to human 
well-being. Yet Aquinas’s anthropocentrism renders this perfection for the sake of human well-being—thus 
the contradiction. Benzoni claims that Aquinas’s eschatology resolves this conflict by claiming that the 
perfection of the temporal world (i.e., changing/moving world) is wholly predicated to the good of the final 
world (i.e., the incorruptible world). See Benzoni, Ecological Ethics and the Human Soul, 49-58.   
73 Berkman, “Towards a Thomistic Theology of Animality,” 24. 
74 Based on passages such as this one—even contextually considered—I find Schaefer’s position 
that Aquinas’s sacramental view of the cosmos imbues it with intrinsic value untenable. See Jame Schaefer, 
“Valuing Earth Intrinsically and Instrumentally: A Theological Framework for Environmental Ethics,” 
Theological Studies 66 (2005), 783-814. Without humanity, the created order would have no value for 
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through humanity.  In this sense, Aquinas’s cosmological theocentrism actually 
reinforces his ethical anthropocentrism; for the justification of humanity’s use of 
nonhuman animals is, for Aquinas, solidified by the providential ordering of the 
cosmos.
75
   
There is a still a question as to how nonhumans exist for God through humanity.  
There are two primary manners.  First, the nonhuman creation provides bodily sustenance 
(e.g., food and clothing) for humanity.
76
  Second, the nonhuman creation provides a 
sacramental revelation of God’s goodness.77  Thus Aquinas’s redactor in the Supplement 
to the Third—which is derived from Aquinas’s commentary on Peter Lombard’s 
Sentences—appropriately represents him:  
We believe all corporeal things to have been made for man’s sake, wherefore all 
things are stated to be subject to him. Now they serve man in two ways, first, as 
sustenance to his bodily life, secondly, as helping him to know God, inasmuch as 
man sees the invisible things of God by the things that are made (ST, S3.91.1).   
 
Ironically, here one of the very points that defenders of Aquinas use to exonerate 
him from accusations of anthropocentrism backfires.
78
  It is true that the entire created 
order, in its multiplicity, reveals the glory of God better than one life form could.
79
  Yet 
for Aquinas this revelation can only have meaning to those with the capacity to 
                                                                                                                                            
anyone. See Aquinas, SCG, III.112.3; ST, 2ǀ2.64.1. In this sense, the value of nonhuman animals in 
particular is fully predicated on their value for, in this case for humanity. On this point see Benzoni, 
Ecological Ethics and the Human Soul, 44.   
75 Benzoni, Ecological Ethics and the Human Soul, 47-48; Andrew Linzey, Why Animal Suffering 
Matters: Philosophy, Theology, and Practical Ethics (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2009), 14. 
76 ST, 1.96.1; SCG, III.112. Aquinas follows Aristotle in claiming using nonhuman animals for 
human benefit—even as food—constitutes a good. ST, 2ǀ2.64.1. 
77 ST, 1.47.1. 
78 See Benzoni, Ecological Ethics and the Human Soul, 56. 
79 E.g., Wynn, “Thomas Aquinas,” 158–162. 
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appropriate it through contemplation (i.e., rational creatures).
80
  Thus even this revelatory 
showing forth is always a showing forth for humanity.    
Theological Foundations for Aquinas’s Conservationism 
I have delineated what I take to be the anthropocentric dimension of Aquinas’s 
theological framework.  His cosmological theocentrism does maintain that the entire 
cosmos has God as its end.  However, this foundation only solidifies Aquinas’s 
anthropocentrism in the temporal realm.  By divine ordering, the non-rational creatures of 
the cosmos fulfill this telos in their service to humanity.   
Aquinas’s conservational dimension is evident in two manners.  First, the 
nonhuman creation, apart from the elements, is wholly relegated to temporal realm and is 
good as it is.
81
  Second, the good cosmos belongs to the entire human community.  
Two fundamental notions inform the first point.  First, Aquinas does not view 
predation as a facet of fallenness.
82
  Says Aquinas,  
In the opinion of some, those animals which now are fierce and kill others, would, 
in that state, have been tame, not only in regard to man, but also in regard to other 
animals. But this is quite unreasonable. For the nature of animals was not changed 
by man’s sin, as if those whose nature now it is to devour the flesh of others, 
would then have lived on herbs, as the lion and falcon (Aquinas, ST, 1.96.1).  
 
Not only is predation not a sign of the fall, it is part of the good order of the cosmos 
inasmuch as humans may kill other creatures if such killing is done in a manner 
conducive to the telos proper to human nature.
83
  Because predation of nonhuman animal 
                                               
80 ST, S3.91.1. 
81 See Susanne M. DeCrane, Aquinas, Feminism, and the Common Good (Washington DC: 
Georgetown University Press, 2004), 44-45. 
82 ST, 1.65.1. 
83 SCG, III.112; ST, 1.91.6. Jenkins argues that Aquinas balances the goodness of creation with the 
ambiguity of death and suffering by the principle of double effect. That is, God wills the goodness of 
creatures (e.g., the ferocity of a lion) with the indirect “evil” effect that the lion then devours the gazelle. 
Jenkins, Ecologies of Grace, 137, 144–145. Jenkins makes an even stranger claim when he writes that 
humanity, in innocence, would not have used animals for food. He provides no reference to Aquinas on this 
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(whether from other animals or humans) is good, there is no need for an eschatological 
redemption for creatures in this cycle.    
This needlessness for eschatological redemption is further solidified by the second 
notion.  Aquinas’s redactor claims that, apart from the elements, the nonhuman creation 
lacks an eschatological telos.
84
 The temporal function of nonhumans (i.e., sustenance and 
revelation for humanity) will cease to be necessary in eternity.
85
  The redactor writes, 
“[I]f the end cease, those things which are directed to the end should cease. Now animals 
and plants were made for the upkeep of human life…Therefore when man’s animal life 
ceases, animals and plants should cease” (ST, S3.91.5).86   
While this point is made most forcibly by Aquinas’s redactor in the Supplement, 
it accurately represents Aquinas.
87
  He follows Augustine in claiming that “man’s last end 
is happiness…but ‘happiness is not possible for animals bereft of reason’… Therefore 
other things do not concur in man’s last end” (ST, 1ǀ2.1.8).  Aquinas is explicit that 
happiness, in the ultimate sense, is an end suited only for humans.
88
   
In short, for nonhumans, the temporal realm is the extent of their existence.  Thus 
Aquinas writes that “death comes to both [humans and nonhumans] alike as to the body, 
but not as to the soul.”89  The death of a nonhuman body is the annihilation of its 
sensitive soul, which in Aquinas’s view are necessarily and wholly dependent on their 
                                                                                                                                            
point (135). In my view, Jenkins’s reading is unfounded and in fact contradicted in Aquinas’s own writings. 
For God has ordered the less perfect for the perfect in terms of bodily sustenance. I can thus see no reason 
why such a hierarchical relationship would not exist in humanity’s innocence. After all, “There is no sin in 
using a thing for the purpose for which it is.” ST 2ǀ2.64.1.  
84 ST, S3.91.1. See also Aquinas, ST, 1.65.1. 
85 ST, S3.91.1.  
86 See also, SCG, IV.97.5.  
87 On humanity’s animal life ceasing, see Aquinas, SCG, IV.83–86. Also, see Benzoni’s 
enlightening engagement with Aquinas’s On the Power of God. Benzoni, Ecological Ethics and the Human 
Soul, 54-57.  
88 ST, 1ǀ2.1.8. See also Carlo Leget, “Eschatology,” in The Theology of Thomas Aquinas, ed. Rik 
Van Nieuwenhove and Joseph Wawrykow (Notre Dame University Press, 2005), 370. 
89 ST, 1.75.6; also, SCG, II.79.  
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physicality.
90
  Hence, referencing the incorruptibility that humanity (and the inanimate 
creation in service to humanity) will attain in the eschaton, Aquinas states, “But the other 
animals, the plants, and the mixed bodies, those entirely corruptible both wholly and in 
part, will not remain at all in that state of incorruption” (SCG, IV.97.5).  Thus Aquinas 
excludes the nonhuman creation—apart from the elements—from the eschatological 
community.  He furthermore maintains that dimensions of the nonhuman order such as 
death and suffering are not evil, but rather part of its goodness.     
Regarding the second point, for Aquinas the nonhuman creation exists for all 
humanity.
91
  This point is most evident in his affirmation of the common good.
92
  For 
Aquinas, part of the good for humanity is that which is required for human bodily 
sustenance.  Yet Aquinas claims that society cannot function unless, as individuals 
seeking this good, it is also established for the entire community.
93
  Thus, in his 
admonition to the king of Cyprus, Aquinas writes that it is a requirement of the king to 
“see that there is a sufficient supply of the necessities required to live well.”94  Susanne 
DeCrane notes these requirements include “physical goods necessary to maintain life.”95  
Furthermore, Aquinas claims that “each one is entrusted with the stewardship of his own 
things, so that out of them he may come to the aid of those who are in need” (ST, 
                                               
90 ST, 1.75.6; also SCG, II.82.    
91 On this point, consider Hollenbach’s strict and repeated exclusion of nonhuman animals from 
the moral concern predicated on the common good. The Common Good, 82–83, 123, 127, 130–132, 149, 
151, 159, 182, 198, 202, 222. 
92 For a good summary of Aquinas’s understanding of the common good, see DeCrane, The 
Common Good, 42-84. 
93 Aquinas, On Kingship, translated by Gerald B. Phelan, revised edition (Toronto, Canada: 
Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1949), 1.1.8. 
94 Ibid.., 2.4.118. 
95 DeCrane, The Common Good, 64.  
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2ǀ2.66.7).96  The point is that the created order, which constitutes a good for the entire 
human community, must be conserved so that all members of that community can make 
use of it.     
An Eco-Theological Ethics of Anthropocentric Conservation 
Aquinas’s theological framework elicits four fundamental concerns with regard to 
the nonhuman creation.  Each of these concerns derives from concern for the welfare of 
the human being and human society in via through this temporal world toward an 
eschatological telos.  As such, all moral concern for the nonhuman creation is indirect.   
First, because in its multiplicity the nonhuman creation reveals God’s goodness, if 
humans abuse a part of the created order to the point of eradication, we diminish the 
revelation of God’s goodness.97  For Aquinas, no creature is without purpose, for all 
creatures participate in revealing God’s goodness more fully.98  Because this revelation is 
for humanity, harming creation to the point of eradication is the same as harming 
humanity.
99
  Thus, one can rightly claim that utilization with disregard for conservation is 
morally reprehensible for Aquinas.
100
   
Second, Aquinas is concerned about human property.  Because nonhuman 
animals “are ordered to man’s use in the natural course of things, according to divine 
                                               
96 Aquinas goes on to say that it is licit for someone to take the possessions of another out of dire 
need. ST, 2ǀ2.66.7. See also DeCrane, The Common Good, 77-79. 
97 Clifford, “Foundations,” 39; Jenkins, Ecologies of Grace, 125–131.  
98 I make this point contra Salisbury, “Attitudes toward Animals,” 78.  
99 Many critics of Aquinas miss this point. See Steiner, Anthropocentrism and Its Discontents, 
131; Wennberg, God, Humans, and Animals, 121. Although, Benzoni makes a strong case here. He writes 
that, according to Aquinas, it is God’s providence that sustains species as opposed to humanity’s moral 
actions. Thus, deriving a conservationist ethics with regard to species is, for Benzoni, a bit specious. 
Benzoni, Ecological Ethics and the Human Soul, 53-54. Thus, Aquinas’s emphasis on providence with 
regard to the perfection of the universe renders his position less helpful in establishing conservationist 
ethics.   
100 ST, 2ǀ2.141.3; SCG, III.129. Also, Shaefer, “Valuing Earth Intrinsically and Instrumentally,” 
792. Aquinas holds that God charges the human creature (as rational) with maintenance of the created 
order. SCG, III.78; ST, 1.64.4; Porter, The Recovery of Virtue, 61, 178.  
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providence” (SCG, III.112), Aquinas maintains that “he that kills another’s ox, sins, not 
through killing the ox, but through injuring another man in his property” (ST, 2ǀ2.64.1).  
Here again, harming part of the nonhuman creation is tantamount to harming humans.         
Third, and regarding specifically nonhuman animals, Aquinas expresses concern 
that humans causing them gratuitous harm might lead to the desensitization of the one 
causing the harm.  This desensitization, in turn, could lead to violence toward other 
humans.
101
  In other words, causing harm to sensitive creatures that have no basis for 
direct moral concern could lead to causing harm to sensitive creatures that do have such a 
basis.   
Fourth, human use of the nonhuman creation must adhere to the propriety of 
virtue.  In particular, humans must not engage in immoderate use of resources that are 
meant first and foremost to direct them to their proper telos, both temporal and ultimate.  
Jame Schaefer makes this point well, noting how Aquinas taught that 
humans should use God’s creation in proper ways for the purposes they fulfill in 
the scheme of creation. Plants exist for animals to eat, animals exist for other 
animals, and all exist for human to eat or use in other ways to bring up children, 
support a family, and meet other bodily needs…However, an individual who 
possesses or desires to possess immoderate amounts of material goods sins 
against another with the sin of avarice, because on individual cannot have an 
abundance of external riches without other individuals lacking them.
102
  
 
This point fundamentally concerns the just distribution of nonhuman resources for the 
entire human community.
103
  This anthropocentric emphasis on ecological social justice 
remains an important part of modern magisterial documents.
104
     
                                               
101 SCG, III.112.13. 
102 Schaefer, Theological Foundations for Environmental Ethics, 199. 
103 On this point, see Benzoni’s discussion of Aquinas and justice. Benzoni, Ecological Ethics and 
the Human Soul, 63-73 
104 For instance, Gaudium et Spes states: “God intended the earth and everything in it for the use 
of all human beings and peoples. Thus, under the leadership of justice and in the company of charity, 
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ANTHROPOCENTRIC CONSERVATION AND INDIVIDUAL NONHUMAN ANIMALS 
I have already adumbrated much of what can be said about the place of individual 
nonhuman animals within the eco-theological paradigm of anthropocentric conservation.  
The nature of nonhuman animals renders them resources meant to meet the needs of 
human creatures, both contemplative and bodily, as they journey toward God.
105
  
Nonhuman resources, lacking the dignity of human nature, have no grounds for direct 
moral concern.  Thus Aquinas echoes Aristotle: “There is no sin in using a thing for the 
purpose for which it is….Wherefore it is not unlawful if man use plants for the good of 
animals, and animals for the good of man, as the Philosopher states” (ST 2ǀ2.64.1).106 
More than “not unlawful,” on account of God’s providential ordering of the cosmos, this 
use of plants and animals is good.     
Aquinas’s view of the nature of nonhuman animals also excludes them from the 
eschatological community.  This exclusion bears ethical consequences, a point consistent 
with Aquinas’s teleological understanding of virtue.  Thus, Aquinas claims that the 
extension of charity to nonhuman animals is improper because “charity is based on the 
fellowship of everlasting happiness, to which the irrational creature cannot attain” (ST, 
2ǀ2.25.3).107  In part, then, Aquinas does not consider nonhuman animals as subjects of 
                                                                                                                                            
created goods should flow fairly to all.” See paragraph 69. On this point, see also Michael Northcott, The 
Environment and Christian Ethics (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 135-36. 
105 The term “resources,” albeit anachronistic, adequately describes Aquinas’s view.  
106 On Aquinas’s understanding of sin and nonhuman animals (and more specifically how humans 
cannot sin against them), see Benzoni, Ecological Ethics and the Human Soul, 62-63. 
107 Aquinas delineates two further reasons why one should not (or cannot) extend charity to 
nonhuman animals. First, “friendship is towards one to whom we wish good things, while, properly 
speaking, we cannot wish good things to an irrational creature.” Second, “all friendship is based on some 
fellowship in life….[and] irrational creatures can have no fellowship in human life which is regulated by 
reason.” ST, II-II, Q 25 A 3. Therefore, Jenkins argument that Aquinas’s view demands charitable 
engagement for the nonhuman creation for its own sake lacks validity. See Jenkins, Ecologies of Grace, 
140–141.  
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direct moral concern because their nature precludes them from the purview of God’s 
redemptive scope.   
Individual nonhuman animals exist in the temporal realm for the sake of the well-
being of the entire human community.  Their suffering and death, deriving from the 
natural order that includes human use, is part of the goodness of the cosmos.  While a 
species as a whole would be protected as a revelatory expression of the divine, use of 
individual animals is subject only to concerns of property and desensitization.
108
  As 
such, the suffering of the individual nonhuman creature needs to be embraced, not 
redeemed.   
Humans, on the other hand, are proper subjects of direct moral concern on 
account of their rational nature, which is directed toward their ultimate telos.
109
  Thus, 
Aquinas states that rational creatures “stand out above other creatures, both in natural 
perfection and in the dignity of their end” (SCG, III.111).  Furthermore, 
[T]here should be a union in affection among those for whom there is one 
common end. Now, men share in common the one ultimate end which is 
happiness, to which they are divinely ordered. So, men should be united with each 
other by a mutual love (SCG, III.117.2).
110
 
 
ANTHROPOCENTRIC CONSERVATION IN SUMMATION     
An eco-theological ethics of anthropocentric conservation establishes a sharp 
distinction between the human community and nonhuman resources.  The human 
community is made of up of essentially unique creatures that constitute the central aim of 
                                               
108 Benzoni rightly notes that, for Aquinas, the species is far more important than the individual 
with regard to the nonhuman creation. “It is the species of creatures that are primarily needed for the 
universe to be perfect because this perfection consists in the order of diverse ‘grades of goodness’ (that is, 
species) to one another. Corruptible individuals are important only in the secondary sense that they are 
necessary for the sake of preserving their species in existence. Corruptible individuals are for the sake of 
their species.” Benzoni, Ecological Ethics and the Human Soul, 52. 
109 SCG, III.117.2; also 117.3. 
110 See also Hollenbach, The Common Good, 149, where Hollenbach grounds Aquinas’s vision of 
the common good in humanity’s “common origin and destiny.”  
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divine concern.  Only humans have a particular eternal telos that is communion with God.  
The nonhuman creation is a good and ordered network of resources that enable all 
humans to move toward their eschatological end by aiding them with regard to bodily 
sustenance as food and clothing and with regard to contemplative matters as a means of 
divine self-disclosure.  In short, the nonhuman world, including individual animals, exists 
for the well-being of humanity.  This function, predicated upon its nature, exhausts its 
temporal telos and renders an eternal telos moot.   
Within this paradigm, humans must use the nonhuman creation properly.  Proper 
use entails a concern for one’s own end (i.e., using in a manner consistent with virtue) 
and the end of one’s fellow humans (i.e., permitting them access to the goods of creation 
so that they might also use them properly).  There is no sin or evil in killing an individual 
animal as long as these requirements are met.  Such killing is in fact part of the good 
order of the cosmos.  It helps perpetuate the divinely established system in which all 
nonhuman animals, along with the rest of the created order, exist for well-being of self 
and neighbor.      
COSMOCENTRIC CONSERVATION: A GOOD AND ORDERED COMMUNITY OF CREATION 
Jenkins rightly notes that, in the wake of Lynn White’s critique of Christianity, 
most eco-theological thinkers accepted that one of the most fundamental aspects of 
retrieving Christianity’s environmental potentials entailed exploring whether or not it is 
bound to a human-centered worldview.
111
  Subsidiary to this exploration are questions 
regarding the role of science in the construction of an eco-theological ethics.  On the one 
hand, a complete relinquishment of truth to the realm of science often engenders a 
demystification of the nonhuman cosmos.  This demystification provides the groundwork 
                                               
111 Jenkins, Ecologies of Grace, 11-12. 
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for an anthropocentric worldview in which nonhumans do not attain to the status of direct 
moral concern.
112
  On the other hand, a staunch rejection of science enables a blind 
affirmation of the essential uniqueness of the human creature by overlooking the stark 
similarities between humans and our closest genetic ancestors.  The disregard for this 
evidence also grounds an anthropocentric worldview.      
In response to the aforementioned new task, theologians, ethicists, and biblical 
scholars have turned to various authoritative historical sources to recover strands of 
Christian thought that resist accusations of anthropocentrism.  In many cases, only a 
critical retrieval of these sources renders them relevant today.  Attempts of critical 
retrieval have, in certain cases, led to the paradigm of eco-theological ethics that I label 
cosmocentric conservation.  In this view, the insights of science are sought to inform the 
manner in which theological claims apply to the relationship between humanity and the 
nonhuman cosmos.  In particular, new understandings of the interconnectedness of the 
created order, including common origins and historical struggles through the evolutionary 
process; the interdependency of life within particular ecosystems and the effect the loss 
of one creature can have on the larger created order; and the shocking similarity on the 
genetic level between humans and nonhuman animals, have led to a dethroning of 
humanity with regard to an essentially unique dignity.  Humans are no longer 
transcendent, above the creation, and unique in the possession of intrinsic value.  Rather, 
they are creatures within the cosmic community, which includes all living creatures and 
the earth itself.   
 
                                               
112 Such a result is evident in a Cartesian framework. See French, “Beast Machines and the 
Technocratic Reduction of Life,” 24–43. 
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THOMAS BERRY’S ECO-THEOLOGICAL ETHICS OF COSMOCENTRIC CONSERVATION  
The basic parameters of cosmocentric conservation have numerous 
representatives across denominational lines.
113
  However, one of the most artful 
representatives is the late Roman Catholic Passionist priest and self-proclaimed 
“geologian,” Thomas Berry.114  While Berry is Roman Catholic, he is adamant that his 
tradition has certain shortcomings that must be redressed.
115
  Thus Peter Ellard identifies 
the “radical nature of Berry’s view” by referring to it as “dark green.”116   
Berry’s amendments to these shortcomings developed under the influences of 
various world religions, most notably indigenous religions of the Americas, Asian 
religions, and Indian religions.
117
  Berry has also been influenced by scholars of history, 
most notably Giambattista Vico and Christopher Dawson.
118
  Regarding Christianity, 
                                               
113 Many of these representations have been developed through the work of Teilhard de Chardin 
and, to varying degrees, Thomas Berry. The ex-Catholic priest and creation spiritualist Matthew Fox 
provides an example in Creation Spirituality: Liberating Gifts for the Peoples of the Earth (San Francisco, 
CA: HarperCollins, 1991). In Protestant thought, cosmocentric conservation is evident in the work of 
Calvin DeWitt. See Earthwise: A Guide to Hopeful Creation Care, third edition (Grand Rapids, MI: Faith 
Alive Christian Resources, 2011). In Liberation theology, Leonardo Boff’s work suggests this paradigm. 
See Ecology and Liberation: A New Paradigm, translated by John Cumming (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis 
Books, 1995). In feminist thought, the work of Rosemary Radford Ruether and Dorothy McDougall are 
examples. See Rosemary Radford Ruether, Gaia and God: An Ecofeminist Theology of Earth Healing 
(New York, NY: HarperCollins Publishers, 1992). See also Ruether’s existentialist eschatology in Sexism 
and God-Talk: Toward A Feminist Theology (Boston: Beacon Press, 1983). On McDougall, see The 
Cosmos as the Primary Sacrament: The Horizon for an Ecological Sacramental Theology (New York, NY: 
Peter Lang, 2003).     
114 For consideration of Berry’s context and his influences, including other religious traditions, 
Aquinas, and Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, see Mary Evelyn Tucker and John Grim’s introduction in The 
Christian Future and the Fate of the Earth [hereafter CFFE], Mary Evelyn Tucker and John Grim, editors 
(Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2009), xiii-xxvii. See also Tucker’s foreword in Thomas Berry, The Sacred 
Universe: Faith, Spirituality, and Religion in the Twenty-First Century [hereafter TSU], Mary Evelyn 
Tucker, editor (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2009), ix-xiii.  
115 Peter Ellard, “Thomas Berry as the Groundwork for a Dark Green Catholic Theology,” in 
Confronting the Climate Crisis: Catholic Theological Perspectives, Jame Schaefer, editor (Milwaukee, WI: 
Marquette University Press, 2011), 313-314.  
116 Ibid.., 301.  
117 For a good biographical summation of Berry, including the influences upon him, see Mary 
Evelyn Tucker, “Thomas Berry: A Brief Biography,” Religion and Intellectual Life, 5/4 (Summer 1988), 
107-114. See also Thomas Berry, “The Universe as Cosmic Liturgy” (2000), CFFE, 96-102.  
118 Tucker, “Thomas Berry,” 109-111. 
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Berry provides an example of a critical appropriation of the work of Thomas Aquinas.
119
  
His later ecological works, however, are most strongly influenced by the Jesuit Pierre 
Teilhard de Chardin, who provides a scientific cosmology to frame Berry’s understanding 
of history.
120
 
The Cosmocentrism of the “New Story of the Universe” 
“It’s all a question of story,” writes Berry.121  Our precarious ecological context 
has arisen from a story developed “within a culture that emerged from a biblical-
Christian matrix.”122  In Berry’s estimation, the Western version of this story is 
particularly harmful, with chapters including the work of René Descartes, Francis Bacon, 
the colonialism of early America, and the Industrial Revolution.
123
  Thus Berry affirms, 
to some degree, White’s critique of Western Christian thought.124   
For Berry, such thought too often evinces anthropocentric tendencies that 
denigrate the nonhuman world.  The Christian story as developed within the West has 
negated intimacy with the world.  Berry claims this negation occurred in three phases.  
The first stage was “the meeting of early Christian spirituality with Greek humanism to 
                                               
119 Berry appreciates passages in Aquinas’s corpus that emphasize the importance of the cosmos as 
a whole. Berry, “Christian Cosmology,” 31. However, he clearly rejects the notion of anthropocentrism we 
detect in Thomas’s theological framework. Oddly, Berry is critical of Augustine on this point, but much 
less so of Aquinas. See Berry, “Wisdom of the Cross,” 85-87; “The Universe as Cosmic Liturgy,” 105-107. 
Given my evaluation of Aquinas’s theological framework, I find Berry’s eco-theological vision 
fundamentally incompatible with Thomas’s.  
120 Tucker identifies five major emphases that Berry derives from Teilhard: “(1) his 
comprehensive view of evolution as both a psychic and a physical process; (2) his discussion of the human 
as the consciousness of the universe; (3) his shifting of theological concerns from redemption to creation; 
(4) his desire to activate human energies for building the earth; (5) his emphasis on the important role of 
science in understanding the universe.” Tucker, “Thomas Berry,” 113. Michael Northcott, who considers 
Chardin to be humanocentric on account of his emphasis on human uniqueness and praise of technological 
advancement, writes that Berry “takes the Teilhardian approach in a much more ecocentric direction.” 
Northcott, The Environment and Christian Ethics, 347, n. 7.    
121 Thomas Berry, The Dream of the Earth (San Francisco, CA: Sierra Club Books, 1990), 123. 
122 Berry, “The Christian Future and the Fate of the Earth” (1989), in CFFE, 35. 
123 Berry, “The Sacred Universe” (1998, 2001), TSU, 153-161. 
124 Berry, The Dream of the Earth, 80. 
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form the basis of a strong anthropocentrism.”  Second, the Black Plague gave rise to an 
escapism from a condemned world in need of redemption.  Finally, the triumph of 
industrialism rendered the world merely “a collection of objects.”125    
Berry insists that, in the midst of ecological degradation, Christian theology 
requires a new shape for its cosmology, one formed within the parameters of the “New 
Story of the universe.”126  This New Story does not obliterate the foundations of the old 
stories—the religious myths of creation.  However, it enhances and develops these myths 
by being attentive to the “voices of the natural world” often silenced in Christian 
theology.
127
  That is, the story is developed within the parameters of the discoveries of 
science, which for Berry constitute a primary form of revelation.
128
   
Even so, the story does not succumb to the scientific tendency of reducing the 
world to an exhaustively calculable object.
129
  Berry is adamant that a scientific approach 
that demystifies the world is as dangerous as a faith perspective that ignores the 
mysterious “voice of the world.”130  Thus Berry seeks to move beyond Deep Ecology.131  
Says Ellard, “Nothing short of great spiritual traditions—or current traditions greatly 
transformed—are in order in response to the current terror.”132  In Berry’s view, the 
confident claims of both science and religion regarding their calculations of the 
nonhuman world and the resulting conceptualization of that world as “thing” ground our 
                                               
125 Berry, “Christianity and Ecology,” CFFE, 60-63; The Dream of the Earth, 125-128. 
126 For a good summary of Berry’s ecological emphases based the New Story, see McDougall’s 
list of thirteen Berrian principles. McDougall, The Cosmos as Primary Sacrament, 22.  
127 Berry, “The Christian Future,” CFFE, 38. 
128 Ellard, “Dark Green Catholic Theology,” 303.  
129 Berry, The Dream of the Earth, 130-131; “Christianity and Ecology,” CFFE, 62-65. 
130 See Berry, The Dream of the Earth, 130-131; “Christianity and Ecology,” CFFE, 62-65; 
“Wisdom of the Cross,” CFFE, 82-83. See also Berry’s enlightening discussion on personhood and 
language in “The Universe as Divine Manifestation,” TSU, 145. 
131 Berry, The Dream of the Earth, 2. 
132 Ellard, “Dark Green Catholic Theology,” 302. Ellard goes to write that theologians “need to 
mythologize scientific findings” (304).  
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ecological crisis.  “We no longer have a world of inherent value, no world of wonder, no 
untouched, unspoiled, unused world.  We think we have understood everything.  But we 
have not.  We have used everything.”133   
Thus Berry draws on religion and science.  Dorothy McDougall summarizes his 
view well: “Berry seeks to integrate postmodern scientific insights into a functional 
cosmology which can guide human aspirations and action within the governing principles 
of the universe.”134  Berry’s balanced combination of religious myth, science, and a 
nature mysticism elicits a worldview in which the “integral universe…constitutes the 
sacred community par excellence.”135       
For Berry, integrating Christian thought into the New Story is “the Great Work to 
which Christianity is called in these times.”136  This New Story is a unifying story.  In a 
literary sense, it is the metanarrative from which all other narratives—religious, political, 
and economic—derive.137  Hence Berry frames his theological explorations within this 
narrative framework.
138
 
Berry describes the New Story as the tale of “a sequence of irreversible 
transformations” spanning around fourteen billion years.139  The plot gives special 
attention to human beings, “that being in whom the universe in its evolutionary 
                                               
133 Berry, “The World of Wonder” (2001), TSU, 171. 
134 McDougall, The Cosmos as Primary Sacrament, 2. 
135 Berry, “Christian Cosmology,” CFFE, 34. 
136 Berry, “The Role of the Church,” CFFE, 53. 
137 See Berry, “The Christian Future,” CFFE, 41; The Dream of the Earth, 136. See also Ellard, 
“Dark Green Catholic Theology,” 304. 
138 For a more developed version of this “New Story,” leading from the birth of the universe 
through the development of stars and chemicals to the rise of humanity and the dawning of the “ecozoic 
era,” see Brian Swimme and Thomas Berry, The Universe Story: From the Primordial Flashing Forth to 
the Ecozoic Era—A Celebration of the Unfolding of the Cosmos (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 1994). 
139 Berry, “Christian Cosmology,” CFFE, 29. 
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dimension became conscious of itself.”140  Yet the narrative is never dominated by these 
late arrivals.
141
  In fact, “the Earth has a privileged role” because it is the space with 
which the entire interconnected biotic community develops.
142
  Furthermore, whatever 
unique qualities exist in the human species derive from the common history of living 
beings in the world.
143
  As Ellard states, “We do not live on earth.  We are earth as it has 
expressed itself in a unique way, an amazing way—self reflective and aware.”144   
For Berry, this derivative nature of the human being not only acknowledges the 
inescapable earth-ness of humans, but also the spiritual-ness of the entire cosmos.
145
  This 
claim bears two important corollaries.  First, it contradicts any scientific reductionism 
that treats the nonhuman cosmos as nothing more than the amalgam of its physical 
components.  In other words, there is a mysteriousness to the cosmos—an excess that 
empiricism cannot calculate.   
Second, it disrupts the dualistic dichotomy between humans as physical/spiritual 
and nonhumans as merely physical.  In the words of Ellard, “All material interactions 
before humans arrived had a psychic component, a mind component, a soul component in 
them…This psyche/mind/spirit/soul aspect of all material things remains in all things.”146  
Thus the uniqueness of humanity is always uniqueness within the evolutionary 
emergence of the cosmos.  The New Story is not anthropocentric, but rather radically 
cosmocentric.  It draws all life into a community.  More than that, it unveils a cosmic 
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family; for human beings are “cousins to every other living being.”147  One could perhaps 
even point to a greater intimacy in which “everything in the universes is the universe.”148  
That is, all that exists in the cosmos is irrevocably united both materially and spirituality.  
One senses here an Eastern influence on Berry.
149
  Though, Berry does not reject 
selfhood.  Rather, he subsumes it into the “Great Self” or “greater self” in which it is 
united with all things.
150
  As Ellard writes, “More than the fact that we are cousins to 
everything else, we are everything else.  Everything else is part of our ‘Great Self’ 
identity.”151   
Conservation of a Cosmos without Need of Redemption 
I have demonstrated Berry’s cosmocentrism.  The cosmos constitutes a 
community in which all share in the materiality and spirituality of one another.  The 
hierarchy of Aquinas is fully dismantled in Berry’s view.  To establish the conservational 
dimension of Berry’s eco-theological ethics, I must address his views concerning 
eschatological redemption.   
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Ellard claims that Berry’s critique of Christianity is sharpest with regard to the 
notions of transcendence and redemption.
152
  Here my emphasis is redemption.  For 
Berry, the New Story of the universe is the necessary framework for all Christian claims, 
including redemption.  Within this framework, redemption is neither rescue from cosmic 
evolutionary processes nor the mechanisms that enable them.  Rather, redemption, if 
there is such a thing in Berry’s view, is the realization of these processes, even in their 
“awesome violence.”153  The violent occurrences in the natural world are not 
consequences of a cosmic fall or sin, but rather “cosmological moments of grace.”154  
They correspond to Christ’s sacrifice on the cross, for they are a “primary necessity in 
activating the more advanced modes of being.”155  Thus the violence of the evolutionary 
process is a manifestation of the wisdom of the cross whereby sacrifice enables life.
156
  
For Berry, “every living being is sacrificed for other living beings.”157  In line with this 
incarnational understanding of violence, Ellard highlights the revelatory function of 
violence in the cosmos:  
Violence is one of the ways that the universe creates and it is part of the context.  
This means, of course, that, just like the universe, the divine is both wonderful 
and violent.  The divine is life-giving and life-taking.  The divine is made 
manifest through destruction, through cancer, and through plague.  We need to 
take comfort in this.  
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155 Berry, “Christian Cosmology,” CFFE, 33. This vision fits within the parameters of Berry’s 
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Ellard’s point is that, for Berry, violence and goodness are not opposed.  Thus he also 
writes, “There is little talk of intrinsic evil within a Berrian system.  In a real sense, there 
is no room for it.”  That which occurs in nature (i.e., natural evil) is part of the order of 
nature, which is good and therefore in need of neither transcendent escape nor 
eschatological redemption.
158
 
Thus, for Berry, death is part of the necessary, good, and divinely ordained mode 
of progress in the unfolding creation.
159
  There is no “Fall” of the nonhuman universe.160  
For this reason, humanity should not lament the violence of nature.  For cosmic peace, 
which entails the sustaining of the balanced order within the creative emergence of the 
universe, requires it.
161
  Far from lamentation, Berry calls for liturgical outlets that enable 
“celebration of the evolutionary transformation moments.”162  Doing so would remedy 
one of Berry’s critiques of Western religions: that they “have been so occupied with 
redemptive healing of a flawed world that they tend to ignore creation as it is experienced 
in our times.”163  Furthermore, such liturgical acts would incorporate our religious story 
into the story of the universe; for “the universe, by definition, is a single gorgeous 
celebratory event.”164      
On account of the goodness of the ordered cosmos, Berry seeks to surmount the 
notion that Christianity necessitates “redemption from a flawed world.”165  It is here that 
he demonstrates the conservational dimension of his cosmocentrism.  Nonhumans are not 
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excluded from the community of eschatological redemption, as was the case in Aquinas’s 
theological framework.  Nor are they included, as will be the case in Orthodox theology.  
For Berry, there is no community of eschatological redemption, nor is there need for 
one.
166
  A chief human mistake, grounded though it is in Christian thought, is that human 
beings seek to overcome the order of nature.
167
  But the laws of this order, established by 
God, require human assent, not correction.  “The universe is the primary law-giver.”168  
The ecological crisis does not need “a human answer to the earth problem, but an earth 
answer to the earth problem.”169  Humanity, like all species, must fit into the mysterious 
whole.
170
   
Many theologians critique Berry—along with others of the so-called creation 
spirituality category such as Matthew Fox—for overlooking the suffering in creation.  
Sallie McFague acknowledges the power of Berry’s vision.  Yet she levels the following 
critique: 
What Berry and other creation spirituality writers lack is a sense of the awful 
oppression that is part and parcel of the awesome mystery and splendor.  The 
universe has not been for species, and certainly not for most individuals within 
species, a ‘gorgeous celebratory event.’  It has been a story of struggle, loss, and 
often early death.
171
     
 
McFague’s critique is common.  Celia Deanne-Drummond approvingly notes that 
“many would see that [Berry’s] vision is overly idealistic, ignoring some of the more 
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unsavoury, destructive aspects of evolutionary and cosmic history.”172  In line with this 
critique is another: the place of eschatology in Berry’s framework.  In McFague’s 
estimation, the beauty of creation spirituality ought to be its eschatological promise.  That 
is, it should represent the world as it ought to be, a community of intimacy.
173
  Yet John 
Haught critiques the absence of such an eschatological promise in Berry’s thought.174   
In my estimation, McFague and others miss Berry’s point.  Berry is well aware of 
the violence in the created order:  
The universe, earth, life, and consciousness are all violent processes.  The basic 
terms in cosmology, geology, biology, and anthropology all carry a heavy charge 
of tension and violence.  Neither the universe as a whole nor any part of the 
universe is especially peaceful.
175
  
 
Thus Berry clearly recognizes that “there is a violent as well as a benign aspect of 
nature.”176  The significant point to be made is that, for Berry and others like him, “the 
‘cosmic-earth’ process…and the process of ultimate human transformation are one in the 
same.”177  That is, the evolutionary emergence of the cosmos is neither superseded by 
eschatological redemption from outside of history nor a burgeoning millennialism from 
within it.  Rather, any notion of redemption is subsumed into the New Story.  If anything, 
the cosmos itself is the harbinger of redemption through the very mechanisms of death 
and suffering that many theologians seek to redress by an appeal to eschatology.
178
  For 
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Berry, “the supremely beautiful is the integrity and harmony of the total cosmic order.”179  
As this order not only includes but currently requires violence, death, predation, 
suffering, and evolutionary waste, these dimensions of the cosmos constitute part of its 
beauty and goodness.  The human fault is the rejection of this beauty and goodness in 
pursuit of some future hope that leaves this natural order behind.  In short, humans erred 
when we convinced ourselves that “we deserved a better world.”180       
An Eco-Theological Ethics of Cosmocentric Conservation 
I have established that Berry’s vision of the world rejects both anthropocentrism 
and the need for an eschatological redemption of the cosmos.  Concerning the latter, the 
cosmos is not a fallen realm of ugliness; rather, it is a beautiful emergence of celebration.  
Concerning the former, the cosmos is not divided between ensouled, spiritual, thinking 
beings and “things.”  Based on these foundations—and with regard to this project—
Berry’s eco-theological ethics has one fundamental core with three practical corollaries.  
The core is the recognition of an egalitarian cosmic community of intrinsic value.  The 
practical corollaries are the dismantling of human dominion, the vision of humanity’s 
“living-with” the cosmos, and finally the extension of rights to the nonhuman creation in 
conjunction with the limiting of human rights.     
Regarding the dismantling of dominion, Berry’s notion of the cosmic community 
rescinds the unique and transcendent identity of humanity as above nature.
181
  As 
McDougall notes, for Berry, “the universe is the primary sacred reality—the imago 
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Dei.”182  Thus, Berry posits a democratization of the imago.  This democratization 
grounds the dismissal of a functional anthropocentrism (i.e., human dominion): 
Apart from the primary intention of the scriptures, the practice of Westerns 
Christians has been to consider that every earthly reality is subject to the free 
disposition of humans insofar as we are able to assert…dominion.  We do not feel 
responsible precisely to the world about us since the natural world has no inherent 
rights; we are responsible only to the creator and to ourselves, not to abuse 
anything…Only in this detached situation could we have felt so free to intrude 
upon the forces of the natural world even when we had not the slightest idea of 
the long-range consequences of what we were doing.
183
   
   
Berry’s dismantling of human dominion even challenges the model of 
stewardship.  For Berry, this model is “too extrinsic a mode of relating”; for “it 
strengthens our sense of human dominance” and “does not recognize that nature has a 
prior stewardship over us as surely as we have a stewardship over nature.”184  Thus, in 
Berry’s view, the role of the nonhuman world is one of mutuality with humans; for 
“humans and the universe were made for each other.”185  The human expresses the 
conscious appreciation and celebration of the universe.  The universe, on the other hand, 
constitutes the primordial sacrament.
186
  It is the “primary revelation of the divine.”187  In 
this mutuality, “human beings find their fulfillment in the universe even as the universe 
finds its fulfillment in the human.”188  There is rather a sacramental reciprocity between 
the human and the nonhuman.  The celebration of the cosmos finds unique expression in 
humanity.  Human fulfillment, in turn, depends upon the “Book of Nature,” which is an 
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essential counterpart to other forms of divine revelation.
189
  In other words, Berry’s 
egalitarian value system is coupled with a functional egalitarianism in which humans 
express cosmic consciousness while at once being intrinsically and indissolubly 
dependent upon the cosmos.  As such, there can be no claim of any form of functional 
anthropocentrism, even stewardship.     
If dominion/stewardship is not the appropriate model of human interaction with 
the cosmos, what is?  The model that Berry suggests is that of an “Ecozoic era, a period 
when humans [are] present to the planet in a mutually enhancing manner.”190  
Humanity’s role, apart from appreciation and celebration, is preservation, a humble living 
with and within the order of the cosmos, a letting be of the natural world.
191
  The 
nonhuman world is not a network of resources for human consumption, but rather a vast 
mystery, a good and ordered community of intrinsic value with a spirit-imbued history 
that long predates humans.  Even so, humanity’s reverential “letting be” does not negate 
utility.  Rather, it qualifies it with a harmonious “living with” the nonhuman world in 
which harmony suggests struggling for human survival without unhinging the community 
that enables that struggle.
192
  Berry calls for balance between a gracious “letting be” of 
the cosmos and a reverential “living with” it, as it is in its beautiful evolutionary 
emergence.  The following sentiment constitutes the heart of cosmocentric conservation:     
To learn how to live graciously together would make us worthy of this unique, 
beautiful, blue planet that evolved in its present splendor over some billions of 
years, a planet that we should give over to our children with the assurance that 
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this great community of the living will lavish upon them the care that it has 
bestowed so abundantly upon ourselves.
193
 
 
Note the multiple and interconnected dimensions of this ethics.  Humans are not 
simply responsible for the cosmos; they are responsible as the cosmos.  They do not 
simply protect the nonhuman creation; they need the nonhuman creation.  Human 
celebration is not an act toward the cosmos.  It is rather a participation in the cosmos—a 
“living-with.”  Thus preservation cannot simply be an “us” (i.e., humans) protecting “it” 
or even “them” (i.e., nonhumans).194  It is rather an act within the sacred community 
itself.  In short, Berry replaces dominion, which is an extrinsic model of the 
human/nonhuman rapport, with a model of reverential “living-with,” which emphasizes 
human immanence in the place of transcendence.  In Mary Evelyn Tucker’s terms, Berry 
calls for “a shift from an anthropocentric sense of domination to an anthropocosmic sense 
of communion with all life forms.”195  This aim of reverential living-with constitutes to 
Great Work of humanity—an opening and embracing of cosmic mutuality.  Says Berry, 
“The Great Work now…is to carry out the transition from a period of human devastation 
                                               
193 Berry, The Dream of the Earth, 12. 
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195 Mary Evelyn Tucker, “A Communion of Subjects and a Multiplicity of Intelligences,” in A 
Communion of Subjects: Animals in Religion, Science, and Ethics, Paul Waldau and Kimberly Patton, 
editors (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2006), 646. As I noted in the introduction, an 
anthropocosmic worldview is similar, with regard to value, to my use of cosmocentrism. The term 
connotes, beyond the issue of value, a strong sense of mutuality between humanity (anthropos) and the 
world (cosmos). However, the question of mutuality is, in my view, less important than the issue of 
intrinsic value. For a strongly anthropocentric worldview can have a symbiotic understanding of humans 
and the cosmos. It can even maintain a strong sense of human immanence in the created order. Thus the 
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its various components—including humans—bears intrinsic value.   
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of the Earth to a period when humans would be present to the planet in a mutually 
beneficial manner.”196        
Once the essential transcendence of humanity is dismantled, Berry is able to 
extend the notion of rights to the entire cosmos.  When there is no longer “I” and “it” or 
even “us” and “them,” then the “nonhuman nature is merely a ‘good’ to be distributed 
evenly.”197  Rather, “the basic referent in terms of reality and of value is the universe in 
its full expression in space and time.”198  Herein lies the “primary law of the universe.”199  
Value belongs to the entire cosmic family in its irrevocable interconnectedness.
200
   
Thus Berry staunchly rejects an anthropocentrism in which one measures value 
only with reference to humanity.
201
  On the contrary, he advocates a biocentrism, a term 
related to my notion of cosmocentrism, in which the value of the nonhuman world is as 
intrinsic as the value of humanity.
202
  All other anthropocentric approaches ground the 
industrial triumph of utility over communion.
203
  Berry’s biocentrism entails the rejection 
of the position that rights apply only to humanity.
204
  In fact, the rights of nonhumans 
require “limited rights” for humanity.205  While this use of the language of rights does not 
denote equal rights, it does denote rights for all: “Each being has rights according to its 
mode of being.  Trees have tree rights, birds have bird rights.”206  
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COSMOCENTRIC CONSERVATION AND INDIVIDUAL NONHUMAN ANIMALS 
Within the paradigm of cosmocentric conservation, the human species is part of 
an evolutionary process that depends on predation, suffering, and death.  In this cycle, 
“each individual life form has its own historical appearance, a moment when it must 
assert its identity, fulfill its role, and then give way to other individuals in the processes 
of the phenomenal world.”207  These dimensions of existence are not the result of sin or 
the fall, but rather cosmic grace in the unfolding of the universe.  Thus they are not in 
need of redemption.   
Because predation and death are part of the good order of nature, it seems that the 
killing of individual nonhuman animals for survival is not only acceptable, but, pending 
the context, good.  However, a human-induced extinction of a species, even for great 
human benefit, is not.
208
  As Berry notes, extinction is “not like the killing of individual 
lifeforms that can be renewed through normal processes of reproduction.”209   
It is crucial to note that, for Berry, nonhuman animals are part of the cosmic 
family and thus kin to humans.  The reverence due their dignity is profound.  In Berry’s 
words, “Every being has its own interior, its self, its mystery, its numinous aspect.  To 
deprive any being of this sacred quality is to disrupt the larger order of the universe.  
Reverence will be total or it will not be at all.”210  Furthermore, Berry claims that animals 
“belong in our conscious human world in a special manner.”211  The treatment of animals 
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within the milieu of our ecological pathology certainly falls under Berry’s critique.212  
Berry even maintains that vegetarianism is “one of the most effective things…we can do 
on an individual scale” to stymie the ecological degradation of the natural world.213  In 
my view, the intensity of Berry’s critique would reach deep into the magisterial 
documents of the Catholic Church.  Berry never uses the word “gift” (and certainly not 
“resource”!) to describe the nonhuman creation with reference to humanity.  He replaces 
this unilateral language by claiming that humans and nonhumans participating in “a 
constant exchange of gifts to each other.”214   
Berry’s critique notwithstanding, reverence is not necessarily opposed to killing 
just as beauty is not opposed to violence.  To the point: only as part of the natural order, 
within its ebb and flow, can humans ethically use the nonhuman creation.
215
  Thus, the 
justification for practices such as hunting and meat-eating is not based on a unique 
spiritual dignity deriving from human transcendence.  In fact, the justification is based on 
the opposite, human immanence within a cosmos that is macroanthropos.
216
  That is, 
humans engage in the mechanisms of evolution, including predation, because we are 
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participants in the integral order of the cosmos, an order that requires violence.
217
  This 
engagement is good and therefore not in need of redemption.  It requires reverence, 
wonder, awe.  But it does not require the cessation of violence in all its forms.  For, in the 
words of McDougall, “The primary intention of life is neither one of peace nor conflict, 
but creativity.”218 
COSMOCENTRIC CONSERVATION IN SUMMATION  
This exploration into the work of Thomas Berry provides a concrete example of 
the eco-theological paradigm I label cosmocentric conservation.  While many other 
scholars from across denominational lines and hermeneutical emphases including 
creation spiritualists, liberation theologians, and eco-feminists, do not share the exact 
claims of Berry, his eco-theological vision nonetheless provides a broad framework into 
which many such writers fit.  Within this framework, there are six central tenets.  The 
first four pertain to cosmocentrism while the other two pertain to conservation.   
First, the cosmos is a community of subjects in mysterious interconnectedness.  
Second, each member of this community participates in the goodness and mystery of the 
whole and thereby is due the reverence of a common dignity.  Third, human beings are no 
longer the transcendent ones, unique in the possession of psyche, spirit, soul, or even the 
imago Dei.  Rather, humans are members of the cosmic community, kin to all living 
creatures, and participants in the pervasive mystery of existence.  Fourth, only as 
members of this community can humans properly engage the cosmos, engagements that 
                                               
217 I thus view Berry’s position on, for instance, hunting, to be that of other deep ecologies such as 
Aldo Leopold who maintain that hunting is a means of placing humanity in the context of the natural order. 
See Marc R. Fellenz, The Moral Menagerie: Philosophy and Animal Rights (Chicago, IL: University of 
Illinois Press, 2007), 164-166. 
218 McDougall, The Cosmos as Primary Sacrament, 22. 
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must balance a gracious “letting be” with a reverential “living-with” fellow members of 
the community, including the earth.   
Fifth, the earth community is good and ordered as it is, and is therefore in no need 
of an eschatological redemption that fixes or changes nonhuman nature.  Sixth, because 
humans await no eschatological redemption, human engagement of the earth must derive 
from the laws of nature evident in the emerging temporal cosmos.  These laws do not 
negate use or predation, for each of these dimensions of existence is part of the good and 
ordered cosmos.  Rather, the laws mandate humility in such use, recognizing that human 
benefit does not constitute the primary purpose of the nonhuman cosmos. 
ANTHROPOCENTRIC TRANSFIGURATION: THE COSMOS AS THE ETERNAL SACRAMENT 
Cosmocentric conservation provides a critique to its anthropocentric counterpart 
for an overemphasis on the temporal importance of humans.  Anthropocentric 
transfiguration, on the other hand, critiques it for an under-emphasis on the eschatological 
import of nonhumans.  Unlike cosmocentric conservation, the fundamental foundation for 
anthropocentric transfiguration is not science but scripture and tradition, particularly as it 
developed in the East.
219
  In this paradigm, the whole of the cosmos has always been 
destined for transfiguration, which denotes in some sense an eschatological participation 
in God’s eternal life.  However, the nonhuman creation’s participation in the 
eschatological community is primarily—if not solely—for the sake of the divine-human 
                                               
219 Though, it would be wrong to suggest that the two facets of knowledge are opposed in 
Orthodox thought. In light of the cosmic dynamism of early Eastern thought, John Meyendorff notes that 
Basil of Caesarea “would not have objected to modern theories of evolution, as long as the origin of the 
evolution’s dynamism would not be seen as ontologically autonomous but would be attributed to divine 
will.” John Meyendorff, “Creation in the History of Orthodox Theology,” St. Vladimir’s Theology 
Quarterly, 27/1 (1983), 29. See also John Zizioulas’s quite positive assessment of science, especially 
regarding its dismantling of a Western emphasis on rationality in the work of Charles Darwin. Zizioulas, 
“Preserving God’s Creation: Three Lectures on Theology and Ecology,” King’s Theological Review 12 
(1989), Part I, 4.  
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drama.  That is, the cosmos serves both temporally and in eternity as a sacrament for the 
sake of humanity’s relationship with God.220   
This paradigm is best represented within Eastern Orthodox theology.
221
  However, 
not all Orthodox theologians explicitly uphold its fundamental tenets.
222
  Some are 
unclear regarding whether or not the nonhuman creation will share in God’s life for its 
own sake or for the sake of humans.  Others seem to suggest that the cosmos will be 
included for its own sake, advocating something more akin to the paradigm of 
cosmocentric transfiguration.  While it would thus be inaccurate to classify all of 
Orthodox theology as an example of anthropocentric transfiguration, it is nonetheless the 
case that this paradigm finds it clearest expression from within Orthodox thought.  Thus, 
establishing concrete examples of the paradigm will require an exploration of Orthodox 
theology.  In this section, I will examine the theological foundations for this eco-
theological ethics as developed in the work of Maximus the Confessor and how these 
foundations have been appropriated in contemporary Orthodox thought.   
DEVELOPED FOUNDATIONS IN MAXIMUS THE CONFESSOR 
While Augustine and Aquinas excluded most of the nonhuman creation—
including plants and nonhuman animals—from the eschatological community, many 
other thinkers in Christian history explicitly deny this exclusion.  Irenaeus, following 
                                               
220 John Haught acknowledges that referring to nature as a sacrament that will be eschatologically 
transfigured does not necessitate the abandonment of a value-based anthropocentrism. He thus maintains 
that “we must reflect further on what it means to say that the whole cosmic story—and not just human 
history—is defined by God’s promise.” Haught, God after Darwin, 167. 
221 Though, there are interesting parallels with certain strands of Roman Catholicism that 
emphasize humanity’s role as the transformer of the cosmos. See William C. French, “Subject-centered and 
Creation-centered Paradigms in Recent Catholic Thought,” The Journal of Religion, 70/1 (January 1990), 
48-72.  
222 In this section, my emphasis will be on the Orthodox school of neo-patristic synthesis. 
Meyendorff notes that this theological approach, which developed largely in response to the Russian 
sophiologists, dominates in present Orthodox thought. Meyendorff, “Creation in the History of Orthodox 
Theology,” 33.  
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Theophilus of Antioch, wrote that animals and humans would return to the peaceful 
relationships of Eden in the eschatological future.
223
  Other Fathers, such as Ephrem the 
Syrian, held similar positions.
224
  These voices provide a historical foundation for the 
transfiguration of the entire cosmos in eschatological consummation.  Thus Meyendorff 
states that “the patristic doctrine of creation is inseparable from eschatology—the goal of 
created history, of time itself, is oneness in God.”225   
One important proponent of this inclusive eschatological vision is Maximus the 
Confessor, who, in the words of Elizabeth Theokritoff, “remains to this day the single 
most important figure in Orthodox cosmological thought.”226  Similarly, John 
Meyendorff writes that “Maximus can be called the real father of Byzantine theology”227 
and that his work on creation provides “criteria for all later Byzantine thought.”228  As 
this authority, Maximus provides the developed foundations for contemporary Orthodox 
theologians who provide examples of anthropocentric transfiguration.   
                                               
223 Irenaeus’ Demonstration of the Apostolic Preaching: A Theological Commentary and 
Translation, Iain M. Mackenzie with the translation of the text of the Demonstration by J. Armitage 
Robinson (Burlington: Ashgate, 2002), paragraph 61. 
224 See Ephrem, Hymns on Paradise, introduction and translation by Sebastian Brock (Crestwood: 
St. Vladimir’s Press, 1989), IX.1. Esther Reed suggests a differentiation between patristic thought and 
Aquinas concerning nonhuman animals in the economy of salvation. Esther D. Reed, “Animals in 
Orthodox Iconography,” in Creaturely Theology: On God, Humans and Other Animals, Celia Deane-
Drummond and David Clough, editors (London, UK: SCM Press, 2009), 68-72. For a developed 
examination of Irenaeus and Ephrem, along with other considerations of transfiguration in Christian 
history, see my work, “Evidencing the Eschaton: Progressive-Transformative Animal Welfare in the 
Church Fathers,” Modern Theology 27, 1 (January 2011), 121-46. 
225 Meyendorff, “Creation in the History of Orthodox Theology,” 29-30. 
226 Elizabeth Theokritoff, “Creator and Creation,” in The Cambridge Companion to Orthodox 
Christian Theology, Mary B. Cunningham and Elizabeth Theokritoff, editors (New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), 66.  
227 John Meyendorff, Christ in Eastern Christian Thought (Washington DC: Corpus Books, 1969), 
99. 
228 Meyendorff, “Creation in the History of Orthodox Theology,” 29. 
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For Maximus, the entire created order participates in God as material 
instantiations (plasticized logoi) of the divine logoi, toward which all things move.
229
  
This natural movement, or mode of existence, is the tropos (i.e., the proper direction or 
way) of a created entity.
230
  This tropos is directed toward God, the telos of the 
cosmos.
231
  As Meyendorff states, “For Maximus, the ‘movement’ or dynamism of 
creation is initiated by God, but it also has God as its ultimate aim.”232  In other words, all 
actual created entities—living and nonliving—naturally move toward the divine intention 
for them, which is a participation in God.
233
   
Human beings, unique in the possession of the image of God—and destined for 
their own logoi as the likeness of God through divination—have the ability to decipher 
the logoi of creation and therefore bear the responsibility to facilitate their natural 
movement (tropos) through a synergistic cooperation with the divine.
234
  As humanity 
engages in this deciphering, the nonhuman creation functions as a sacrament for 
humanity, revealing the divine wisdom and facilitating the divine-human drama.  Human 
beings are well-suited for their task because, as both material and spiritual, we are 
                                               
229 Drummond defines logoi as “the principles and ideas in the sensory world as we know it in 
different manifestation, but which ultimately express their source in the divine Logos.” Drummond, Eco-
Theology, 61. 
230 See Maximus the Confessor, Ambigua, 7, 42. Sections from Ambigua are taken from On the 
Cosmic Mystery of Jesus Christ, translated by Paul M. Blowers and Robert L. Welken (Crestwood, NY: St 
Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2003). See also Radu Bordeianu, “Maximus and Ecology: The Relevance of 
Maximus the Confessor’s Theology of Creation for the Present Ecological Crisis,” Downside Review 127, 
no. 447 (2009), 104-107; Meyendorff, Christ in Eastern Christian Thought, 101-102.   
231 Maximus, Ambigua, 7. 
232 Meyendorff, “Creation in the History of Orthodox Theology,” 29. 
233 The natural dynamism in Maximus’s cosmology strikes against the Platonism of Origen. See 
Meyendorff, Christ in Eastern Christian Thought, 99-101. 
234 Meyendorff, Christ in Eastern Christian Thought, 103-105; Andrew Louth, “Between Creation 
and Transfiguration: The Environment in the Eastern Orthodox Tradition,” in Ecological Hermeneutics: 
Biblical, Historical and Theological Perspectives, David G. Horrell, Cherryl Hunt, Christopher Southgate 
and Francesca Stavrakopoulou, editors (New York, NY: T & T Clark, 2010), 217-219. 
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microcosms of the created order.  As such we are able to gather up all dimensions of the 
created order before the divine in our own being.
235
   
This gathering, for Maximus, constitutes the role of humanity.  Humans are 
priests of the sacramental world, the ones called to unite the cosmos with the divine.
236
  
Maximus describes this priestly role more specifically as a uniting of the five divisions in 
the cosmos: “uncreated and created, intelligible and sensible, heaven and earth, paradise 
and the world, male and female.”237  The gathering of all creation into humanity 
constitutes the movement of the cosmos toward the divine.  The cosmos’s movement 
toward the divine leads to its transfiguration, in which it becomes that which God 
intended to be, a transparent revelation of the divine in eternity.
238
   
Thus, humanity, for Maximus, plays a crucial role in the transfiguration of the 
cosmos.
239
  In turn, the cosmos, as the sacrament of divine presence, plays a crucial role 
in the transfiguration of humanity.  “The relationship between humanity and the world is 
mutual: humans sanctify creation, and creation helps us in our salvation.”240     
Yet humanity strayed from its role, causing a corruption in the tropos of 
creation.
241
  This straying constitutes the cosmic Fall.  Thus, in the present state of nature, 
                                               
235 Vladimir Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church (Crestwood, NY: St. 
Vladimir’s Press, 1976), 108-109. 
236 Maximus, Ambigua 41, in Bordeianu, “Maximus and Ecology,” 117. 
237 Bordeianu, “Maximus and Ecology,” 111. See also Meyendorff, Christ in Eastern Christian 
Thought, 105; Theokritoff, “Creator and Creation,” 66-67. 
238 Louth, citing Maximus, compares Christ’s transfiguration on Mount Tabor to the 
transfiguration of the cosmos in that transfiguration reveals what each truly is. Regarding the cosmos, 
Louth claims it is the revelation of the divine. Thus, “transfiguration…sums up everything that theophany 
represents: God’s self-manifestation in creation, in his communication of himself in revelation.” Louth, 
“Between Creation and Transfiguration,” 215-216. See also Alexander Schmemann, For the Life of the 
World: Sacraments and Orthodoxy (Crestwood, NY: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1973), 102. 
239 Meyendorff, Christ in Eastern Christian Thought, 105; Bordeianu, “Maximus and Ecology,” 
110-111. 
240 Bordeianu, “Maximus and Ecology,” 117. Also Meyendorff, Christ in Eastern Christian 
Thought, 105. 
241 Maximus, Ambigua, 8. 
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“a disorderly kind of movement is perpetuated.”  For “the movement of Adam determines 
the direction in which the rest of creation moves.”242  As humans bear the responsibility 
of facilitating the proper tropos of the cosmos, when humans stray from the path to God, 
the cosmos follows them.   
Human priesthood has been compromised by sin.  Yet in Christ the task has been 
realized.  For in Christ the divisions of the created order are overcome.
243
  Thus the 
incarnation enables humans to return to their proper role and in turn draw the cosmos 
back to its tropos, the path to transfiguration.  Humanity, functioning properly as priests, 
can detect the logoi of created reality and, through cooperation with the divine, correct 
the corrupted tropos.
244
   
CONTEMPORARY ORTHODOX THOUGHT 
The work of Maximus has in modern times been appropriated by many Orthodox 
theologians as a powerful Christian response to improper attitudes concerning the 
nonhuman creation.
245
  While there are definite nuances among these voices, there are 
also consistent similarities.  These similarities pertain largely to the cosmic dimension of 
transfiguration.  However, there are also numerous examples of anthropocentrism.
246
  It is 
necessary to develop these similarities within the theological framework of creation, fall, 
and redemption.
247
      
 
                                               
242 Bordeianu, “Maximus and Ecology,” 109. 
243 Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church, 110. 
244 Bordeianu, “Maximus and Ecology,” 109. 
245 See ibid.., 103-126. 
246 Though, these examples are less pervasive in contemporary Orthodox thought than cosmic 
transfiguration.  
247 On the appropriateness of this step, see John Chryssavgis, “The Earth as Sacrament: Insights 
from Orthodox Christian Theology and Spirituality,” in The Orthodox Handbook of Religion and Ecology, 
Roger S. Gottlieb, editors (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2006), 98-99. 
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Transfiguration in the Schema of Creation, Fall, and Redemption 
The doctrine of creation in Orthodox theology begins with the fundamental 
tension between divine transcendence and immanence.
248
  It begins here because all talk 
of God begins here.  Orthodox theologians express the tension of trinitarian otherness and 
nearness with the distinction between the divine essence and divine energies.
249
  As 
Lossky notes, this distinction is neither a division within God nor a distinction between 
God and not-God: 
We…recognize in God an ineffable distinction, other than that between His 
essence and His persons, according to which He is, under different aspects, both 
totally inaccessible and at the same accessible.  This distinction is that between 
the essence of God, or His nature, properly co-called, which is inaccessible, 
unknowable and incommunicable; and the energies or divine operations, forces 
proper to and inseparable from God’s essence, in which He goes forth from 
Himself, manifests, communicates, and gives Himself.
250
 
    
It is within this distinction that God can create (an act of absolute freedom 
deriving from the divine nature enacted through the divine energies) and remain 
unchanged (in the divine nature).  This distinction also permits an aporetic tension 
between divine immanence and transcendence vis-à-vis the creation.  On the one hand, 
the act of creation is the product of the divine energies carrying out the divine will 
without actually being ontologically the same as those uncreated energies.  Thus the 
cosmos is other than God.
251
  On the other hand, the divine logoi—which according to 
Lossky exist in the divine energies but derive from the Logos, the second hypostases of 
                                               
248 Theokritoff, “Creator and Creation,” 64.  
249 See Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church, chapter 4. 
250 Ibid.., 70. 
251 Orthodox writers tend to stress the importance of creatio ex nihilo. See Lossky, Mystical 
Theology, chapter five. Ware qualifies this view: “Rather than say that [God] created the universe out of 
nothing, we should say that he created it out of his own self, which is love.” Kallistos Ware, The Orthodox 
Way, Revised Edition (Crestwood: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1995), 44. See also Chryssavgis, “The 
Earth as Sacrament,” 101-104.   
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the Trinity—are in some sense present in the created order itself.252  Hence, “every 
created thing has its point of contact with the Godhead; and this point of contact is its 
idea, the reason or logos which is at the time the end toward which it tends.”253  Or, as 
Kallistos Ware states, “The whole universe is a cosmic Burning Bush, filled with the 
divine Fire yet not consumed.”254  For in Ware’s admittedly panentheistic view, “God is 
in all things as well as above and beyond all things.”255  Likewise, within the tension of 
transcendence and immanence, Chryssavgis can claim that the Holy Spirit “safeguards 
the intrinsically sacred character of creation” without lapsing into pantheism.256  
Meyendorff notes that God’s transcendence will remain even in the oneness of “the 
ultimate eschatological union.”257  
The pervasive tension of divine transcendence and immanence in Orthodox 
cosmology establishes two key theological points.  First, with regard to transcendence, 
the creation was not created complete.  The very real distance—and that not only 
ontological—between God and world suggests that the latter was created in via toward its 
divinely intended telos.  Thus even before the Fall, there was a “not yet” of the created 
order.  Says Lossky, “The primitive beatitude was not a state of deification, but a 
condition of order, a perfection of the creature which was ordained and tending towards 
its end.”258   
                                               
252 On the relation between the Logos and logoi, see Meyendorff, “Creation in the History of 
Orthodox Theology,” 28-29. 
253 Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church, 98. See also, Meyendorff, Christ in 
Eastern Christian Thought, 102. 
254 Ware, The Orthodox Way, 118. 
255 Ibid., 46; emphasis original.   
256 Chryssavgis, “The Earth as Sacrament,” 97. 
257 Meyendorff, “Creation in the History of Orthodox Theology,” 30. 
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Second, with regard to immanence, the sharp distinction between nature and grace 
dissolves.
259
  Within this dissolution, the entire cosmos, as expression of the divine logoi, 
becomes a sacrament.
260
  That is, it becomes the revelatory means of communion with the 
divine.
261
  The sacramental dimension of the entire nonhuman creation is not exhausted in 
the temporal realm—as was the case with Aquinas.  Rather, the cosmos will be the final 
sacrament, necessary for the divine-human drama even in eternity.
262
  Thus there is an 
irrevocably cosmic dimension to human existence, even in eternity.
263
    
Within the order of the good and sacramental cosmos, humanity has an essentially 
unique role.  Following Maximus, Orthodox theologians consistently use the images of 
priest and microcosm to describe this role.
264
  On this point, Alexander Schmemann is 
worth quoting at length: 
The only natural (and not “supernatural”) reaction of man, to whom God gave 
this blessed and sanctified world, is to bless God in return, to thank Him, to see 
the world as God sees and—in this act of gratitude and adoration—to know, name 
and possess the world.  All rational, spiritual and other qualities of man, 
distinguishing him from other creatures, have their focus and ultimate fulfillment 
in this capacity to know, so to speak, the meaning of the thirst and hunger that 
constitutes his life.  “Homo sapiens,” “homo faber”…yes, but, first of all, “homo 
adorans.”  The first, the basic definition of man is that he is the priest.  He stands 
in the center of the world and unifies it in his act of blessing God, of both 
                                               
259 In conjunction with this tension is the dialectic between grace and nature. For Orthodox 
theologians, the two are never opposed. Meyendorff, Christ, 87; Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the 
Eastern Church, 101. 
260 Schmemann, For the Life of the World, 14-15. 
261 Ware, The Orthodox Way, 42; Schmemann, For the Life of the World, 44-45. 
262 See Dumitru Staniloae, The Experience of God: Orthodox Dogmatic Theology, Volume 2 (The 
World: Creation and Deification), translated and edited by Ioan Ionita and Robert Barringer (Brookline, 
MA: Hold Cross Orthodox Press, 2000), 77-78, 212-213; Bordeianu, “Priesthood Natural, Universal, and 
Ordained: Dumitru Staniloae’s Communion Ecclesiology,” Pro Ecclesia 19, no. 4 (2010), 409; 
Schmemann, For the Life of the World, 14-16; Louth, “Eastern Orthodox Eschatology,” in The Orthodox 
Handbook of Eschatology, Jerry L. Walls, editor (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2008), 212-
213. 
263 Lossky, Mystical Theology, 110. 
264 This position is the central subject of John Zizioulas’s lectures at King’s College. These 
lectures appeared later in King’s Theological Review. On this point, see also Ware, The Orthodox Way, 49-
50, 53-55; Lossky, Mystical Theology, 108; Staniloae, Creation and Deification, 85; Louth, “Between 
Creation and Transfiguration,” 214-216; Bordeianu, “Priesthood,” 407-411. 
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receiving the world from God and offering it to God—and by filling the world 
with this eucharist, he transforms his life, the one that he receives from the world, 
into life in God, into communion with Him.  The world created as the “matter,” 
the material of one all-embracing eucharist, and was created as the priest of this 
cosmic sacrament.
265
    
 
The nonhuman cosmos is a sacramental gift from God to humanity.  Humans act as 
priests of the sacramental cosmos by offering it back to God as a return gift in liturgical 
worship.
266
  In this act of offering, the cosmos becomes communion between God and 
humanity.
267
  As the object of gift exchange that facilitates communion, the nonhuman 
cosmos itself is drawn into the divine life.
268
    
Yet humanity’s role as priest of the good world has been corrupted by human sin, 
which bears a strong ecological component.
269
  In conjunction with this corruption, the 
movement along the path to the transfiguration of the cosmos, dependant as it is in some 
sense on the role of humanity, was derailed.
270
  In the words of Meyendorff, “The fall of 
man, who had been placed by God at the center of creation and called to reunify it, was a 
cosmic catastrophe that only the incarnation of the Word could repair.”271  Thus, in the 
face of the disrupted order of the cosmos, it is the incarnation that constitutes the 
historical realization its destiny, which is union with the divine.
272
  Furthermore, this new 
reality enables humanity to return to the position of priest and thereby redirect the cosmos 
toward the divine.
273
  This redirection of the cosmos requires a synergistic effort between 
                                               
265 Schmemann, For the Life of the World, 15; emphasis original. 
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God and humanity.
274
  In this act of cooperation, which is essentially a gift exchange 
between the divine and the human, there is both a remembrance of the protological past 
and a prolepsis of the inaugurated future.
275
      
The heart of eschatological transfiguration lies at the intersection of creation and 
the fall.  The entire cosmos is the necessary sacrament for the divine-human drama.  This 
role constitutes its destiny.
276
  Without the cosmos, humans cannot commune with God.  
Humans are not only irrevocably embodied; we are irrevocably encosmosed.
277
  Thus, 
regarding the eschatological community, contemporary Orthodox theologians 
consistently maintain that the entire cosmos will be transfigured in the eschatological 
consummation.
278
  According to Lossky, the creation “can have no other end than 
deification.”279  Ware writes, “In the ‘new earth’ of the Age to come there is surely a 
place not only for man but for the animals: in and through man, they too will share in 
immortality, and so will rocks, trees and plants, fire and water.”280  The participation of 
the sacramental nonhuman cosmos in eternity requires its transfiguration, in which it will 
become that which God always intended it to be.  The task of humanity is to “transform 
the whole earth into paradise.”281  Thus Lossky claims, “In his way to union with God, 
                                               
274 Chryssavgis, “The Earth as Sacrament,” 99; Schmemann, For the Life of the World, 23. 
275 See Theokritoff, “Creator and Creation,” 70; Chryssavgis, “The Earth as Sacrament,” 100; 
Louth, “Eastern Orthodox Eschatology,” 237. 
276 Schmemann, For the Life of the World, 120. 
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135 
 
man in no way leaves creatures aside, but gathers together in his love the whole cosmos 
disordered by sin, that it may at last be transfigured by grace.”282     
Such a transformation of the cosmos is what distinguishes anthropocentric 
transfiguration from its conservational variants.  Zizioulas in fact critiques Augustine on 
this very point, claiming that under his influence “the human being was singled out from 
nature as being not only a higher kind of being but in fact the sole being that mattered 
eternally.”283  This rejection of the eternal significance of the cosmos, in Zizioulas’s 
view, led to Descartes’s sharp distinction between the thinking subject and the non-
thinking machine.
284
  Thus, on account of an affirmation of the transfiguration of the 
cosmos, Orthodox theologians differ from advocates of anthropocentric conservation.  
The disparity between the cosmos as it is now and as it will be in eternity leads 
many Orthodox writers to critique a purely conservationist framework.
285
  Of particular 
import is Bordeianu’s critique of the biocentrism of both Deep Ecology and Thomas 
Berry.
286
  In Bordeianu’s view, Maximus would reject the cosmic-centered position of 
Berry:  
Biocentrism and geocentrism cannot be the solutions to the ecological crisis; on 
the contrary, they are precisely the cause, or at least part of the cause of today’s 
environmental destruction, since Adam looked for stability in creation and thus 
regarded it as the purpose of his movement, when in fact only God can offer 
stability and purpose.
287
   
 
                                               
282 Ibid.., 111. 
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In a similar manner, though without specifically naming Berry or any other 
potential representatives of cosmocentric conservation, Zizioulas critiques the 
foundations of the paradigm.  He even goes so far as to equate its manner of recovering 
the sacredness of the cosmos with paganism:  
The pagan regards the world as sacred because it is permeated by divine presence; 
he therefore respects it (to the point of worshipping it explicitly or implicitly) and 
does not do damage to it.  But equally, he never worries about its fate; he believes 
in its eternity.  He is also unaware of any need for transformation of nature or 
transcendence of its limitations: the world is good as it stands and possesses in its 
nature all that is necessary for its survival.
288
   
 
Anthropocentrism in the Schema of Creation, Fall, and Redemption 
If the transfigurative dimension of Orthodox thought is clear, at least in the 
general sense that the nonhuman cosmos is and will be taken into the divine life, the 
anthropocentric dimension is more complicated.  On the one hand, Orthodox writers are 
consistent in affirming a functional anthropocentrism in which humanity performs a 
central role—that of microcosm and priest—in the transfiguration of the cosmos.289  Thus 
Zizioulas states that “the solution of the problem [of the survival of the cosmos] lies in 
the creation of Man.”290  On the other hand, they maintain that any form of 
anthropocentrism divorced from a theocentric anthropology is untenable.
291
   
                                               
288 Zizioulas, “Preserving God’s Creation: Three Lectures on Theology and Ecology,” King’s 
Theological Review 12 (1989), Part III, 5. Granted, Zizioulas’s claim that the pagan does not worry about 
the fate of the world because it has no beginning or end could not be farther from Berry’s work. That point 
aside, every other emphasis in the quote seems in complete agreement with Berry’s eco-theological 
understanding. Berry does emphasize divine immanence in the cosmos. He does accept the nonhuman 
world is good as it is. He would also disavow a functional anthropocentrism that voids meaning of the 
nonhuman creation in the absence of humanity.    
289 Meyendorff, Christ, 105-106.   
290 Zizioulas, “Preserving God’s Creation,” Part III, 1. See also Louth, “Between Creation and 
Transfiguration,” 214. 
291 On this point, see Zizioulas’s critique of Augustinian anthropocentrism. Zizioulas, “Preserving 
God’s Creation,” Part I, 3. See also Theokritoff, “Creator and Creation,” 71-73.  
137 
 
In this project, however, my question regards specifically whether or not the 
nonhuman cosmos, including particular nonhuman animals, exists primarily (or 
exclusively) for the sake of humanity in relation to God.  With regard to Orthodox 
theology the question is not whether or not the cosmos is included in the eschatological 
community—it is—but rather why it is included.  More poignantly: does nonhuman 
cosmos exist, and will it be included in the eschatological community, to facilitate the gift 
exchange of the divine-human drama?   
Orthodox theologians provide a gamut of answers to this question.  Furthermore, 
at times the answers seem ambiguous.  According to Lossky, the world was “created that 
it might be deified.”292  Lossky furthermore posits a sacramental view of the cosmos 
entailing that “revelation for theology remains essentially geocentric.”  And yet such 
revelation is “addressed to men.”293  Thus it appears that the deification of the cosmos is 
connected to the geocentric nature of revelation—even in the eschaton—which is in turn 
for humanity in relation to God.    
From his liturgical approach, Schmemann states that the earth is a gift to 
humanity for communion with God: “In the Bible the food that man eats, the world of 
which he must partake in order to live, is given to him by God, and it is given as 
communion with God.”294  Humanity’s (or more accurately “man’s”295) role as priest is to 
“know, name and possess the world.”  In doing so the human creature is “receiving the 
world from God and offering it to God.”296  Schmemann’s words later in the same work 
                                               
292 Lossky, Mystical Theology, 101. 
293 Ibid.., 105. 
294 Schmemann, For the Life of the World, 14. 
295 For Schmemann’s seemingly androcentric view of natural priesthood, see Schmemann, For the 
Life of the World, 85. 
296 Ibid.., 14-15. 
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are revealing.  The cosmos is “an essential means both of knowledge of God and 
communion with [God], and to be so is its true nature and its ultimate destiny.”297  Thus 
the inclusion of the nonhuman creation in the eschatological community is 
anthropocentric inasmuch as “its true nature and its ultimate destiny” are exhausted by 
being the necessary sacrament that facilitated the divine-human drama.    
Zizioulas does not deny the superiority of human beings, only that such 
superiority rests in the quality of rationality.  Rather, it rests in humanity’s tending toward 
that which is beyond what is “given” (i.e. creation) and commune with God, which 
entails “freedom.”298  Zizioulas rejects an anthropocentrism in which humans, as 
individuals, engage in utility of the cosmos for the sake of “self-satisfaction or 
pleasure.”299  But he affirms a doxological anthropocentrism in which the human 
encounters the cosmos and—as a person within it—offers it back to God.   
In this approach, “man would still use creation as a source from which he would 
draw the basic elements necessary for his creation as a source of life, such as food, 
clothing, building of houses, etc. But to all this he would give a dimension which we 
could call personal.”300  In short, use becomes reverential or liturgical, drawing creation 
into the communion between humanity and God.
301
  In this sense, humanity is not the end 
of the nonhuman creation—which was also true of Aquinas’s theology.  Rather, in the 
priesthood of humanity the cosmos finds its teleological aim: a means of communion.  “A 
human is the priest of creation as he or she freely turns it into a vehicle of communion 
                                               
297 Ibid.., 120. 
298 Zizioulas, “Preserving God’s Creation,” Part I, 2; Part III, 2-3.  
299 Ibid.., Part III, 4; “Ecological Asceticism,” 22. Aquinas would concur with Zizioulas on this 
point. 
300 Zizioulas, “Preserving God’s Creation,” Part III, 4; emphasis original. 
301 Zizioulas “Ecological Asceticism,” 23. On liturgical engagement with the cosmos, see 
Schmemann’s stunning chapter on the Eucharist in For the Life of the World, 23-46.  
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with God and fellow human beings.”302  Thus, Zizioulas states that when we receive back 
what we have offered to God (e.g. in the formal celebration of the Eucharist), “we 
consume them no longer as death but as life.”303    
Meyendorff’s anthropocentrism is at times obvious.  He writes, “[T]he ultimate 
aim of the divine plan is…man’s deification.”304  On the other hand, at times his 
affirmations are ambiguous.  Citing Maximus, he claims that “all creatures are destined 
for communion with” God.305  Though again, citing Maximus he writes that only “in the 
case man” does God grant “an eternal existence.”306  Notwithstanding this ambiguity, the 
question is whether or not “all creatures are destined for communion” with God for their 
own sake.  Or do they simply facilitate a sacramental role for the divine-human drama?   
Meyendorff claims that Orthodox theology finds common ground in a 
“theocentric anthropology” and an “anthropocentric cosmology.”307  The former claim 
denotes that, even as imago Dei and whatever attributes that implies, humanity is only 
truly human in relation to God, and ultimately in deification.
308
  For Meyendorff, “the 
‘theocentricity’ of man makes it inevitable that the whole of creation be considered as 
anthropocentric.”309  Meyendorff continues: 
Man—and man alone—if liberated by baptism from his fallen state of dependence 
upon nature, possesses in himself a restored image of God.  This changes his 
entire relationship with created nature.  The ancient Orthodox liturgical tradition 
is very rich in various sacramental acts through which nature is ‘sanctified.’  
However, all these acts affirm the lordship and responsibility of man, exercised on 
behalf of the Creator.  The eucharistic bread and wine become the body and blood 
                                               
302 Zizioulas “Ecological Asceticism,” 23. Note that communion with the creation itself is not part 
of this equation. 
303 Zizioulas, “Preserving God’s Creation,” Part III, 5. 
304 Meyendorff, Christ, 109; emphasis mine.  
305 Meyendorff, “Creation in the History of Orthodox Theology,” 29. 
306 Meyendorff, Christ, 104. 
307 Meyendorff, “Creation in the History of Orthodox Theology,” 34-37. 
308 Ibid.., 35. 
309 Ibid.., 36. 
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of Christ because they are human food.  Baptismal water—or water sanctified on 
other occasions—is holy because it serves as means of cleansing and drinking.  
Oil is blessed as an instrument of healing.  Examples here can be multiplied.  
They all point to the restoration, in the Church of God, of the original, paradisiac 
plan of relationships between God and creation, with man serving as mediator, as 
servant and as friend of God.
310
  
 
Thus anthropocentrism does not mean that human beings are all that matter within a 
world of matter.  In fact, Meyendorff’s central point is that it as human creatures, as 
material subjects, that humans matter (as opposed to as the impersonal notion of human 
nature).  In other words, value is not, for Meyendorff, relegated to humanity’s incorporeal 
dimensions.   
 Meyendorff’s anthropocentrism is first and foremost functional.  It regards 
humanity’s role in the cosmos.311  And yet this point entails a position in which, in a 
manner ironically similar to Aquinas’s position, the nonhuman creation matters to God 
through human beings.  Humans sanctify the nonhuman creation and thereby mediate the 
proper relation between it and God by using it properly.
312
  Thus Meyendorff can claim 
that a “positive” achievement of “the modern scientific and technological revolution” is 
that it entails “the reaffirmation, more explicit than ever, of man’s rule over creation.”313         
Even more so—or at least explicitly more so—than the above authors, the 
position of Dumitru Staniloae, the Romanian theologian persecuted under a Communist 
regime, evinces anthropocentrism.  On this point, Staniloae is unapologetic: “The world 
as nature is created for the sake of human subjects and has an anthropocentric 
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is God’s movement to humanity through the world. The second is humanity’s movement to God. 
Meyendorff, Christ, 109.  
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character.”314  In his view, nature is “an object or… succession of objects.”  Furthermore, 
“God creates this ensemble of objects…for the sake of a dialogue with humans.  
Otherwise, their creation would have no point.”315  Elsewhere, Staniloae makes the same 
claim regarding nonhuman animals: if the rationality evident in these creatures “did not 
have as its purpose the service of man, it, too, would be without meaning.”316   
Yet Staniloae is clear that the nonhuman cosmos participates in deification: 
“Nature as a whole is destined for the glory in which men will share in the kingdom of 
heaven.”317  Likewise, humanity experiences deification through the cosmos.318  Says 
Bordeianu, “Staniloae refers to the sacramentality of creation in the sense of visible sign 
and instrument through which grace is communicated.”319  This sacramental role of the 
nonhuman creation will continue in the eschaton.  And it is as the necessary sacrament 
facilitating this drama that the cosmos is included in the eschaton.
320
  Thus the nature of 
nonhuman participation in the eschatological community is indirect, for it always remains 
for the sake of divine-human drama.
321
  Thus, perhaps ironically, Staniloae and Aquinas 
only disagree about the eschatological community with regard to degree.  That is, the 
main difference is how much of the nonhuman creation is included in the eschaton.  
Concerning the why of its inclusion, they are nearly identical.      
                                               
314 Staniloae, Creation and Deification, 20. 
315 Ibid.., 14; emphasis added.  
316 Ibid.., 28.  
317 Ibid.., 3, 18-19, 25, 58-59.  
318 On this reciprocity between humanity and the nonhuman creation, see Bordeianu, “Priesthood,” 
410. 
319 Ibid.., 409. 
320 Ibid.. 
321 Staniloae, Creation and Deification, 1. It is significant that Staniloae connects his view to 
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For Staniloae, the nonhuman cosmos “finds it meaning in” humanity.322  It is an 
object of gift-exchange that facilitates love between God and humanity and among 
humans.
323
  In a manner that is strikingly similar to Aquinas, Staniloae writes, “The 
rationality of things has this double purpose: first, to be useful to man in maintaining his 
biological existence; second, and equally, to foster human spiritual growth through the 
knowledge of meanings.”324   
Ultimately, for Staniloae, the world is “only a framework,” a “field” created so 
that humanity “might raise the world up to a supreme spiritualization, and this to the end 
that human beings might encounter God within a world that had become fully 
spiritualized through their own union with God.”325  In other words, the transfiguration of 
the cosmos remains anthropocentric in that it is for the sake of the divine-human drama.  
In short, the world is the necessary and eternal sacrament for humanity.
326
    
Elizabeth Theokritoff defends both Meyendorff and Staniloae against the charge 
of anthropocentrism, qualifying their use of the term.
327
  Ultimately, she suggests that the 
Orthodox position is thus: “if the world exists ‘for humanity’, it is no less true that 
humanity exists for the sake of the universe.”328  This claim is significant.  However, it is 
difficult to maintain in light of Staniloae’s comment: “Nature itself proves itself to have 
been made for the sake of consciousness, not consciousness for the sake of nature.”329  
Regardless, my point is not to classify all Orthodox theology—and the appreciation for 
the aporetic mystery of the divine-world drama within Orthodox thought resists a sharp 
                                               
322 Staniloae, Creation and Deification, 13. 
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325 Ibid.., 62-63; emphasis mine. 
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categorization.
330
  I only maintain that, based on my explorations, some Orthodox 
theologians evince a concretized form of anthropocentric transfiguration.   
An Eco-Theological Ethics of Anthropocentric Transfiguration 
What does an eco-theological ethics of anthropocentric transfiguration look like in 
practice?  Answering this question is difficult, as Drummond notes that Orthodox 
theologians resist the construction of a system of ethics.
331
  Still a humble effort must be 
made here.   
First and foremost, such an ethics would be grounded in the notion that one ought 
to treat the sacramental cosmos in a manner akin to how one treats the elements of the 
Eucharist itself.  Thus Ware states that humanity’s “vocation is not to dominate and 
exploit nature, but to transfigure and hallow it.”332  Chryssavgis suggests living by a 
“sacramental principle, which ultimately demands from us the recognition nothing in this 
life is profane or unsacred.”333  For Zizioulas, any engagement of the nonhuman creation 
that violates its sacramentality constitutes a sin.
334
  To treat the world as a sacrament is to 
celebrate the inbreaking of eschaton in the resurrection of Christ, a point that Chryssavgis 
sees in liturgical prayers of Orthodoxy.
335
  Thus Chryssavgis states: “There is…no 
                                               
330 I acknowledge that certain Orthodox thinkers are better categorized in cosmocentric 
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greater estrangement from the world than in its use in a manner that fails to restore the 
correct vision of the world in the light of the resurrection.”336   
But what does this vision entail?  It cannot be separated from the notion of 
creation itself.  Thus Louth’s words are illuminating:  
The doctrine of creation…means that our created environment is touched by the 
hand of God, is a place where we can encounter God, and still in some way bears 
the traces of the paradise of delight that God intended his creation to be.  Human 
sin obscures our perception of this, and encourages an attitude to the created order 
that ceases to take seriously the fact that it is created, seeing it rather as a resource 
to be exploited for our own purposes.  As we do that we begin to misconstrue the 
world around us, our attitude becomes destructive, we cease to see the world as a 
gift, and instead begin to compete with one another in fashioning our own worlds, 
which encroach on one another, so that it becomes a matter of contention whether 
this is mine or yours, as we forget that it is God’s—and so both mine and yours, 
as a gift to share, or neither mine nor yours, as a possession to grasp and hold.”337   
    
Louth’s comment maintains the reverential respect for the cosmos.  Yet at the same time 
it highlights another dimension of this eco-theological paradigm: the manner in which we 
hallow that cosmos.  For world is not a resource for the human community to abuse for 
self-gratification.  But the world is a gift to the human community.  We must use it as 
such.    
In Zizioulas’s estimation, reverencing the cosmos implies a world-affirming or 
ecological asceticism.
338
   
An ‘ecological asceticism’…always begins with deep respect for the material 
creation, including the human body, and builds upon the view that we are not 
masters and possessors of this creation, but are called to turn it into a vehicle of 
communion, always taking into account and respecting its possibilities as well as 
its limitations.
339
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Such asceticism demands that humans—and more accurately, contemporary humans 
influenced by modernity’s mechanistic understanding of nature—reevaluate our “concept 
of quality of life.”340  In short, it requires a simple living in which we do not take more 
than we need.  And what we do take, we must take reverentially.  Thus Chryssavgis states 
that asceticism “is a communal attitude that leads to the respectful use of material 
goods.”341 
In this sense, the ethical consequence of anthropocentric transfiguration is a 
reverential use of the material cosmos.  All matter becomes liturgical in the hands of 
human priests, who engage it humbly and always with ultimate reference to God.  Such 
engagement entails a use of creation in which it is transformed into communion with God 
and within the human community.
342
    
ANTHROPOCENTRIC TRANSFIGURATION AND INDIVIDUAL NONHUMAN ANIMALS  
Where do individual nonhuman animals fit into this ethics?  Schmemann claims 
that the sacramentality of the cosmos recovers a reverence for eating.  Yet food is still 
food.
343
  Do animals fall into this category of that which humans both reverence and eat?  
Chryssavgis suggests that humanity’s proper relation to the environment is evident in 
Adam’s naming of the animals, which entails “a loving and lasting personal 
relationship.”344  Yet this notion implies that the sacramental eating of plants is not at 
odds with such a relationship.   
Zizioulas notes how hagiographies depict compassion of saints to animals, even 
weeping over their death.  He continues, “Even today on Mount Athos one can encounter 
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monks who never kill serpents, but co-exist peacefully with them—something that would 
make even the best Christians among us shiver and tremble.”345  Likewise, Lossky quotes 
Isaac the Syrian as an example of the Eastern Orthodox view of the cosmos.  Says Isaac: 
What is a merciful heart? …The burning of the heart unto the whole creation, 
man, fowls and beasts, demons and whatever exists; so that by the recollection 
and the sight of them the eyes shed tears on account of the force of mercy which 
moves the heart by great compassion.  Then the heart becomes weak and it is not 
able to bear hearing or examining injury or any insignificant suffering of anything 
in creation.  And therefore even in behalf of the irrational beings and the enemies 
of the truth and even in behalf of those who do harm to it, at all times he offers 
prayers with tears that they may be guarded and strengthened; even in behalf of 
the kinds of reptiles, on account of his great compassion which is poured out in 
his heart without measure, after the example of God.
346
   
       
There is, then possibility of a non-violent response to nonhuman animals as a 
reverent appreciation of their goodness.  Indeed, Issa Khalil notes that the Orthodox 
faithful are vegan for more than half the year on account of liturgical fasts.  Furthermore, 
Orthodox monks are vegetarian for most of the year.
347
  Khalil notes that the Orthodox 
foundation for this fast in not primarily the sentience of the animals; rather, it is self-
control.  Yet he also notes a “deeper theological meaning of the fast.”  It is “an act of 
repentance towards the animals, as well as an act of reconciliation, prefiguring life in 
paradise where the lamb shall lie with the wolf and not be hurt, and especially lie with the 
worst predator of all, and not be eaten.”348   
These notions notwithstanding, it is necessary to note that, among many Orthodox 
theologians, individual nonhuman animals are subject to reverential use for the sake of 
the human-divine rapport.  And such a use does not seem to reject the possibility of 
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killing individual nonhuman creatures.  For example, in Staniloae’s theological view, the 
nonhuman animal is part of the sacramental world and thus part of the “succession of 
objects” that facilitates “the dialogue of the gift” between God and humanity.349  At the 
very least, I maintain that an eco-theological ethics of anthropocentric transfiguration 
more easily tends toward a permissiveness to harming individual animals than its 
explicitly cosmocentric counterpart, which I explore in subsequent chapters.       
ANTHROPOCENTRIC TRANSFIGURATION IN SUMMATION  
This exploration through the work of various Orthodox theologians teases out the 
possibility of a paradigm of eco-theological ethics that I label anthropocentric 
transfiguration.  It would be a misnomer to identity all Orthodox theology with this 
particular paradigm.  Nonetheless, the theological foundations of anthropocentric 
transfiguration are most evident in concrete form in the work of certain theologians 
within the Orthodox tradition.   
These foundations include the following: first, an affirmation of the sacredness or 
sacramentality of the entire cosmos, which in turn renders the nonhuman creation 
necessary for temporal and ultimate human fulfillment; second, an inclusion of the 
cosmos in the eschatological community through humanity; third, an emphasis on the 
purpose of the nonhuman world as existing in order to facilitate the divine-human drama 
through a gift-exchange. 
The picture arising from these foundations is one in which humans use the 
creation reverentially, offering it back to God in worship.  While the created order is not 
merely a machine for human pleasure, neither does it have a purpose or integrity separate 
from its benefit to humanity.  Ultimately, the cosmos is the eternally necessary sacrament 
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for humanity in relation to God.  Its inclusion in the eschatological community is 
ultimately for that relationship.         
ANOTHER OPTION: COSMOCENTRIC TRANSFIGURATION AS THE BEST OF BOTH 
WORLDS 
I have considered three of the four eco-theological paradigms of my proposed 
taxonomy.  My exploration has provided concrete examples of these paradigms within 
Christianity.  Among the most important differences between the paradigms are the role 
and status of the human being (anthropology), the role and status of the nonhuman 
creation (cosmology), and the scope of the eschatological community (eschatology).  At 
this intersection, one senses the real contrast between the eco-theological visions.   
Table 1 – 1 summarizes this contrast:    
TABLE 1 - 1 
 
Anthropocentric 
Conservation 
Cosmocentric 
Conservation 
Anthropocentric 
Transfiguration 
Anthropology: 
Central Status/ 
Role of Human 
Beings 
Essentially unique moral 
dignity; Subject of 
ultimate divine concern 
Enhanced dignity; 
Member of creation 
community 
Essentially unique moral 
dignity; Microcosm, co-
creator, and priest 
Cosmology: 
Central Status/ 
Role of the 
Nonhuman 
Creation 
Network of good and 
ordered resources/gifts 
for human well-being 
Good and ordered 
interconnected 
community of intrinsic 
value 
Necessary and ultimate 
sacrament for divine-
human drama 
Scope of the 
Eschatological 
Community 
God and humanity; 
Angels and 
elements/matter 
Eschatology de-
emphasized in favor of 
current order of world 
and its goodness 
Cosmos (human and 
nonhuman) 
The Primary 
Unity of Moral 
Consideration 
(General or 
Particular) 
Particular humans; 
General nonhumans 
General   
Particular humans; 
General nonhumans 
Ethical Human 
Engagement of 
the Nonhuman 
Creation 
Proper use in via toward 
uniquely human telos 
Balance of a “letting be” 
and a reverential “living-
with” 
Reverential use as 
sacramental gift that 
facilitates communion 
with others and God 
Some 
Representatives 
Augustine; Thomas 
Aquinas; Roman Catholic 
Magisterium 
Thomas Berry; 
Matthew Fox; 
Rosemary Radford 
Ruether 
John Meyendorff; 
Dumitru Staniloae 
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The differences between these paradigms underline the possibility for a fourth.  
Note the fundamental categories.  On the one hand, a paradigm can be either 
anthropocentric—understood as claiming only humans have intrinsic value before God—
or cosmocentric—understood as the entire cosmos including both human and nonhuman 
having intrinsic value before God.  On the other hand, a paradigm can be either 
conservational—understood as the preservation of the current good and natural order—or 
transfigurative—understood as the movement of a fallen and/or incomplete creation 
toward its eschatological telos.  Thus a fourth paradigm naturally forms, as is evident in 
Table 1 – 2:350   
TABLE 1 – 2  
  Why does creation have value/dignity? 
  Utility to human beings Intrinsic value 
What is the 
responsibility of 
human beings 
toward creation? 
Preserve the goodness 
and order of the 
unfallen cosmos. 
Anthropocentric 
conservation 
Cosmocentric 
conservation 
Guide the fallen 
and/or 
eschatologically 
incomplete cosmos 
toward its telos. 
Anthropocentric 
transfiguration 
??? 
 
I naturally label this fourth paradigm as cosmocentric transfiguration.  Although this eco-
theological ethics has been underdeveloped, in my view it represents a promising path 
forward as a theologically grounded Christian ethics.   
I describe cosmocentric transfiguration as “the best of both worlds” in a double 
manner.  First, it combines the common dignity of all creatures evident in cosmocentric 
conservation with the eschatological import of the entire cosmos in anthropocentric 
transfiguration.  Second, it has the potential to pay heed to a scientific worldview, even 
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project.  
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the New Story of the Universe, without rejecting the theological value of eschatology.  It 
provides a balance of creation and redemption.   
This second point is especially important and draws out the particular wordplay of 
the phrase “the best of both worlds.”  On the one hand, cosmocentric transfiguration 
appreciates the goodness and order of the cosmos.  It thus guards against a simplistic 
escape from the world.  On the other hand, it advocates the teleological claim that the 
entire cosmos, including every individual instantiation of life therein, is moving toward 
an eschatological participation in God’s own life.  Thus it guards against a simplistic 
naturalism that condemns all creatures to their gratuitous suffering in the evolutionary 
emergence of the cosmos.  In this sense, cosmocentric transfiguration navigates the 
“already” and the “not yet” of eschatological thought in a manner that neither disregards 
the voice of the earth nor the revelatory voice of God’s future.  Within this paradigm, 
humans become proleptic witnesses to that future by living as peacefully as possible 
within the emerging and evolutionary system of the cosmos.  For humans can recognize 
the “groaning of creation” (Romans 8:22) in juxtaposition to the divine promise of a 
future freedom from that groaning (Isaiah 11:1-9; Romans 8:18-21) and, by witnessing to 
the future within that recognition, became a theophany of God’s peace for the cosmos.   
Because this paradigm is underdeveloped, I will explore two concrete examples of 
the theological foundations for it in depth.  First, I will engage the thought of the 
Lutheran theologian of hope, Jürgen Moltmann.  Second, I examine the work of the 
premier animal theologian, Andrew Linzey.  By comparing and contrasting these two 
Christian thinkers, and placing them in dialogue with the three paradigms developed in 
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this chapter, I will ultimately be able to point toward the construction of a developed eco-
theological ethics of cosmocentric transfiguration.   
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CHAPTER 2  
COSMOCENTRIC TRANSFIGURATION IN THE THEOLOGY OF JÜRGEN MOLTMANN:  
THE ADVENT OF A MAXIMALLY INCLUSIVE ESCHATOLOGICAL PANENTHEISM 
 
 “If I have theological virtue at all, then it is one that has never hitherto been 
recognized as such: curiosity.”1  This sentence provides an insight into Jürgen 
Moltmann’s (b. 1926) methodology, which is unapologetically subjective, personal, 
dialogical, and experimental.
2
  Even so, Moltmann’s influence on the landscape of 
theology in the 20
th
 and today can hardly be overstated.
3
  His seminal work, Theology of 
Hope, launched him into international recognition, and his following works have not 
disappointed in their ingenuity.  
In this chapter, I seek to delineate the theological foundations Moltmann provides 
for an eco-theological ethics of cosmocentric transfiguration.  In order to do so, I begin 
by very briefly sketching Moltmann’s major works and his influences.  I then attempt to 
provide an overview of theological themes in his thought that are pertinent to 
cosmocentric transfiguration.
4
  Finally, with these pieces in place, I explore Moltmann’s 
ethics with regard to ecology in general and nonhuman animals in particular.  Here, my 
aim is mainly what Moltmann does say in his works; though, I also hint at what I believe 
he should say given his theological foundations.   
                                               
1 Jürgen Moltmann, The Coming of God: Christian Eschatology (hereafter CoG), translated by 
Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996), xiv. All citations of quotes will henceforth appear 
parenthetically in the text unless they are the first citations for that source.  
2 For Moltmann’s self-reflection on his methodology (and the subject of methodology in general), 
see Moltmann, Experiences in Theology: Ways and Forms of Christian Theology, translated by Margaret 
Kohl (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2000). See also Jeremy Law, “Jürgen Moltmann’s Ecological 
Hermeneutics,” in Ecological Hermeneutics: Biblical, Historical and Theological Perspectives, David G. 
Horrell Cheryl Hunt, Christopher Southgate, and Francesca Stavrakopoulou, editors (New York, NY: T&T 
Clark, 2010), 227-28.  
3 Seventeen years ago, Miroslav Volf calculated that Moltmann’s work had been the topic of over 
130 dissertations. See Miroslav Volf, “A Queen and a Beggar: Challenges and Prospects of Theology,” in 
The Future of Theology: Essays in Honor of Jürgen Moltmann, Miroslav Volf, Carmen Krieg, and Thomas 
Kucharz, editors (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1996), ix-x. 
4 While I am cognizant of the development in Moltmann’s theology, in this section my outline is 
thematic rather than chronological.  
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JÜRGEN MOLTMANN: A BRIEF SKETCH 
Moltmann’s first three works—Theology of Hope (1965),5 The Crucified God 
(1973), and The Church in the Power of the Holy Spirit (1975)—each “look at theology 
as a whole from one particular standpoint.”6  In his later six volume set, he seeks to make 
contributions to theological themes pertinent to systematic theology without constructing 
a concrete system.   
I now viewed my ‘whole’ as a part belonging to a wider community, and as my 
contribution to theology as a whole.  I know and accept the limits of my own 
existence and my context.  I do not claim to say everything.
7
   
 
This set of contributions includes, in order of publication, Trinity and the Kingdom 
(1980), God in Creation (1985), The Way of Jesus Christ (1989), The Spirit of Life 
(1991), The Coming of God (1995), and Experiences in Theology (2000).  Moltmann has 
of course written many other works, the most recent of which, Ethics of Hope (2010), he 
refers to as “the close of my contributions to theological discussions.”8   
Moltmann’s influences are vast and diverse.9  He is quite impacted by Jewish 
thought, both in thinkers like Ernst Bloch, Franz Rosenzweig, Martin Buber, and 
Abraham Heschel; and in Kabbalism.
10
  His affiliation with Bloch evinces Moltmann’s 
                                               
5 These parenthetical dates reflect the year of the original German publication. 
6 Jürgen Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom: The Doctrine of God (hereafter TKG), 
translated by Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), xi. These works constitute a trilogy in the 
Moltmann corpus. 
7 Moltmann, TKG, vii. 
8 Jürgen Moltmann, Ethics of Hope (hereafter EH), translated by Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis, 
MN: Fortress Press, 2012), xi. 
9 For more extensive considerations, see Richard Bauckham, Moltmann: Messianic Theology in 
the Making (Basingstoke, UK: Marshall Pickering, 1987).  
10 See Jürgen Moltmann, The Crucified God: The Cross of Christ as the Foundation and Criticism 
of Christian Theology (hereafter TCG), translated by R. A. Wilson (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 
1993), 5; Moltmann, CoG, 29-46; Jürgen Moltmann, The Way of Jesus Christ: Christology in Messianic 
Dimensions (hereafter WJC), translated by Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1993), xvi. 
Also, Bauckham, Messianic Theology, 3-22; Geiko Müller-Fahrenholz, The Kingdom and the Power: The 
Theology of Jürgen Moltmann, translated by John Bowden (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2001), 42-
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debt to Karl Marx—a debt further evident by his affinity with the Frankfurt School.11  He 
was instructed by both Karl Barth and Karl Rahner.
12
  His biblical scholarship bears the 
marks of Gerhard von Rad.
13
  His works evince dialogue with contemporary theologians 
such as Wolfhart Pannenberg and Hans Urs von Balthasar.
14
  In later works especially, he 
is heavily influenced by Eastern Orthodox theology.
15
  Finally, it must be said that 
Moltmann has been influenced by his own life experience, including his stint as a 
German soldier in World War II.
16
  Ultimately, Moltmann’s theology is an experiential 
and thus subjective contribution amidst the great community of theologians and thinkers 
to whom he acknowledges his indebtedness.
17
   
PERTINENT DIMENSIONS OF MOLTMANN’S THEOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
My first task in delineating Moltmann’s potential contribution to an eco-
theological ethics of cosmocentric transfiguration is exploring theological themes of his 
work that are pertinent to this ethics.  My focus is limited.  What follows is not a 
summary of Moltmann’s theology.  My hermeneutical engagement with these themes is 
                                                                                                                                            
43; Eugene B. Borowitz, Contemporary Christologies: A Jewish Response (New York, NY: Paulist Press, 
1980), 83-84, 87-88. 
11 See Moltmann, TCG, 5. The Frankfort School, initially the Institute of Social Research at 
Frankfurt University, formed in 1923 and advocated a Neo-Marxist approach to social issues. For historical 
considerations, see Gerald L. Atkinson, “About the Frankfurt School,” available online at 
http://frankfurtschool.us/history.htm.  
12 Moltmann, TKG, viii. 
13 See Müller-Fahrenholz, The Kingdom and the Power, 47-48. 
14 Bauckham, Messianic Theology, 93-96. 
15 Jürgen Moltmann, The Church in the Power of the Spirit: A Contribution to Messianic 
Ecclesiology (hereafter CPS), translated by Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1993), 36-37; 
TKG, xv; Jürgen Moltmann, The Spirit of Life: A Universal Affirmation (hereafter SL), translated by 
Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1992), xi. Moltmann’s History and the Triune God is 
dedicated to Dumitru Staniloae.  
16 For these biographical considerations, see Müller-Fahrenholz, The Kingdom and the Power, 15-
39. Of course, Moltmann’s autobiography is a fine source for understanding his influences, both his 
dialogues with various voices and his personal experiences. Jürgen Moltmann, A Broad Place: An 
Autobiography, translated by Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2008). 
17 Moltmann, TKG, vii-viii. 
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aimed at how, for Moltmann, the relationship between humans and nonhumans is shaped 
by God’s relationship with the world.   
THE SOCIAL TRINITY’S HISTORY WITH THE WORLD 
Moltmann begins to develop his thoughts on the Trinity in his earlier works.  In 
Theology of Hope and The Crucified God, he focuses mainly on the relationship between 
the Father and the Son and its significance for Christian thought and practice.  In The 
Church in the Power of the Holy Spirit, he more clearly brings the pneumatology that was 
latent in those previous works into the forefront.  However, it is with The Trinity and the 
Kingdom that he fully focuses on contributing to the doctrine of the Trinity and delineates 
his social understanding of the Trinity. 
The Trinity as Social Trinity 
In Moltmann’s view, two forms of emphases on divine oneness have dominated 
Western thought.  The first is substantialistic.  This view “was given by Greek antiquity, 
continued to be given in the Middle Ages, and still counts as valid in the present-day 
definitions of the Roman Catholic Church” (TK, 10).  The divine persons share in a 
common substance that underlies them.  This substance vouchsafes the divine unity and 
logically precedes it.  Thus, writers in the West tend to begin with the attributes of God 
(i.e., qualities that belong to the divine substance and are thus shared by all the persons) 
and only afterwards discuss the trinitarian persons.
18
   
                                               
18 A similar judgment is rendered by Karl Rahner. Karl Rahner, The Trinity, translated by Joseph 
Donceel (New York, NY: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 2005), 15-21. Indeed, Moltmann evinces a 
progressive understanding of Rahner’s dismantling of the distinction between the immanent and economic 
Trinity. There is not an immutable substance hidden behind the divine persons revealed in history. See 
Moltmann, TKG, 158-62; also Richard Bauckham in The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann (Edinburgh: T&T 
Clark, 1995), 156. 
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The second form emphasizes God’s subjectivity.  This view develops in the wake 
of the metaphysical shift in anthropology beginning with Immanuel Kant.
19
  Based on the 
modern notion of “person” as a sovereign subject, advocates of this position claim that it 
is no longer appropriate to think of Father, Son, and Spirit as persons.  Moltmann 
identifies his mentor Karl Barth as one of the promulgators of this view.
20
  Barth argues 
that sovereignty belongs to the whole of the divine—to “God”—not individually to its 
persons.
21
   
Moltmann claims that both of these approaches to trinitarian thought miss the 
complexity of the biblical view of the divine by surrendering the doctrine to H. Richard 
Niebuhr’s “radical monotheism.”22  Such views are reductionist for Moltmann because 
they do not give primacy to God as Trinity and therefore do not do justice to the self-
disclosure of God in the history of the world.
23
  In other words, they prioritize abstract 
considerations of what God must be according to reason and nature (general revelation) 
over God’s self-disclosure in history (special revelation).24  This reduction is also 
dangerous in that it leads to oppression in the natural and political spheres vis-à-vis an 
emphasis on the sovereignty of a singularity over and against the community.
25
   
                                               
19 Moltmann, TKG, 13-15.  
20 Ibid., 63-64. 
21 Ibid.. 
22 See Moltmann, TCG, 215. On Niebuhr’s view, which maintains that all reality comes from and 
returns to one ultimate reality, see H. Richard Niebuhr, Radical Monotheism and Western Culture—with 
Supplementary Essays (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1970).  
23 Jürgen Moltmann, History and the Triune God: Contributions to Trinitarian Theology (hereafter 
HTG), translated by John Bowden (New York, NY: Crossroad, 1992), 84-85. 
24 Moltmann, TKG,17; HTG, 82-84; Müller-Fahrenholz, The Kingdom and the Power, 142. 
25 Moltmann, TKG, 10-12, 191-202; Jürgen Moltmann, God for a Secular Society: The Public 
Relevance of Theology (hereafter GSS), translated by Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 
1999), 97-98; Timothy Harvie, Jürgen Moltmann’s Ethics of Hope: Eschatological Possibilities for Moral 
Action (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2009), 123-30; M. Douglas Meeks, “The Social Trinity and Property,” in 
God’s Life in Trinity, Miroslav Volf and Michael Welker, editors (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2006), 
15. 
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In response to these emphases on God’s oneness, Moltmann aligns his own 
thought with the Eastern Fathers who focused on the relationships of the trinitarian 
persons.
26
  In line with this thinking, he seeks “to start with the special Christian tradition 
of the history of Jesus the Son, and from that to develop a historical doctrine of the 
Trinity” (TK, 19).  Within this framework, Moltmann develops his social doctrine of the 
Trinity.  He argues that God’s eternal existence is always and already a trinitarian 
existence of mutual love.  Drawing on the imagery of perichoresis developed by John 
Damascene, Moltmann maintains that God’s oneness originates in the intimacy of the 
persons with and in one another.
27
  “God is a community of Father, Son, and Spirit, 
whose unity is constituted by mutual indwelling and reciprocal interpenetration” (TK, 
viii; also 174-75).  In other words, the perichoretic union of the divine community of 
persons is what vouchsafes the claim that God is one.
28
  Neither a common substance nor 
a single subjectivity is required in the face of perichoresis.
29
   
                                               
26 Moltmann, TKG, 19; HTG, xi-xii. John Meyendorff approvingly reviews Moltmann’s view with 
reference to the Cappadocian Fathers. See “Reply to Jürgen Moltmann’s ‘The Unity of the Triune God,” St. 
Vladimir's Theological Quarterly, 28/3 (1984), 183-188. However, Meyendorff explicitly differs with 
Moltmann’s claim that each person of the Trinity has a will and an intellect. He maintains that they share a 
single will and intellect perichoretically. Ibid., 187. He also differs with Moltmann in claiming that the 
persons share a common and immutable nature. Ibid., 188.  
27 Moltmann, TKG, 174.  
28 Moltmann, CoG, 298. This social view of God notwithstanding, Moltmann does adhere to the 
monarchy of the Father as the source of divinity in the Godhead. See Moltmann, TKG, 162-70. The Father 
begets the Son and spirates the Spirit from eternity. Without this distinction, trinitarian thought would lapse 
again into monotheism; for the divine persons would end up being three repetitions of the same. For 
example, if the Father does not uniquely beget the Son, how could the Father be uniquely Father in relation 
to the Son? Likewise, if the Spirit also begets the Son, the Father’s unique relational identity is 
compromised. Yet Moltmann is clear that the Father’s primacy refers only to the generation of the divine 
persons. Ibid., 165. There is neither primacy nor subordination in the actual lived interaction of the divine 
persons. On this point, see Moltmann’s critique of Pannenberg’s monarchial view of the Trinity in 
Moltmann, HTG, xviii-xix. Harvie maintains that Moltmann’s acceptance of the monarchy of the Father 
implies his acceptance of an essential similarity in substance among the divine persons. Harvie, 
Moltmann’s Ethics of Hope, 113-17. 
29 Moltmann, TKG, 175. In The Way of Jesus Christ, Moltmann summarizes his effort in Trinity 
and the Kingdom of God as an attempt “to free the Christian doctrine of God from the confines of the 
ancient metaphysics of substance.” Moltmann, WJC, xv. 
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For Moltmann, this union is what John means when he writes, “God is love” (1 
John 14:16).
30
  This communitarian view of God correlates to the kind of union that God 
desires for the created order.
31
  Whereas monotheism justifies the sovereignty of the one 
over and against the many, the social Trinity, in safeguarding the uniqueness of the divine 
persons in relation to one another, places the individual within the community without 
dissolving her individuality.
32
             
The Social Trinity as Open Trinity 
The Trinity is not a closed-gate community.  The relational life of God is open to 
that which is other than God—namely, the creation.  God is open to share God’s life with 
the cosmos.  
The Trinity’s openness takes two forms for Moltmann, both of which highlight a 
facet of his panentheism.  First, the Trinity opens a space “in God” for creation to be 
itself.  Says Moltmann, “The trinitarian relationship of the Father, the Son, and the Holy 
Spirit is so wide that the whole creation can find space, time and freedom in it” (TK, 
109).  Thus the Trinity’s openness permits the protological act of creation and enables the 
creation’s ongoing existence.  Second, the Trinity is open to perichoretic union with the 
created order.  The trinitarian love that constitutes the divine unity seeks to incorporate 
                                               
30 See Moltmann, TKG, 57-60. For a summary of Moltmann’s view, see Bauckham, The Theology 
of Jürgen Moltmann, 173-82. 
31 See Jürgen Moltmann, God in Creation: A New Theology of Creation and the Spirit of God 
(hereafter GC), translated by Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), 16-17; TKG, 191-202; 
CoG, 301-02. Bauckham is critical of Moltmann for reintroducing an immanent Trinity that differs from 
the history of God with the world. Bauckham, The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann, 155-66; 173-79. See also 
Tim Chester, Mission and the Coming of God: Eschatology, the Trinity and Mission in the Theology of 
Jürgen Moltmann and Contemporary Evangelicalism (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock Publishers, 2006), 37-
40. Steven Bouma-Prediger is also critical of Moltmann on this point. See, The Greening of Theology: The 
ecological Models of Rosemary Radford Ruether, Joseph Sittler, and Jürgen Moltmann (Atlanta, GA: 
Scholars Press, 1995), 260-61. Harvie suggests that the solution to this criticism rests in the notion of 
participation. The Spirit draws creation into the Trinity’s life and in doing so begins to conform the 
community of creation to the divine communion. Harvie, Moltmann’s Ethics of Hope, 133-34.  
32 Moltmann, TKG, 191-222; HTG, xii-xiii. Müller-Fahrenholz, The Kingdom and the Power, 147-
50. 
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the created order into itself without obliterating creation’s integrity.33  This openness 
renders Moltmann’s trinitarian theology eschatological.34   
The openness of God means that the history of the world is simultaneously the 
history of the Trinity.
35
  For it is within history that God desires the world and seeks its 
companionship.
36
  This seeking is only possible because the Trinity opens itself to cosmic 
history.  Within this framework, the doctrinal facets of the economy of salvation, 
including creation, evil, christology, pneumatology, and eschatology, are all expressions 
of the Trinity’s dynamic history with the world.  This economy impacts the life of the 
created order and the life of the triune God by constituting the history of each.
37
   
THE CREATION AS DYNAMIC AND TELEOLOGICAL 
Moltmann does not pay particular attention to the doctrine of creation in his 
earlier works.  However, like many other themes that develop more explicitly later, his 
interest in cosmology is always evident: “A new doctrine of creation had been on my 
                                               
33 Moltmann, CPS, 55-56. 
34 See HTG, 86-87. It also makes it soteriological. See Joy Ann McDougall, Pilgrim of Love: 
Moltmann on the Trinity and Christian Life (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2005), 122-25.  
35 Moltmann develops this thought over time. The central core of it is that the events between the 
world and God are absolutely meaningful to both. See Bauckham, Messianic Theology, 106-10. See also 
Bauckham, The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann, 58-60. Müller-Fahrenholz notes that the history of the 
Trinity with the world is the outlining principle of Moltmann’s first trilogy of works. See The Kingdom and 
the Power, 81. 
36 See Müller-Fahrenholz, The Kingdom and the Power, 137-47. 
37 Such a history requires both mutability and passibility in the Trinity. See Moltmann, CPS, 50-
65; Bauckham, Messianic Theology, 110-13. Here Moltmann’s thought bears a greater similarity with 
“relational theologies” like process theology and open theism (sometimes called “freewill theism”) than 
traditional theism. On process theology, see John B. Cobb Jr. and David Ray Griffin, Process Theology: An 
Introductory Exposition (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1976). For a good review of open theism, 
see Clark Pinnock, Richard Rice, John Sanders, William Hasker, and David Basinger, The Openness of 
God: A Biblical Challenge to the Traditional Understanding of God (Downers Grove: Intervarsity Press, 
1994). On the distinction between process theology and open theism, see the collection of dialogical essays 
in Searching for an Adequate God: A Dialogue Between Process and Free Will Theists, John B. Cobb Jr. 
and Clark H. Pinnock, editors (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2000), 
especially chapter 4.These similarities notwithstanding, Moltmann is explicit about his rejection of 
traditional theism (which he simple labels “theism”), especially with regard to impassibility. See 
Moltmann, TCG, 207-19.  
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agenda ever since I wrote Theology of Hope in 1964” (GC, xi).38  Moltmann distinguishes 
between three phrases of creation: creatio originalis, creatio continua, and creatio 
nova.
39
  Here, I use this structure to consider the dynamic community of creation and its 
teleological (i.e., eschatological) orientation. 
The Dynamism of God’s Creation 
Historically, the doctrine of creation tends toward an understanding of the “six 
days” of God’s creative work.40  Moltmann views this formulation of the doctrine as 
reductionist in three manners.  There manners pertain to both cosmology and theology 
proper and point beyond the original act of creation to creation’s dynamism toward its 
eschatological telos.  
First, creatio originalis is itself preceded by a divine decree and act.  Moltmann 
adapts the traditional notion of creatio ex nihilo by addressing what the presence of 
“nothing” means.  Drawing on the kabbalistic notion of zimzum, Moltmann maintains that 
the nothing within which the created order takes shape is necessarily preceded by God’s 
                                               
38 In my view, William French is mistaken when he suggests a radical change in Moltmann’s view 
between Theology of Hope (in which, according to French, he devalues history and the created order in 
favor of eschatology) and God in Creation (in which, according to French, he recovers the value of the 
created order). See William C. French, “Returning to Creation: Moltmann’s Eschatology Naturalized,” The 
Journal of Religion, 68/1 (1988), 178-81. Moltmann’s eschatology was never escapist or world-denying. 
French’s representation of Moltmann misses the broader scope of his theology—an irony given his defense 
of Aquinas I noted in the first chapter. 
39 See Moltmann, GC, 208; Bouma-Prediger, The Greening of Theology, 110-14. Alan Torrance is 
critical of Moltmann’s use of these terms in conjunction with his appropriation of the doctrine of creatio ex 
nihilo. Torrance offers three critiques. First, Moltmann locates the act of original creation in space and 
time. Second, Moltmann establishes too sharp a divide between original, continuous, and “new” creation. 
Third, Moltmann introduces a linear temporality into God. See Alan J. Torrance, “Creatio Ex Nihilo and 
the Spatio-Temporal Dimensions, with Special Reference to Jürgen Moltmann and D. C. Williams,” in The 
Doctrine of Creation: Essays in Dogmatics, History and Philosophy, Colin E. Gunton, editor (New York, 
NY: T&T Clark, 1997), 91-93.  
40 See Moltmann, GC, 55. 
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decree to withdraw the divine presence in order to create space for the cosmos.
41
  This act 
precedes the creation of the cosmos, which is the filling of the “nothing” with something.   
This claim leads naturally to Moltmann’s dismantling of divine passibility, a 
dismantling that is one of the central tenets of Moltmann’s theology.42  In order to create, 
God must first be passible, able and willing to suffer the space necessary for the created 
order.
43
  Thus, not only can God suffer, but, in order for creation to exist in genuine 
rapport with the divine, God must suffer.  Yet this suffering is God’s own doing: “Only 
God can limit God.”44  Because God embraces God’s own passibility in order to give 
creation its own space, God’s suffering is “part of the grace of creation” (CoG, 306).  
That is, it is God’s suffering that makes creation’s rapport with God possible.  
Moltmann’s view is firmly embedded in his trinitarian theology, most evident in his 
theology of the cross.
45
  It is the cross that calls for “the revolution needed in the concept 
of God” (TCG, 4) in which the Trinity revealed therein replaces the Hellenistically 
derivative immutable deity of “theism.”46   
The trinitarian passion not only makes creation possible, but also drives forward 
the common history of God and the world. Again, this point is evident at the cross: “It is 
                                               
41 Moltmann, GC, 86-89; CoG, 297; TKG, 109; Harvie, Moltmann’s Ethics of Hope, 65-67. 
42 Moltmann has been critiqued on this point. See, for example, Daniel Castelo, “Moltmann’s 
Dismissal of Divine Impassibility: Warranted?” The Scottish Journal of Theology 61/4 (2008): 396–407.  
43 See Moltmann, TKG, chapter 2, 109-110. Moltmann derives the notion of God’s passibility 
from the history of God with the world. He thus overturns the Hellenistic notions of God as immutable. See 
Jürgen Moltmann, Theology of Hope: On the Ground and the Implications of a Christian Eschatology 
(hereafter TH), translated by James W. Leitch (London, England: SCM Press, 2002), 127-28; TCG, 207-19; 
HTG, xvi; Bauckham, The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann, 58-61; Müller-Fahrenholz, The Kingdom and the 
Power, 77-79. 
44 Jürgen Moltmann, “God’s Kenosis in the Creation and Consummation of the World” (hereafter 
“GKC”) in God and Evolution: A Reader, Mary Kathleen Cunningham, editor (New York, NY: Routledge, 
2007), 279. Here, Moltmann reveals a difference between his own thought and that of process theologians. 
For Moltmann, God is only limited by choice as opposed to necessity. On process theology’s view of God, 
see Cobb and Griffin, Process Theology, 41-62. 
45 Moltmann, HTG, xvi-xvii; TCG, 242-47. 
46 Moltmann, TCG, 207-219. See also the link between this “theistic” notion of God and atheism 
(219-27). 
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one divine passion which leads to the pain of the Father, the death of the Son and the 
sighing of the Spirit: the passion of love for lost creatures” (HTG, xvi).  Because creation 
is preceded by the Trinity’s willingness to suffer creation its own space, Moltmann can 
say that creatio ex nihilo is simultaneously creatio ex amore Dei.
47
  For “God loves the 
world with the very same love that he himself is in eternity” (TK, 57).  Thus the act of 
creation is both an act of freedom and one of nature (i.e., love), a point consistent with 
Moltmann’s panentheistic view of the cosmos.48  Based on this view of creation, 
Moltmann notes that God’s self-limitation of omnipotence and omnipresence is 
simultaneously a delimitation of God’s goodness.49   
Second, Moltmann claims that a strict six-day understanding of God’s creative 
work neglects the actual crown of the original creation: God’s sabbath rest.50  I will 
develop this point under Moltmann’s eschatology.  Third, God’s creative activity does 
not cease even with the sabbath.  Moltmann rejects any relegation of the doctrine of 
creation to creatio originalis.  In his view, this relegation would constitute a reduction of 
the doctrine’s significance for both the created order and for God.51  The act of creation 
                                               
47 Moltmann, GC, 75-76; EH, 122. Torrance remains unconvinced that Moltmann’s understanding 
of ex nihilo settles the dilemma between nature and will. See Torrance, “Creatio Ex Nihilo,” 89. 
48 See Moltmann, TKG, 106-8. On Moltmann’s consideration of divine decree versus emanation, 
see Moltmann, GC, 79-86. Moltmann’s own position is evident on 84-86. See also Chester, Mission and the 
Coming of God, 34. Ryan Neal suggests that Moltmann missteps at this point, setting up a false dialectic 
between freedom and necessity as opposed to freedom and faithfulness. Ryan A. Neal, Theology as Hope: 
On the Ground and the Implications of Jürgen Moltmann’s Doctrine of Hope (Eugene, OR: Pickwick 
Publications, 2009), 137-40. It seems to me that such is not the case. Moltmann’s dialectic is ultimately 
freedom and nature (i.e., love, which certainly includes faithfulness).  
49 TKG, 119. 
50 Moltmann, GC, 187. Müller-Fahrenholz, The Kingdom and the Power, 156-58. 
51 Moltmann has in mind here Scholastic theology and its legacy: “Ever since Thomas Aquinas, 
the Christian doctrine of creation…in its theological account, has always expounded ‘the six days’ work.’” 
Moltmann, GC, 55. Moltmann critiques this theology, stating that its advocates have “not sufficiently 
noticed that the stories about creation in the Priestly writings and in the Yahwist’s account do not as yet 
present a Christian doctrine of creation, for the messianic orientation is here not yet overtly present.” Ibid.. 
For Moltmann, the term “creation” must embrace creatio originalis, creatio continua, and creatio nova in 
order to be truly messianic. Ibid..  
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in the beginning is the secondary stage of creation.  It is followed by creatio continua, 
God’s ongoing creative engagement with the world.  Furthermore, creation is aimed 
toward creatio nova, the consummation of the cosmos in the eschaton, the new creation.  
Creatio continua has two components.  First, the created order has a dynamic 
self-development within the space and time God has ceded to it.
52
  That is, creation has 
its own integrity by which it moves within its space.  It has randomness and 
unpredictability.  For Moltmann, creation’s integrity includes the evolutionary 
development of life in which it organizes itself into increasingly complex life forms.
53
  
Second, God remains involved in the created order.  Moltmann’s pneumatology 
maintains that, while giving creation its own space to develop (transcendence), God is 
nonetheless present as the affirmation of life in all living things (immanence).
54
  Thus, 
God is both transcendent, a condition necessary for the created order’s integrity, and 
immanent, a condition necessary for the created order’s life and well-being.   
I must mention one more point here.  Creation’s integrity has meaning for God.  
While creatio originalis is an act of both divine will and nature that is constitutive for the 
created order, it is also, in some sense, constitutive for God inasmuch as it requires divine 
self-limitation.  This reciprocation continues with creatio continua because the Trinity’s 
own history is now a history with and within the unfolding of the created order—an 
“other” with its own integrity.55       
 
 
                                               
52 Moltmann, GC, 198-200. 
53 Ibid., 200-1, 206-7. 
54 On this balance, see Bouma-Prediger, The Greening of Theology, 114-19. 
55 Bauckham, The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann, 58-60. 
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The Community of God’s Creation 
For Moltmann, at all stages of its existence, the created order, like its Creator, is a 
community.  Thus, just as there can be no Father isolated from the Son, so also there can 
be no humanity isolated from the nonhuman creation.
56
  This point is true in the 
beginning, when humanity is created within the world.  It also holds true at the end.  On 
this point Moltmann adjusts Cyprian’s famous quip as follows: “nulla salus sine terra” 
(CoG, 274).  The physical creation is essential for human creation, existence, and 
salvation.
57
   
This understanding of the community of creation bears three significant 
corollaries.  First, it suggests that humans cannot truly exist, either now or in eternity, 
without bodily form.
58
  Human beings both have bodies (a claim that avoids scientific 
reductionism) and are bodies (a claim that avoids a Platonic or Gnostic escapism).
59
  
Second, it suggests that human beings are relational.  Humans are em-personed, which is 
to say always and already in relation with others.  This point is solidified in Moltmann’s 
                                               
56 Moltmann validates this point both theologically and scientifically. See Moltmann, GC, 185-90. 
57 Based on the intrinsic relationality of the cosmos and the ontological significance of that 
relationality for human identity, John Haught concurs with Moltmann on this point. See God after Darwin: 
A Theology of Evolution, second edition (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008), 169-170. 
58 Moltmann, GC, 244-47. Here Moltmann diverges from any attempt to ground human continuity 
in an immortal or subsistent facet located within human beings, a strategy he traces back to Plato’s Phaedo. 
See Moltmann, CoG, 58-60. Such a view stands in contrast to the hope for the resurrection of the flesh, for 
which death is not the release from bodily corruption but rather the final enemy of life. Ibid., 65-66. This 
hope leads humans not to an attempt to “cling to their identity through constant unity with themselves” but 
rather to “empty themselves into non-identity, knowing that from this self-emptying they will be brought 
back to themselves again for eternity.” Ibid., 67. This self-emptying entails the acceptance that the “I” 
“shall die wholly” and “rise wholly.” Ibid.. Yet at the same time in death the totality of a person’s being, for 
which Moltmann uses the German term Gestalt, “remains in God’s relationship to that person.” Ibid., 76. 
This relational subsistence is for Moltmann the meaning of being “with Christ” in death. See ibid., 104-5. 
Moltmann thus seems to discard any intrinsic subsistence of the human soul in favor of a relational 
understanding of the Gestalt’s endurance with God until the resurrection, in which all individual 
components of the Gestalt will return in their fullness.  
59 Moltmann, GC, 187; EH, 52-53. Prediger critiques Moltmann here, claiming that his distinction 
risks introducing a metaphysical dualism back into theology. Bouma-Prediger, The Greening of Theology, 
220-23. Ironically, he also critiques Moltmann’s claim about the similarity between humans and 
nonhumans on account that it risks a scientific reductionism of humanity. Ibid., 225-26.  
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relational interpretation of the imago Dei, which is “first of all God’s relationship to the 
human being, and then the relationship of human beings, women and men, to God” (CoG, 
72).
60
  For human beings are not the imago Dei as isolated monads, but rather as a 
community.
61
  In this manner, humans are the image of trinitarian love, or the “image of 
[God’s] inward nature” (GC, 241).62  With this claim Moltmann establishes a trinitarian 
imago—a “social image of God” in which no one can embody the imago outside of the 
human community—in contrast to Augustine’s emphasis on the individual as the imago 
trinitatis.
63
   
Moltmann’s relational understanding of the image of God also embraces the 
nonhuman creation.  Human beings are not the imago Dei as a community isolated from 
creation, but rather as part of the cosmic community.
64
  Humans are both imago Dei and 
imago mundi.
65
  As the former, they are meant to bring peace to the cosmos.
66
  Humans 
“stand before God on behalf of creation, and before creation on behalf of God” (GC, 
190).  This functional dimension reveals that, for Moltmann, the imago has meaning for 
God, humanity, and the nonhuman creation.
67
   
                                               
60 Moltmann’s understanding of the imago corresponds to his dynamic and relational ontology, 
which is juxtaposed against a static and substantive one. See Moltmann, GC, 230-34.  
61 Moltmann, EH, 68. 
62 Müller-Fahrenholz, The Kingdom and the Power, 160-63. The imago also has an eschatological 
dimension in which humans become imago Christi and finally gloria Dei. See Harvie, Moltmann’s Ethics 
of Hope, 170-80. Even when he considers the overall process of the imago, for Moltmann the doctrine 
remains always relational, eschatological, and primarily derivative of the Trinity. Moltmann, GC, 215-43. 
Also, Law, “Moltmann’s Ecological Hermeneutics,” 229; McDougall, Pilgrim of Love, 113-17.  
63 On Augustine’s understanding of the individual human as imago trinitatis in his On the Trinity, 
see Stanley J. Grenz, The Social God and the Relational Self: A Trinitarian Theology of the Imago Dei 
(Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2001), 154-57. Grenz notes that for Augustine “the Trinity is 
prefigured in the structure of the human mind, specifically, in the three faculties of memory, intellect, and 
will.” Ibid., 156. On the difference between this view and Moltmann’s see Moltmann, HTG, 60-63; GC, 
234-40; McDougall, Pilgrim of Love, 115-16. 
64 Moltmann, GC, 29-31. 
65 Ibid., 185-86, 
66 Ibid., 29-31, 187-88. 
67 Ibid., 77-78, 188-90. Dominic Robinson is critical of Moltmann’s notion of the imago. He 
claims that Moltmann’s functional emphasis of the imago in which humans represent God in the cosmos is 
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The significance of the imago for the nonhuman creation adumbrates the third 
corollary: embodied and em-personed human beings are also en-cosmosed.
68
  That is, 
humans exist as part of the community of creation.
69
  In this community, there is a 
sacramental reciprocity between humans and the nonhuman world.  The creation is 
sacramental for humanity in that it makes possible humanity’s relationship with the 
divine—though this sacramental role exhausts neither its purpose nor its value.  Humans 
are sacramental to creation because they reveal God’s eschatological hope to the cosmos.  
Thus the creation of the cosmos precedes (and makes possible) humanity and the 
redemption of humanity precedes (and, in some sense, makes possible) the redemption of 
the cosmos.  In this sense, “creation has its meaning for human beings, and human beings 
have their meaning for the community of creation” (GC, 189).70   
This affirmation of the cosmic community correlates to an affirmation of the 
intrinsic value of the nonhuman creation.
71
  The community has its own integrity in 
which human beings participate.
72
  Furthermore, all members of the community have a 
right to a life for their own sakes.
73
  It thus shatters the modern expression of 
anthropocentrism, which Moltmann consistently claims is detrimental to the cosmos.
74
        
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
anthropocentric as it renders humans the primary revelation of God. Dominic Robinson, Understanding the 
“Imago Dei” (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2011), 133-34. He also claims that Moltmann’s emphasis on 
divine passibility and immanence leads to a reconfiguration of anthropology that negates the seriousness of 
sin with regard to salvation. Ibid., 140-43, 151-56. 
68 “Em-personed” and “en-cosmosed” are my terms. Though I feel they aptly describe Moltmann’s 
view. 
69 Moltmann, GC, 31. 
70 Ibid., 189. 
71 Ibid., 11. 
72 Moltmann likens the ecological community to the community of the Trinity. Moltmann, GC, 
16-17. 
73 Moltmann, GSS, 111-13; GC, 289-90.  
74 See Moltmann, CoG, 92-93; GSS, 94-101. 
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The Teleological Nature of God’s Creation 
Moltmann’s cosmology is “messianic” in that it “sees creation together with its 
future—the future for which it was made and in which it will be perfected” (GC, 5).  That 
is, it does not isolate the realities of creatio continua from the hope for creatio nova.  
Thus, the community of creation is not simply all created things existing at any particular 
time.  Rather, it encompasses all creation from all times.  The present creation, both 
human and nonhuman, is united as a community in part because it suffers together the 
contradictions of its current state as it longs for creatio nova.
75
   
A messianic cosmology cannot consider the cosmos “as it is”, isolated from its 
eschatological destiny, which is perichoretic union with the divine and among its own 
members.
76
  Thus, for Moltmann the hope of cosmic christology cannot simply be the  
supposedly existing ‘harmony of the world’, for its starting point is the 
reconciliation of all things through Christ; and the premise of this reconciliation is 
a state of disrupted harmony in the world, world powers which are at enmity with 
one another, and threatening chaos. (WJC, 278)   
 
It is this eschatological dimension of his cosmology that stands in stark contrast with 
theologians like Thomas Berry.
77
   
Moltmann’s teleology rejects the notion of a perfect original creation.  He adheres 
to an Irenaean cosmology in which God creates the entire cosmos in an infancy requiring 
development.
78
  The creation is meant to grow into its telos—or, more properly, to 
                                               
75 Jürgen Moltmann, Sun of Righteousness, Arise! God’s Future for Humanity and the Earth 
(hereafter SRA), translated by Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2010), 70-71. 
76 This telos is captured in Moltmann definition of the kingdom of God, which is “the perfected 
perichoretic unity of God and world” (SRA, 30). 
77 See Moltmann, GC, 7. However, Moltmann also offers a positive response to cosmic 
spirituality. See Moltmann, GSS, 101-106. 
78 On Irenaeus’s cosmology, see Matthew Craig Steenberg, Irenaeus on Creation: The Cosmic 
Christ and the Saga of Redemption (Boston: Brill, 2008), 145-49. 
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encounter the advent of that telos within its history.
79
  In this growing process, God 
“suffers the contradiction of the beings he has created” and continues to work in creation 
by “opening up the systems that are closed in on themselves” (GC, 210-11).   
On account of this teleological view of the cosmos, Moltmann establishes a stark 
contrast between the notions of “nature” and “creation.”80  The former is that which one 
can observe in creatio continua: “Theologically, we call ‘nature’ the state of creation 
which is no longer creation’s original condition, and is not yet its final one” (CoG, 91).  
As it is, “nature” is “full of beauties and full of catastrophes” (SRA, 68).  It is not only 
open to newness; it requires newness as redemption.  For “nature…knows no sabbath” 
(GC, 6).   
Unlike “nature”, the term “creation” refers to the temporal and eternal scope of 
the cosmos, thus including its eschatological redemption.  Moltmann’s cosmology does 
not define God according to nature (i.e., the way things are), but rather defines creation 
(understood teleologically) according to God.
81
  He thus claims that  
the messianic understanding of the world is the true natural theology.  In the 
messianic light, all earthly things and all living beings can be discerned in their 
forfeiture to transience and in their hope for liberation to eternity. (GC, 60)   
 
This understanding is messianic in part because it depends on Christ’s return: “the 
coming of Christ in glory is accompanied by a transformation of the whole of nature into 
its eternal discernible identity as God’s creation” (WJC, 280).  In the meantime, nature is 
embedded within the cycles of suffering, predation, and death, all of which for Moltmann 
constitute evils.  
                                               
79 Thus, for Moltmann, eschatology is not a return to protology. See Moltmann, TCG, 261; 
Moltmann, CoG, 296-308. 
80 Moltmann, GC, 37-40; WJC, 253. 
81 Moltmann, GC, 53. 
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EVIL AS SUFFERING AND DEATH 
Moltmann defines evil as “the perversion of good, the annihilation of what exists, 
the negation of the affirmation of life” (GC, 168).  Thus his struggle with evil tends to 
center on the problem of death.  Here I consider how Moltmann understands death vis-à-
vis the original creation, the ongoing creation, and the new creation. 
Protology and the Fall 
Moltmann commonly refers to the current state of the created order (i.e. “nature”) 
as disrupted.
82
  He accepts some form of its “fallenness.”83  But this fallenness takes the 
form of a (pre-human) straying from the path towards the telos of the dynamic cosmos 
rather than an event that shatters protological harmony.
84
  Thus, the eschatological 
resurrection entails both “surmounting the consequences of the Fall” and “the 
consummation of creation-in-the-beginning” (SRA, 67).  Regardless, the corruption 
entailed by this straying is systemic, affecting every particle of the cosmos. 
But when/why/how did this “Fall” occur?  In his earlier works, Moltmann seems 
to suggest that there can be no answer to these questions.
85
  The only response he offers is 
that, in the face of suffering and death, God, through the incarnation, engages in com-
passion—co-suffering and even co-death.86  In the Spirit, too, God suffers alongside the 
cosmos.
87
   
                                               
82 Moltmann, WJC, 281. See also HTG, 71-72. 
83 Moltmann, SRA, 67. His theological framework is more congruent with a creation in via toward 
eschatological fulfillment. See TKG, 114-18. For a critique of Moltmann’s notion of the Fall in conjunction 
with his dismantling of the distinction between the economic and immanent trinity, see Chester, Mission 
and the Coming of God, 44-49. 
84 Moltmann, CoG, 261-67; Richard Bauckham, “Eschatology in The Coming of God,” in God 
Will Be All in All: The Eschatology of Jürgen Moltmann (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2001), 17. 
85Moltmann, TKG, 50-51; Bauckham, The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann, 82-91. For the context 
of Moltmann’s “eschatological theodicy,” see ibid., 71-82.  
86 Moltman, TCG, 146-53; Borowitz, Contemporary Christologies, 83-84. 
87 Moltmann, SL, 51; GC, 96-97; SRA, 206; TKG, 111. 
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Yet in later works, Moltmann seems to suggest that the forces of annihilation in 
the created order result from the integrity of the space and time that God allots to the 
world.
88
  Already in Trinity and the Kingdom he maintains that “God creates the world by 
letting his world become and be in himself: Let it be!” (TK, 109)  In his later Sun of 
Righteousness, he specifically links this “letting be” to the existence of evil:  
Why is this creation of God’s threatened by chaos and why has it fallen victim to 
annihilation?  Because the creator is by no means ‘the all-determining reality’ of 
what he has created—in that case creation would be itself divine—but because he 
has conferred on creation its own scope for freedom and generation. (SRA, 205)   
 
The space of creation includes its freedom and generation.  But this space also 
necessitates the possibility of disruption, even before humans arrive.
89
  Thus, Moltmann 
maintains that “we even have to talk about the ‘sin’ of the whole creation, which has 
isolated itself from the foundation of its existence and the wellspring of its life, and has 
fallen victim to universal death” (WJC, 283).90  The Fall may thus be interpreted as the 
straying of the nonhuman creation, both in randomness and, much later, in will, from the 
                                               
88 See Moltmann, GC, 164-69.  
89 For this position, see Moltmann, “GKC,” 273-83. This point, I believe, counters Chester’s 
critique that Moltmann advocates a Hegelianism in which evil is necessary to the becoming of God. 
Chester, Mission and the Coming of God, 46-48. Evil is potential in the history of God in relation with a 
world to which God permits its own time and space. Such a view finds its roots in Irenaeus, not Hegel. On 
this point, see John Hick, “An Irenaean Theodicy,” in Encountering Evil: Live Options in Theodicy, 
Stephen T. Davis, editor (Westminster John Knox Press, 2001), 40-42. Regardless, this point highlights a 
tension, highlighted well by Drummond, in Moltmann’s thought. He seems to appreciate the randomness of 
evolution. Yet he also claims that the Spirit is the working principle in evolution. This ambiguity detracts 
from Moltmann’s evolutionary theodicy. Celia Deanne-Drummond, Christ and Evolution: Wonder and 
Wisdom (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2009), 46-47. On Moltmann’s difference from Hegel, see also 
Celia Deanne-Drummond, Eco-Theology (Winona, MN: Anselm Academic Press, 2008), 172.  
90 Polkinghorne thus misreads Moltmann in claiming he does not adhere to the notion of 
fallenness. Polkinghorne, “Moltmann’s Engagement with the Natural Sciences,” 61-62. In fact, the very 
space that God grants creation through the kenotic act of creation denotes chance. The presence of chance 
in the cosmos is, as Polkinghorne notes, favored by science. Ibid., 62-63. Polkinghorne claims that God 
works within these conditions. Ibid., 67. But it should also be noted that God is also willingly conditioned 
by these conditions. Hence, the possibility of a disruption of the path toward the telos of the created order 
reappears, though not in the form of human will and sin. It appears in the very potentiality of the created 
order affects God in a way God had not intended—to isolate itself, as it were, by straying from the path 
toward eschatological consummation, and thereby constitute part of God’s trinitarian history.  
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path toward eschatological consummation.
91
  Human sin, then, can be interpreted not as 
the cause of this Fall, but rather as both the embracing of it and, in this embrace, the 
intensifying of the straying of the cosmos.
92
 
But what exactly is entailed by this Fall?  Is it the cause of evolutionary 
mechanisms such as suffering, predation, and death?  Or did God ordain these 
mechanisms for the created order?  
Suffering, Death, Evolution, and Redemption 
The question of suffering and especially death presents a great difficulty for 
Moltmann.  On the one hand, he wants to state unequivocally that neither suffering nor 
death pertain to the eschatological future of creation.  Thus he states that “the living God 
and death are irreconcilable antitheses” (SRA, 81).  On the other hand, he wants to take 
seriously the findings of science, which suggest that neither suffering nor death can have 
originated with human disobedience.
93
  Thus he asks: “Did the dinosaurs become extinct 
because of the sin of the human beings who did not yet exist?” (CoG, 83)  In light of this 
reality, Moltmann acknowledges that “there is sin without death in creation [i.e., the 
                                               
91 Regarding the question of God’s foreknowledge concerning the creation’s integrity, Moltmann 
augments the self-limitation of God implied in creation. As God withdraws his eternity and presence to 
give the creation its time and space, he also limits his foreknowledge to give creation its integrity. “God 
does not know everything in advance because he does not will to know everything in advance. He waits for 
the response of those he has created, and lets their future come” (“GKC,” 281).  
92 Moltmann’s theology clearly alters the role of sin. Such alteration has led to critique. For 
instance, see Robinson, Understanding the “Imago Dei”, 144-146. While Moltmann’s theology does 
displace sin as the central issue regarding salvation, this displacement does not necessitate that he does not 
take sin seriously. Sin hinders the realization of the world’s telos, which makes death and suffering all the 
more potent. Thus, salvation must account for sin and the Fall fully. See Moltmann, SRA, 67. Moltmann’s 
soteriology goes beyond sin, however, in claiming that all suffering and dying creatures are drawn into 
Christ’s fellow-suffering and resurrection, which is God’s triumph over death. Neal, Theology as Hope, 
160.  
93 Moltmann, GC, 22; “GKC,” 273; John Polkinghorne, “Jürgen Moltmann’s Engagement with the 
Natural Sciences,” in God’s Life in Trinity, Miroslav Volf and Michael Welker, editors (Minneapolis, MN: 
Fortress Press, 2006), 61-62. Willis Jenkins is critical of Moltmann’s use of science, writing: “Even though 
Moltmann insists natural science and revealed theology do not compete, his practical response to earth 
relies much more upon theological experience than natural science.” Willis Jenkins, Ecologies of Grace: 
Environmental Ethics and Christian Theology (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2008), 73.  
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angels], and death without sin [i.e., nonhuman animals]” (CoG, 90).  He also accepts that 
human beings were mortal from the beginning.
94
   
Thus, death cannot be the consequence of sin.
95
  Still, Moltmann does not want to 
accept that suffering and death are part of God’s good creation.96  The difficult question 
that arises is: Who introduces these facets of existence into creation?  The question, 
“From whence evil?” effectively becomes “From whence suffering and death?” Or 
simply “From whence transience?” 
Moltmann engages biblical material with reference to this question but finds an 
ambiguity therein.  Death at times appears the negative result of sin.  Elsewhere it is the 
natural end of life.
97
  This ambiguity is reflected in Moltmann’s own thought.   
For all his disdain of suffering and death, Moltmann remains ambiguous on the 
extent to which they are, in and of themselves, enemies.  In fact, he acknowledges that 
they are, in some sense, “natural.”98  They pertain to the transient stage of the creation—
creatio continua.  In The Coming of God, Moltmann claims that they are “characteristics 
of a frail, temporal creation which will be overcome through the new creation of all 
things for eternal life” (CoG, 78).  He frequently refers to the biblical image of a grain of 
wheat that brings forth fruit, thus suggesting a positive dimension to death when it is not 
                                               
94 Moltmann, CoG, 90-91. 
95 Thus, while Lisa Sideris rightly notes Moltmann’s ambiguity regarding the etiology of nature’s 
distortion, she at once incorrectly claims that his theology implies “that creation was perfect in its original 
form…and became corrupted with the fall of humans.” Lisa H. Sideris, Environmental Ethics, Ecological 
Theology, and Natural Selection (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2003), 103. Moltmann is 
fairly adamant that such is in fact not the case. 
96 Moltmann does at times draw on the language of an original creation free from violence as a 
prolepsis of messianic peace. For instance, see WJC, 127-28. However, these occurrences are more a 
mythic indulgence than affirmations of historicity.  
97 Moltmann, CoG, 78-83. 
98 Here, one must understand Moltmann’s differentiation between “nature” and “creation.” Here 
Moltmann has this corrupted understanding of “nature” in mind. For elsewhere he claims: “The death of all 
the living is neither due to sin nor is it natural” (CoG, 92). See also Müller-Fahrenholz, The Kingdom and 
the Power, 206.  
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isolated from the vast sweep of created existence.
99
  Death is neither the salvation of the 
soul from the body nor the separation of the human from God; it is rather the necessary 
point of transformation from transient life to eternal life.
100
  “Death de-restricts the 
human being’s spirit in both time and space” (CoG, 77).101  
This acknowledgement notwithstanding, Moltmann claims that suffering and 
death will be destroyed in the redemption of the cosmos.  For “new creation is new from 
the root up only if it issues from the cosmic annihilation of the death of created being” 
(WJC, 252). Thus, to the extent that death is “natural,” it is also the enemy in 
juxtaposition to resurrection hope.
102
  Says Moltmann:   
Even if death is part of temporal creation, it does not have to be called ‘natural’ in 
the sense of being self-evident of a matter of course; and if it is called natural, this 
‘nature’ by no means has to be taken as final.  If we turn back from the end to the 
beginning, then the death of all the living is a sign of the first, temporal and 
imperfect creation. (CoG, 91) 
 
Because death stands in contrast to the divine intention for the cosmos, blithely 
embracing it is an affront to Christian cosmology.
103
  Death should elicit grief and protest 
(as it did for Christ on the cross, evinced in the cry of dereliction).
104
  Thus Moltmann 
                                               
99 Moltmann, GC, 269; SRA, 64-65; WJC, 248-49. Read in isolation from his corpus Moltmann is 
here not all that different from either Berry or Ruether. See the introduction and chapter one. He is also 
similar to Holmes Rolston. See Rolston, “Disvalues in Nature,” 250-78.  
100 Moltmann, WJC, 249-50. 
101 Although, for Moltmann death is not an impenetrable boundary between transience and 
eternity. See CoG, 291-92. 
102 Moltmann, CoG, 65-66; Bauckham, “Eschatology in The Coming of God,” 18. 
103 Such claims elicit the critique of Willis Jenkins, who maintains that Moltmann’s theological 
schema is problematic in that it creates a “discontinuity between nature as it is and nature as God would 
have it.” This discontinuity elicits three issues. First, what Moltmann wants to save is not nature as it is, but 
nature as it is intended to be. This disparity places a greater emphasis on special revelation to the detriment 
of general revelation. Second, Jenkins notes that emphasizing such a discontinuity “may unwittingly evince 
some restless distaste for our present environment.” Third, Moltmann offers no hermeneutic of adjudicating 
appropriate action in nature based on the hope for God’s coming and the new creation. See Jenkins, 
Ecologies of Grace, 73-74. 
104 Moltmann, SL, xii. 
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claims that death “is a fact that evokes grief and longing for the future world and eternal 
life” (CoG, 92).  Why?  Because “all life is intended to live and not to die” (WJC, 253).   
But the question remains: Did God ordain these mechanisms of evolution?  
Moltmann displays further ambiguity on this question—particularly between God in 
Creation and The Way of Jesus Christ.
105
  On the one hand, he sees many positive 
dimensions of the evolutionary process.
106
  It produces higher forms of life.  It requires a 
level of cooperation in the cosmos.  It suggests an openness to the future.
107
  Thus 
creation and evolution are not opposing concepts per se.
108
  It even seems as if God is the 
author of evolution: “There is a creation of evolution, because evolution is not explicable 
simply in terms of itself” (GC, 19).109 Indeed, Moltmann claims that “the Spirit is the 
principle of evolution” (GC, 100).110   
                                               
105 See Bauckham, The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann, 190-98. I believe Bauckham is correct in 
interpreting Moltmann’s positive assessment of evolution within the boundaries of its requiring redemption. 
Ibid., 194. Even so, Moltmann’s ambiguity has led to critique. See Law, “Moltmann’s Ecological 
Hermeneutic,” 235; Drummond, Eco-Theology, 107.  
106 Sideris maintains that Moltmann overemphasizes the positive aspects of evolution. While she 
overstates her case on account of citing only God in Creation, she nonetheless has a point that it is unclear 
whether (or why) the mechanisms of evolution are in place for Moltmann’s cosmology. He “posits 
suffering and struggle in nature as forces that the spirit of God overcomes, but it is not clear where these 
forces come from, since selection has no significant role to play in his theory of evolution.” Sideris, 
Environmental Ethics, 100. Sideris’s critique of the place of natural selection in Moltmann’s thought is 
interesting but overstated. She notes that Moltmann’s “ecological concept of space essentially resembles a 
pre-Darwinian economy of nature in which every living thing occupies a particular spot and displays a near 
perfect fit to its given location with that larger economy.” In Sideris’s view, such a concept “leaves little for 
natural selection to do.” Sideris, Environmental Ethics, 97. Again, Sideris’s understanding of Moltmann’s 
view is myopic because she only engages God in Creation. 
107 Moltmann, GC, 100, 196-97; SRA, 218; EH, 126-27. 
108 Moltmann states in God in Creation that pneumatology is “well suited to help us to stop 
thinking of creation and evolution as opposing concepts” (GC, 19). 
109 In his most recent work, Ethics of Hope, Moltmann writes that “the earth possesses the energy 
for the evolution of life.” Moltmann, EH, 112. Thus evolution pertains to the space given to the earth itself 
in the act of creation. God has granted the earth this space within which to develop. But God does not 
appear to be the sovereign cause of the violent processes of evolution. These processes pertain to the 
integral space of creation. 
110 Also, Moltmann, SRA, 207; EH, 122-23. Drummond suggests that Moltmann shifts his 
pneumatology regarding the question of evolution between God and Creation and The Way of Jesus Christ. 
Drummond, Eco-Theology, 132-33. My engagement somewhat concurs with this assessment. I think it is 
better to claim that Moltmann’s intention in God in Creation is best interpreted in light of his thought in 
The Way of Jesus Christ. 
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On the other hand, Moltmann consistently claims that evolution can exhaust 
neither the divine aim for creation nor the means of realizing that aim.  Evolution has too 
many victims.
111
  Thus, he claims that “Christ brings human beings into harmony with 
God’s good creation.  Orientation toward the forces of nature, which are themselves in 
need of redemption, does not help” (SRA, 68).112  Bauckham notes here a “sharp rejection 
of Teilhard de Chardin’s thorough-going identification of the evolutionary process with 
salvation history.”113  This rejection implicitly applies as well to Berry.    
Despite the above ambiguity, for Moltmann, neither suffering nor death is an 
acceptable condition for the created order.  Thus, he maintains that, in the eschatological 
redemption, this transience will be destroyed.
114
  The entire cosmos will be freed from its 
corrupted state.  While there is a positive dimension to evolution in which the Spirit is at 
work, because evolution as it occurs in nature requires suffering and death—and 
                                               
111 Moltmann, WJC, 294; SRA, 223. 
112 William Schweiker critiques Moltmann, saying that he conflates the reverence that humans 
must have for life on account of its sanctification with the ambiguous harmonious action humans must take 
in light of this reverence. See William Schweiker, “The Spirit of Life and the Reverence for Life,” in God’s 
Life in Trinity, Miroslav Volf and Michael Welker, editors (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2006), 26-31. 
Schweiker’s error is that he reads Moltmann’s view as eschatological and pneumatological, but not 
christological. The cross of Christ teaches Christians to protest death. In this protest, reverence leads to 
action that anticipates the harmony of the eschatological kingdom in which death will be no more (evident 
in Christ’s resurrection). Schweiker thus seems to commit the error Bauckham warns against: he reads 
Moltmann’s eschatology apart from his christology by reading The Coming God (and, in this case, 
Moltmann’s pneumatological works) apart from the eschatology developed in The Way of Jesus Christ—an 
error solidified by an examination of the sources Schweiker cites. On this error, see Bauckham, 
“Eschatology in The Coming of God,” 3-4. Ultimately, Schweiker’s plea for the “integrity of life,” which 
consists of living out one’s own life by seeking that which is required for continued existence and 
facilitating an environmental ethos in which other creatures may do the same, is very similar to the 
cosmocentric conservation of thinkers like Berry. See Schweiker, “The Spirit of Life,” 29-31. His position 
differs from Moltmann (and my own) in his primary claim that “the world around us is neither a ghastly 
drama [a phrase taken from Albert Schweitzer] nor is awaiting its true creation.” Ibid., 31. Schweiker’s 
position seems amenable to that of Holmes Rolston. See Holmes Rolston III, “Disvalues in Nature,” The 
Monist 75 (April 1992), 250-78 
113 Bauckham, The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann, 194. See also Moltmann, WJC, 293-97; SRA, 
209. 
114 Moltmann, CoG, 90-91. 
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gratuitously so!—it cannot be the final word on the doctrine of creation.115  Even the 
Spirit’s experience of evolution is part of the divine “sighing” for redemption: “The 
evolutions and the catastrophes of the universe are also the movements and experiences 
of the Spirit of creation.  That is why Paul tells us that the divine Spirit ‘sighs’ in all 
created things under the power of futility” (GC, 16).  In short, evolution cannot be 
redemptive; for it must be redeemed.  For Moltmann, its redeemer is Christ, the victim 
par excellence of evolution.
116
   
CHRIST AS THE ESCHATOLOGICAL TURNING POINT 
Christology is arguably the central theological theme of Moltmann’s work.117  
Even his emphasis on eschatology is fundamentally derivative of christology.
118
  
Cosmologically, the Son is the Logos of creation, its wisdom.
119
  But in the incarnation, 
the Son becomes the concrete divine assumption of the world’s contradictions.  He 
suffers the wounds of all the suffering.  He dies the death of all the dying.  Yet he also is 
resurrected, an event which renders possible the resurrection of all the dead.  Thus Christ 
is the eschatological turning point in history—that point in which the power of death fails 
                                               
115 Given Moltmann’s position regarding the gratuitous suffering entailed by evolution, it is 
unfathomable to me that Sideris can write, “In positing a direct involvement for God in ‘creation,’ 
Moltmann tends to deemphasize evil and suffering, interpreting nature as predominantly harmonious.” 
Sideris, Environmental Ethics, 92. Or again that Moltmann’s work “relies heavily on an assumption of 
harmony in nature.” Ibid., 96. I believe Sideris can only maintain this rather false notion because she only 
cites God in Creation, ignoring Moltmann’s larger theological corpus. For Moltmann would certainly her 
acknowledgement that “nature does not provide for individual beings.” Sideris, Environmental Ethics, 265. 
After all, his central issue with evolution is the sheer vastness of its victims.  
116 Drummond astutely identifies Moltmann’s identification of the Spirit with the creative side of 
evolution and Christ with the darker sides. Deanne-Drummond, Christ and Evolution, 46. However, 
Moltmann also identifies the Spirit with the suffering implied in evolution. See Moltmann, GC, 16.  
117 See Bauckham, The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann, 4-5. 
118 Moltmann, TH, 178-81; Bauckham, “Eschatology in The Coming of God,” 2-10. 
119 Moltmann, SRA, 30-31. 
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in its encounter with the divine affirmation of life.
120
  Hence, “Christianity stands or falls 
with the reality of the raising of Jesus from the dead” (TH, 152).    
The Cross as Trinitarian Contradiction 
Moltmann’s earlier works viewed the various dimensions of Christian theology as 
facets of eschatology.  His seminal Theology of Hope parses the significance of God’s 
messianic promise that has come to fruition in Christ’s resurrection in dialogue with 
Ernst Bloch’s philosophy of hope.121  In The Crucified God, he explores the significance 
of Christ’s crucifixion for the life of God and the life of the world.   
For Moltmann, the cross constitutes the gathering of the contradictions of the 
world into a contradiction in the history of the Trinity.  At the cross, Jesus takes on the 
entirety of creation’s corrupted condition.122  He experiences the abysmal depths of 
suffering, the pain of God-forsakenness, and ultimately the finitude of death.
123
  As 
Moltmann’s social doctrine of the Trinity begins with the persons in communion as 
opposed to the oneness of God’s substance or subjectivity, he can claim that the cross 
reveals the passibility of God.
124
  Likewise, it constitutes a real “death in God” (TCG, 
                                               
120 Moltmann, EH, 55-56. 
121 See Bauckham, The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann, 41-46; Müller-Fahrenholz, The Kingdom 
and the Power, 46-57. 
122 Moltmann, TCG, 246. 
123 Ibid., 146-53. For Moltmann, the suffering of God is the only adequate response to what he 
describes as “protest atheism” and the problem of suffering. See TCG, 219-27; TKG, 47-52. 
124 Moltmann, TCG, 204-5. On this christological point, see Bauckham, The Theology of Jürgen 
Moltmann, 47-49, 60-65; Neal, Theology as Hope, 45-50; Chester, Mission and the Coming of God, 36-37. 
Bauckham notes the distinction between “God’s incarnate suffering” and “God’s non-incarnate suffering” 
(60-67). There is indeed this difference in Moltmann’s thought. However, in my reading, Bauckham may 
only be incorrect when he relegates God’s “non-incarnate” suffering to “empathy” (67). Moltmann does 
state that Spirit is “God’s empathy, his feeling identification with what he loves” (SL, 51). However, God 
the Spirit suffers the contradictions of the world as the Spirit in the world. Empathy, which denotes actual 
suffering that is vicarious, seems too transcendent a term to describe God’s suffering in the Spirit because 
the Spirit actually experiences the events and sources of suffering. That is, God suffers not vicariously, but 
directly, in the Spirit. Thus Moltmann states, “Through the presence of his own being, God…participates in 
the destiny of his own creation. Through the Spirit he suffers with the sufferings of his creatures. In the 
Spirit he experiences their annihilations.” Moltmann, GC, 96-97.  
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207).
125
  It is in this manner that the central contradiction of creation (i.e., life and death) 
becomes a contradiction within the Trinity.  The entirety of one of the persons of the 
Trinity—the Logos—dies on the cross.126  Furthermore, the Father uniquely suffers the 
experience of the death of the Son: “The Son suffers dying, the Father suffers the death of 
the Son” (TCG, 243).127  And the Spirit protests the separation of each.128  In this event, 
all of the suffering of the created order is taken into the perichoretic union of the 
Trinity.
129
   
But the suffering of Trinity at the cross is not the final event.  For Moltmann, the 
cross is a dialectic event with the resurrection.
130
  The cross reveals the present state of 
creation; the resurrection reveals its eschatological hope.
131
  When Jesus takes on the 
condition of the world, he also heals it in his resurrection.
132
  Thus, “the transfiguration of 
Christ’s dead body is the beginning of the transfiguration of all mortal life” (WJC, 251).  
It is in this sense that Ryan Neal notes, “The ground of Moltmann’s hope is the dialectic 
of the cross and the resurrection.”133   
 
                                               
125 The phrase “death in God” is Moltmann’s trinitarian resolution of the monotheistic phrase 
“death of God.” See TCG, 200-207.  
126 Moltmann, TCG, 193, 205-06; TKG, 79-80. 
127 Based on this point, it is my opinion that the criticism leveled against Moltmann by Dorothee 
Soelle is misplaced. The Father is not the “ruling, omnipotent” sadist who causes the suffering of the Son. 
See Dorothee Soelle, Suffering, translated by Everett Kalin (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1975), 26-
28. If anything, at the cross the Father experiences a new level of impotence. Consider the question: Would 
a parent rather die or watch his or her child die? It may be that the suffering of the Father, while different 
from the Son’s, was nonetheless greater in its own way!  
128 For the inclusion of the Spirit, see TKG, 80-83; SL, 60-73.  
129 Moltmann, TCG, 244-47. Moltmann states, “Even Auschwitz is taken up into the grief of the 
Father, the surrender of the Son and the power of the Spirit” (Ibid., 278). The suffering experienced by God 
is not limited to humanity, however. It includes all creatures. See Moltmann, WJC, 157; SL, 75-77.  
130 Moltmann, TCG, 178-87; TH, 210-15; Bauckham, The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann, 32-33. 
131 Moltmann, TH, 6; Bauckham, The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann, 34. 
132 On this soteriological dimension of christology, see Moltmann, WJC, 44-45. Also, TCG, 182-
86. 
133 Neal, Theology as Hope, 1. 
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The Eschatological Promise and the Resurrection 
The concept of promise is significant for Moltmann’s messianic theology.  “It is 
from promise that there arises that element of unrest which allows of no coming to terms 
with a present that is unfulfilled” (TH, 89).  The promises of God constitute hope and all 
hope rests on God’s promises.  For Moltmann, promise, in a sense, constitutes history in 
that it opens history to a new future.
134
  But in the resurrection, the messianic promises of 
God regarding the future of creation come to fruition.
135
  Hence, Christ “is the pioneer 
and leader of the life that lives eternally” (CoG, xi).  The resurrection is the concrete 
realization of God’s eschatological promise—the burgeoning of a new creation in which 
death is no more.
136
 In short, “Christ’s resurrection is the first day of the new creation” 
(HTG, 77).   
Christ’s resurrection is thus not merely an interruption of history, but rather the 
actual advent of the eschaton.
137
   
If Christ has been raised from the dead, then he takes on proleptic and 
representative significance for all the dead…The process of the resurrection of the 
dead has begun in him, is continued in ‘the Spirit, the giver of life’, and will be 
completed in the raising of the those who are hid, and of all the dead. (CoG, 69)   
 
In Christ’s resurrection, there occurs a “conquest of the deadliness of death” (TH, 196) 
within history.
138
  The Trinity opens to the cosmos in a new manner—not simply to 
                                               
134 See TH, 103-4. For a good reflection on this function of promise in Moltmann’s thought, see 
Harvie, Moltmann’s Ethics of Hope, 13-22, 151; Neal, Theology as Hope, 12-15; Hans Schwarz, 
Eschatology (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2000), 147-48. 
135 See Law, “Moltmann’s Ecological Hermeneutics,” 226. 
136 Moltmann, TCG, 171; Harvie, Moltmann’s Ethics of Hope, 20. 
137 See Moltmann, TH, 181; CoG, 25-29; WJC, 250; Müller-Fahrenholz, The Kingdom and the 
Power, 50-51. Moltmann rejects Pannenberg’s claim that Christ’s resurrection is an historical prolepsis of 
the coming resurrection. Christ’s resurrection is not simply a foretaste, but the actual beginning of the 
resurrection life coming to the world from God’s future. See CoG, 195. For considerations of Moltmann in 
comparison to Pannenberg, see Bauckham, The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann, 41-42; Neal, Theology as 
Hope, 8-12.  
138 Moltmann, WJC, 252-53. 
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permit the world a space “in God,” but to bridge that distance and share in perichoretic 
communion.
139
  The resurrection happens in history as novum; it thus also happens to 
history.   
Christ is the advent of the fulfilled promise for new creation.  Yet the promise was 
given to the “old” creation.  Thus, in order for the promise to be fulfilled, there must be 
continuity between creatio continua and creatio nova.  Christ is the fulfillment of 
promise at just this point: the new creation of his resurrection is as continuous with the 
present creation as the resurrected Christ is with the crucified God.
140
  For Moltmann “the 
risen Christ is the historical and crucified Jesus, and vice versa” (TCG, 160).  Yet the 
risen Christ bears a radical newness; for he is transfigured.
141
  Cosmologically, then, 
Moltmann can say that the eschatological consummation pertains to creatio originalis in 
that it is the fulfillment of that creation.
142
  Creatio nova does not intimate two creations, 
only this creation transfigured in resurrection, which is “the negation of the negative” 
(TH, 201), the destruction of death and even hell.
143
  Hence, “the end is much more than 
the beginning” (CoG, 264).  In Neal’s words, “While creation in the beginning was very 
good, the new creation in the future will be much more than very good.”144   
 
                                               
139 Moltmann, TKG, 121-22. For the germinal form of this thought, see TCG, 274-75. 
140 See Moltmann, TH, 184-85; CoG, 84-85. 
141 Moltmann, TCG, 126-27; CoG, 28-29. 
142 Thus Prediger is incorrect when he suggests that Moltmann’s category of novum robs creatio 
continua of its value and even threatens to annihilate it. Bouma-Prediger, The Greening of Theology, 244-
48. Brian Walsh makes a similar misguided claim. Brian J. Walsh, “The Theology of Hope and the 
Doctrine of Creation: An Appraisal of Jürgen Moltmann,” Evangelical Quarterly 59/1 (1987), 56-57. The 
“new” comes to the old as novum and transfigures it. The consistency of complete newness of the “new” 
and the continuity of the “old” with that “new” hinges on this point. The “new” is the eschatological 
future—God’s coming to the created order. In that radically new event, the created order (“old”) is 
transfigured and participates in the new, thus being creatio (“old”) nova (“new”). Because nothing in the 
old is lost other than the negation of the negative (i.e., transience and death), everything in the old is 
completely affirmed, but never in isolation from its eschatological telos.  
143 Moltmann, SRA, 57; Moltmann, HTG, 78. 
144 Neal, Theology as Hope, 216. 
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Christ’s Future as the Redemption of Evolution 
In his earlier works, Moltmann does not emphasize the importance of christology 
vis-à-vis the doctrine of creation.  His later developments are implicit in some cases and 
germinal in others.  Yet the full development of this line of thought does not surface 
explicitly until later works such as God in Creation and The Coming of God.   
This development includes what I have already noted above concerning evolution 
and evil.  Moltmann contrasts his own position with that of Teilhard de Chardin by 
claiming that Christ cannot be merely the pinnacle product of evolution.  He also rejects 
the notion of an “omega point” in which the evolutionary process comes to an historical 
head.
145
  Evolution cannot be a redemptive process.  It has too many victims.   
Furthermore, the positive outcomes of the evolutionary process do nothing to 
redeem the suffering of those left in its wake.  Those like Teilhard de Chardin and Berry 
seem to accept that all suffering is redemptive inasmuch as it contributes to the upward 
movement of the cosmic community through participating in its evolutionary 
emergence.
146
  But for Moltmann, the question is not whether or not all suffering is 
redemptive in the sense that it is the seed for something greater, but rather whether or not 
all suffering is redeemed for the individuals that suffer.
147
  Thus Bauckham:  
In identifying with the godforsaken the crucified God does not sanction their 
suffering as part of his purpose, because the dialectic of the cross and resurrection 
still remains.  God’s purpose is liberation from suffering, promised in the 
resurrection.
148
   
 
                                               
145 See Moltmann, WJC, 293-97.  
146 On Teilhard de Chardin, see Deanne-Drummond, Christ and Evolution, 45. On this point, see 
also Holmes Rolston III, “Does Nature Need to be Redeemed?” Zygon 29 (1994), 205-229. This statement 
is also true, in a non-evolutionary sense, of Aquinas’s thought.  
147 Moltmann, WJC, 302-3. I believe Borowitz misses this point in his criticism of Moltmann’s 
dialectics of the cross. See Borowitz, Contemporary Christologies, 90-94. 
148 Bauckham, The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann, 87. Also, Drummond, Eco-Theology, 172. 
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If any of the victims of evolution are left in their graves, then their suffering is not 
redeemed.
149
   
Thus, in contradistinction to Teilhard de Chardin, Moltmann describes Jesus not 
as the apex of evolution, but rather as its ultimate victim.
150
  In the incarnation, Christ 
suffers the suffering of all the victims of evolution.  He dies the death of all the dead, 
human and nonhuman.
151
  But in doing so, through his resurrection he becomes the new 
beginning in which the divine promise of messianic redemption actualizes in history.
152
  
“Christ died the death of all the living in order to reconcile them all (Col. 1.20) and to fill 
them with the prospect of eternal life” (CoG, 92-93).  Christ’s death gathers up the death 
of the entire cosmos.  Likewise, his resurrection will gather up the life of the entire 
cosmos, drawing it into God’s own triune life.  Any less extensive christology is, for 
Moltmann, too anthropocentric.
153
  Moltmann carries this christological dismantling of 
anthropocentrism into his pneumatology, maintaining that the Spirit, in various modes of 
relation to the cosmos, draws all creation into the life of the divine.   
PNEUMATOLOGY AS BOTH DIVINE IMMANENCE AND ESCHATOLOGICAL ADVENT 
Before The Church in the Power of the Holy Spirit, discussion of the Spirit was 
somewhat limited in Moltmann’s thought—a point that opened him to critique.154  Yet his 
later work on the Spirit is, like his cosmology, in nascent form in his earlier works.
155
  
Moltmann’s development of the social doctrine of the Trinity in Trinity and the Kingdom 
                                               
149 Moltmann, WJC, 296. 
150 Ibid.. For Moltmann, Jesus could not be the apex of evolution because the incarnation 
constitutes a genuine novum in history. Therefore it must be more than what evolution could ever offer as 
an apex. One could even say that, for Moltmann, Jesus is not the culmination of the past but rather the 
future itself—God’s coming and his arrival.  
151 Ibid., 255. 
152 Ibid., 253. 
153 Moltmann, WJC, 45; CoG, 92-93. 
154 Bauckham, Messianic Theology, 110. 
155 See Bauckham, The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann, 151-57. 
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provides further engagement with the Spirit as a personal member of the Trinity.
156
  He 
continues this trend in God in Creation, in which he discusses the significance of 
pneumatology for cosmology; The Way of Jesus Christ, in which he develops a 
pneumatological christology; and the Coming of God, in which he addresses the interplay 
between pneumatology and eschatology.  But his clearest exploration in pneumatology is 
in his originally unplanned addition to his contributions to systematic theology, The Spirit 
of Life.   
The Spirit as Divine Immanence 
Cosmologically, Moltmann maintains that the Spirit “has to do with life and its 
source” (SL, 7).  In Moltmann’s view, the Spirit, as the breath of God, is the principle of 
life present in all living things.
157
  To establish this position, he draws on the linguistic 
connection of the Hebrew ruach, which translates as breath, wind, and/or spirit.  The 
breath of all creatures is the Spirit, who constitutes the principle of life.
158
   
Everything that is, exists and lives in the unceasing inflow of the energies of and 
potentialities of the cosmic Spirit.  This means that we have to understand every 
created reality in terms of energy, grasping it as the realized potentiality of the 
divine Spirit.  Through the energies and potentialities of the Spirit, the Creator is 
himself present in his creation.  He does not merely confront it in his 
transcendence; entering into it, he is also immanent in it. (GC, 9)   
 
The Spirit is thus active in the protological act of creation as the initial principle 
of life.  The Spirit is also present and active in creatio continua, preserving the cosmos as 
                                               
156 On the personhood of the Spirit, see Moltmann, TKG, 125-26. 
157 Moltmann, SL, 35. Northcott critiques Moltmann’s panentheistic approach to environmental 
ethics because it cannot differentiate value on account of the Spirit’s ubiquity. That is, “God as Spirit is in 
everything including presumably the smallpox virus and the louse.” Michael Northcott, The Environment 
and Christian Ethics (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 142. In my view, Northcott’s 
critique is flawed in that he does not take into account the various modes of the Spirit’s presence in 
Moltmann’s theology. I will draw this point out below.  
158 Ibid., 40-43; HTG, 72-75. Also, Harvie, Moltmann’s Ethics of Hope, 63; Müller-Fahrenholz, 
The Kingdom and the Power, 184-86. 
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its ongoing principle of life.
 159
  As the presence of God in the unfolding history of 
creation, the Spirit is also the manner in which God suffers the fate of the created 
order.
160
  Because the Spirit is the immanence of God in a world subjected to the futility 
of evolution, the Spirit is “God’s empathy, his feeling identification with what he loves” 
(SL, 51).  Thus the Spirit is within all sighing in the cosmos—all longing for 
redemption.
161
  This sighing is the openness of all creatures in creatio continua to creatio 
nova.
162
  Furthermore, it is pneumatological immanence that constitutes the community 
of creation.
163
  The Spirit “indwells both every individual creature and the community of 
creation,” which entails that all things have a “self-transcendence” (GC, 101).  Thus the 
divine Spirit entails a commonality between humanity and the nonhuman creation:  
To experience the fellowship of the Spirit inevitably carries Christianity beyond 
itself into the greater fellowship of all God’s creatures.  For the community of 
creation, in which all created things exist with one another, for one another and in 
one another, is also the fellowship of the Holy Spirit. (SL, 10)   
 
In this sense, pneumatology shatters anthropocentrism.
164
  
The Spirit as Prolepsis of God’s Future 
If the Spirit is the immanent divine presence in the cosmos from the onset of 
creation and through its ongoing existence, what is the significance of Pentecost?  
Moltmann delineates three modes of the Spirit’s indwelling presence to answer this 
                                               
159 Moltmann, HTG, 75-77; GC, xiv, 10. 
160 Moltmann, SL, 51; GC, 96-97. 
161 Moltmann, SRA, 206; TKG, 111. 
162 The Spirit is further present in history as the facilitator of creation’s openness to its 
eschatological consummation. Moltmann, SRA, 207. French, rightly in my opinion, notes the danger of 
Moltmann’s thought here. Some eco-systems are so fragile that any openness endangers their integrity. 
Thus, the notion of creation’s openness to the eschatological future runs the risk of ignoring the plight of 
creatures that rely on the delicate balances in nature. French, “Returning to Creation,” 83-84. 
163 Moltmann, GC, 11. 
164 Moltmann, SL, 37. 
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question: cosmic, reconciling, and redemptive.
165
  I have already noted the Spirit’s 
creative and sustaining role, evident in the Spirit’s presence as the principle of life in all 
things.  But the Spirit also has reconciling and redemptive roles.  These roles involve the 
Spirit rendering present the new creation within history and ultimately consummating the 
cosmos in its eschatological telos.
166
     
Moltmann develops the Spirit’s reconciliatory role in his pneumatological 
christology (and christological pneumatology).
167
  The Spirit is present in the life, death, 
and resurrection of Christ and made present in the world in a new manner through that 
same life, death, and resurrection.
168
  In Bauckham’s words,  
the Spirit, whose mission derives from the event of the cross and resurrection, 
moves reality towards the resolution of the dialectic, filling the God-forsaken 
world with God’s presence and preparing for the coming kingdom in which the 
whole world will be transformed in correspondence to the resurrection of Jesus.
169
   
 
Because Christ’s death and resurrection constitute, on the one hand, the 
contradictions of the world being taken into the very life and history of the Trinity and, 
on the other hand, the new creation burgeoning into the very life and history of the world 
through the healing of those contradictions, Moltmann associates the Spirit’s presence 
with the new creation.  The Spirit is a “sacrament of the kingdom.”170  In the redemption 
that pours out from the life of Christ, the Spirit becomes the principle of new life—eternal 
life—for the entire created order.  In this sense, the Spirit of God pertains to both the 
                                               
165 Moltmann, GC, 12. Moltmann makes a similar distinction between the modes of Christ’s 
presence in the cosmos. See Moltmann, WJC, 286. Corresponding to this distinction, Moltmann also 
differentiates between both the Spirit’s manifestation in history and the Spirit’s efficacy in history. On 
these distinctions, see Bouma-Prediger, The Greening of the Theology, 127-34.  
166 Thus the same Spirit is present and active cosmologically and eschatologically. Moltmann, SL, 
9. 
167 On this link between pneumatology and christology, see ibid., 17-18. 
168 Moltmann, GC, 95-96; EH, 38. 
169 Bauckham, The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann, 5. 
170 See Moltmann, CPS, 199-206. 
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sustaining of the cosmos and its transfiguration.  With the Spirit, the entire created order 
is already drawn into the life of the Trinity.  The Spirit’s presence is thus the prolepsis of 
the new creation already within history—the “advance pledge of foretaste of the coming 
kingdom of glory” (SL, 74).  In the Spirit, God is more than a conservationist.171 Thus, 
the new modes of the Spirit’s indwelling presence permit dimensions of a transfigurative 
ethics even within the flow of history.    
Finally, the Spirit’s eschatological role is not relegated to the present.  The Spirit 
will bring to consummation the indwelling of God in the cosmos.
172
  Such is the Spirit’s 
redemptive role in the economy of salvation.  It is by the Spirit that the resurrection and 
transfiguration of the cosmos are completed.
173
  Thus the Spirit preserves creation in its 
groaning, draws it proleptically into its future, and will ultimately consummate that future 
eschatologically.  In the end, the Spirit “will make petrified conditions dance” (SL, 74).   
Moltmann’s christology and pneumatology both highlight that the end (i.e., the 
eschaton) is that event in which all of creation, even the systems of life themselves, will 
be transfigured into the life of Christ through the Spirit.  It is the transfiguration of 
creation, the healing of its wounds and its perichoretic union with the divine.  It is a 
maximally inclusive panentheism.         
ESCHATOLOGY AS MAXIMALLY INCLUSIVE PANENTHEISM 
In Theology of Hope, Moltmann views the entire scope of Christian theology 
through the lens of eschatology vis-à-vis the resurrection of Christ.  He maintains that, 
“from first to last, and not merely in the epilogue, Christianity is eschatology, is hope, 
forward looking and forward moving, and therefore also revolutionizing and 
                                               
171 Moltmann, GC, 209; HTG, 77-79; Bauckham, The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann, 188-89. 
172 Moltmann, GC, 149-150.  
173 Moltmann, TKG, 123-24. 
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transforming the present” (TH, 16).  Yet Moltmann’s eschatology diverges from the 
traditional “last things.”174  Here, I explore this divergence in three dimensions: first, the 
import of sabbath and Shekinah for Moltmann’s eschatology; second, the scope of the 
eschatological community in his theology; and third, his understanding of the advent of 
novum in relation to phenomenological future.    
The Redemption of Time and Space: Eschatological Panentheism 
Already in Theology of Hope, Moltmann writes about an “all-inclusive 
eschatology which expects…a new being for all things” (TH, 190).  He develops this 
view in The Coming of God in which he argues that such an eschatology must include 
both time and space.  I here consider each inclusion in turn.   
The subject of time is a complex dimension of Moltmann’s thought.175  On the 
one hand, he understands phenomenological time—the “time of creation”—as being 
created with the created order.  In the act of creation, “God withdrew his own eternity 
into himself in order to take time for his creation and to leave his creation its own 
particular time” (GC, 114).  On the other hand, God’s eternity is not without time.176  In 
favor of Boethius’s view, Moltmann claims that eternity is not the absence of time but its 
fullness—all time gathered together.177  Eternity is thus a qualitative qualifier of time, not 
                                               
174 In Schwarz’s estimation, “Moltmann moves so far away from a one-sided emphasis on the so-
called ‘last things’… that he almost forgets to mentions these last things.” Schwarz, Eschatology, 149. 
175 For a good summary, see Richard Bauckham, “Time and Eternity,” in God Will Be All in All: 
The Eschatology of Jürgen Moltmann (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2001), especially 158-73. 
176 On this tension, see Harvie, Moltmann’s Ethics of Hope, 147-48. 
177 For a summary of Boethius’s view as well as a challenge to understandings of it that draw upon 
the notion of duration, see Garrett J. DeWeese, God and the Nature of Time (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 
2004), 134-45. On Moltmann’s view, see Moltmann, SRA, 62-63; CoG, 280-81, 291. This view of eternity 
as cyclical time in a diachronic present also applies to the cosmic experience of eternity. See Moltmann, 
CoG, 71. Polkinghorne offers a good critique of Moltmann on this point, stating that eternal time should 
still be thought of as linear. See Polkinghorne, “Moltmann’s Engagement with the Natural Sciences,” 62-
66.  
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a quantitative one.
178
  Creation is indeed subject to change in time.  It is this mutability 
that endows the cosmos with an openness for the new future God desires for it.
179
  But 
this mutability is neither identical with time nor antithetical to eternity.  Thus, God’s 
eternity is not inimical to change; rather, “God’s eternity…means God’s unrestricted and 
perfect livingness and his inexhaustibly creative fullness of life” (SRA, 63).  Because 
time, eternity, and change are not contradictory terms, Moltmann can speak of “eternal 
time,” which is the time of consummated history.  Concerning this time, he states that it 
is  
permissible to assume that in the kingdom of glory there will be time and history, 
future and possibility, and these to an unimpeded degree…This of course means 
thinking of change without transience, time without past, and life without death. 
(GC, 213)
180
  
 
But the concept of time is more complicated still on account of the priority 
Moltmann ascribes to the future.
181
  He follows Georg Picht and Bloch in claiming that 
the past is that which is complete and unalterable—realized being.  The future is that 
which may actualize within history—potential being.  The present is that moment of 
“now” in which potential becomes real and unalterable (i.e., it happens) or becomes 
unrealized (i.e., it does not happen)—actual being.182  This flow of time gives priority to 
the future; for  
                                               
178 Moltmann, EH, 58. 
179 Moltmann, CoG, 283; GC, 197-214. Bauckham refers to this openness as the positive side of 
historical time, the negative side being transience. See Bauckham, “Time and Eternity,” 173, 183. 
180 Bauckham suggests—rightly in my opinion—that Moltmann must clarify the manner in which 
eternal time can account for mutability while not slipping into transience. Prediger seems to doubt such a 
possibility. Bouma-Prediger, The Greening of Theology, 237. But I believe Bauckham makes a fine point in 
suggesting that “time without past” could mean the possibility of newness (i.e., future) without the transient 
threat of nothingness (i.e., past). Bauckham, “Time and Eternity,” 162-63, 183-86. 
181 See Moltmann, GC, 118-24. Müller-Fahrenholz, The Kingdom and the Power, 202-3. For a 
consideration of this preference and its development in Moltmann’s thought in critical dialogue with 
Pannenberg, see Bauckham, Messianic Theology, 93-96. 
182 Moltmann, CoG, 286. 
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if reality is real-ized potentially, then potentiality must be higher ontologically 
than reality.  If out of the future there is past, but out of past there is never again 
future, then the future must have pre-eminence among the modes of time. (CoG, 
287)   
 
This move permits Moltmann to give absolute precedence to the eschatological future, 
which differs from the phenomenological future in that it never becomes the past.
183
  This 
future “is the transcendent possibility of time in general” (CoG, 287).  It is the source of 
all time and that for which time is destined.  In brief, that eschatological future is nothing 
other than the Trinity’s openness to cosmic time in eternity.184   
The Trinity’s openness to time is an openness to the unique (i.e., non-eternal) time 
of the cosmos.  This openness is the foundation for the eschatological possibilities of 
phenomenological time.  Yet the openness itself is costly for God.  For phenomenological 
time is, in the unfolding history of the world, a time of transience—that is, a time of 
suffering and death.  The divine openness to this time entails that these darker sides of it 
will affect the divine in eternity.  This cost is evident both in the Spirit who suffers the 
contradictions of history and in the cross.  God’s willingness to bear this cost entailed in 
the Trinity’s openness to cosmic time renders possible the inclusion of the transient 
cosmos in eternity.  The Trinity is open to include and transfigure phenomenological time 
into eternity.   
This inclusion is evident in the sabbath, the true crown of God’s created work in 
which the entire created order shares in God’s rest, the pure enjoyment of life.  In this 
                                               
183 However, Moltmann’s preference for the future is true both within phenomenological time 
itself and with reference to the eschatological future. See Jürgen Moltmann, “The Bible, the Exegete and 
the Theologian,” in God Will Be All in All: The Eschatology of Jürgen Moltmann (Minneapolis, MN: 
Fortress Press, 2001), 228. 
184 As promise, this eschatological future constitutes historical time, which becomes messianic 
time with the Christ event. The intersection of historical and messianic time constitutes eschatological time, 
which will become eternal time when the future fully transforms history in line with the divine promise. 
Moltmann, GC, 124.  
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sense, the historical sabbath is the proleptic link between creatio continua and the creatio 
nova of eschatological consummation.
185
  In Moltmann’s words, “The sabbath opens 
creation for its future.  On the sabbath the redemption of the world is celebrated in 
anticipation” (GC, 276).  Thus, the redemption of time is already evident in the first 
creation narrative through the crown of God’s creative work.  In the sabbath, God 
sanctifies time.  For as Moltmann frequently points out, the sabbath has no night.
186
  The 
divine rest thus encompasses the scope of time within it.
187
  The sabbath also evinces the 
Trinity’s openness to time.  For in creating it, God does not begrudge his creatures a 
share in trinitarian rest.   
What about space?  Again, because God is the Creator, nothing created can fall 
away in the new creation.  Thus, not only time, but also all space must be drawn into 
God’s life.  Just as the Trinity opens itself to time, so also it opens itself to space.   
I have already explored the Trinity’s openness to space in the cosmological 
exploration of Moltmann’s appropriation of creatio ex nihilo.  This appropriation is 
significant here and warrants revisiting.  As with time, the divine openness to space is 
adumbrated in the first creation narrative in which God withdraws in order to make space 
(i.e., nihilo) for the created order to fill.  This withdrawal necessitates a distance between 
God and the cosmos.
188
  Hence, the created order is not divine; for God’s openness here 
entails withdrawal for the sake of the integrity of the other.  Yet this distance does not 
denote a divine absence.  Rather, God gives the cosmos its own space by allowing it to 
                                               
185 Moltmann, WJC, 119-22; CoG, 266; EH, 121; Moltmann, “The Liberation of the Future and Its 
Anticipations in History” (hereafter LTF), in God Will Be All in All: The Eschatology of Jürgen Moltmann, 
Richard Bauckham, editor (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2001), 279-80.  
186 Moltmann, GC, 277. 
187 See Law, “Moltmann’s Ecological Hermeneutics,” 230-31. 
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exist “in God”—that is, in the absolute space of God.189  In this sense, Moltmann couples 
his notion of the immanence of the divine Spirit in creation with the divine transcendence 
that is necessary for the creation’s integrity.  Without the space created in the divine 
withdrawal and the resulting distance this space necessitates, the created order could not 
be a genuine partner before God. 
In order to describe this tension between immanence and transcendence, 
Moltmann draws on the notion of God’s Shekinah, which he appropriates from rabbinic 
and kabbalistic thought.
190
  The term denotes a division within God that allows God to be 
both present in the created order and transcendent to it.  Says Rosenzweig, “God cuts 
himself off from himself. He gives himself away to his people.”191  Moltmann states that 
“the same thing is true in its own degree of the indwelling of God in the creation of his 
love: he gives himself away to the beings he has created, he suffers with their sufferings, 
he goes with them through the misery of the foreign land” (Moltmann, GC, 15).  
Moltmann links the Shekinah specifically to God the Spirit.
192
  He goes as far as to say 
that, as the Spirit/Shekinah, God is in exile with the created order, suffering all of its 
contradictions in history.
193
  In this sense, Moltmann maintains that God is open to the 
creation in both opening the divine space to make a unique space for the created order 
and in cutting God’s own self off in order to share that cosmic space with the creation.194   
                                               
189 Moltmann, GC, 147-57; CoG, 299. 
190 He is particularly influenced by Rosenzweig at this point. See Moltmann, GC, 15. 
191 Rosenzweig, Der Stern der Erlösung; quoted in Moltmann, GC, 15. 
192 See Moltmann, GC, 15, 96; SL, 47-51. 
193 Moltmann, GC, 97. 
194 In this sense, Moltmann’s use of the term Shekinah—along with his pneumatology—guards 
against the hesitation of Christopher Southgate that Moltmann’s understanding of creatio ex nihilo might 
imply “that there is an ontological ‘space’ to which God is not present.” Southgate, The Groaning of 
Creation, 59.  
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Just as the sabbath proleptically evinces God’s openness to share God’s eternal 
time with the created order, so also the Shekinah proleptically evinces God’s openness to 
share with it the divine space.
195
  Hence, the distance between God and the world is not 
the final destiny of the creation.  If the redemption of phenomenological time is the 
dismantling of transience through the perichoretic union of phenomenological time and 
eternity, the redemption of space is the traversing of the distance implied by cosmic space 
through the perichoretic union of the Trinity and the cosmos.  The eschatological telos of 
the cosmos is a perichoretic indwelling with the Triune God.  This mutual indwelling 
occurs when God comes to dwell in the spaces of the world.
196
  As the persons of the 
Trinity interpenetrate each other in a perichoretic union, so also the Trinity and creation 
will interpenetrate one other in the eschaton.
197
  So the world becomes “God’s eternal 
home country.”  Conversely, God becomes “the eternal home of everything he has 
created.”198   
Thus the original divine self-limitation implied by creatio ex nihilo corresponds to 
an eschatological de-limitation in which God comes to earth in order to be at home.
199
  
Yet this divine traversing of the original distance between God and creation—which is 
literally the negation of the original “nothing” of creation—obliterates the uniqueness of 
neither the Trinity nor the world: “In the consummation, everything in its unique 
character (and therefore without losing itself) will dwell within the Deity beyond” (IEB, 
                                               
195 Moltmann, CoG, 283. 
196 Moltmann, CoG, 306. 
197 Ibid., 278, 307; Moltmann, In the End, the Beginning: A Life of Hope (hereafter IEB), 
translated by Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2004), 103.  
198 Moltmann, IEB, 157-58.  
199 Moltmann, GC, 88-89. See Moltmann, CoG, 294, for a concise explanation of his view on the 
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158).  Said differently, “The world will find space in God in a worldly way when God 
indwells the world in a divine way.”200     
The Maximally Inclusive Eschatological Community of Creation 
As noted, the scope of Moltmann’s eschatology includes not only time and space, 
but all the times of all spaces.  According to Moltmann’s cosmology, the creation is 
allotted its time and space by divine withdrawal.  Time and space are then filled with life 
infused with the Spirit.  This life, too, is the subject of God’s redemptive scope.   
Eschatology thus embraces all things.  Bauckham notes this all-inclusive 
eschatology has three underlying foundations.
201
  First, God is both Creator and 
Redeemer; therefore, all creation must be redeemed.  Creation and redemption, 
cosmology and eschatology, are intricately and irrevocably linked.  For Moltmann, 
“without cosmology, eschatology must inevitably turn into a gnostic myth of redemption” 
(CoG, 260).  Second, Christ died for all; therefore his resurrection must apply to all.
202
  
Third, all creation is interconnected; therefore, the resurrection of part of the creation 
implies the resurrection of the entire creation.  Thus, Moltmann’s eschatology establishes 
a link between his cosmology and christology:  “Unless the whole cosmos is reconciled, 
Christ cannot be the Christ of God and cannot be the foundation of all things” (WJC, 
306).
203
  In short, every single instantiation of life that has ever lived must be gathered up 
into eschatological redemption.   
                                               
200 Moltmann, “The World in God or God in the World?” in God Will Be All in All: The 
Eschatology of Jürgen Moltmann, Richard Bauckham, editor (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2001), 41.  
201 Bauckham, “Eschatology in The Coming of God,” 12-13. 
202 On this claim, see Moltmann, CoG, 69-70; WJC, 193-94. 
203 See Chester, Mission and the Coming of God, 16-17. 
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Regarding humanity, Moltmann’s inclusive eschatology has two key facets.  First, 
humans are saved as embodied.
204
  As already noted, Moltmann rejects the notion of the 
immortality of the soul in favor of the notion of the resurrection of the flesh.
205
  Second, 
Moltmann’s theology naturally gravitates toward a universalism in which Christ redeems 
both the victimized and the victimizer.
206
  “As the crucified one, the risen Christ is there 
‘for all’.  In the cross of the Son of God, in his abandonment by God, the ‘crucified’ God 
is the human God of all godless men and those who have been abandoned by God” (TCG, 
195).  This claim leads Moltmann to critique juridical interpretations of eschatological 
judgment, which for Moltmann is “not retaliatory justice…that gives everyone their ‘just 
deserts’” (CoG, 250), but rather the divine setting right of all that has gone astray.207  In 
judgment, nothing will be left behind or unredeemed.
208
  In Schwarz’s words, “There are 
no dark spots left on the landscape.”209  Thus a universal resurrection of all life is 
essential to the very idea of justice, for neither the victimized nor the victimizers can be 
left in their graves.
210
  For the sake of judgment, “all the disrupted conditions in creation 
must be put right so that the new creation can stand on the firm ground of righteousness 
and justice, and can endure to eternity” (SRA, 141). This putting right “embraces the 
                                               
204 Ibid., 16. 
205 Moltmann, CoG, 58-77; T. David Beck, The Holy Spirit and the Renewal of All Things: 
Pneumatology in Paul and Jürgen Moltmann (Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2007), 130-31. 
206 Moltmann, SL, 129-37; SRA, 136-37; HTG, 44-53; CoG, 251. Moltmann notes that both the 
double outcome of judgment and apokatastasis are attested to in scripture. See Moltmann, CoG, 237-43. 
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setting all things right does not necessitate a universal reconciliation. See Moltmann, WJC, 338. 
207 Moltmann, CoG, 235-37, 250-51; SRA, 4. For an overview, see Harvie, Moltmann’s Ethics of 
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208 Moltmann distinguishes between “apocalyptic Christianity,” which views justice as retaliation, 
and “Christian eschatology,” which views justice as rehabilitation. Moltmann, WJC, 337-38. 
209 Schwarz, Eschatology, 151. 
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universal reconciliation of human beings and the bringing again of all things into the 
new eternal creation” (SRA, 141).  If all is not set right, then judgment is not complete.  
Thus, God’s “‘Last Judgment’ has no ‘double outcome’, but serves the universal 
establishment of the divine righteousness and justice, for the new creation of all things” 
(CoG, 243).
211
     
Moltmann’s claim that humans will be saved only as embodied is coupled with 
his claim that they will be saved only as en-cosmosed.  “There is no resurrection of the 
dead without the new earth in which death will be no more” (CoG, 69).  Regarding the 
nonhuman creation, then, Moltmann maintains that eschatological consummation and the 
transfiguration of the cosmos, including its systems of development, are irrevocably 
connected.  Furthermore, Moltmann emphasizes that all flesh will experience resurrection 
and redemption.
212
  He is explicit that the word “all” includes nonhuman animals.213  
Furthermore it is not simply all species of animals, but every individual animal that has 
ever lived, that will participate in God’s eternity without losing its individual 
particularity.
214
  Not only will each individual creature be resurrected, but all times of 
each creature will be resurrected and experienced by that creature diachronically.  
Bauckham refers to this eternal existence as Moltmann’s “novel concept of resurrection” 
in which “all creatures as they are diachronically in the process of their history and in all 
their temporal relationships with other creatures, will be resurrected and transfigured in 
eternity.”215   
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Thus, for Moltmann, the resurrection is the resurrection of “all the living.”216 
Moltmann is so adamant about this point that he claims that “if we were to surrender 
hope for as much as one single creature, for us God would not be God” (CoG, 132).  
Thus, “the new creation will not only manifest in the liberty of the children of God.  It 
will also bring ‘the deification of the cosmos’ through the unhindered participation of all 
created beings in the livingness of God.”217   
Moltmann’s emphasis on the resurrection of all flesh derives from his 
christological claim that Jesus is the ultimate victim of evolution.  In his death, Christ 
dies the death of all the victims of evolutionary emergence.
218
  Likewise, his resurrection 
is the hope for a new future for all of those victims.  Redemption thus “runs counter to 
evolution” as “the divine tempest of the new creation, which sweeps out of God’s future 
over history’s fields of the dead, waking and gathering every last created being” (WJC, 
303).  In running counter to evolution, redemption actually encompasses evolution within 
it; for “the forces of nature…are themselves in need of redemption” (SRA, 68).   
The nature of Christian resurrection hope thus constrains “every personal 
eschatology… to press forward to ever-widening circles to cosmic eschatology.”219  
Thus, for Moltmann the scope of eschatological redemption is quite broad.  It includes 
both time and space.  It includes every single life.  The effect of Jesus’s resurrection is so 
extensive that it includes “plants, stones, and all cosmic life-systems” (WJC, 258) in the 
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hope for eternal existence.  Furthermore, because Moltmann’s vision of the creation is 
thoroughly relational, even the beautiful needs redemption in its relation to that which is 
not beautiful.
220
  The cooperation of nature needs redeemed in the face of nature’s bloody 
competition.  So maximally inclusive is Moltmann’s notion of eschatological redemption, 
even God is included in it inasmuch as God’s “exiled Shekinah” is finally able to come to 
rest in proper relationship with the created order.
221
  Because God suffers the creation its 
own space, “the deliverance or redemption of the world is bound up with the self-
deliverance of God from his sufferings” (TK, 60).  The consummation of cosmic history 
is constitutive for trinitarian history as well.
222
  In this sense, there is nothing, neither 
creation nor God, that is not swept up in the hope for redemption.
223
   
 
                                               
220 Thus Moltmann claims that “nature” is, by definition, that which needs to be redeemed. 
Moltmann, CoG, 93.  
221 Moltmann, CoG, 305-6; SL, 48-49. Elsewhere, Moltmann talks about the “divine ‘need’” that 
results from the initial kenosis of the creative act. See TKG, 58-60. Of course, such need is not the same as 
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Hope, 124-28. 
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223 This maximally inclusive eschatology—particularly the claim that every single instantiation of 
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Moltmann, the “resurrection of nature…is not a romantic wonder-world, but a realistic matter of right and 
justice” (EH, 114). If the suffering of any victim is left unredeemed for that victim, God cannot be 
genuinely just. Thus, every life victimized either in the unfolding evolutionary emergence of existence or in 
relation to humanity’s misuse of creation must be brought to rest in God. Southgate notes the stark 
difference on this point between Rolston and Moltmann. Southgate, The Groaning of Creation, 82-83. 
Rolston accepts that individuals are continuously redeemed in the progressive movement of the whole. See 
Rolston, “Does Nature Need to be Redeemed?” 205-29. At any rate, even if this view seems inadequate for 
ethical differentiation in cosmic time, this inadequacy does not negate its theological validity. Yet this 
judgment is dependent upon the manner of Moltmann’s understanding of how eschatological hope affects 
history. 
198 
 
“Already” and “Not Yet” Versus Advent and Novum 
One of the Moltmann’s achievements is portraying the significance of 
eschatology for history.  He does not develop his eschatology in a vacuum.  He is 
affected by the historical millenarianism of Constantinian Christianity and the 19
th
 
century Christian optimism that he rejects and in contrast to which he affirms 
eschatological millenarianism.
224
  He is likewise affected by the general recovery of 
eschatology from Albert Schweitzer to Karl Barth.
225
  Yet he distances his own view 
from theirs.  In The Coming of God, Moltmann states,  
in dispute with consistently futurist eschatology and the absolute eschatology of 
eternity, I propose to follow the line taken in The Theology of Hope, and put 
forward Advent as an eschatological category, and the category Novum as its 
historical reverse side. (CoG, 6)   
 
A futurist eschatology transports eschatology into time, thus rendering it merely a “not 
yet” of the “already.”226  An absolute eschatology of eternity risks surrendering the 
significance of history in the crisis entailed by a wholly other eternity breaking into 
time.
227
  In contradistinction to these two positions, Moltmann suggests that “the eschaton 
is neither the future of time nor timeless eternity.  It is God’s coming and his arrival” 
(CoG, 22).  By this claim, Moltmann intends to distinguish eschatology from 
phenomenological time and thereby emphasize its genuine newness.  The eschaton 
neither develops naturally out of the flow of history nor has no meaning for the flow of 
                                               
224 See Moltmann, CoG, 146-202; Harvie, Moltmann’s Ethics of Hope, 45; Schwarz, Eschatology, 
150-51; Bauckham, “Eschatology in The Coming of God,” 21-22. For a summary and critique of 
Moltmann’s view, see Müller-Fahrenholz, The Kingdom and the Power, 207-13.  
225 See Moltmann, TH, 23-81; Bauckham, “Time and Eternity,” 155-57, 174-78. 
 226 Moltmann places both Albert Schweitzer and Oscar Cullmann in this category. Moltmann, 
CoG, 7-13. 
227 Moltmann, CoG, 13-14. On both accounts, see Bauckham, “Time and Eternity,” 157. 
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history.  To explicate this position, he offers the related notions of adventus and 
novum.
228
   
Novum is that which is genuinely new and thus cannot merely burgeon out of the 
latencies of history (i.e., the pregnancy of the past).
229
  It must meet history from the 
future, permitting “eschatological surprise.”230  Because novum meets history, the new 
must not discard the “old.”  Thus novum cannot obliterate history in its coming.  It must 
meet history within history and transfigure it.  Novum comes from adventus, which 
Moltmann juxtaposes to futurum.  Futurum is that which develops out of and within the 
flow of historical time.
231
 Adventus, on the other hand, is the eschatological future that 
comes to phenomenological time and encounters it.  In this encounter, the entirety of the 
“old” is transformed into the genuinely “new”—novum.  Hence Moltmann can say that 
adventus is “God’s future…the future of time itself.”232  This newness neither occurs 
from within history itself nor without history itself.
233
  Because newness is possible in the 
eschatological advent, there can be genuine proleptic experiences of it in history.  
However, these experiences are only anticipations that “correspond to the future of the 
coming God,” for the kingdom is not a matter of human effort in history.234  This hope 
for genuine newness and its anticipations even within the ebb and flow of historical time 
                                               
228 The following discussion derives from Moltmann, CoG, 25-29. For a discussion of these terms 
in relation to Moltmann’s historical context, see Beck, The Holy Spirit and the Renewal of All Things, 121-
26. For the influence of Bloch at this point, see Neal, Theology as Hope, 27-32. 
229 Harvie, Moltmann’s Ethics of Hope, 21. 
230 Beck, The Holy Spirit and the Renewal of All Things, 126. 
231 Moltmann, CoG, 25; Bauckham, “Time and Eternity,” 163-64. 
232 Moltmann, LTF, 265. 
233 Moltmann, GC, 132-33.  
234 Moltmann, LTF, 289. See also Bauckham, The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann, 104-6; Harvie, 
Moltmann’s Ethics of Hope, 23; Müller-Fahrenholz, The Kingdom and the Power, 93.  
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permit Moltmann to avoid, on the one hand, a mere conservation of the world as it is and, 
on the other, efforts to progressively complete the kingdom within history.
235
   
As an example of this newness, Moltmann refers to the resurrection.
236
  The 
resurrected Christ does not evolve naturally from the crucified Jesus.  But neither is the 
resurrected Christ anyone other than the crucified Jesus, transfigured.
237
  Thus, the new is 
not bound to the unfolding sequence of the old.  Neither is the old obliterated with the 
coming of the new.
238
 In Bauckham’s words, “Historical time cannot produce it [the 
eschatological future], but nor is it unrelated to historical time: it comes to time to 
transform it.”239  Such is the image of God’s coming to the created order.  Advent enables 
novum, which implies transfiguration—“a glorifying and a transformation” (TK, 123)—
but never a replacement. 
How does eschatology impact the present?  One of the clearest ways is the work 
of the Spirit within the church.  Thus it is pertinent to consider briefly Moltmann’s 
ecclesiology.       
 
 
                                               
235 See Moltmann, LTF, 276-79. Lisa Sideris is extremely critical of any appropriation of 
eschatological theology into ecological ethics. See, for example, Sideris, Environmental Ethics, 189-93. 
But she seems almost always to misrepresent uses of eschatology in both theology and ethics. This failure 
is most evident in her critique of Moltmann, whom she profoundly misreads. First, she argues that 
Moltmann’s eco-theology is grounded upon a “hope for restoration to pre-Fall conditions.” Sideris, 
Environmental Ethics, 191; italics added. This claim is problematic on two counts. In the first place, while 
Moltmann at times uses the imagery of Eden in a mythic sense, he is adamant in the denial of its historical 
existence. Second, Moltmann’s cosmology is more influenced by Eastern thinkers like Irenaeus than those 
who claim creation fell from perfection. That is, Moltmann does not hope for a restoration of something in 
the past; he hopes for something genuinely novum. On both these points, see above. Indeed, the concept of 
novum (newness) is so central to Moltmann’s thought, it is curious that Sideris could equate it with “an 
eschatological restoration of nature to its original state.” Sideris, Environmental Ethics, 191. 
236 Moltmann, CoG, 28-29. 
237 See Moltmann, TH, 206-7; TCG, 160; TKG, 123.  
238 See Bauckham, “Eschatology in The Coming of God,” 5-7. 
239 Bauckham, “Time and Eternity,” 157. 
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ECCLESIOLOGY AS HOPE AND MISSION 
Between his understanding of what constitutes the church and his vision of the 
relationship between the church and Israel, Moltmann’s ecclesiology is complex.240  My 
aim here is not at all a comprehensive overview.  Rather, I seek only to establish 
Moltmann’s general understanding that the church is the community of hope that 
witnesses proleptically to the eschatological future.  The church is thus “the agent of 
eschatological unrest.”241    
In the wake of the resurrection, the Spirit works to draw all creation from the 
suffering of the cross into the glory of the resurrection.
242
  In this sense, the creation is 
not statically awaiting eschatological redemption.  It is rather immersed in the burgeoning 
of that redemption by the presence of the Spirit.
243
  For Moltmann, humanity, and most 
visibly the church, is to proclaim in word and deed the new creation in the present.
244
  
The church’s   
universal mission is to prepare the way for this future.  Christianity prepares for it 
now by already drawing everything into its worship of God, and by respecting 
everything, each in its own right, in ‘reverence for life.’ (SRA, 32)  
 
Bauckham succinctly summarizes Moltmann on this point:  
Christian eschatology is the hope that the world will be different.  It is aroused by 
a promise whose fulfilment can come only from God’s eschatological action 
transcending all the possibilities of history, since it involves the end of all evil, 
suffering and death in the glory of the divine presence indwelling all things. But it 
                                               
240 For competent summaries of Moltmann’s ecclesiology, see Bauckham, The Theology of Jürgen 
Moltmann, 119-50; Müller-Fahrenholz, The Kingdom and the Power, 80-106; Veli-Matti Karkkainen, An 
Introduction to Ecclesiology: Ecumenical, Historical and Global Perspectives (Downers Grove, IL: 
Intervarsity Press, 2002), 126-33. 
241 Bauckham, The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann, 102. 
242 See Moltmann, TKG, 89; SL, 234. 
243 The present reality of redemption preceded Moltmann’s full theological development of the 
Spirit’s role in new creation. See TH, 139; TCG, 168-170, 278. However, on the inclusion of the Spirit, see 
also TH, 211-12; TCG, 244-46.  
244 Moltmann, CPS, 76-84, 189-96; TH, 20-22; Bauckham, The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann, 13-
14. 
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is certainly not therefore without effect in the present.  On the contrary, the 
resurrection set in motion a historical process in which the promise already affects 
the world and moves in the direction of its future transformation.  This process is 
the universal mission of the church.
245
   
 
The church is centered on the notion of hope, the role of which can hardly be 
overstated in Moltmann’s thought.  Hope pertains to the essence of Christianity.246  It is 
that which makes eschatology the subject of advent.  As such, eschatology is always a 
combination of hope and praxis.
247
  There is no real hope without ethics.
248
  For Christian 
conversion is conversion to God’s future.  It is “the anticipation of life in the kingdom of 
God in the conditions of the old world” (WJC, 102).249  This conversion is made possible 
by God’s coming, which is the ultimate subject of hope.250   
If this anticipatory life of hope is true of the Christian, it is also true of the church: 
“The church in the power of the Holy Spirit is not yet the kingdom of God, but it is its 
anticipation in history” (CPS, 196).  Because the church is not yet—nor can it be—the 
kingdom, it must anticipate the kingdom by suffering the contradictions of the world as 
an exiled community.
251
  In these contradictions, it endures the fellow-suffering of the 
entire created order in love.  This solidarity with all creation drives the church to act as a 
herald of the eschatological future.
252
  In this manner, “the pro-missio of the kingdom is 
the ground of the missio of love to the world” (TH, 209).  Such is the church’s essentially 
“eschatological orientation” (TH, 309).   
                                               
245 Bauckham, The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann, 10; also, Moltmann, SL, 230-31.  
246 Moltmann, TH, 308-9. 
247 This combination is at the heart of Theology of Hope. Moltmann, TH, 16; Bauckham, The 
Theology of Jürgen Moltmann, 6. 
248 Moltmann, TH, 18. 
249 For a good reflection on the function of the phrase “kingdom of God” in Moltmann’s thought, 
including its irrevocable connection to christology, see Harvie, Moltmann’s Ethics of Hope, 39-55. 
250 Schwarz, Eschatology, 150. 
251 See Bauckham, The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann, 146-50; Harvie, Moltmann’s Ethics of 
Hope, 31-36; Chester, Mission and the Coming of God, 77-85. 
252 See Moltmann, GSS, 105; Neal, Theology as Hope, 78-85. 
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Part of this witnessing entails contradicting the world by alleviating the suffering 
of creatures.  “Those who hope in Christ can no longer put up with reality as it is, but 
begin to suffer under it, to contradict it” (TH, 7).  Moltmann draws on the Orthodox 
notion of humans as priests of creation as a way of discussing this role of alleviating 
suffering.
253
  In the Spirit, members of the church are led “into solidarity with all other 
created things.  They suffer with nature under the power of transience, and they hope for 
nature, waiting for the manifestation of liberation” (GC, 101).  Says Moltmann:   
Faith may be able to free us from the religious fear of death, if that means fear of 
judgment…But love brings us into solidarity with the whole sad and sighing 
creation.  We die into the earth, which is need of redemption and awaits it.  Hope, 
finally, means that we cannot come to terms with dying at all, or with any death 
whatsoever, but remain inconsolable until redemption comes. (CoG, 93) 
 
Hope for a future without death leads the church to be the life-embracing witness 
to that future.
254
  But what does this witness entail?  It entails “resistance against the 
forces of death and unconditional love for life” (EH, 55).  In a world of death, the church 
is a proleptic witness to the eschatological future of the world evident in the resurrection 
of Christ.  In its life-affirmation in the Spirit, the church’s hope is transformative for the 
world.
255
   
MOLTMANN’S ECO-THEOLOGICAL ETHICS OF COSMOCENTRIC TRANSFIGURATION 
To this point, I have offered an explication of dimensions of Moltmann’s theology 
pertinent to my thesis.  Here I delineate Moltmann’s general ethics of cosmocentric 
transfiguration, particularly with regard to the whole—the cosmic community.  In the 
next section I will examine his ethics with regard to individual nonhuman animals and 
                                               
253 See Moltmann, GC, 189-90; WJC, 307-12. 
254 Moltmann, TH, 17. 
255 Ibid., 311-12; CPS, 191-96; Harvie, Moltmann’s Ethics of Hope, 89. 
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suggest why I believe this ethics is inconsistent with the theological foundations I have 
outlined above.    
COSMOCENTRISM AND THE COSMIC COMMUNITY 
Moltmann specifically targets anthropocentrism as a central culprit in the 
ecological crisis.
256
  He furthermore acknowledges (Western) Christianity’s part in this 
philosophical legacy.
257
  The radical monotheism of Western theology validates 
hierarchal views of the world in which nature becomes merely the object of human use.  
It is just this human-centered worldview that Christianity must shed if it is to have 
anything relevant to say in its current context.
258
  Humans must learn about other 
creatures not for the sake of domination, but rather to know how best to love them for 
their own sakes.
259
  The shedding of anthropocentrism begins with God’s social nature, 
which replaces the rule of the one with the community of the many.
260
   
Moltmann’s rejection of anthropocentrism in favor of a cosmic community is 
similar to Berry’s position.261  This rejection in no way lessens concern for human well-
being.
262
  Moltmann is adamant: “The dignity of human beings is unforfeitable” (GC, 
233).  But the dignity of humanity is not categorically unique.  It is a manifestation of the 
dignity of the created order.  In the cosmic community, each individual member has its 
own intrinsic dignity as part of the whole.  The individual is not dissolved into the whole.  
Neither is the whole disregarded on account of individual ambition.  Rather each member 
                                               
256 Moltmann, SRA, 190-92; GSS, 96-101; SL, 29-31; WJC, 271-72; EH, 61. See also Law, 
“Moltmann’s Ecological Hermeneutics,” 23-25. 
257 Moltmann, GSS, 98; SL, 36-37; EH, 135-36. 
258 Moltmann reviews both creation spirituality and the Gaia hypothesis positively inasmuch as 
they both move toward this shedding of anthropocentrism. See Moltmann, GSS, 101-110; EH, 109-11. 
259 Moltmann, GC, 69-70. 
260 Moltmann, EH, 68. 
261 Moltmann is very close to Berry’s “New Story” of the cosmos in Moltmann, WJC, 246-47. 
262 Moltmann, SRA, 144-46; Harvie, Moltmann’s Ethics of Hope, 181-87. 
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is drawn into the other members in a manner of love that reflects God’s communal 
existence.
263
  Everything has worth in itself.  But everything is related as a whole; and the 
whole also has worth in itself.
264
   
In positing this cosmic community, is Moltmann cosmocentric?  He does not 
explicitly embrace cosmocentrism—which he seems to understand only in its pre-
industrial context.
265
  Rather, he claims that Christianity must recover its theocentrism.
266
  
However, while Moltmann is critical of cosmocentrism divorced from theocentrism,
267
 
his description of theocentrism matches what I have defined as cosmocentrism within a 
theocentric framework.
268
  That is, all creatures have value apart from their utility to one 
another.
269
  “Life is an end in itself…it is beyond utility or uselessness” (EH, 59).  No 
creature is simply a chain in evolutionary emergence.
270
  No creature is merely a resource 
for human use.  Thus, Moltmann can write: “It is not the human being that is at the center 
of the earth; it is life” (EH, 61-62).  Moltmann’s cosmocentric (according to my 
definition) worldview is grounded by his theocentrism: “If this earth, together with all 
living things, is God’s creation, then its dignity must be respected for God’s sake, and its 
continued existence must be protected for its own sake” (GSS, 111).  Whereas for 
                                               
263 Moltmann, EH, 68, 137. 
264 On the worth of the whole, see Moltmann, GSS, 101. 
265 See Moltmann, GSS, 130. 
266 Moltmann, GC, 30-31, 139; Bauckham, The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann, 189-90, 93; 
Bouma-Prediger, The Greening of Theology, 231. 
267 See Moltmann, WJC, 271-72. 
268 Thus Moltmann’s affirmation of theocentrism is similar to that of James Gustafson inasmuch as 
theocentrism serves to unhinge a rampant and unqualified anthropocentrism. On Gustafson, see the 
introduction of the present work. On Moltmann, see Moltmann, GSS, 129-31; Bauckham, The Theology of 
Jürgen Moltmann, 158, 200-3. See also Bauckham’s description of Moltmann’s “theocentric eschatology,” 
which also fits my notion of cosmocentrism. Bauckham, “Eschatology in The Coming of God,” 24-25. For 
a more positive view of cosmocentrism in Moltmann’s thought, see Moltmann, WJC, 46-47. In this same 
work, Moltmann contends that both christocentrism and theocentrism necessarily include the cosmos. Ibid., 
276. 
269 This point is further evident in Moltmann’s discussion of the sabbath as a time when creatures 
are no longer considered for their usefulness. Moltmann, GC, 286. 
270 Moltmann, SRA, 222-23; EH, 128. 
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Aquinas the nonhuman creation existed for God by existing for humanity, for Moltmann 
the nonhuman creation, including each individual creature, exists for God for its own 
sake.
271
  This theocentrically based cosmocentrism bears legal ramifications for 
Moltmann.  
(CONSERVATIONIST) LAW AND THE COSMIC COMMUNITY 
Moltmann’s affirmation of a community of creation in which all individual 
members bear a unique dignity coupled with his dismantling of anthropocentrism places 
him firmly in the cosmocentric category as I have delineated it.  There is one cosmic 
community.  But community relies on law, which safeguards the integrity of its members.  
Law is especially necessary for creatures that cannot make formal legal protests 
themselves.  Thus, Moltmann calls for a legal solidification of the rights of the various 
parts of the cosmos for their own sakes.
272
 
What should the law of the cosmic community look like?  Living in this 
community certainly entails conservation.  Humanity cannot live by destroying the 
world.
273
  Humans must, in some sense, let nature be nature.  Moltmann makes this 
appeal with reference to the sabbath: 
In the sabbath stillness men and women no longer intervene in the environment 
through their labour.  They let it be entirely God’s creation.  They recognize that 
as God’s property creation is inviolable; and they sanctify the day through their 
joy in existence as God’s creatures within the fellowship of creation.  The peace 
of the sabbath is peace with God first of all.  But this divine peace encompasses 
not merely the soul but the body too; not merely individuals but family and 
people; not only human beings but animals as well; not living things alone, but 
also, as the creation story tells us, the whole creation of heaven and earth. (GC, 
277) 
                                               
271 Moltmann, GSS, 104; EH, 127-28. 
272 Moltmann, GSS, 112-13. This point is solidified by the sabbath. Moltmann, GC, 289-90. My 
emphasis here is on cosmic rights in general. For a brief overview of Moltmann’s view of human rights, see 
Bauckham, The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann, 113-17. 
273 Moltmann, GC, 46-47. 
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In line with this sabbatical letting-be, Moltmann offers general boundaries and guidelines 
for the law of the cosmic community.
274
  The sabbath laws imply a peace in the cosmic 
community.
275
  But they also demand compassion within the human community itself.  
Thus Moltmann’s theology mandates a balance with regard to utilization of the earth 
between first and third world nations.
276
  He is also adamant about the rights of individual 
humans, human communities, and future humans.
277
  This balance includes a law of 
compensation for the sake of the entire cosmic community: 
The first ecological law is that for every intervention in nature there must be a 
compensation.  If you cut down a tree you must plant a new one…If your city 
builds a power station, it must plant a forest which produces just as much oxygen 
as the power plant uses up. (GSS, 94)   
 
Thus Moltmann advocates conservationism; for “every intervention in nature which can 
never be made good again is a sacrilege” (GSS, 105). 
In addition to sabbath laws, Moltmann also highlights the significance of divine 
immanence.  Because Christ is the wisdom of creation, “the person who reverences 
Christ also reverences all created things in him, and him in everything created.”  
Correspondingly, then, “what we do to the earth, we do to Christ” (GSS, 103).  Likewise, 
a recognition of the presence of the Spirit in the cosmos “leads to a cosmic adoration of 
God and an adoration of God in all things” (GSS, 104). 
                                               
274 On these guidelines, see also Moltmann, LTF, 280-89. French argues that Moltmann’s ethical 
notions are insufficient in the face of the ecological crisis. French, “Returning to Creation,” 84-85. 
275 Sideris rightly notes that Moltmann here “combines the Jewish recognition of the significance 
of the Sabbath with a Christian, messianic eschatology.” Sideris, Environmental Ethics, 95. Moltmann 
would himself acknowledge this combination. Moltmann, GC, 55. Though, Jeremy Law correctly 
highlights that Moltmann’s eschatological reading of the sabbath is partly based on the notion that the 
sabbath has no night and therefore “holds a permanent meaning for all the days of creation.” Law, “Jürgen 
Moltmann’s Ecological Hermeneutics,” 230. At any rate, it ought to be noted that the sabbath itself need 
not have messianic overtones. In fact, in many ways, the idea of the sabbath more naturally lends itself to 
an affirmation of the repeating cycles in nature. 
276 Moltmann, GSS, 92-95. 
277 See ibid., 110, 117-29. 
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In line with these sabbatical principles and the immanence of God in creation, in 
Ethics of Hope, Moltmann delineates four general rights of the inanimate creation.
278
  
First, it has the right to existence, which Moltmann defines as “preservation and 
development.”  Second, it has the right to the integrity of its ecosystems.  Third, it has the 
right to its own development apart from human intervention with the exception of 
justified and legitimate cases.
279
  Finally, rare ecosystems are under absolute protection.  
These rights pertain to the eschatological future of the cosmos as the temple of God’s 
Shekinah.
280
   
TRANSFIGURATION AND THE COSMIC COMMUNITY 
The cosmic community is a community of law.  Thus, all members of the 
community bear rights that are consistent with the manner of their unique existence.  Yet 
for Moltmann the present existence of the cosmos cannot be isolated from the totality of 
its existence, including the future hope of creatio nova.  Thus there is a tension within the 
law of the community between the law of nature (as we encounter them in our experience 
of creatio continua) and the law of creation (which is revealed as novum in the advent of 
God’s eschatological future).  I here explore the tension Moltmann’s eschatology causes 
for his ethics.  
 
 
                                               
278 The following is from Moltmann, EH, 144-45. 
279 Concerning the criteria of justification and legitimacy, Moltmann states that interventions “are 
only permissible if the conditions for the intervention have been established in a democratically legitimate 
proceeding and with regard to the rights of nature, if the concern behind the intervention is weightier than 
the concern for an undiminished preservation of the rights of nature, and if the intervention is not 
excessive.” Furthermore, “after any damage, nature must be restored once more whenever possible.” 
Moltmann, EH, 144. It seems to me that these guidelines are quite vague and would require a wealth of 
interpretation to yield specific and concrete applicability.  
280 Ibid., 150. 
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The Law, Nature, and (New) Creation 
To draw out this tension, it is pertinent to revisit the distinction between nature 
and creation in Moltmann’s thought.  One of the tasks of theology is to “show how nature 
is to be understood as God’s creation” (GC, 38).  Because “nature” is the distorted 
condition of the created order, theologically—and ethically—any talk of “creation” must 
not develop a static ethics based on observable nature.  Nature is not to be theologically 
discarded, for “the present world is a real symbol of its future” (GC, 56).281  But as such a 
symbol, nature cannot be seen as an ethical set of immutable laws and cycles.  It is rather 
both distorted and open to the eschatological future.
282
  The law of nature cannot be the 
ultimate law of creation;
283
 for “Christian ethics are eschatological ethics” (TLF, 289).    
What does the eschatological law of creation look like?  In a word: resurrection.  
In Christ, “resurrection has become the universal ‘law’ of creation” (WJC, 258).  The 
resurrection of Christ permits humanity to see nature anew, according to its 
eschatological destiny.  More specifically, Christ’s resurrection reveals nature as creation.  
Because the entire cosmos is included in the hope for the eschatological resurrection, “all 
those who hope for a resurrection [are] under an obligation to remain true to the earth, to 
respect it, and to love it as they love themselves” (SRA, 72).  Thus the law of creation 
(i.e., resurrection) establishes a new community of creation—the community of creatio 
nova in which “mutual destruction is replaced by a community of peace in which all 
created being are there for one another, with one another and in one another” (WJC, 255).       
                                               
281 For Moltmann’s analysis of the relationship between natural and revealed theology, see GC, 
57-60. 
282 Moltmann, WJC, 251; GC, 63, 197-206. See also ibid., 158-69, where Moltmann discusses the 
significance of heaven for the cosmic openness to God’s eschatological future.  
283 The juxtaposition of the “law of nature” and the “law of creation” is my own interpretation of 
Moltmann; though, it well-grounded in his understanding of eschatology, creation, and nature.   
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How does Moltmann resolve the tension between the law of nature and law of 
creation?  He cannot relegate the latter to a transcendent future.  For Moltmann’s 
cosmology makes the present cosmic order inseparable from the eschatological 
consummation which comes to meet it in history.  Furthermore, because this new future 
breaks into history (as adventus) already with the redemptive presence of the Spirit in the 
wake of the Christ event, the entire community of creation is now open to proleptic 
moments of novum in the unfolding of history.  Thus, to subsume creation into nature 
isolates what is (creatio continua) from God desires and what will be (creatio nova) and 
is thus theologically myopic.   
Yet Moltmann’s eschatology makes it clear that the eschatological kingdom is not 
a matter of human effort.  Thus one cannot discard the law of nature and attempt to force 
creatio nova in the midst of creatio continua.  Moltmann resolves this tension by 
maintaining that the law of creation (again, my phrase) challenges the law of nature by 
way of anticipation:  
The hope for God’s eschatological transformation of the world leads to a 
transformative ethics which tries to accord with this future in the inadequate 
material and with the feeble powers of the present and thus anticipates it. (EH, 
xiii) 
 
In the midst of creatio continua, there exists a “creatio anticipavita” (GC, 209), the 
prolepsis of creatio nova in the presence of the Spirit.  Moltmann is careful to distinguish 
anticipation from fulfillment.  Yet anticipation is nonetheless “already the presence of the 
future in the conditions of history” (CPS, 193).   
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The Law of (New) Creation and Historical Practice 
It is clear that Moltmann’s notion of a cosmic community governed by law cannot 
be limited to conservation of “nature.”  Indeed, Moltmann is critical of such ethics.  For 
example, in critique of Ruether’s eco-feminism, he writes: 
Deep respect for ‘the good earth’ does not mean that we have to give ourselves up 
for burial with the consolation that we shall live on in worms and plants.  It means 
waiting for the day when the earth will open, the dead will rise, and the earth 
together with these dead will ‘be raised’ for its new creation. (CoG, 276-77) 
 
Such a critique clearly applies to those like Teilhard de Chardin and Berry as well.   
In contrast, Moltmann consistently claims along with Eastern theologians that the 
eschatological telos of the cosmos is deification or transfiguration.
284
  Thus conservation 
in the present does not do justice to the community of creation.  Moltmann’s eco-
theological ethics moves, at least in theory, beyond conservation to incorporate 
transfiguration.  Preservation remains important.
285
  It pertains to a realistic worldview.  
But it does not exhaust human responsibility to the cosmos, which includes witnessing to 
new possibilities in hope through proleptic, transforming action.
286
   
The transfigurative dimension of Moltmann’s ethics is qualified by his 
cosmocentrism.  In this way, his position is not the same as many Orthodox writers.  
Though he cites Dumitru Staniloae frequently, he especially differs from him.  As I have 
already shown in chapter 1, for Staniloae and many Orthodox theologians, the inclusion 
of the nonhuman creation in the eschaton remains anthropocentric in that it serves as a 
means of divine communion for humans.  The nonhuman creation is the final sacrament.  
Yet Moltmann does not define creation’s eschatological inclusion according to this 
                                               
284 Moltmann, WJC, 47-48, 302. See also Moltmann’s exploration of possible visions for the telos 
of the cosmos. Moltmann, CoG, 267-79. 
285 See Moltmann, GSS, 92-101. 
286 Moltmann, EH, 3-5; CPS, 191-96. 
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sacramental role.
287
  On the contrary, in the eternal kingdom “God will be directly and 
universally manifest through himself, and creation with all created things will participate 
directly and without any mediation in his eternal life” (GC, 64).  The creation is not 
merely a sacrament for the divine-human drama.  Rather, every instantiation of life, every 
particle of matter, is included in God’s communal life for its own sake.    
This ethics of cosmocentric transfiguration suggests that the human role is to 
witness to the eschatological kingdom of God, which Moltmann defines as “God in all 
things and all things in God” (SRA, 32).  It is in this manner that Moltmann can say that 
“creation is to be redeemed through human liberty” (GC, 69).  The nonhuman creation 
experiences redemption here and now through humanity’s Spirit-enabled witness to the 
perichoretic communion of the eschatological future.  This human role is not predicated 
upon creation’s sacramentality, but rather upon God’s desire for the creation for its own 
sake.  Humans do not love the creation in order to love God; they love God by loving the 
creation for its own sake.
288
  God desires the human being to be for the created order for 
its own sake.   
MOLTMANN’S COSMOCENTRIC TRANSFIGURATION AND INDIVIDUAL NONHUMAN 
ANIMALS 
My delineation of Moltmann’s general eco-theological ethics points toward how 
that ethics would affect humanity’s relation to nonhuman animals.  Animals are part of 
the cosmic community.  God desires them for their own sake.  They share a destiny with 
humanity: transfiguration and a perichoretic indwelling with the Trinity.  Here, I seek to 
                                               
287 Though at times he does use language more compatible with Orthodox thought (e.g., 
Moltmann, GC, 70-71), he consistently speaks—even in the midst of his Orthodox similarities—of all life’s 
intrinsic value, even saying all creatures should be loved for their own sakes (Moltmann, GC, 69-71). 
288 See chapter 1 to compare this claim to that of Staniloae and John Meyendorff.   
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examine more closely Moltmann’s engagement with nonhuman animals and critically 
suggest where his ethics should go based on his theological framework. 
MOLTMANN’S COSMOCENTRISM AND THE HUMAN UNIQUENESS 
 The affirmation of a cosmic community in which all living creatures participate 
does not entail that all creatures are the same.  There are important commonalities—
especially regarding the telos of life—but there are also differences.289  Moltmann’s 
anthropology maintains that “human beings must neither disappear into the community of 
creation, nor must they be detached from that community” (GC, 190).  He maintains this 
balance by an appeal to the imago Dei. 
Moltmann and the Image of God 
For Moltmann, humanity’s central uniqueness is expressed in the doctrine of the 
imago Dei.
290
  But unlike much of the substantialistic imago Dei tradition before him, for 
Moltmann this difference does not afford humans a unique privilege over and against 
animals.
291
  He is explicit that the imago Dei denotes neither despotism nor dominion.
292
  
In conjunction with relational interpretations of the imago, Moltmann maintains that it 
entails that humans exist with and before God.  In conjunction with functional 
interpretations of the imago, Moltmann maintains that it entails that humans exist with 
and before the created order.  As already noted, humans have a “priestly calling.” They 
“stand before God on behalf of creation, and before creation on behalf of God” (GC, 
                                               
289 For a general though dated overview, Bouma-Prediger, The Greening of Theology, 223-30. 
290 However, Moltmann also views humans as unique with reference to awareness of death: 
“Unlike other living things, human beings know about their deaths while they are still alive, and adjust 
themselves to death” (CoG, 54). Animals (and plants) are not aware of their own impending death 
throughout life. Moltmann links sin to death in that it is the fear of death that grounds humans’ desire to 
sin: “Death is only the consequence of sin inasmuch as sin exists because of death” (CoG, 91). Animals 
lack awareness of their death; thus, they do not sin. Moltmann, CoG, 93.  
291 On this point, Douglas John Hall, Imaging God: Dominion as Stewardship (Grand Rapids: 
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1986), 90. 
292 Moltmann, EH, 67-68. 
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190).
293
  This priestly function is for the creation’s own sake.  But what exactly does this 
function look like vis-à-vis nonhuman animals?   
Humans, the Image of God, and Nonhuman Animals 
As already noted, Moltmann’s anthropology is Irenaean.294  He claims that, while 
imago Dei, human beings are called to become the imago Christi in the world.
295
  But this 
image bears different meanings for animals than it does for the earth.  Says Moltmann:   
The prophetic visions of the messianic kingdom of peace (Isa. 11.6ff) give 
sublime and ultimate form to [the] initial peaceful order between animals, human 
beings and the plants of the earth.  But the beginning teaches that human lordship 
over the animals has to be distinguished from human subjection of the earth for 
the purposes of nourishment, and distinguished more clearly than is the case in the 
traditional theological doctrine of the dominium terrae; for this doctrine throws 
the two together and intermixes them, with disastrous consequences for the world. 
(GC, 224) 
 
For humans bearing the imago, subduing the earth means “nothing but the injunction to 
eat vegetable food.”  But for animals it is different: “there is no mention at all in the 
creation accounts of enmity between human beings and beasts, or of a right to kill 
animals.  Human beings are appointed as ‘justices of the peace’” (GC, 188).  Thus, with 
regard to nonhuman animals, the priestly role of humanity implied by the imago is one of 
reverential servantry that reflects Christ’s own eschatological ministry.296  Moltmann’s 
understanding of the imago suggests that not only do animals not exist for the sake of 
                                               
293 Thus Moltmann evinces a functional anthropocentrism in his thought.  
294 See Steenberg, Irenaeus on Creation, 101-52. 
295 See Moltmann, GC, 225-28; Harvie, Moltmann’s Ethics of Hope, 172-74. It this dynamic 
dimension of Moltmann’s anthropology that Walsh misses when he states, “One wonders what human 
beings were at the beginning if they only become human at the end.” Walsh, “Theology of the Hope,” 61. 
296 On a few occasions Moltmann references—at least within the symbols of biblical mythology—
the vegetarian diet of protological humans. Moltmann, GC, 29-31, 187-88, 224. While Moltmann rejects 
the historicity of this edenic state, he nonetheless accepts that it provides a prolepsis of the eschatological 
future. Thus, the peaceful vision of creation in Genesis 1 envisions the eschatological kingdom of Christ. It 
is to this kingdom that humans must witness.  
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humans—as both Aristotle and Aquinas maintained—but humans exist functionally for 
their well-being.  Anything less is an affront to the God whose image humanity bears: 
As the image of the Creator, human beings will love all their fellow creatures with 
the Creator’s love.  Otherwise, far from being the image of the Creator and lover 
of all the living, they will be his caricature.  (GSS, 132) 
 
Human Dignity 
 
Thus, while Moltmann maintains there is a difference—both ontological and 
functional—between humans and animals, this difference is not one of dignity.297  The 
difference is not the difference proposed by modern anthropocentric followers of 
Emmanuel Kant.  Moltmann is extremely critical of the distinction between “person” and 
“thing” with regard to nature generally, but especially with regard to animals.298  Says 
Moltmann, “An animal is not a human ‘person’, but it is not a ‘thing’ or a ‘product’ 
either.  It is a living being, with its own rights, and it requires the protection of public 
law” (GSS, 131).299   
Rather, the difference is one of function.  Humans are the priests of the earth, the 
heralds of the eschatological kingdom.  This priestly and eschatological role entails that 
human beings witness to a deeply significant commonality between humans and 
nonhuman animals: Christ died for both.  This claim draws all creatures into a common 
telos and a common dignity.  Says Moltmann:   
If Christ has died not merely for the reconciliation of human beings, but for the 
reconciliation of all other creatures too, then every created being enjoys infinite 
value in God’s sight, and has its own right to live; this is not true of human beings 
alone.  If according to the Christian view the uninfringeable dignity of human 
beings is based on the fact that ‘Christ died for them’, then this must also be said 
                                               
297 In fact, humanity’s unique dignity is only recognizable as part of the dignity of the cosmos. 
Thus Moltmann states that “we can talk about special human dignity if the premise is our recognition of the 
creation dignity of all other creatures—not otherwise” (GSS, 132).  
298 Moltmann, GSS, 129-30. 
299 Ibid., 131. 
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of the dignity of all other living things.  And it is this that provides the foundation 
for an all-embracing reverence for life.
300
 (WJC, 256) 
 
On account of Christ’s death and resurrection, “every created being” has “infinite value” 
and “its own right to live.”  Thus, the theological grounding of creation’s dignity leads to 
a political dimension of humanity’s priestly role vis-à-vis nonhuman animals: animal 
rights.  
COSMOCENTRISM AND THE RIGHTS OF (INDIVIDUAL) NONHUMAN ANIMALS 
From Moltmann’s understanding of Christ’s death, it follows that he speaks 
positively of animal rights.  He claims that “a Universal Declaration of Animal Rights 
should be part of the constitutions of modern states and international agreements” (GSS, 
131).
301
  Yet like many of his ethical claims Moltmann is vague in his description of 
animal rights.
302
  He maintains that they must include a prohibition on factory farming 
and GMOs.
303
  He wavers on animal experimentation, calling for reduction through the 
development of alternative methods, but not cessation.
304
  He does not—nor could he—
reject that humans can “use” animals.305  Yet use is qualified by this eschatological 
                                               
300 Moltmann borrows the terms “reverence for life” from Albert Schweitzer. Moltmann, SL, xiii; 
WJC 256. Even so, Moltmann critiques Schweitzer’s eschatology and anthropocentrism. See Moltmann, 
TH, 24-25; EH, 140. I am not convinced the difference between the two is a great as Moltmann seems to 
think. For Schweitzer, reverence for life is “The ethic of reverence for life is Jesus’ ethic of love widened to 
universality.” Albert Schweitzer, Out of My Life and Thought: An Autobiography, translated by Antje 
Bultmann Lemke (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1990), 235. This widening of Jesus’s ethic of love 
is exactly what Moltmann does, extending the Shema as follows: “You shall love God and this earth and all 
your fellow creatures with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your might!” (SL, 72) 
301 See also Moltmann, WJC, 256, 307-8. 
302 Drummond notes this vagueness in conjunction with his theological claims of a maximally 
inclusive and death-free eschatological vision. Drummond, Eco-Theology, 173. Likewise, Jenkins notes 
that Moltmann does not sufficiently delineate how a human’s participation in Christ informs that human’s 
participation in nature. Jenkins, Ecologies of Grace, 74. I find this critique particularly true in Moltmann’s 
ethics regarding animals.  
303 Moltmann, GSS, 131; EH, 156-57. 
304 Moltmann, GSS, 131. 
305 Ibid., 112. 
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caveat: “God wants all he has created to live in peace with one another ‘each according to 
its kind’” (WJC, 311).   
Moltmann’s vagueness derives partly from his agnosticism: 
It is not yet fully clear what it means to withdraw from human beings the right of 
disposal over the creatures which they are in a position to dominate.  But it quite 
certainly includes the protection of species. (WJC, 311)   
 
It seems to me that he is clear about the conservationist side of ethics (protection of 
species).  In Ethics of Hope, he claims that all animals have the right to “preservation and 
development of its genetic inheritance” and “a species-appropriate life” (EH, 144).306  His 
vagueness—which I maintain is a hesitancy to follow his own theological thought to 
conclusion—seems to arise with reference to what individual nonhuman animals, who 
have “infinite value” and a “right to live” (WJC, 256), are due in actual praxis.  It is here 
that I will critique Moltmann’s ethics. 
HUMANITY AS THE PROLEPTIC WITNESS TO A PARTICULAR ESCHATOLOGICAL HOPE  
While Moltmann embraces, however vaguely, the notion of animal rights in a 
conservationist sense, I submit that his eschatological theology mandates that he go 
further in order to be consistent with his own framework.  That is, while his theology 
relies heavily on the notion of cosmic transfiguration—including every instantiation of 
life that has ever lived—his ethics toward nonhuman life is at times astonishingly 
conservationist.  Here, I aim to delineate what I believe to be ethical principles that are 
consistent with Moltmann’s theology.  I then argue that Moltmann’s own ethics are 
inconsistent in light of these principles.   
 
                                               
306 It is interesting (and perhaps ironic) to note that, for all his theological differences with 
Aquinas, Moltmann seems to suggest an ethics with regard to nonhuman animals that is rather Thomistic.  
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The Church Revisited (for Nonhuman Animals) 
As already noted, for Moltmann it is humans who, in Christ, are able to see the 
world as a new cosmic community of peace that reflects resurrection as the new 
“universal ‘law’ of creation” (WJC, 258) for all life.307  More specifically, it is the church 
that is meant to be the heart of this new community in history.  It becomes as such by 
opening itself to the suffering of others within the contradictions of the world:   
When the weaker creatures die, the whole community of creation suffers.  If the 
church sees itself as representing creation, then it will feel this suffering of 
creation’s weaker creatures as conscious pain, and it will have to cry out in public 
protest. (GSS, 105)
308
   
 
The church is to represent the new creation and the new law of resurrection by embracing 
the suffering of all life as its own and lamenting death, whether human or nonhuman.  
This fellow-suffering leads to protest—to action on behalf of those that suffer.  It is a 
refusal to become numb to the death of nature’s law.  Says Moltmann:  
We have got used to death, at least the death of other creatures and other people.  
And to get used to death is the beginning of freezing into lifelessness oneself.  So 
the essential thing is to affirm life—the life of other creatures—the life of other 
people—our own lives…the people who truly affirm and love life take up the 
struggle against violence and injustice.  They refuse to get used to it.  They do not 
conform.  They resist. (SL, xii)   
 
Therefore, while ultimate justice remains eschatological, the church, in hope, 
willingly suffers and protests in the midst of the contradictions of history.  In that 
suffering, the church becomes a prolepsis of the future.  And that future is the reverse of 
the suffering itself:  
                                               
307 Moltmann, WJC, 255. Trevor Hart refers to this notion as the imagination of humanity set loose 
by the Spirit. See Hart, “Imagination for the Kingdom of God? Hope, Promise, and the Transformative 
Power of an Imagined Future,” in God Will Be All in All: The Eschatology of Jürgen Moltmann, Richard 
Bauckham, editor (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2001), 61-76. 
308 Also, Moltmann, TH, 183; SRA, 64. In this reference, Moltmann is engaging creation 
spirituality and is most likely referring to the “weaker creatures” in a general sense (i.e., the loss of a 
species).  
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Anyone who lives in necessary contradiction to the laws and powers of ‘this 
world’ hopes for a new world of correspondences.  The contradiction suffered is 
itself the negative mirror-image of the correspondence hoped for. (CoG, 200)   
 
Witness to the eschatological future entails becoming the “mirror-image” of the 
contradictions that creatures suffer in history.  Thus is the eschatological mission of the 
church.  But what should this “mirror-image” look like with reference to nonhuman 
animals?   
The New Law of Resurrection and Transfigurative Ethics 
Given Moltmann’s position regarding the new law of resurrection and the new 
community it establishes, it seems quite accurate to claim that Christians ought to live in 
such a way as to protect all creatures from suffering and death and also attempt to shape 
public policy along these lines. Surely this protection ought to take the shape of a deeply 
transfigurative ethics.
309
  After all, Christ reveals that neither suffering nor death pertain 
to the eschatological future of any individual creature.  If such is the case, then no one 
can justify killing by appealing to the naturalness of death.  There is a new law—a law of 
life.  There is a new community—a community of peace.  This community includes all 
creation and entails a cosmic sympathy—a suffering together that “banishes fear and the 
struggle for existence from creation” (GC, 213).  
Therefore, the suffering and death of any and every creature should cause lament.  
For such transience is antithetical to God’s kingdom, of which the church is a proleptic 
witness.  Because every life is part of the community and sighs for redemption, every life 
                                               
309 While Harvie’s Moltmann’s Ethics of Hope is commendable in elucidating how hope grounds 
practice in the human community, it is unfortunately wanting with regard to ecology and nonhuman 
animals.  
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taken out of necessity should elicit a “metaphysical sadness,” which Moltmann defines as 
“a feeling for the tragedy of history” (EH, 75).310   
Yet even more can be said when one adds Moltmann’s understanding of eternity 
to his christological eschatology and the new cosmic community it entails.  For 
Moltmann, eternity is the fullness of time—all time gathered up into an eternal present.  
As such, a nonhuman animal’s participation in eternity entails that the totality of its 
cosmic times be gathered up into God’s life.  The entire history of that creature is 
gathered into the eternal present.
311
  But this point suggests that every moment of time of 
every creature’s life bears eternal significance.  Each moment of every individual 
creature’s life is sacred.  Therefore, to cause one creature even a moment of suffering is 
to embrace the order of transience.  While at times such actions might be necessary, it 
seems to me that they should never be considered good.  
Moltmann’s Inconsistency: The New Law of Resurrection and Meat-Eating 
Moltmann’s theology thus provides the grounds for a radical ethics of 
cosmocentric transfiguration.  Yet whether or not Moltmann adheres to such an ethics 
with regard to nonhuman animals is unclear.  In fact, his ethics seems to suffer from a 
lack of consistency vis-à-vis his theological framework.  This inconsistency is evident in 
his views on vegetarianism.   
If the eschatological future is seriously a category of novum, then every proleptic 
witness to it is simultaneously an act of rebellion toward some reality pertaining to the 
                                               
310 Moltmann is here discussing medical ethics and focusing on humanity. Yet I believe the point 
is consistent with his understanding of all victims of suffering and death. While I remain suspicious about 
any language of “justifying killing,” in my opinion Moltmann’s theological foundations suggest he should 
say the same thing about nonhuman animals as he does about a fetus: “It can very well be that a life has to 
be killed in order that a life can be saved. But then one should justify the act of killing, not disparage the 
object to such an extent that it is no longer a question of killing at all.” Moltmann, EH, 85. This is not to 
say the two are equated in all senses, but rather simply that this principle should also apply to animals.  
311 Moltmann, CoG, 75. 
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present—a “mirror-image” of the “contradiction suffered” (CoG, 200).  So, if “an ethics 
of hope sees the future in light of Christ’s resurrection” and “points the way to 
transforming action so as to anticipate as far as possible, as far as strength goes, the new 
creation of all things” (EH, 41); if this new creation entails a cosmic peace between 
humans and animals that precludes predation; and if so many humans on the planet today 
eat meat out of luxury and not necessity; then it seems an inevitable conclusion that 
vegetarianism is a higher form of proleptic witness than meat-eating.  The same 
reasoning that Moltmann applies elsewhere (e.g., regarding fair trade prices) applies here.  
Just prices in a global economy are not “already the kingdom of God itself; but…they 
correspond to the kingdom more closely than unjust prices” (TLF, 288).  It seems to me 
that, following the same logic, vegetarianism better corresponds to the eschatological 
kingdom—in which peace will reign and death will be no more—than meat-eating.312 
Moltmann does not make this link between the eschatological future and 
vegetarianism explicitly.  He does claim that vegetarianism is a better way to live; but, 
like Berry, this claim seems more about preservation than eschatological witness.   
It is…useful not to eat the goods which top the good chain but to move away from 
meat to vegetarian dishes.  How much grain has to be used in order to produce 
one kilo of meat?  It is not just cheaper to eat vegetarian food but fairer too, and 
healthier in addition.  No one must suddenly become a vegetarian if his body 
cannot cope with the changeover to vegetarian food, but everyone can reduce his 
consumption of animal food to some extent, as long as this is not distasteful. (EH, 
157) 
 
The qualification of “as long as this is not distasteful” strikingly undermines any notion 
that vegetarianism is optimal for Christian living.  It makes sense for Moltmann to 
suggest that people hindered by health issues should not “suddenly” switch to 
                                               
312 This conclusion only applies to those who are able to do it, however. On Moltmann’s balance 
between amorphous and rigid ethics, see Moltmann, EH, 74.  
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vegetarianism.  But for Moltmann, one does not even have to “reduce his consumption” 
of meat if it is “distasteful” to do so!  The weakness of this claim betrays a lack of direct 
concern for the nonhuman creatures involved.
313
  It takes the form of a half-hearted 
suggestion that aims not to offend.  I contend that this weakness evinces a blaring 
inconsistency in Moltmann’s thought.314 
IN SUM  
Moltmann’s vague ethics of nonhuman animals can be summed up as follows.  
All members of the community of creation should be protected under law.  Each animal 
is a member of the community that is meant to reflect the perichoretic love of the Trinity.  
Each sighs under the chains of evolutionary emergence—under the transience of death.  
Each is imbued with the Spirit that awakens its life and opens it to the eschatological 
future.  Each is the subject of Christ’s redemptive action on the cross and in the 
resurrection.  Each will have all of the moments of its life gathered up into the fullness of 
                                               
313 How Moltmann can offer this weak view in light of his christology is confusing. He states, 
“Unless the whole cosmos is reconciled, Christ cannot be the Christ of God and cannot be the foundation of 
all things. But if he is this foundation, then Christians cannot encounter other creatures in any way other 
than the way they encounter human beings: every creature is a being for whom Christ died on the cross in 
order to gather it into the reconciliation of the world” (WJC, 307). How can one encounter an animal in the 
same way “they encounter human beings” and eat it? 
314 Sideris notes a similar inconsistency in the work of both Ruether and McFague. She notes that, 
in Ruether’s egalitarian model, “vegetarianism is on option, but it’s not required.” She goes on ask, “But 
why isn’t vegetarianism required of this model? After all, it would seem that the model involves loving 
others as one loves oneself and other humans; this model…involves treating others as ends in themselves, 
not as objects to be used by us, to our own ends.” Sideris, Environmental Ethics, 78. McFague similarly 
argues for a subject-based view of animals. Again, Sideris asks, “How can one justify eating another 
subject, even if raised and killed humanely?” She deems that “McFague really has no answer to this 
question in terms that are consistent with the Christian ethic she wants to extend to nonhuman animals. 
Instead, she defers to Native American customs.” Sideris (rightly in my view), argues that this response is 
inadequate because “Native Americans are not Christians seeking to love nature in keeping with Jesus’s 
ministry of love, healing, and caring for all subjects.” Ibid.. Ultimately, Sideris frankly judges that 
McFague “presents a picture of nature that is scientifically inaccurate and then develops an ethical 
translation of that picture (love and care for all subjects as subjects) only to depart from this ethic when it 
demands something radically different in our treatment of nonhuman animals.” Sideris, Environmental 
Ethics, 79. As I have already noted with regard to Sideris, I do not believe that Moltmann’s worldview is 
scientifically inaccurate. Yet whatever critiques apply to Ruether and McFague regarding the inconsistency 
of their theological ethics vis-à-vis nonhuman animals and vegetarianism are, in my view, vastly amplified 
in Moltmann’s work. 
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eternal life at the resurrection.  Each will participate in God’s eschatological kingdom of 
interpenetrating love.  For all of these reasons, each individual animal has its worth and 
dignity and therefore has the right to live.  Every violation of the eschatological destiny 
of all creatures requires some form of justification.  Humans do not have the right to kill 
animals; they have the responsibility to serve them as proleptic witnesses of a future in 
which all the negatives in history will be negated in the coming of God.   
CONCLUSION 
Moltmann’s theological vision as it pertains to my thesis may be summarized as 
the history of the triune God and the world.  The beginning of this history is the self-
limitation of God, which is an outpouring of the eternal love that constitutes the unity of 
the social Trinity.  This limitation enables the space within which the created order 
develops in its own integrity.  The ongoing nature of this history is the dynamism in 
which God moves in and toward the cosmos—which is in some sense both corrupted and 
incomplete (i.e., it is “nature”)—from the eschatological future.  The ultimate telos of this 
history is an eschatological panentheism in which the Trinity and the totality of the 
created order perichoretically indwell one another in eternity.  Within this history, the 
Son and the Spirit act in unique manners in order to bring the created order to its telos.  
The Son is both the wisdom of the created order and, in the incarnation, the historical 
concretization of its telos.  The Spirit is the principle of life and the reinvigorating 
principle of new life.  Because the Spirit and the Son (through the Spirit) continue to be 
active in the history of the created order in a redemptive fashion, the eschatological 
consummation continues to move toward the world in history, making it new without 
obliterating it.  The church is the proleptic community of this movement, bearing witness 
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to the genuine newness of the inbreaking kingdom of God.  Humanity’s experience of 
redemption calls them to participate in proclaiming eschatological hope by living in 
solidarity with all who suffer and engaging in efforts to alleviate that suffering.  The 
picture Moltmann envisions is a perichoretic community of creation analogous to God’s 
own communal life.  Because all life constitutes the community, the division between 
community and resource dissolves. 
Based on this theological vision, Moltmann’s eco-theological ethics fits in the 
category of cosmocentric transfiguration.  It cannot bear anthropocentrism.  Nor can it 
bear mere conservationism.  Human beings should act as proleptic witnesses to the 
eschatological future in which all creatures will participate together in the Trinity’s 
communion and will thereby live in eternity.  The dimensions of transience that pertain to 
the present order of creation—death and suffering—will be no more in the kingdom of 
God.  Because it is this kingdom to which humanity is called to be a witness, because it is 
this kingdom we render proleptically present through anticipation, the manner of mission 
must be life-affirmation.  This affirmation pertains to humans, nonhuman animals, and 
the earth itself.       
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CHAPTER 3  
COSMOCENTRIC TRANSFIGURATION IN THE THEOLOGY OF ANDREW LINZEY: 
THE HUMAN ROLE AS PROLEPTIC WITNESS TO THE PEACEABLE KINGDOM 
 
In chapter two, I explored the theology of Jürgen Moltmann and the eco-
theological ethics deriving from that theology.  To further establish the eco-theological 
paradigm of cosmocentric transfiguration I will here examine the work of the preeminent 
animal theologian Andrew Linzey (b. 1952).  I have chosen thusly because Moltmann 
and Linzey will complement one another well when I move toward a systematic 
construction of cosmocentric transfiguration in chapter four.  While Moltmann thrives in 
theological ingenuity but is rather non-concrete (and inconsistent) in his ethics, Linzey’s 
ethics are, more often than not, specific and definite.  However, Linzey tends to be less 
developed in his theological explorations than Moltmann.   
Here, I will draw out pertinent dimensions of Linzey’s theological framework.  I 
will then consider the general ecological ethics of his work, including the place (or lack 
thereof) he provides for individual non-sentient creatures, species and ecosystems, land, 
and cosmic systems.  Next, I will emphasize the abstract and concrete ethical assertions 
he makes with reference to individual nonhuman animals.  This emphasis will include his 
engagement with particular issues such as hunting and animal experimentation.  Lastly, I 
will critically draw out some of the tensions and ambiguities that are evident in Linzey’s 
writings.   
ANDREW LINZEY: A BRIEF SKETCH 
Throughout his career, Linzey acknowledges that his work entails a “continued 
wrestling” that requires ongoing development.1  Those who read individual works of his 
                                               
1 Andrew Linzey, Christianity and the Rights of Animals (hereafter CRA), (New York, NY: 
Crossroad, 1987), 2-6; Andrew Linzey, Animal Theology (hereafter AT), (Chicago, IL: University of 
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without referring to other installments in his extensive corpus often miss these 
developments along with nuances of his thought.
2
  Here, I do not pretend to engage 
everything Linzey has written.  I do, however, take close account of the major works he 
has authored.
3
  These works include Animal Rights (1976), Christianity and the Rights of 
Animals (1987), Animal Theology (1994), After Noah (1997), Animal Gospel (1998), 
Creatures of the Same God (2007), and Why Animal Suffering Matters (2009).
4
   
As was the case with Moltmann, in what follows my arrangement of material is 
topical as opposed to chronological.  On some points, Linzey remains rather consistent 
throughout his writings.  On other issues, there is development.  In these cases, I will 
draw out the difference in Linzey’s earlier and later thought, especially when these 
developments seem to constitute a tension or shift in his position.       
Linzey has many influences.  He acknowledges his debt to the animal welfare 
movement in general.
5
  He is also influenced by particular ethical and theological voices, 
including Rosalina Godlovitch, whom Linzey suggests may be “the intellectual founder 
of the modern animal movement” (WASM, 158)6; Karl Barth, whose theology constituted 
                                                                                                                                            
Illinois Press, 1994), vii, 20-22; Andrew Linzey, Creatures of the Same God: Explorations in Animal 
Theology (hereafter CSG), (New York, NY: Lantern Books, 2009), x-xi. First citations will appear as 
footnotes. Afterwards, direct quotes will appear as in-text parenthetical references. 
2 Linzey, CSG, 55-56. As of 2007, Linzey’s corpus includes twenty books and over 180 articles. 
3 Most of Linzey’s books either are a collection of or contain revised previously written articles, 
presentations, and essays. Furthermore, the books tend to contain work from different periods of Linzey’s 
life. See, for instance, AT, vii; Linzey, Animal Gospel (hereafter AG), (Louisville, KY: Westminster John 
Knox Press, 1998), 5; Linzey, CSG, xix; Andrew Linzey, Why Animal Suffering Matters: Philosophy, 
Theology, and Practical Ethics (hereafter WASM) (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2009), vii. I 
take these collections, along with his other books, to be the best representation of the development of his 
thought. Linzey himself acknowledges in 2005 that his “important works” include (here leaving aside 
works he edited): Animal Rights, Christianity and the Rights of Animals, Animal Theology, After Noah, 
Animal Gospel, and Animal Rites: Liturgies for Animal Care. See Andrew Linzey, “The Divine Worth of 
Other Creatures: A Response to Reviews of Animal Theology,” in Review and Expositor, 102 (Winter 
2005), 124, n. 12. All of these texts I engage thoroughly with the exception of Animal Rites. 
4 These parenthetical dates represent the original publication dates. 
5 Linzey, AR, viii. Linzey also recognizes his debt to the International Fund for Animal Welfare, 
an organization that funds his fellowship in theology and animal welfare. See Linzey, AT, x.  
6 See also Linzey, AR, 30-31. 
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the center of Linzey’s dissertation7; Albert Schweitzer, whose “reverence for life” Linzey 
describes as “the most penetrating contribution made to our subject [i.e., animal rights] 
by a person from within the Christian Tradition” (AR, 42)8; Dietrich Bonhoeffer, to 
whom Linzey credits the genesis of his notion of theos-rights
9
; Tom Regan, whose 
“intellectual grasp” regarding issues surrounding the rights of nonhuman animals, is, for 
Linzey, “without rival in the movement” (CRA, ix).10 Linzey also draws upon central 
thinkers of the Christian tradition, though mostly from the East.
11
 
Linzey currently holds the International Fund for Animal Welfare’s Senior 
Research Fellowship at Mansfield College, Oxford, which is directed specifically toward 
Christian theology and animal welfare.  His post is the first of its kind.  He also is the 
founder and director of the Oxford Centre for Animal Ethics, “an international and multi-
disciplinary center at Oxford dedicated to the ethical enhancement of the status of 
animals through academic research, teaching, and publication” (CSG, xix).  While mainly 
                                               
7 Linzey acknowledges positive dimensions in Barth’s theology for animals. However, he is 
consistently critical of Barth’s “deficient christology” (AT, 11), claiming that his limitations of the 
significance of the incarnation to human flesh truncates the Christ event itself. See Linzey, AT, 9-12. 
Linzey also sees this anthropocentric tendency at work in Barth’s covenantal theology. CRA, 29-30.  
8 On this influence, see also Linzey, AR, 42-45; CRA, 14-16; AT, 4-12. While Linzey clearly 
appreciates Schweitzer and defends his impact of Christian thought, this appreciation is not uncritical. See 
AT, 9. 
9 See Andrew Linzey, “C. S. Lewis’s Theology of Animals” (hereafter CSLTA), Anglican 
Theological Review 80/1 (Winter 1998), 60-81; AT, 23; CRA, 70-71. 
10 Linzey also recognizes his development alongside other members of the animal rights 
movement, including Peter Singer. Yet Linzey is clear on distinguishing his own position from both Regan 
and Singer. Linzey, CRA, 82-83; CSG, 55. Also, Lisa Kemmerer, In Search of Consistency: Ethics and 
Animals (Boston, MA: Brill, 2006), 270-271; Michael Northcott, The Environment and Christian Ethics 
(New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 147. In addition, his work is prior to or at least 
contemporary with these thinkers. Thus it is without warrant, as Linzey himself notes, to claim, as Celia 
Deanne-Drummond and David Clough do, that Linzey “attempts to illuminate the links between 
Christianity and the philosophy of Regan by attaching to it a particular theological rationale.” See their 
introduction to Creaturely Theology: On God, Humans and Other Animals, edited by Celia Deane-
Drummond and David Clough (London, UK: SCM Press, 2009), 4. Linzey does not merely start with 
Regan and then add theology.   
11 See Linzey, CRA, 17-18, 32; AT, 10-12. 
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an animal theologian/ethicist, Linzey has also published on child rights, human violence, 
embryonic research, and justice for homosexuals.
12
   
LINZEY’S THEOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
“For me the choice has always been between theism and nihilism.  There is either 
reason to hope or nothing to hope for; good news or no news at all” (AG, 1).  While this 
claim evinces the import of religion for Linzey’s thought, his first work, Animal Rights, is 
much less theologically explicit than his later works.  He further acknowledges a 
development in his appreciation for the Christian tradition.  In self-critique, he states that 
his early work “failed to grapple sufficiently with the theological tradition about animals 
that we have inherited” and thereby offered “moral critique with insufficient theological 
understanding” (CRA, 5).  So much does his view shift that, in his second work, he writes 
that “the best the Christian tradition has to offer cannot, I judge, be bettered elsewhere” 
(CRA, 5).
13
  Linzey’s theological emphasis continues into Animal Gospel, in which he 
claims: “I believe that without faith in the Gospel we are inexorably led to a fundamental 
kind of despair about animal suffering” (AG, 2).14   
THE CENTRALITY OF THE TRINITY 
In Animal Gospel, Linzey concludes his introduction with a personal credo, which 
is thoroughly trinitarian.  It affirms God as the Creator of all, Jesus as the “Word made 
flesh”, and the Spirit as the animator of all life.15  He ends with a trinitarian prayer: “May 
                                               
12 See Linzey, CSG, xiii. 
13 Also, Linzey, AT, vii-viii; CSG, xii. On this point, see especially Andrew Linzey, After Noah: 
Animals and the Liberation of Theology (hereafter AN), (Herndon, VA: Mowbray, 1997), 62-113. 
14 Michael Hauskeller, although not a theist, concurs with Linzey’s assessment in the general sense 
that, without some religious framework, there can be no intrinsic value of all creatures. See Michael 
Hauskeller, Biotechnology and the Integrity of Life: Taking Public Fears Seriously (Burlington, VT: 
Ashgate Publishing, 2007), 77-90. 
15 Linzey, AG, 7. Linzey thus distinguishes his approach from that of both Singer and Regan. See 
Linzey, CRA, 82-83. Linzey claims that his theos-rights places him on “a very different track” than Singer 
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God the Holy Trinity give me strength to live out my commitment to this day” (AG, 8).  
This creed evinces that, like Moltmann, Linzey’s theology is grounded in the Trinity.16  
He derives three important points from this doctrine: that God’s nature is love and is open 
to the created order; that this love grounds rights; and that God’s openness is the ground 
for eschatological hope.     
Linzey claims that God’s openness to creation is fundamentally predicated upon 
trinitarian love.  “God is for creation.  I mean by that that God, as defined by trinitarian 
belief, cannot be fundamentally indifferent, negative or hostile to the creation which is 
made” (AT, 24). God’s trinitarian nature, which is love, opens itself to creation, thereby 
allowing creation to be itself.  But this space is ultimately meant to be overcome, evident 
in the incarnation: “The Trinity is that community of love which has already taken 
creation to itself, to bind it, and heal it, and make it whole” (AN, 77).   
For Linzey, the Trinity not only grounds all theology, it also grounds the validity 
of rights.
17
  God’s trinitarian love establishes rights for the created order.18  Thus, 
Linzey’s view of animal rights is, especially in his later works, predicated upon the rights 
of the Creator as opposed to the creation itself, a view to which he refers to as theos-
rights.
19
  It is the Trinity’s shared narrative with the world in the economy of salvation 
that permits Linzey to extend his understanding of rights to nature.   
                                                                                                                                            
and Regan, a track that does “not come with (or agree with) much of the philosophical baggage that 
accompanies them” (CSG, 55). 
16 While Moltmann and Linzey are contemporaries, there is very little engagement between them. 
To my knowledge Moltmann never engages Linzey’s work. Linzey does engage Moltmann, but very rarely 
and never in any great detail. See Linzey, CRA, 11; WASM, 164. Furthermore, many citations are critical in 
nature. See Linzey, AT, 25, 159 n. 96, and 191 (Linzey’s annotations on The Crucified God and God in 
Creation).   
17 Again, Linzey is less emphatic about this point in Animal Rights. 
18 Linzey, AT, 24, 95. 
19 I will explore this notion in more detail below. Here, I seek only to note the connection between 
theos-rights and Linzey’s trinitarian theology. 
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The Trinity’s nature, as love, also grounds the economy of salvation for the 
created order, including its eschatological hope.  Said differently, the ultimate hope of the 
created order is predicated upon God’s story with it, a story in which the Trinity works 
toward the eschatological consummation of all things.  Says Linzey: 
God the Father gives life; God the Son in his passion, death, and resurrection 
rescues this life from its own folly and wickedness, thereby reconciling it again to 
the Father; and God the Spirit indwells in this life preserving it from dissolution, 
working towards the redemption and consummation of all created things. (CRA, 
71)
20
   
 
Thus, the Trinity grounds both the creation’s current existence and its eschatological 
hope.  Only because the suffering of the entire cosmos is taken into the Trinity in Christ 
can there be any hope that “all suffering can be transformed by joy” (CRA, 45).  Nihilism 
is averted only because God indwells the cosmos in the Spirit.  In this manner, the Trinity 
is imperative for Linzey’s theology, his understanding of animal rights, and his hope for 
the future.   
Linzey’s view of the Trinity and its outreaching love that seeks communion with 
the created order has an important corollary.  The God who loves the world is willing to 
suffer with the world in its history.  Thus, the Trinity’s love is a suffering love, which 
entails that God must be passible.   
THE GOD WHO SUFFERS 
In Animal Theology, Linzey writes that the 
‘for-ness’ of God toward creation is dynamic, inspirational, and costly.  It is 
dynamic because God’s affirmation of creation is not a once-and-for-all event but 
a continual affirmation otherwise it would simply cease to be.  It is inspirational 
because God’s Spirit moves within creation—especially within those creatures 
that have the gift of a developed capacity to be.  It is costly because God’s love 
does not come cheap. (AT, 25)   
 
                                               
20 See also Linzey, CSG, 53. 
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Evident in this quote is Linzey’s position that the original act of creation is a risk 
for God inasmuch as it entails the inauguration of an ongoing dynamism that is at least in 
part free from divine control.
21
  In a manner similar to Moltmann, Linzey maintains that 
creation necessitates a God who is willing to suffer the cosmos its own integrity.  Thus, 
the creation must begin with an act of kenosis.
22
  But the initial decision of kenosis 
continues throughout creation’s narrative.  For the Trinity continuously safeguards the 
integrity of the cosmos.  God continues to suffer in this narrative, particularly with 
reference to sin and redemption.  Hence, Linzey affirms unequivocally that God suffers.
23
     
For Linzey, this scope of God’s co-suffering with the creation is maximal.  God’s 
suffering is open to all suffering.
24
  Thus, the Trinity encompasses the travails of 
individual nonhuman animals—at least the travails that are bound up in the notion of 
sentience, which Linzey defines as “sense of perception and the capacity to experience 
pain” (AR, 26).25  It is this openness that ultimately shapes Linzey’s theology of animals: 
“Only the most tenacious adherence to the passibility of God may be sufficient to redeem 
us from our own profoundly arrogant humanistic conceptions of our place in the 
universe” (AT, 57).  In this manner, God’s ability to suffer—and God’s willingness to 
suffer with and for animals—is central to Linzey’s theological concern for the well-being 
of nonhuman animals.    
                                               
21 Linzey, CRA, 12. 
22 Though, Linzey draws this point out less obviously than does Moltmann. 
23 However, he avoids the theological problem of how that suffering might be reconciled with 
other claims about the divine (e.g., omnipotence or impassibility).  He merely argues that “the insight 
derived from God’s self-definition in Jesus Christ leads inescapably to the view that God really and truly 
enters into suffering” (AT, 50). 
24 See Linzey, AT, 52. 
25 In later works, he refers to this combination of attributes as suffering, which also includes the 
psychological effects of deprivation—that is, when an animals are denied “some aspect or condition of 
their natural life without ameliorating compensation” (CRA, 110). For a more detailed description, see 
Linzey, WASM, 9-10, 47. Linzey acknowledges that proving this dimension of animal suffering is quite 
difficult. CRA, 112.   
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COSMOLOGY: THIS IS OUR FATHER’S WORLD 
I have already noted Linzey’s similarity to Moltmann with regard to the act of 
creation, divine risk, and divine passibility.  Here, I want to draw out the significance that 
Linzey applies to the fact that God is the Creator.  That is, it is God who creates; 
therefore, the creation belongs first and foremost to God.  This position qualifies any 
claims that humans can make vis-à-vis the nonhuman creation.    
In line with this qualification, Linzey maintains that one of the most pressing 
issues for animal theology is to help humans to understand “properly the nature of the 
creation around us and our part within it” (CRA, 7).  Essential in this understanding is the 
dismantling of a value-based anthropocentrism.  In Christianity and the Rights of 
Animals, Linzey makes a case for this dismantling based on the theological notion of 
blessing: “To affirm the blessedness of creation is to affirm an independent source of its 
worth.  In this sense all creation has an irreducible value” (CRA, 8).26  As the Creator, 
God establishes value—and God has blessed all things. 
This claim highlights a unique dimension of Linzey’s theological view of animal 
rights.  The intrinsic value of all creatures is grounded relationally—in particular every 
creature’s relationship to God.27  Linzey refers to this notion as theos-rights.  In short, 
“All creation, large and small, intelligent and unintelligent, sentient and non-sentient, has 
worth because God values it” (CRA, 9).  Later in the same work, he offers three definitive 
                                               
26 In Animal Theology, Linzey argues that the classical doctrine of God as Creator necessitates the 
intrinsic value of creation. Linzey, AT, 95-97. Because all creation is “good”, Linzey infers that all creation 
must have intrinsic value. I confess I do not follow his reasoning here. Both Augustine and Aquinas 
advocate the goodness of creation without necessarily advocating the intrinsic value of the nonhuman 
creation, which was good inasmuch as it ordered to God through humanity. Thus, the intrinsic value of 
creation does not logically follow from its goodness, which could be contingent upon its utility and 
therefore not intrinsic. 
27 I do not concur with Kemmerer’s assessment that Linzey denies the intrinsic value of all 
creatures in favor of a claim that only God has value. See Kemmerer, In Search of Consistency, 270-271. 
An intrinsic value relationally grounded is, in my view, much closer to Linzey’s position.  
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facets of theos-rights.  First, “God as Creator has rights in his creation”; second, “Spirit-
filled, breathing creatures, composed of flesh and blood, are subjects of inherent value to 
God”; and third, “these animals can make an objective moral claim which is nothing less 
than God’s claim upon us” (CRA, 69). The point is that the rights of individual creatures 
do not simply derive from some intrinsic and unchanging essence, but rather from their 
relational existence as God’s creatures.28   
Thus, theos-rights are not grounded in a contractualism that requires an equal 
capacity for duties on all parties involved.  The community of life is important.  It is 
where rights bear meaning.  However, “while rights are grounded in the existence of 
Spirit-filled lives, what constitutes their rights is the will of God who desires that they 
should so live” (CRA, 75).  It is therefore not capacity that grounds dignity, but rather a 
creature’s being before God.29   
It is the combination of Linzey’s emphasis on God as Creator and his relational 
view of rights that entails the rejection of anthropocentrism.  For all creation belongs not 
to humanity, but to God.  It is God’s rights in creation that are protected by animal 
rights.
30
  It is thus Linzey’s theological cosmology that leads him to claim that 
“Christians are precluded from a purely humanistic, utilitarian view of animals.”  
Humans cannot be the measure of value; for “God alone is the source of the value of all 
living things” (AG, 37). 
But could it not be possible that God created a world and designed value 
hierarchically?  After all, as I have already shown, evolutionary biology suggests that the 
                                               
28 Linzey, AT, 23-25. Also, Kemmerer, In Search of Consistency, 232-235. 
29 While Linzey makes this claim, he does accept that the capacity to suffer grounds rights in a 
unique manner. See Linzey, WASM, 10-11. 
30 Linzey, CRA, 55.  
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stronger have always advanced, at least in part, through the suffering of the weaker.  Is 
such a world compatible with Linzey’s claim that animal rights are predicated on the 
notion that “God desires that [animals] should so live”?  If God desires animals to live, 
why are suffering, predation, and death biologically necessary?  Linzey addresses this 
problem by appealing to nature’s disruption.   
PROTOLOGY AND THE FALL: ORIGINAL HARMONY AND THE DISRUPTION OF NATURE 
Although Linzey is adamant that creation is good and blessed by God, he is 
equally as adamant in claiming that the entire cosmos is, in some sense, fallen and 
incomplete.
31
  In Christianity and the Rights of Animals, he juxtaposes the goodness of 
creation, represented by the aforementioned notion that creation is blessed, with the 
corruption of that good creation, which Linzey represents with the notion of curse.
32
  This 
latter notion sums up for Linzey the meaning of cosmic fallenness.  Here, I aim to 
delineate Linzey’s view of the Fall.  I explore two consistent points in his thought.  First, 
that it is essential to Christian faith.  Second, that it renders nature unfit as a “moral 
textbook.”  Then, I examine a much more ambiguous dimension of this thought: the 
etiology of nature’s fallenness.   
The Essentiality of the Doctrine of the Fall 
Linzey maintains that the Fall is a “vital key” in Christian theology.33  In 
particular, “Classical Christian theism teaches that the wickedness of man throws the 
system of intending order into disorder, harmony becomes engulfed in meaninglessness 
                                               
31 Linzey, CRA, 33. 
32 See Linzey, CRA, chapter one. 
33 Christopher Southgate argues, contra Linzey, that the Fall is not only not essential, but unhelpful 
in our contemporary Darwinian context. See Southgate, The Groaning of Creation: God, Evolution, and the 
Problem of Evil (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2008), 28-35. He prefers an “only way” 
theodicy in which an evolutionary world such as ours “is the only sort of universe that would give rise to 
the range, beauty, complexity, and diversity of creatures the Earth has produced.” Ibid., 29.  
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and teleology lapses into futility” (CRA, 11).  So vital is the Fall that Linzey posits it as a 
differentiating point between Christian and non-Christian thought:  
Here, we reach another parting of the ways between Christians and non-
Christians.  For the latter, there is no Fall, either of human or anything else.  The 
world is simply ‘as it is,’ and we must be reconciled to it as it is.  But the Gospel 
truth is that we do not have to accept the world as it is.  We must distinguish 
creation from nature. (AG, 15) 
 
Linzey’s refusal to accept the world “as it is” dramatically expresses the 
difference between his own position and that of advocates of cosmocentric conservation.  
In fact, Linzey explicitly develops his thought in juxtaposition to thinker he refers to as 
“anti-Fall theologians” (AG, 30).34  Included in this camp are Richard Cartwright Austin 
and Matthew Fox.
35
  Linzey rightly, if not quite dramatically, describes their position: 
“Life eating life is not some unfortunate aspect of the natural world to be tolerated in the 
meantime between creation and consummation.  Rather, God actually wills and blesses a 
self-murdering system of survival.  God’s will is death” (AT, 119).36   
In Creatures of the Same God, Linzey links a rejection of cosmic fallenness to an 
emphasis on general-centric ethics by marking a sharp differentiation between eco-
theologians and animal theologians.
37
  He acknowledges that these groups overlap in 
their rejection of anthropocentrism, which correlates to a recognition of the larger 
                                               
34 See also Linzey, CSG, 33-34; CSLTA, 70-71. 
35 See Linzey, CSG, 33. Linzey also includes process theologians like Jay B. McDaniel (33-35) 
and feminist theologians like Rosemary Radford Ruether (53) in this view. 
36 See also, Linzey, CSG, 15-16. Certainly, Linzey’s description requires qualification. The system 
is not self-murdering on the macro-level. Rather, it is self-murdering on the micro-level. It sacrifices 
creatures (self-murdering) for the sake of the whole, which makes life possible. Even with this 
qualification, Lisa Sideris would criticize Linzey’s view as both anthropocentric and anthropomorphic as 
he applies human values and terms (e.g., “murder”) to nature. See Lisa H. Sideris, Environmental Ethics, 
Ecological Theology, and Natural Selection (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2003), 274, n. 18.  
37 Linzey rightly qualifies his distinction: “Not all ecologists are anti-animals and vice versa” 
(CSG, 37).  
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community of creation, a community that is not divided into subjects and resources.
38
  It 
is just this similarity that I intimate by the term “cosmocentrism.”  However, there is also 
this stark distinction:  
Ecologists invariably look upon the system of predation as God-given and care 
more for ‘the whole’ than they do for individual animals.  Animal theologians, on 
the other hand, see ‘nature’ as we now know it as incompatible with the good 
creation that God originally made.  Nature is fallen and has a tragic quality; and 
individual sentients count—not just the system as a whole. (CSG, 29)39   
 
Two important and correlative points arise here.  First, for many eco-
theologians—whom I would categorize under the paradigms of cosmocentric 
conservationism—the suffering of individual animals exists for the common good of the 
larger system.  This goodness in some ways nullifies the apparent evil itself, rendering 
the suffering part of the good system.  Second, because suffering is part of the good 
system, there is no reason to speak of the fallenness of creation.  To this latter point, 
Linzey adds the corollary that there is no need for redemption if there is no fallenness.  
Given these tensions, Linzey writes, “There is, I believe, no easy way to harmonize these 
perspectives,” which are separated by a “deep theological cleavage” (CSG, 44).  
For Linzey, the position on the other side of this cleavage is untenable for 
Christian theology.  In line with this belief, he lists four problems that would arise should 
the “anti-fall theologians” succeed in removing the doctrine of the Fall from theology.40  
First, “predation and parasitism [become] either morally neutral or, even worse, positive 
                                               
38 Linzey, CSG, 30. 
39 Linzey engages the careful thought of Annie Dillard to highlight this point. See Linzey, CSG, 
30-32. Also, see Linzey’s discussion on animal conservationists in WASM, 68. Christopher Southgate 
argues that Linzey—as well as Singer and Regan—focus on individual animals to the detriment of the 
species, sparing very little effort discussing the issues of extinction. See Christopher Southgate, “The New 
Days of Noah? Assisted Migration as an Ethical Imperative in an Era of Climate Change,” in Animals on 
the Agenda: Questions about Animal Ethics for Theology and Ethics, Andrew Linzey and Dorothy 
Yamamoto, editors (Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1998), 256. 
40 Linzey, AG, 28-31; CSLTA, 70-71. 
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aspects of nature to be tolerated or even emulated” (AG, 28).  Second, there is no longer 
any need for the eschatological redemption of the nonhuman world.
41
  For Linzey, the 
absence of this need is an issue on account of Jesus’s eschatological message.42  That is, a 
rejection of the Fall does not, for Linzey, do justice to the centrality of eschatology for 
Christian thought.
43
  Third, humans are not ethically obliged to witness against the 
mechanisms of evolution, but rather should participate in the “one inexorable law of the 
universe,” which is “eat and be eaten” (AG, 30).  Finally, “to reject absolutely the 
possibility of a transformed new heaven and earth in which all sentients will be redeemed 
is logically tantamount to denying the possibility of a morally good God” (AG, 31).   
I will revisit the significance of the Fall for theology proper below.  First, it is 
prudent to examine more closely Linzey’s rejection of nature as a moral guide for human 
action.         
The Fall and the Law of Nature 
In Linzey’s estimation, the rejection of the Fall (or at least the cosmic dimension 
of it) that often accompanies conservationist paradigms of eco-theological thought entails 
the theologically incorrect identification of the current state of nature with God’s 
intention.  He prefers to understand nature in light of its eschatological telos—that is, as 
creation.  The corollary of this rejection is that the present state of creation cannot 
“simply be read as a moral textbook” (CRA, 61); for the creation “it is both glorious and 
bestial” (CRA, 20).   
                                               
41 Linzey, AG, 29.  
42 Linzey, AT, 123. 
43 Southgate argues that Linzey’s appeal to fallenness and his “ignoring of the scientific evidence 
clouds unnecessarily” his eschatological ethics. He continues, “There is no reason to believe that just 
because God used a long evolutionary process to give rise to the biosphere we know, God may not have 
inaugurated a redemptive movement that will heal that process.” In Southgate’s reading, such is the view of 
Moltmann, whom he juxtaposes to Linzey’s with regard to the doctrine of the Fall. Southgate, The 
Groaning of Creation, 179, n. 1.  
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For Linzey, the darker side of creation must be accounted for both theologically 
and ethically.
44
  Creation is good, glorious, and blessed because it was created by a good 
and loving God.  Yet at the same time it is also “bestial.”45  While it is appropriate for 
humanity to seek to emulate and participate in creation’s goodness, it is at the same 
inappropriate for humanity to justify causing suffering, engaging in predation, or killing 
other creatures simply because that is nature’s way of operating.   
Thus, Linzey cannot accept the conservationist view in which “we are supposed 
to glory in the economy of existence whereby one species devours another with 
consummate efficiency” (AT, 85).  Natural law, as a means of adjudicating moral 
propriety, cannot be established merely by appeals to the current state of nature.
46
  
Rather, true natural law is better understood as “trans-natural law”—a law that accounts 
for God’s eschatological intention for nature.47  So the law of fallen nature cannot be the 
moral code of human beings.  There is real evil in nature.  At this point a troubling 
question arises: How did God’s creation become so ambiguous?  What is the etiology of 
its darker qualities?   
The Etiology of Nature’s Corruption 
Linzey acknowledges that the question of the origin of natural evil is a difficult 
one.  Its difficulty is evident in the ambiguity of his answer, which he develops somewhat 
                                               
44 Linzey makes this point early on: “Suffering is an integral part of the natural world and, 
moreover, often caused through non-moral beings” (AR, 70).  
45 See Linzey, AN, 78. By the term “bestial” Linzey intimates something bad. He notes that this 
term is often used derogatively with references to animals. Linzey, WASM, 44. It thus seems Linzey 
maintains that what a nonhuman animal is not (a “beast”) the collective system of evolutionary emergence 
is (“bestial”).   
46 Neil Messer makes a similar point in his discussion of Aquinas’s appropriation of Aristotelian 
biology: “Biology qua biology gives no grounds for equating [the ends creatures seek in nature] with the 
good...or for concluding that they are proper ends.” Neil Messer, “Humans, Animals, Evolution and Ends,” 
in Creaturely Theology: On God, Humans and Other Animals, Celia Deane-Drummond and David Clough, 
editors (London, UK: SCM Press, 2009), 215. 
47 Linzey, AT, 83-84. Linzey maintains that creation will remain unfinished “until all violence is 
overcome by love” (AN, 76).  
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amorphously throughout his writings.
48
  In his earlier Christianity and the Rights of 
Animals, Linzey states that “humans alone are properly responsible” for the curse, 
including “suffering and predation,” apparent in the present condition of nature (CRA, 
18).  This claim makes it seem as if Linzey adheres to the notion of an historical Eden 
that was free of death but disrupted by human sin.  Yet in the same work he also 
acknowledges that evolutionary suffering, which includes predation, “seems almost 
essential to” creaturely life (CRA, 61).49  Hence, while he maintains that there is “some 
connection between human sin and creaturely corruption” (CRA, 61), the nature of this 
connection does not seem necessarily one of humanity’s sole causality.   
Later, in Animal Theology, Linzey seems to soften his emphasis on protological 
harmony and the Fall.  He still maintains that according to Genesis, “parasitical existence 
is incompatible with the original will of God” (AT, 80).  He further argues that the 
Genesis narrative presents God as accommodating a distorted creation by both permitting 
and limiting killing.  However, he refers to both the Fall and flood narratives as “the great 
symbols of why humanity can no longer live at peace either with themselves or with 
other creatures” (AT, 81).  The word “symbol” adds a level of ambiguity to his view.  
Was there ever an historical state of existence absent of predation?  Was there an actual 
                                               
48 Also, Linzey, CRA, 11. 
49 Linzey receives critique that he does not take scientific discovery seriously enough. Daniel 
Cowdin applies a schema of “creation, sin, incarnation, and redemption” to Linzey’s theology of animals. 
In critique of this schema, Cowdin writes that “our contemporary understanding of nature as a whole, and 
current ecoevolutionary insight, seems to lack moral relevance. An animal-based or even a more broadly 
organismic approach to moral status tends to function independently of scientific perceptions of 
collectivities and systems. Yet such perceptions impact our basic understanding of individual animals in the 
world.” See Daniel Cowdin, “The Moral Status of Otherkind in Christian Ethics,” in Christianity and 
Ecology: Seeking the Well-Being of Earth and Humans, Dieter T. Hessel and Rosemary Radford Ruether, 
editors (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 270. His ultimate position is that “exclusive 
moral concern for individual animals becomes incoherent at the level of land management.” Ibid.., 271. 
Kemmerer writes that Linzey “does not reflect the teachings of science” but rather “takes for granted that 
the Christian God created the universe as described in Genesis.” Kemmerer, In Search of Consistency, 253. 
Linzey’s mature thought does in fact take scientific evidence into account. He does, as Cowdin notes, reject 
the moral potency of this evidence.  
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historical “Fall” from such a state?  If not, did God ordain predation, contra the language 
of Genesis 1?  Linzey summarizes the apparent dilemma:  
Either [we] can accept that God did not ordain a just state of affairs, in which we 
can no longer postulate a loving, just deity; or, otherwise [we] have to accept that 
God is not—as claimed—the sovereign Creator of all things. (AT, 81)   
 
Linzey argues that this dilemma is a false one, advocating an alternative 
possibility; namely, “that the world is really creation” (AT, 81).  With this claim he 
intimates that creation, because it is by definition other-than-God, requires growth and 
development.  It is, by nature, “incomplete, unfinished, imperfect” (AT, 81).50  Thus he 
seems to back away from the image of the human corruption of an historical edenic state.  
Creation is “incomplete or unfinished” (AT, 85); but these terms are not synonymous with 
fallen.   
Yet Linzey does not abandon the notion that the darker mechanisms of 
evolutionary emergence derive from some sort of Fall.  In conjunction with his appeal to 
the incompleteness of creation, he cites E. L. Mascall’s musing that the evolutionary 
process resulted from an angelic fall prior to human existence.
51
  Linzey acknowledges 
that this view, while one of the “many theories that have been expounded” to explain the 
current state of the cosmos, has not “found complete assent within the Christian tradition” 
(AT, 98).  However, in his later thought he gives this view preference over others, 
                                               
50 In line with this development, Linzey notes the positive dimensions of evolution. “Whilst it is 
true that there seems to be cruelty, aggression and violence in the natural world (humans included) it is also 
true that there is cooperation, mutual aid, even possible altruism between species, animals as well as 
human” (AT, 120).  
51 See Linzey, AT, 167, n. 8. Linzey notes that C. S. Lewis appeals to an angelic fall because (1) 
human sin cannot account for the suffering of dinosaurs in a post-Darwin worldview and (2) “Lewis cannot 
resign himself to predation, carnivorousness and pain as the result of God’s direct will” (CSLTA, 64).    
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suggesting that evolution is in fact the result of an historical Fall, but one that predates 
humans.
52
    
In Animal Gospel, Linzey remains ambiguous about the historical nature of the 
Fall.  He even suggests that the world described in Genesis 1 reflects the eschatological 
hopes of Israel evident in Isaiah’s vision of the peaceable kingdom rather than a past 
historical reality.
53
  He furthermore clarified what he holds to be the “complex truth” 
underlying the doctrine of the Fall.  This truth includes  
the dual recognition that God as the Creator of all things must have created a 
world which is morally good—or at least justified in the end as a morally 
justifiable process—and also the insight that parasitism and predation are 
unlovely, cruel, evil aspects of the world ultimately incapable of being reconciled 
with a God of love. (AG, 27-28; emphasis mine)   
 
Significantly, Linzey here accepts the possibility that the present state of existence, 
including the mechanisms of evolutionary progress, may be justifiable (which, for 
Linzey, is not necessarily the same as “good”).  Such a justification, ultimately 
eschatological, would be necessary in the face of God’s love and justice.  At any rate, the 
truth behind the doctrine does not seem to necessitate a human Fall from Eden.  But it 
does require the disavowal of any identification of suffering, predation and death with the 
goodness of the created order. 
In Creatures of the Same God, Linzey’s ambiguity intensifies.  On the one hand, 
he maintains his position that “creation is good, even ‘very good,’ yet it is also 
incomplete and unfinished” (CSG, 36).  On the other hand, he appears to reject his own 
earlier “third option” to the false dilemma of nature and evil: “Either parasitical nature is 
                                               
52 See Linzey, CSLTA, 70; AN, 106. For more considerations on an angelic fall, see Robert N. 
Wennberg, God, Humans, and Animals: An Invitation to Enlarge Our Moral Universe (Grand Rapids, MI: 
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2003), 327-330. 
53 Linzey, AG, 81. 
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or is not evil.  Either God wills a self-murdering system of survival or God does not.  
There really is not a third way” (CSG, 53).54  This dilemma leads Linzey to suggest that, 
while the exact nature of the Fall, and most significantly its origin, is problematic, the 
doctrine is necessary because “the alternative is dire beyond words” (CSG, 54).  
In Sum 
Linzey’s ambiguity notwithstanding, he is consistent in his claim that whatever 
the etiology of creation’s current state of predation and suffering—whether an angelic fall 
exacerbated by human sin or merely a natural outpouring of cosmic finitude—the 
eschatological hope for creation calls humans to a higher ethics than nature itself reveals.  
He is adamant that the world of suffering and predation presents a problem with regard to 
the affirmation of a good and loving God.
55
  There can thus be no unadulterated 
affirmation of the goodness of this state.  “It is violence itself within every part of 
creation that is the preeminent mark of corruption and sinfulness” (AT, 127).56  For 
Linzey, “pain and suffering and death are evils overcome in the passion and resurrection 
of Christ” (CRA, 82).  There is a greater intention for the cosmos—one that cannot be 
derived from its current state.  This intention is intimated in Isaiah’s vision of the 
peaceable kingdom, in which the wolf will lie with the lamb and the lion will eat straw 
like an ox (see Isaiah 11:6-9).  This vision, when coupled with the protological claims of 
an edenic harmony, suggests that the perfection of animal nature is not predation but 
                                               
54 Also, Linzey, CSLTA, 71. 
55 Linzey, CRA, 59. Linzey thus decries theodicies, in particular John Hick’s soul-building 
theodicy, that ignore or downplay the significance of nonhuman suffering. Linzey, AR, 70-71.  
56 Also, Linzey, AG, 148. 
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rather peace.
57
  Thus, Linzey’s view of fallenness corresponds to his understanding of 
eschatology, to which I now turn.  
ESCHATOLOGY: THE SENTIENT-INCLUSIVE PEACEABLE KINGDOM 
As he develops his eschatological vision, Linzey is adamant about avoiding three 
reductions.  First, eschatology cannot be discarded by way of the claim that creation is 
not in need of redemption.  Second, eschatology cannot be limited to the human creature.  
Third, eschatology cannot be relegated to a transcendent future that bears no direct 
meaning for history.  Here, my aim is to develop these three positions in Linzey’s 
thought.    
Creation and Redemption 
Even in his earliest thought, Linzey notes that anything less than cosmic 
redemption renders the travail of nature incoherent and pointless.
58
  Thus, the notion of 
the Fall and the hope for eschatological redemption are intricately connected.  “The logic 
is inescapable: no real state of fallenness, no real redemption” (CSG, 53).  The exhaustive 
extent of cosmic fallenness corresponds to an exhaustive need for redemption.  Because 
all of creation “is radically estranged from God,” it “cries out for redemption” (CRA, 40).  
Thus Linzey argues, christologically, that “the act of reconciliation must…include all that 
is fallen, all that was previously unreconciled” (AT, 98).59   
What does redemption of creation look like?  Because Linzey believes the 
fallenness of nature is evident in predation and suffering, he claims that “God’s will is a 
redeemed creation free from parasitism” (AT, 76).  It is this view that grounds his 
                                               
57 Linzey, AT, 82. 
58 Linzey, AR, 75. 
59 On this point, whether or not animals have willfully sinned is beside the point. Animals are 
affected by willful sin; they are drawn into its consequences. Therefore, redemption from that sin (and from 
those consequences) must bear relevance for animals. See Linzey, AT, 98-99. 
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criticism that “much ecotheology issues in a non-redeeming God and therefore a non-
God, at least as traditionally understood” (CSG, 128, n. 10).  For Linzey, “Gospel hope in 
the future is not some optional extra to moral endeavor.”  Rather it is “its essential basis” 
(AG, 152).
60
  This view represents an absolute break with those like Thomas Berry who 
reject cosmic redemption as a pertinent dimension of Christian theology.  For Linzey, 
there can be no good news if there is not good news for all creatures who suffer and die 
in the unfolding process of evolutionary development.  The cosmic dimension of 
eschatology, which Linzey rightly notes is well-attested in both Jewish and Christian 
history,
61
 is essential to Christianity.
62
   
Sentient-Inclusive Eschatology 
While Linzey is distinct from conservationists, he also differs from many who 
embrace the notion of a cosmically eschatological redemption. including certain 
Orthodox theologians.  This difference is two-fold.  First, he maintains that all individual 
sentient creatures must be redeemed.  Second, he maintains that these creatures are 
redeemed for their own sake.  Thus, Linzey’s transfigurative ethics is coupled with both a 
particular-centric emphasis and a cosmocentric scope.  
In Animal Gospel, Linzey’s creed states: “I affirm the hope of the world to come 
for all God’s creatures” (AG, 7).  This confession suggests that all individual creatures 
                                               
60 For Linzey, God’s justice renders the redemption of animals necessary. Linzey, CSG, 53. Based 
on this claim, it is quite unclear why Kemmerer claims that Linzey “does not emphasize God’s peaceable 
kingdom.” Kemmerer, In Search of Consistency, 268.  
61 See Linzey, CRA, 33, 49; AR, 74-75. Linzey also notes the cosmic eschatology evident in non-
canonical literature, particularly the restoration of peaceful relationships between humans (including Jesus) 
and animals. AN, 62-70; AG, 26-27. Linzey also notes that, regarding animals in particular, for much of 
Christian thought the “telos of animals is assumed to be identical with human needs” (CSG, 11). There are 
thus different strands of thought here. While thinkers like Irenaeus and John Wesley included animals in 
their eschatological purview, those like Augustine and Aquinas certainly did not. 
62 Linzey holds this position with reference to scripture. He maintains that “The characteristic 
thrust of the biblical writers is eschatological—to look forward to what God will do in the future, to 
complete the work of creation by grace…we can be sure that God’s will is for a transformed creation” 
(CSG, 50). 
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will in some manner, as individuals, participate in the eschatological redemption of the 
cosmos.  This individually-inclusive eschatological redemption derives from his 
cosmology.  For  
nothing that God has made can be omitted in the moment of completion.  
Christians may be questioning and agnostic as to the precise details of this hope, 
but it cannot but follow from a God who creates, incarnates, and reconciles that 
everything will be made new…It must also follow that each and every hurt and 
harm in creation (both human and animal, in so far as each is capable of being 
hurt or harmed) will be made good, and that all the suffering of the present time is 
not worth comparing to the glory yet revealed. (AT, 99-100)   
 
This quote links Linzey’s individually-inclusive eschatology to his christology.63  As he 
says earlier, the incarnation constitutes God’s “triumph over death” and is therefore “the 
hope for all creatures” (AR, 130).  It also reveals that, for Linzey, redemption 
complements (and completes) creation. 
Like the import of cosmic eschatology in general, Linzey notes that the inclusion 
of animals in redemption is not without precedence in Christian thought.  Engaging the 
thought of both John Wesley and C. S. Lewis, he writes, “Some form of eternal life for 
animals has found serious advocates within Christianity” (AT, 100).64  Based on this 
tradition, Linzey maintains that, at the very least, the belief in the resurrection and 
eternity of individual nonhuman animals “can be supported by [doctrines of] orthodox 
Christian belief” and, much stronger, that “these doctrines taken together require such an 
affirmation” (AT, 100-101).   
It is this form of reasoning that leads Linzey to his own affirmation “that all 
sentient beings will be redeemed in a way that compensates them for the injustice and 
suffering that they have had to undergo.”  Linzey adds, acknowledging the need for 
                                               
63 Linzey, CSG, 14. 
64 On Lewis, see Linzey, CSLTA, 64-66. Linzey argues that Lewis “does not go far enough” on 
this matter (CSLTA, 75).  
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caution: “How precisely that will be done, I am happy to leave to the Almighty” (CSG, 
133, n. 13).
65
  But that it happens “is required by the doctrine of a just God” (CSG, 133, 
n. 13); for a God who does not redeem the suffering of individual creatures has not acted 
righteously with regard to those creatures.
66
 
Linzey’s eschatological inclusion of all individual sentient creatures for the sake 
of divine justice highlights his break from what I have labeled anthropocentric 
transfiguration.  These creatures are not included as a sacrament of communion between 
humanity and God.  Rather, the recompense they receive for their suffering is their own.  
It is for their sake in relation to God; for “God enjoys creatures” (AN, 104) in and of 
themselves.   
Eschatology, History, and Ethics 
Linzey’s eschatology, particularly its inclusion of all individual sentient creatures 
in the redemption from the darker mechanisms of evolution, corresponds to a theological 
ethics with regard to nonhuman animals.  To establish this claim, it is first pertinent to 
establish the somewhat unclear nature of the relationship between eschatology and 
history in Linzey’s thought.  In short, what does eschatology have to do with the present?   
Neil Messer is not, in my view, completely misguided when he writes that 
“Linzey’s language of ‘approximating’ the peaceable kingdom has its dangers, because it 
tends to obscure [the] distinction between witnessing to and establishing the kingdom.”67  
                                               
65 Also, Linzey, WASM, 26-27. In Linzey’s estimation, the salvation of animals and humans differ. 
Humans need to be saved not only from the effects of sin, but from the reality of their own sinfulness. 
Animals, as amoral creatures, need only be saved from the effects of sin. Linzey, CSG, 52. 
66 Linzey, CSLTA, 65, 74. Linzey links creation and redemption in a manner similar to Moltmann: 
“It is quite impossible to posit a loving Creator who allows the life he has created, loved and sustained to be 
thrown away as worthless” (CRA, 38). Also, Linzey, AN, 82-84.  
67 See Messer, “Humans, Animals, Evolution and Ends,” 224. Messer does, however, misread 
Linzey’s affirmation of the complexity of the world and the moral ambiguity that accompanies that 
complexity. See 222-226. Furthermore, as I will argue, Linzey’s overall theological position (including his 
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Indeed Linzey writes that the Isaianic vision of the peaceable kingdom is, by the Spirit, a 
“realizable possibility” (CRA, 104).  Does his mean that this eschatological peace is 
achievable within history via political programs?  He runs the risk of this interpretation 
when he goes on to write that humanity’s “impossible commission to make peace” in the 
cosmos “is made possible” by the Spirit (CRA, 104).  Thus, Linzey’s eschatology at times 
seems in danger of appearing to be one that is realizable within history.   
However, in the same work Linzey also maintains that eschatological redemption, 
while calling for humanity’s participation and witness, is ultimately a divine activity.  All 
creatures, including humans, “await the world that is to come” (CRA, 35).68  There is thus 
a restriction on human activity.  Living in a fallen world that is not yet redeemed impedes 
the experience of redemption within history.  In this manner, Linzey recognizes the 
limitations of constructing the kingdom.  This limitation notwithstanding, he writes that 
“Christians should never say that this world as it is, is all that we have to contend with 
and that God is satisfied that we stay as we are” (CRA, 50).  As long as one maintains that 
the world is not as God desires it to be, the embrace of the present reality of nature can 
never be without qualification.   
In line with this refusal to embrace the goodness of nature as it currently exists, 
Linzey draws on the dynamism of creation to dismantle appeals to the status quo of 
nature.  God is working within the created order to direct it toward its eschatological 
telos.
69
  Limitation is thus coupled with possibility.  “Human striving cannot…by itself 
                                                                                                                                            
development) intimates strongly a rejection of social programs to build to the kingdom by human effort. 
Southgate provides a better reading of Linzey than Messer on this point. See Southgate, The Groaning of 
Creation, 120-121.  
68 See also his discussion of Hauerwas in CRA, 50. 
69 Linzey, CRA, 50. 
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achieve the dream [of universal peace], but we cooperate with God’s Spirit in the 
realization of the divine dream” (AG, 71).70   
But it is here that Linzey’s ambiguity is evident.  Humans cannot construct the 
kingdom through their own striving.  Yet is it possible for the eschatological future to 
develop fully within history when human striving cooperates with God’s grace?  Or, does 
the eschatological future—the fullness of the kingdom—require a decisive break with 
history such that even humans cooperating with grace cannot realize it now?  Even in 
Linzey’s later work, in which he more explicitly emphasizes the need for divine 
intervention to establish the peaceable kingdom, whether or not this intervention can 
happen fully within history or requires a decisive break with the laws of natural history is 
unclear.
71
  Below, I will argue that Linzey’s anthropology suggests that the latter is a 
better image of the interplay between eschatology and history.      
At any rate, Linzey neither relegates eschatology to a fully transcendent future nor 
subsumes it into a social program.  Eschatology informs both what will be in the ultimate 
future and what a witness to redemption should look like within history.  For Linzey, 
“Christian ethics is essentially eschatological…The God of Isaac, of Jacob, of Abraham, 
and of Jesus is not limited by what we know of elementary biology” (AG, 17).72  He 
makes this point by juxtaposing, in my words, conservation and transfiguration: “If ‘eat 
and get eaten’ is the moral law of the universe, or if predation is ‘beautiful,’ there can be 
no moral imperative to live without injury” (AG, 31).  However, if there is a hope for the 
                                               
70 Also, Linzey, CSG, 50. 
71 Linzey, CSG, 51, 53.   
72 Christopher Southgate concurs on this point. See “The New Days of Noah?” 264; The Groaning 
of Creation, 116-117. Although he also qualifies his position, arguing that humane killing is a possible 
facet of humanity’s role in the cosmos in history. The Groaning of Creation, 121. 
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resurrection and eternal life of individual sentients, then living without injury as much as 
possible is a Christian ideal. To act otherwise is to embrace the fallenness of the world:  
Whatever the difficulties in conceiving a world without predation, to intensify and 
heighten—without any ethical necessity—the parasitical forces in our world is to 
plunge creation further into that darkness from which the Christian hope is that 
we shall all, human and animal, be liberated. (AT, 114)   
 
Thus, the eschatological inclusion of individual nonhuman animals entails meaning for 
them even in the present.  As will become evident in Linzey’s anthropology, through 
humanity’s moral interaction with animals, these creatures already experience a prolepsis 
of their eschatological telos. 
CHRISTOLOGY: THE BEARER OF THE KINGDOM 
Linzey’s christology, like his eschatology, provides a stark challenge to both 
anthropocentrism and conservation.
73
  Here, I seek to explicate the manners in which 
Christ’s life, death, and resurrection bear meaning for Linzey’s animal theology.  These 
manners include both a dismantling of anthropocentrism through an affirmation of God’s 
openness to the cosmos and an affirmation of hope for all who suffer in conjunction with 
a call for acts of liberation on their behalf in an embrace of the peace that Christ makes 
possible. 
The Incarnation and the God’s Cosmic Eschatological Embrace 
Linzey is critical of Barth’s christology on account of its anthropocentric slant.74  
The incarnation cannot simply be “God’s ‘Yes’” to humanity.  Rather, “since the ousia 
assumed in the incarnation is the ousia of all creaturely being, it is difficult to resist the 
conclusion that what is effected in the incarnation for man is likewise effected for the rest 
                                               
73 His theology is thoroughly christological: “For me Jesus is the way, the truth, and the life. What 
is given in Jesus is, in my view, determinative of our understanding of the nature of God” (AG, 47). Linzey 
qualifies this claim with an inclusivist understanding of the religious other’s access to truth.  
74 See Linzey, AT, 31-32, 68. 
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of the non-human creation” (CRA, 34).75  Said differently, “The incarnation is God’s love 
affair with all fleshy creatures” (CSG, 14).   
Thus, far from being merely the savior of humans, Christ is the embodiment of 
the cosmic nature of messianic hope found in Judaism.
76
  God affirms creation in the 
graciousness of the decision both to create that which is other than God and to become (in 
the incarnation) that which is other than God.  For this reason, “nothing God has made 
can be in the last resort alien to him” (CRA, 8-9).  That is, everything that exists must 
come to rest in the divine community that is both Creator and Redeemer.  The incarnation 
thus solidifies Linzey’s eschatological vision in which the creation, which is 
ontologically other than the Creator, “is open to God” (AT, 97) and God to it.  The 
incarnation at once affirms the transcendence and immanence of God by acknowledging 
God’s alterity from the world and God’s at-home-ness in the world.77   
The Incarnation, Suffering, and Liberation 
In the incarnation, the Son not only takes on the matter of the cosmos, but also its 
travails, even to the point of death.  Thus, Linzey can write: “What we see in Jesus is the 
revelation of an inclusive, all-embracing, generous loving” (AG, 20).  Christ’s suffering 
envelops the suffering of all sentient creatures.  “The curse which Jesus Christ takes upon 
himself reverses the natural order of mortality not only for human beings but for the ‘sad 
                                               
75 See also Linzey, AG, 11-12. Peter Manley Scott critiques Linzey here because he does not “find 
some way of showing how it is that non-human animals participate in Jesus’s human flesh” by “developing 
an intermediate, bridging metaphysics” between humans and nonhumans. See Peter Manley Scott, 
“Sloughing Towards Jerusalem? An Anti-human Theology of Rough Beasts and Other Animals” in 
Creaturely Theology, Creaturely Theology: On God, Humans and Other Animals, Celia Deane-Drummond 
and David Clough, editors (London, UK: SCM Press, 2009), 174.  
76 Linzey, CRA, 33-34; AG, 14-15. Linzey makes this point by appealing to a logos christology: 
“The Logos is the origin and destiny of all created things” (CSG, 14; also AT, 68). Linzey also maintains 
that Christ establishes a covenant as extensive as the Noahic covenant. Linzey, AT, 69-70.  
77 Linzey writes that this at-home-ness suggests that the cosmos “is the appropriate medium for 
[divine] self-revelation” (AT, 97). 
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uncomprehending dark’ of innocent creatures” (CRA, 13).78  It is in this sense that Linzey 
claims that Christ’s suffering grounds the hope that “all innocent suffering will be 
transformed” (WASM, 164).  
Therefore, Christ’s work is primarily the work of liberation.  In this emphasis 
Linzey bears the marks of liberation theology.  Linzey follows Gustavo Gutierrez’s basic 
notion that “Christ’s work is understood as recreating or making a new creation” (AR, 
74).  He differs from many liberation theologians, however, in his answer to the key 
question: “What or whom is to be liberated?” (AT, 62)  Linzey is critical of liberation 
theology, accusing many of its central advocates—including Gutierrez and Leonardo 
Boff—of a staunch anthropocentrism deriving from a “deficient christology.”79  In 
Linzey’s reading, “Gutierrez does not maintain this emphasis upon the inclusive nature of 
cosmic redemption” (AT, 64).  Indeed, some under the banner of liberation theology fall 
rather well into the paradigm of anthropocentric conservation, claiming that all creation is 
to be conserved and justly distributed to all peoples.
80
  In this manner, liberation theology 
at times excludes animals from the realm of liberation.
81
  This exclusion betrays an 
anthropocentrism, “albeit qualified and seemingly sympathetic to environmental 
concerns” (AT, 67).   
 
 
                                               
78 Also Linzey, AR, 76. 
79 See Linzey, AT, chapter 4; AR, 75.  
80 This anthropocentric slant continues in liberation thought with the work of Leonardo Boff. 
Linzey, AT, 65-67. Animal Theology was written before Boff’s later works Ecology and Liberation (1995) 
and Cry of the Earth, Cry of the Poor (1997), both of which point toward a more inclusive moral paradigm. 
At any rate, Linzey argues that while Boff evinces an awareness of the cosmic dimension of Christ’s work, 
he fails “to recognize its moral dimension” (AT, 70). Linzey also includes Jon Sobrino in his christological 
critique. AT, 68.  
81 Linzey, AT, 67. 
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In Sum 
For Linzey, Christ’s work must include every individual sentient in order to be a 
genuine liberation from suffering.  Contra anthropocentrism, Christ’s person draws in the 
ousia of all flesh into the life of God.  Contra conservationism, Christ’s redeeming work 
assumes and promises to redeem the suffering of all sentient creatures.  This redemption 
begins already in the work of the Spirit, who makes possible both present existence and 
new creation. 
PNEUMATOLOGY: THE IMMANENCE OF THE DIVINE 
Linzey’s pneumatology bears two significant dimensions.  First, the Spirit has a 
cosmological role as the vitality of all life.  Second, the Spirit bears an eschatological role 
in the wake of the Christ event, opening new possibilities of peace between humans and 
animals.  
In Animal Gospel, Linzey confesses his belief in “the life-giving Spirit, source of 
all that is wonderful, who animates every creature” (AG, 7).  Again, “It is the Spirit 
immanent in creation that gives life and in so doing develops all beings into their 
particular fullness” (CRA, 9).82  This presence of the Spirit in breathing creatures 
constitutes their unique claim of theos-rights.
83
  As the breath of all sentient creatures, the 
Spirit draws them into a community.  This commonality is evident biblically in the notion 
of nephesh, which Linzey links both to the soul of humans and animals and to the 
presence of the Spirit in these creatures.
84
   
                                               
82 Also, Linzey, CSG, xii. 
83 Linzey, CRA, 69. 
84 See Linzey, CSG, xii. The commonality of nephesh in humans and animals leads Linzey to the 
eschatological assertion that “whatever hope there might be for a future life for humans applies equally to 
animal life as well” (CRA, 37).  
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The cosmological presence of the Spirit is also the manner of divine immanence 
in the fallen cosmos.  “Through the Holy Spirit, the giver of life and inspirer of all, God 
experiences the creation as it were from the inside, and sees and feels through all the 
creatures of the earth” (CSG, 14).  The Spirit is God’s manner of suffering in creation 
even prior to the incarnation.  This presence of the Spirit is the catalyst of a dynamism in 
which the cosmos is open to and moving toward God’s desire.85  
The Spirit’s cosmological role of vitalizing, sustaining, suffering, and developing 
takes on new eschatological significance in light of the incarnation.  It is this redemptive 
presence of the Spirit that enables new forms of living within the world—forms that 
make for peace between humanity and nonhumans.
86
  The Spirit is “moving creation 
forward, however mysteriously, to the realization of God’s hope for us and his world” 
(CRA, 103).   
In light of these considerations, Linzey maintains that Christians must not dismiss 
Isaiah’s vision of the peaceable kingdom (Isaiah 11:6-9) either as a future or present 
possibility.  For this vision of the cosmos “is not simply presented…as a future state, but 
a realizable possibility through the Holy Spirit” (CRA, 104).87  The Spirit enables humans 
to become more than “mere spectators of the world of suffering” (AT, 56).  In the power 
of the Spirit, humans cooperate in the world’s redemption as the continuation of God’s 
                                               
85 Linzey, AG, 141. 
86 Linzey, AR, 74; CRA, 49; AT, 72. 
87 Two potential problems arise here with Linzey’s thought. First, his hermeneutical identification 
of Isaiah’s use of the spirit with the Christian notion of the Holy Spirit is a leap that is exegetically 
ungrounded. Second, his use of the word “realizable” is problematic. However, as already noted, Linzey is 
clear that the eschaton must not be subsumed into a historical endeavor. He furthermore qualifies his 
position by claiming human effort must go “as far as we are enabled by the Spirit” (CRA, 104). Regardless, 
Linzey’s meaning of the presence of the peaceable kingdom possible in human action would be better 
served by a consistent use of the language of proleptic witness. Theologically speaking, one might say that 
humans are sacraments of the eschaton for the nonhuman creation, but, as sacraments, never exhaust the 
eschaton itself. 
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incarnate work
88—even if a full living out of that future peace is impossible within 
history.
89
   
ANTHROPOLOGY: THE PROLEPTIC WITNESS OF THE KINGDOM OF THE SUFFERING GOD 
In chapter two, I addressed Moltmann’s ecclesiology as it pertained to the 
nonhuman creation.  While Linzey’s work is not absent of similar ecclesiological claims, 
it will be more fruitful here to address his understanding of human beings vis-à-vis the 
nonhuman creation.  In particular, I will explore his rejection of a value-based 
anthropocentrism and his embrace of a functional anthropocentrism, his understanding of 
the boundaries of humanity’s role within history, and finally his claim that humans are to 
witness to eschatological hope in their practices. 
Human Uniqueness and Moral Differentiation 
Linzey does not deny that there are differences between humans and nonhuman 
animals.  In fact, the arch of his eco-theological ethics depends on it.  However, he argues 
that the differences have been misappropriated.  First, many supposed distinctions are 
little more than cultural assumptions.
90
  Second, the claim to human uniqueness, whether 
valid or not, is used to promote an anthropocentric agenda.  
Linzey incriminates the dominant voices of Western Christianity on both of these 
accounts.
91
  He often centers this critique on the Roman Catholic tradition.
92
  In Animal 
                                               
88 Linzey, AN, 109; AG, 32. This understanding leads Linzey to affirm that the Spirit is at work 
wherever practices of peace are being promulgated toward nonhuman animals. Such a position opens 
fruitful possibilities for interreligious dialogue. See Linzey, AG, 140-141; CSG, chapter 1. 
89 See Linzey, AT, 88-89; AG, 24. 
90 The two most basic assumptions are that humans are masters of nature and that animals have no 
valid claims to direct moral consideration. Linzey, AR, 4. 
91 Linzey, CRA, 22-23. 
92 See Linzey, AR, 5; AT, 12, AG, 34-36, 56-63; CSG, 11-13; WASM, 16-17. Linzey’s critique is 
directed to the magisterium. However, he also rightly acknowledges positive voices in the Roman Catholic 
tradition. Linzey, CSG, 26. He frequently engages Cardinal Henry Newman’s sermon that compares the 
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Gospel, Linzey engages the most recent Roman Catholic Catechism as an example of 
Christian thought perpetuating cruelty “because it represents in a clear and dramatic way 
how unenlightened official Christian teaching still is about animal welfare” (AG, 57).93  
He often references Pope Pius IX’s refusal to open an animal protection office in Rome 
because of his belief that humans have no direct duties to nonhuman animals.
94
  In 
Linzey’s view, this tradition has, at least magisterially, taken up the position of Thomas 
Aquinas, whom he chastises more than any other theologian on account of his 
Aristotelian anthropocentrism.
95
  It is in this manner that Linzey claims Aquinas “leaves 
Christianity theology with a bitter legacy” that has “helped support years of indifference 
and wantonness towards animal life” (CRA, 27-28).96   
Other Western traditions are similarly culpable.
97
  Says Linzey in his earliest 
work, “Very few, if any, Catholic and Protestant theologians have questioned man’s right 
to exploit animals and to use animal life for the needs of man” (AR, 9).  Thus, Linzey also 
                                                                                                                                            
suffering of animals to the suffering of Christ. See Linzey AG, 64-67; WASM, 38-39. See also Linzey’s 
praise of James Gaffney’s “welcome piece of Catholic self-criticism” in Animals on the Agenda (65-66). 
93 For Linzey’s critique of the Catechism’s engagement with animals, see Linzey, AG, 56-63. In 
sum, Linzey claims that it acknowledges animals as God’s creatures that are due kindness but also 
embraces “a wholly instrumentalist understanding of their status as resources for human use” (AG, 61). He 
also suggests that “It is absolutely vital that all who care for animals make known their opposition to this 
Catechism” (AG, 62).  
94 See Linzey, AR, 9; CRA, 23; AT, 19; AN, 10; AG, 19-20. 
95 See Linzey, AR, 10-12; CRA, 22; AT, 12-15, 17-19, 46-47; AN, 6-7; AG, 19-21; CSG, 11, 15; 
WASM, 14-17. In my opinion, Linzey oversimplifies Aquinas’s position. Drummond concurs with this 
assessment. See Celia Deanne-Drummond, “Are Animals Moral? Taking Soundings through Vice, Virtue, 
Conscience and Imago Dei,” in Creaturely Theology, Creaturely Theology: On God, Humans and Other 
Animals, Celia Deane-Drummond and David Clough, editors (London, UK: SCM Press, 2009), 198. For a 
more detailed critique of Linzey’s reading of Aquinas, see Mark Wynn, “Thomas Aquinas: Reading the 
Idea of Dominion in the Light of the Doctrine of Creation,” Ecological Hermeneutics: Biblical, Historical 
and Theological Perspectives, edited by David G. Horrell, Cherryl Hunt, Christopher Southgate and 
Francesca Stavrakopoulou (New York, NY: T & T Clark, 2010), 154-167. Linzey also accuses Augustine 
promulgating a “negative tradition” toward animals in Christian thought. Linzey, CSG, 26.   
96 Even when Linzey qualifies his critique of Aquinas, for instance acknowledging his context (as 
in Linzey, CRA, 27) or referring to him as “a great scholar and saint” (AG, 21), his ultimate aim for 
engagement is to critique Thomas’s view on animals.  
97 See Linzey, CRA, 16-17; AG, 56. Linzey notes that his critiques of various Christian traditions 
has elicited “furious letters” (AG, 56).  
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criticizes major voices in the Protestant tradition, including Martin Luther and John 
Calvin.
98
  Another Western religious voice Linzey frequently disparages is René 
Descartes, whose mechanistic view of nonhuman animals facilitates a denial of their 
sentience.
99
  Even here, however, Linzey intimates Aquinas’s accountability: “The 
French philosopher…carries the line of indifference to animal cruelty…already indicated 
by St. Thomas, to its logical conclusion” (AR, 12).100  Though he notes exceptions to his 
critiques, Linzey ultimately judges that Christianity is “arguably one of the most 
anthropocentric of all world religions” (WASM, 108).     
This anthropocentric history of differentiation begins to break down in the face of 
scientific inquiry, including an affirmation of the evolutionary development of 
humans
101—though, Linzey’s acceptance of some of these scientific developments is at 
times tentative.
102
  Nonetheless, he fully accepts the evidence regarding nonhuman 
animals’ ability to suffer, which includes self-consciousness.103  At least equally 
important as scientific challenges to human assumptions about nonhuman animals, 
however, are theological and philosophical challenges. 
Throughout Linzey’s work, he not only attempts to confront the ingrained 
assumptions about what nonhuman animals lack (e.g., sentience and rationality), but also 
to question the moral conclusions based on these assumptions.
104
  Says Linzey, “The 
                                               
98 See Linzey, AR, 9; AN, 7-8 CSG, 11. 
99 See Linzey, AR, 12-14; AN, 8-10. Linzey believes the Cartesian rejection of animal suffering 
has been adopted by Western Christian thought. Linzey, CRA, 63; WASM, 45-47.  
100 See also, Linzey, CRA, 62. 
101 See Linzey, AT, 46. 
102 Linzey, AR, 5. Regarding the questions of ethics, Linzey states, “Moral issues cannot be turned 
into scientific ones, nor subsumed under scientific categories” (WASM, 61).  
103 Linzey, AG, 112; WASM, 9-10. Linzey writes that there is “ample evidence in peer-reviewed 
scientific journals” concerning the suffering of mammals.CSG, 5; also WASM, 47. He does not, however, 
provide an example for this claim.   
104 See Linzey, CRA, 54-67. 
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difference-finding tendency in Western tradition has undoubtedly served to minimize the 
moral standing of non-human creatures, and to enable us to exploit them with a clear 
conscience” (AT, 47).  While Linzey begins this critical process early on, he develops and 
clarifies it in later works.
105
  In Why Animal Suffering Matters, he accepts, for the sake of 
argument, standard assumed differences between humans and animals in order to explore 
“whether any of the proposed differences are morally relevant, that is, whether any 
should reasonably form the basis for differential treatment of one species over another” 
(WASM, 10).  Table 3 – 1 summarizes his conclusions:  
TABLE 3 – 1 
Linzey’s Challenge to Moral Conclusions Drawn from Assumed Differentiations between 
Humans and Animals
106
 
Proposed Difference Proposed Moral Conclusion Linzey’s Moral Conclusion 
The world as a 
teleological hierarchy 
In nature, the lesser are naturally 
slaves to the greater 
In Christ, the greater exist for the sake of 
the lesser 
Animals lack reason Animals cannot suffer in the 
proper sense of the term 
Lack of reason can intensity the 
experience of suffering, rendering it more 
morally significant 
Animals lack language Animals cannot participate in 
social contracts, which means 
they are not part of the moral 
community 
Animals cannot consent to human 
exploitation such that “every act which 
makes them suffer is an act of coercion” 
(WASM, 22) 
Animals are amoral Animals cannot be part of the 
moral community 
Animals cannot be improved by suffering 
as moral agents can 
Animals lack an 
immortal (rational) soul 
Animals are not of intrinsic value 
to God (or humanity) 
Animal that suffer will not receive 
eternal compensation (as humans will), 
making their suffering more problematic 
Animals lack the imago 
Dei 
Humans have the right to 
dominate animals 
Humans uniquely responsible for bearing 
the image of a loving God to the creation 
 
Linzey’s Functional Anthropocentrism 
As I have noted, Linzey challenges both the scientific validity of certain claims 
about human uniqueness and the ethical conclusions drawn from proposed distinctions 
between humans and nonhuman animals.  But he does maintain that humans are unique 
in the cosmos.  So what does make humanity unique?  “One crucial difference is that of 
                                               
105 For Linzey’s earlier views, see AR, 10-19, CRA, 52-67. 
106 This chart is developed from Linzey, WASM, 11-29.  
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capacity for moral consciousness and responsibility” (AR, 69).107  However, far from 
privileging humans above the nonhuman world, it is just this difference that renders 
humans uniquely accountable to God for the world.  Again, “it has to be said that humans 
are freer in their relationship to God” than other creatures.  But this “special freedom” 
also means that humans “are freer in their relationship with other creatures as well” and 
therefore elicits a “particular responsibility” (CRA, 10). 
Thus, Linzey’s rejection of anthropocentrism intimates more specifically a 
rejection of an anthropomonistic view of value—that is, that only humans are of intrinsic 
value and therefore a matter of direct moral concern.
108
  In fact, for Linzey the value of 
humans and the value of nonhumans are complimentary.
109
  In this vein he writes, contra 
many suspicions, that  
Christian animal rights advocates are not interested in dethroning humanity.  On 
the contrary, the animal rights thesis requires the reenthroning of humanity.  The 
key question is, what kind of king is to be reenthroned? (AG, 38) 
 
Linzey’s answer to this question is perhaps most evident in his discussion on the 
term “dominion.”  He rejects the prevailing anthropocentric interpretations of dominion 
evident in both Thomas Aquinas and Martin Luther.
110
  Such a view replaces the 
monarchial responsibility of humanity as co-creators and co-redeemers for the well-being 
of the cosmos with a hierarchical status that privileges human over and against 
animals.
111
  It is just these claims, in Linzey’s estimation, that comprise the dominant 
                                               
107 Also, Linzey, CSLTA, 77. Linzey’s rather consistent claim that “there is no evidence that any 
other species possess [the] capacity for morality” (AR, 69) seems too strong. There is, in fact, evidence to 
the contrary. On this point, see Drummond, “Are Animals Moral?” 190-210.  
108 Linzey, CRA, 61; AT, 58-59; AG, 49; CSG, 11. 
109 See Linzey, CRA, 76; AT, 72. 
110 Linzey, CRA, 25. See also Linzey’s introduction to Part II of Animals on the Agenda (63-65). 
111 Linzey, CRA, 27; AT, 40. It is thus overly simplistic when Kemmerer writes that “Linzey 
maintains the traditional view of hierarchy.” Kemmerer, In Search of Consistency, 248. Kemmerer’s point 
is that Linzey accepts a special place of humanity vis-à-vis the nonhuman creation. Yet Linzey’s 
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view in Western Christian thought from Aquinas to the present—a view that is 
“unthinkingly anthropocentric” (CSG, 11).112   
For Linzey, dominion can be neither despotic nor hierarchical for three reasons.  
First, exegetically, in Genesis 1, the notion of dominion includes a vegetarian mandate 
for humans (Genesis 1:29).
113
  This limitation detracts from any tyrannical reading of 
dominion.  In his later thought, Linzey follows the dominant strand of biblical studies 
experts in linking the imago to humanity’s function for the cosmos.114  This function “is 
inexorably related to the exercise of dominion and the maintaining of God’s peace in 
creation” (CSG, 16).115  
Second, because dominion is connected to the functional imago and the imago is 
the image of a particular God, the exercise of dominion is best informed by the divine 
condescension in Christ.
116
  In Animal Gospel, Linzey expounds this nature in his creed, 
confessing that Jesus is “the true pattern of service to the weak,” “the Crucified” in whom 
are “the faces of all innocent suffering creatures” (AG, 7).  Christ expresses the nature of 
                                                                                                                                            
monarchial interpretation of this place is not “the traditional view of hierarchy.” Kemmerer later intimates 
this point but does not develop it.  
112 Linzey, AT, 64-65; AG, 48-50; WASM, 108. As already noted, Linzey’s earlier view of the 
Christian tradition changes in his later thought. Contra Peter Singer and Richard Ryder, he notes that it has 
not been all negative. Linzey, AT, 54-56. It is at times ambivalent and at other times even positive. Positive 
examples include ancient (typically Eastern) voices, the monastic tradition, including notably Saint Francis 
of Assisi, and the modern work of thinkers like Humphry Primatt, William Wilberforce, Arthur Broome, 
and Lord Shaftsbury. See Linzey, CRA, 17, 32, 44-46, 52-53; AT, 15-19, 36; AN, 70-75, 91-113; CSG, 24; 
WASM, 10-11. Linzey claims that the hagiographies suggest that “to love animals is not sentimentality (as 
we know it) but true spirituality” (CRA, 45).  
113 Linzey, CRA, 25; AT, 34, 125-126. See especially WASM, 28-29. Kemmerer rightly notes that 
this mandate is not only vegetarian, but vegan. Kemmerer, In Search of Consistency, 255. I would further 
this claim by noting that Genesis 1:29 suggests a fruitarian diet (i.e., humans can only eat seed-bearing 
plants), while nonhuman animals are permitted a more extensive diet in 1:30 (every green plant).  
114 For a fine example of biblical scholarship on this issue, see J. Richard Middleton, The 
Liberating Image: The Imago Dei in Genesis 1 (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2005). Linzey notes that 
when the doctrine of the imago is subsumed into a capacity-based and substantive notion, the exclusion of 
animals from moral consideration typically follows. Linzey, CRA, 63. This view echoes the position of 
John Douglas Hall. See Imaging God: Dominion as Stewardship (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 
2004), 90. 
115 This link is further solidified in Linzey, WASM, 28-29. 
116 See Linzey, AT, 32-33. 
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divine rule, which in turn expresses the intended nature of human rule.  In Christ, “God’s 
power is expressed in powerlessness, in condescension (katabasis), humility and 
sacrificial love” (CRA, 28).  Therefore, “to stand for Jesus is to stand for animals as 
God’s creatures, against all purely humanistic or utilitarian accounts of animals as things, 
commodities, resources, here for us” (AG, 11).117   
In this condescension, the hierarchal value system of creation is reversed, which 
presents a new moral paradigm for humanity.
118
  “Where we once thought that we had the 
cheapest ride, we are now beginning to sense we may have the costliest responsibilities” 
(CRA, 29).  Linzey connects this christic form of dominion to the imago Dei by claiming 
that Christ opens new possibilities for creation because he renews the divine image which 
has been “marred by human sinfulness and violence” (AG, 16).119  Christ restores—or at 
least begins the process of restoring—the divine image and thereby enables humans to 
assume their role as keepers of the peace in the cosmos.
120
  In Animal Theology, Linzey 
argues that humans bear a central function in the cosmos as the “servant species.”121  
“From this perspective, humans are the species uniquely commissioned to exercise a self-
sacrificial priesthood, after the one High Priest, not just for members of their own 
species, but for all sentient creatures” (AT, 45).122  As already noted, this function renders 
humans necessary for the eschatological redemption of the entire cosmos.
123
      
                                               
117 Also, Linzey, CSG, 17. 
118 Linzey, AG, 38-39. 
119 This point highlights that, for Linzey, the term imago Dei bears moral connotations. See AR, 
19. 
120 Linzey, AG, 149. 
121 See Linzey, AR, chapter 3; CSG, 3. 
122 Linzey’s notion of priesthood bears similarities to the Orthodox notion of natural priesthood 
and coheres with certain interpretations of that notion. However, on this point Linzey seems too easily to 
draw support from voices that are nuanced from his own. He often uses similar terms as these other voices, 
but in such a different way that they may not recognize his use as valid. For example, see Linzey, AT, 52-
55. Such is the case with his view on the natural priesthood of humanity, which, as with the concept of the 
261 
 
Third, Linzey interprets both stewardship and dominion eschatologically.
124
  
Human beings are to act in light of God’s ultimate desire for the cosmos, which entails its 
redemption from suffering and death.  When humans act peacefully toward other 
creatures, the eschatological future of the world becomes present by means of 
anticipation.
125
  “We must let the Spirit, that is the Spirit of all suffering creatures, pray 
through us so that we may become a sign of the hope for which all creation longs” (AN, 
109).  Thus, against Barth’s reluctance to structure an ethics for nonhuman animals based 
on eschatology, Linzey proposes a balance between a realizable and a fully transcendent 
eschatology.
126
  In his view, the doctrine of Trinity—including its economic interaction 
with the world—requires humans to cooperate with the redemptive movement of God 
within history without lapsing into a political program of completing the kingdom apart 
from eternity.
127
  
Linzey’s dominant argument is that humanity’s great uniqueness constitutes a 
powerful responsibility for the sake of those creatures that do not share that uniqueness.  
In Animal Theology, he captures this responsibility with the term “generosity.”   
The Generosity View rejects the idea that the rights and welfare of animals must 
always be subordinate to human interests, even when vital human interests are at 
                                                                                                                                            
sacramentality of creation, differs from those in the category of anthropocentric transfiguration. See 
Linzey, AT, 54-55; AN, 94-95. For Linzey, Christ-like priesthood is for the other’s sake. It is “an extension 
of the suffering, and therefore also redeeming, activity of God in the world” (AT, 52). As priests, humans 
follow Christ’s example, sacrificing their own peace by entering into the suffering of all those who can. 
They furthermore do so for the sake of those suffering creatures. This act points toward the eschatological 
solidarity of all creation. In this sense, there can be no genuine human priesthood of creation that is not for 
nonhuman animals. Drawing on the extensive solidarity of Isaac the Syrian, Linzey writes, “Only when we 
can say that we too have entered—however fleetingly—into the suffering of Christ in the suffering of all 
creatures can we claim to have entered into the priestly nature of our humanity” (AT, 56). Based on my 
work in chapter 1, I doubt Staniloae would find this depiction of natural priesthood acceptable. 
123 Linzey, AT, 45. 
124 Linzey, CRA, 86-89. 
125 Part of the human role, which Linzey sees as evident in the monastic tradition, entails being 
moved by the suffering of sentient creatures and acting to alleviate such suffering. Linzey, CRA, 45. 
126 On Linzey’s critique of Barth, see CRA, 93. 
127 Linzey, CRA, 93. 
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stake.  We must be quite clear about this.  Acting out the Generosity Paradigm 
will cost human beings. (AT, 44)   
 
In Linzey’s view, generosity is the proper outlook at the intersection of sentience and 
innocence, an intersection that links animals and children.
128
  Like children, animals 
have, in some sense, a greater moral claim than adult humans.  “In my view, what we 
owe animals is more than equal consideration, equal treatment, or equal concern.  The 
weak, the powerless, the disadvantaged, the oppressed should not have equal moral 
priority but greater moral priority” (AG, 39).   
Eschatological Witness: Possibilities and Limitations 
Linzey consistently makes the claim humanity is central to God’s redemptive 
movement in the cosmos.  In this manner, his functional anthropocentrism bears an 
eschatological dimension and solidifies an ontological cosmocentrism: “New creation is 
man-centered…but it cannot logically be man-monistic, i.e., for man only” (AR, 75).  The 
new creation is centered on humanity “precisely because of [humanity’s] unique ability to 
co-operate with the Spirit” (CRA, 76).  On account of this ability, “humankind is essential 
in order to liberate animals” (AT, 72).  Thus, this functional anthropocentricity, directed 
toward the well-being of the nonhuman creation for its own sake, exists within the 
framework of a moral cosmocentricity.  Human beings, following the example of Christ’s 
kenotic sacrifice for the world, must embrace the value of all sentient life.  In this manner 
Christ’s death “is the basis for a contemporary Christian ministry to all creatures” (AG, 
148).
129
   
                                               
128 On the connection between animals and children in Linzey’s thought, see also Linzey, AT, 36-
38; WASM, 30-34, 36-37. 
129 In Why Animal Suffering Matters, Linzey links this functional anthropocentrism to the 
functional interpretation of the imago Dei. This position is better grounded exegetically. See Linzey, 
WASM, 28-29.  
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In Animal Rights, Linzey intimates his (albeit nascent) position on humanity’s 
role as proleptic witness in the saga of cosmic redemption.  “By reception of the gift of 
redemption, by receiving the ‘first fruits’ of the Spirit, man stands in a unique position 
responsible to God for the completion of the work of redemption” (AR, 74).  The 
troubling word “completion” is softened in Linzey’s later work, in which he maintains 
that the human role in creation is both essential and limited.  On the one hand, “humans 
cannot redeem animals (only God can do that).”  On the other hand, “they can at least 
become anticipatory signs of the kingdom” (CSG, 52).130   
The notion that humans can (and should) become “signs of the kingdom” 
highlights what I believe is his central and most valuable anthropological claim.  Human 
beings, in the power of the Spirit made available in the Christ event, are uniquely capable 
of witnessing proleptically to the eschatological future in which all creatures will be at 
peace with one another.  When humans engage in this witness, acting peaceably toward 
sentient creatures, they become sacraments of the eschaton for those creatures.
131
  In 
doing so, they render present the eschatological redemption in a limited but very real 
manner.  They provide a “glimpse of the possibility of world redemption” (CRA, 36).   
Based on this possibility, Linzey argues that, ethically, humans must “seek to 
become a living sign of the Gospel for which all creatures long” (AG, 7-8).  Hence, 
dominion bears an ethical corollary.  Says Linzey: “Living without killing sentients 
wherever possible is a theological duty laid upon Christians who wish to approximate the 
peaceable kingdom” (AT, 76).  Here, he anticipates my distinction between cosmocentric 
                                               
130 On this point, see also the above discussion on Linzey’s view of eschatology and history.  
131 The phrase “sacraments of the eschaton” is my phrase. However, I believe it captures what 
Linzey’s anthropology intimates. I also think that the word “symbol” would be of better use for Linzey than 
“sign” with regard to human witness.  
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conservation and cosmocentric transfiguration.  For it is at just this point—the claim that 
humans must not only perceive themselves as part of nature but also as those with the 
capacity to witness to creation’s eschatological telos of peace—that he acknowledges a 
“major cleavage between those who advance an ‘ecological ethic’ and those who 
advocate a creation-based liberation theology” (AT, 76).  For both dominion and 
stewardship require the exercise of eschatological imagination, which exceeds a blithe 
acceptance of the current state of nature.
132
  “The groaning and travailing of creation 
awaits the inspired sons of God” (CRA, 104).  The fallen cosmos longs for the witness of 
the saints who enacted peace even in the wilderness.
133
   
LINZEY’S ECO-THEOLOGICAL ETHICS OF COSMOCENTRIC TRANSFIGURATION 
Given Linzey’s theological framework, what does his eco-theological ethics look 
like with regard to the earth at large—the system as a whole and its non-sentient 
components?  To answer this question, it is pertinent to examine the distinction Linzey 
makes between sentient and all non-sentient life, a distinction to which he attaches moral 
significance.  Given this distinction, Linzey’s opts for the exclusion of non-sentient life 
from theos-rights. 
MORALLY RELEVANT GRADATIONS OF BEING 
As already noted, Linzey accepts that humans are unique in the created order.  
However, he denies that this uniqueness constitutes an exclusion of sentient nonhuman 
animals from the moral community.  With regard to non-sentient life, however, Linzey’s 
position is less positive. 
                                               
132 Linzey, CRA, 102-103. 
133 Linzey, AG, 26-27; AN, 100. 
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Positively, Linzey claims “all creation, large and small, intelligent and 
unintelligent, sentient and non-sentient, has worth because God values it” (CRA, 9).  This 
quote captures the extent of Linzey’s concept of value regarding the cosmos.  However, 
he also notes that “to hold the biblical principle that all life has value is not to hold that 
all being has the same value or to hold that there are not morally relevant distinctions 
between one kind of being and another” (AT, 23).  More strikingly, in Animal Gospel, he 
claims that God does not love all creatures equally.
134
  
Linzey argues that scripture evinces both an inclusion of animals into the moral 
community and an exclusion of plants from that community.
135
  Animals “are made on 
the same day, recipients of common blessing, subject both to the blessing and curse of the 
Lord, and are both to be redeemed” (AT, 23).136  Furthermore, he draws out the 
significance of the notion of covenant for nonhuman animals.  Covenant establishes 
community, including moral parameters of interaction.
137
  Based on these similarities, 
Linzey argues that it “is simply not possible to extrapolate from the biblical material the 
notion that God wished to create man as an entirely different form of life” (CRA, 65).138  
While God is certainly concerned for plants, Linzey argues that animals and humans 
belong in a common moral community that excludes plants.  He summarizes his 
interpretation of scripture thusly: “The lilies are not to be compared with the glory of 
Solomon but it is the sparrows who are not forgotten by God” (AT, 35).   
                                               
134 Linzey, AG, 37-38. A generous reading would be that God does not love all creatures in the 
same manner. 
135 Linzey, AT, 34-35; Kemmerer, In Search of Consistency, 229-230. 
136 On this point, see also Linzey, CRA, 31. 
137 Linzey, CRA, 31-32. Kemmerer challenges Linzey on this point, rightly noting that the whole 
earth is included in the Noahic covenant. Thus, by Linzey’s own view, plants ought to be part of the moral 
community. See Kemmerer, In Search of Consistency, 277.  
138 For other positive examples of animal welfare in scripture, see Linzey, CSG, 12. For a good 
critique of Linzey on this point, see Kemmerer, In Search of Consistency, 272-274.  
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Furthermore, Linzey argues that both pneumatology and christology provide a 
manner of differentiating between the rights of animals and the rights of plants and other 
non-sentient creatures such as insects.  The Spirit’s unique presence in certain creatures 
as ruach (spirit/breathe) coupled with the Spirit’s redemptive role for individual suffering 
creatures permit a distinction.  In addition, Christ’s assumption of flesh and blood in the 
incarnation provides a unique vision of redemption for sentient creatures of flesh and 
blood.
139
  While Linzey recognizes that these arguments do not provide a “watertight 
distinction” between sentient creatures and plants, he nonetheless suggests that the 
biblical view tends toward an affirmation that “through his covenant God elects creatures 
of flesh and blood into a relationship with himself and humanity” (CRA, 80).    
Based on these claims, Linzey opts for an “exclusive view” of theos-rights, 
claiming that “only animals which come clearly within the definition of ‘Spirit-filled, 
breathing beings composed of flesh and blood’ have theos-rights” (CRA, 84).  He remains 
cautious about this exclusivism, acknowledging that there is yet much to learn about the 
spiritual capacities of insects.  Moreover, he maintains that, regardless of these capacities, 
“all living beings are subjects of value” (CRA, 85).140   
THE STATUS OF NON-SENTIENT, NONHUMAN LIFE 
So what is Linzey’s position regarding the nonhuman creation at large, including 
its non-sentient but living components?  Does Linzey’s implicit cosmocentric theos-rights 
                                               
139 Linzey, CRA, 79-80. 
140 It is somewhat troubling that Linzey excludes well over 90% of the entire animal kingdom 
from theos-rights. After all, 90% of “animals” are arthropods! See Wennberg, God, Humans, and Animals, 
26. More troubling still is his acknowledgement that “it may be that the Spirit has found homes that we 
have not yet discovered or resting places in what are to us the most unlikely of species” (CRA, 85); for this 
claim acknowledges that his criteria quite possibly (and likely) excludes creatures from theos-rights that 
ought not to be excluded. Yet Linzey’s aim is to maximize moral concern for creatures that are more 
obviously sentient and yet have been excluded from rights language. He seeks to avoid the caricatures that 
animals rights activists will soon be working toward the rights of plants as well. See Linzey, WASM, 53. 
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apply to non-sentient creatures?  His answer is ambiguous.  He echoes Moltmann’s view 
of the Sabbath, suggesting that sharing in the divine rest is the telos of all creatures.
141
  
All creatures that exist “are to be with God.  They are to enjoy their life with him 
according to their creaturely being” (CRA, 10).  It is this insight about the commonality 
of created existence that leads Linzey to claim that “all creation has an irreducible value” 
(CRA, 8).    
Linzey also defines creation as a “gift” (see CRA, 8) that elicits celebration.  This 
affirmation comes very close to the common Orthodox notion of cosmic 
sacramentality.
142
  However, in my reading, Linzey strongly departs from Orthodox 
thinkers such as Staniloae that maintain what I described in chapter one as 
anthropocentric transfiguration.  This departure rests on the distinction between gift and 
community.  As I already noted, for Staniloae, the nonhuman creation is a gift from God 
to humanity.  It facilitates, as a sacrament, the communion among humanity and between  
humanity and God.
143
  For Linzey, however, created existence itself (as an act of divine 
generosity) is a gift to the entire created order.
144
   
Yet, as I have already noted, Linzey excludes non-sentient creatures from theos-
rights.  He makes clear his distinction between sentient animals and plants in his 
extended discussion of sealing, in which he defends seals over and against plants.
145
   
                                               
141 Linzey, CRA, 10-11. 
142 See also Linzey, AN, 78, 81-82. 
143 This point solidifies my earlier claim that Linzey too uncritically draws upon the Orthodox 
notion of priesthood. 
144 Perhaps one could even say—though Linzey does not explicitly make this claim—that 
existence is the eternal sacrament for all (at least sentient) creatures that exist. Regardless, Linzey’s affinity 
with Eastern thinkers is limited. He is correct to note that Maximus the Confessor and Vladimir Lossky 
include the nonhuman creation in the scope of redemption, but I am not convinced they would agree, as 
Linzey implies, that “we should love our fellow creatures not for our own sake but for their own” (CRA, 
32). 
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If seals were simply vegetables, that is, beings without sentience who could 
experience no pain, fear, or suffering and whose movements exhibited no 
complexity of awareness, then there would be no moral objection to using them 
and killing them.  They might, like vegetables, have a kind of aesthetic value, but 
no one would think of mounting campaigns to protect them or worry about their 
rights.  But seals do not belong to that category.  On the contrary, seals are 
sentient and intelligent; they are highly developed social beings capable of 
experience intense pain and suffering…It is because seals, like other mammals, 
are sentient…that it is right to say that they have—as individuals—‘intrinsic’ or 
‘inherent’ value…The value of other sentient beings in the world does not rest (as 
in the cases of stones or cabbages) entirely or largely in their relationship to us 
and the uses we may put them. (WASM, 137-138) 
 
What is startling about this claim is that Linzey seems to deny intrinsic value to 
non-sentient creatures.
146
  How does this claim square with his view that “all creation has 
an irreducible value” (CRA, 8) and that “all creation, large and small, intelligent and 
unintelligent, sentient and non-sentient, has worth because God values it” (CRA, 9)?  The 
answer is unclear.  It seems to me that Linzey’s position is that an ethics of 
transfiguration applies to sentient life while an ethics of conservation applies to non-
sentient life.  In this sense, it might be more accurate to label his paradigm as 
sentiocentric transfiguration.
147
  That is, Linzey accepts that a transfigurative ethics—
which entails protesting dimensions of nature such as suffering, predation, and death—is 
appropriate for creatures that can suffer.  But this ethics does not seem to apply to non-
                                                                                                                                            
145 For the larger discussion, see Linzey, WASM, chapter 5. He also decries the categorization of 
mammals as fish. See WASM, 137. 
146 Kemmerer is critical of Linzey on this point. See Kemmerer, In Search of Consistency, 277-
278. 
147 Linzey does not reject this label, though he defines it as “mammalocentricity.” See CRA, 84-85. 
Oddly, Northcott defends Linzey against his own admission of “mammalocentrism” based on his claims 
that God relates to all things and thereby grants them with dignity and respect. See Northcott, The 
Environment and Christian Ethics, 147. In my view, Northcott here misses the manner in which Linzey 
uses “centric” terminology. Linzey wants to claim that God’s unique relationship to sentient creatures 
establishes an essentially distinct category of value and moral concern that does not exist for non-sentient 
life. Wennberg describes one form of environmentalism as “sentientism,” which comes close to Linzey’s 
view. See Wennberg, God, Humans, and Animals, 36. 
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sentient life.  For such life, a conservationist ethics—which entails accepting predation 
and death—seems sufficient for Linzey.  As he states:  
We have a choice here.  Either we continue to talk of a general responsibility for 
nature (which is usually reflected in our socio-economic conservation of 
resources) and continue to understand moral rights exclusively as the property of 
human beings, or we widen our perspective to include the rights of non-humans 
which possess the capacity for consciousness and sentiency. (AR, 27)
148
 
 
WHAT OF SPECIES, ECOSYSTEMS, AND THE EVOLUTIONARY SYSTEM?   
Linzey is certainly interested in the protection of species.  However, his primary 
unit of moral concern is the individual nonhuman animal.
149
  Thus, to return to the terms 
of the introduction, his thought is particular-centric as opposed to general-centric.  He is 
adamant that a conservationism that seeks to protect a species by subordinating the rights 
of individual animals is problematic.
150
  Such is the “blind spot” of conservationists who 
do not seek to protect each individual creature from harm (WASM, 138). Ultimately, he 
maintains that “we treat animals and humans unjustly if we proceed on the assumption 
that their rights can normally be sacrificed to the interest of others” (CRA, 133).   
For Linzey, all individual “animals have an irreducible non-utilitarian value” (AT, 
95).  Thus, it is inappropriate to sacrifice the one for the sake of the many except in 
conditions of absolute necessity.  It would seem that this same line of thinking would 
apply to ecosystems as well—although, like many animal ethicists and theologians, 
Linzey does not really address the moral status of systems of life.  The one significant 
exception is the system of evolutionary emergence.  It is this system that Linzey refers to 
                                               
148 It seems odd to me that Linzey, after making a case for the centrality of sentience, should 
utilize the phrase “consciousness and sentiency” here. However, such use can be explained by his desire to 
make certain readers are aware of his meaning of sentiency, which includes “sense of perception” (26).  
149 See Linzey, CRA, 109. 
150 Linzey takes specific aim at Aldo Leopold on this point. Linzey, CRA, 132-133. Also, WASM, 
68, 138.  
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as “bestial” (CRA, 20), “self-murdering” (AT, 119), and incompatible with divine 
goodness.
151
  These claims aside, it is somewhat unclear how Linzey ethics would engage 
larger systems of life, which depend on predation for balance.  What is clear is that he 
refuses to subsume the value or rights of the individual into a holistic ecology.   
LINZEY’S COSMOCENTRIC TRANSFIGURATION AND INDIVIDUAL NONHUMAN ANIMALS  
Linzey’s entire theological project may rightly be seen as an attempt to put 
nonhuman animals on the agenda for theological and ethical discussion.
152
  As noted 
above, his primary concern is for the individual animal—and more specifically, the 
individual sentient animal.  Here, I seek to expound this concern in Linzey’s thought.  I 
begin with a general overview of the philosophical nature of Linzey’s ethics regarding 
individual sentients.  I then explore specific how this ethics translates into practice with 
reference to particular issues such as animal experimentation, hunting, fur-trapping, and 
the consumption of meat.   
THE NATURE OF LINZEY’S CONCERN FOR INDIVIDUAL, SENTIENT NONHUMAN ANIMALS 
When considering Linzey’s ethics with regard to individual sentients, a few 
preliminary issues arise.  These include Linzey’s foundations for rights language, his 
moral framework (e.g., utilitarian, deontological, etc.), his emphasis on sentiency, and 
finally the manner in which rights apply to nonhuman sentients.  Here I consider each 
issue in turn.     
The Language of Rights and Its Foundations 
Linzey is interested in establishing the import of law for protecting the well-being 
of individual creatures.  Thus, he advocates not relegating issues of animal protection to 
                                               
151 See Linzey, AT, 81. 
152 Linzey, AR, vi, 1-2. 
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the language of welfare.  He recognizes the theological dangers of rights language, 
repeatedly acknowledging that such language is insufficient for the task of constructing a 
theological ethics that adequately addresses the problems of animal suffering.
153
  
Nonetheless, he maintains that such language must be part (but not the whole) of the 
discussion of animal protection.
154
  Thus, he advocates not relegating issues of animal 
protection to the language of welfare.    
Regarding the foundations for rights language, in his earliest work, Linzey 
somewhat neglects the theology.  Instead, he attempts to build a rational Christian case 
for the inclusion of nonhumans into the sphere or rights based on sentience.
155
  This 
argument includes the notion that any attempt to base rights solely on an anthropocentric 
and capacity-based notion of personhood (e.g., the capacity for moral duty) risks denying 
rights to many humans.
156
  In later works, however, Linzey adjusts his Bentham-like 
approach of sentience alone in favor of the construction of a theological framework that 
accounts for sentience.
157
  In this framework, rights cannot be based on “any capacities 
which may be claimed by the creature itself in defense of its own status” (CRA, 83); 
rather, they must be based on “God-given spiritual capacities” that remain only because 
of God’s ongoing relationship to the created order.158  Linzey further adds to this 
theological dimension the claim that God’s own passion draws all suffering, regardless of 
                                               
153 Linzey, AT, viii-ix, 3-19, 41-42; CRA, 94-96; CSG, 56-57; WASM, 162.  
154 Linzey, AR, 42-46; CRA, 68-98; WASM, 160-162. 
155 Linzey, AR, chapter 3. 
156 Linzey, AR, 22-24. It should be noted that Linzey’s criteria of sentience is open to the same 
critique. For example, are comatose patients sentient? To his credit, Linzey acknowledges this problem 
(AR, 28) but it is less pressing, as the sentience criterion errs “on the right side” by rendering morally 
important all cases of actual suffering.   
157 See Linzey, CRA, 80-81. In distancing himself from the position of Bentham, Linzey also 
highlights the distinction between his own work and that of his contemporary, Peter Singer. For example, 
see AT, 28-41. 
158 Linzey, CRA, 83. 
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degree, into the sphere of moral concern.
159
  From this standpoint, he maintains that 
Christian theology provides a better foundation for animal rights than secular thought.
160
   
Yet Linzey never abandons the rational case for animal rights.  In fact, in his 
latest authored book, he calls for more development of it.
161
  But he acknowledges that 
“rational argument…has to begin somewhere…with something given” (AG, 5).  In 
Creatures of the Same God, Linzey’s “given” is that it is wrong to harm sentient animals 
because of their  
inability to give or withhold their consent, their inability to verbalise or represent 
their interests, their inability to comprehend, their moral innocence or 
blamelessness, and, not least of all, their relative defenselessness and 
vulnerability. (WASM, 151)   
 
These “givens” shape Linzey’s religious worldview: “My conviction is that no religion 
that leads us to insensitivity to suffering can be the real thing” (CSG, 7).   
Deontology or Utilitarianism? 
Linzey lauds the papal encyclical Veritatis Splendor for its “reaffirmation of the 
category of ‘intrinsically evil acts’” along with its “utter rejection of consequentialism as 
an adequate basis for theological ethics” (AG, 66).  He applies this category to “deliberate 
infliction of pain and suffering upon animals” (AG, 67) with the exception of aiding the 
animals (e.g., taking them to the veterinarian).
162
  He furthermore decries the use of 
violence by animal rights activists because, in his view, “rights theory, in contrast to 
utilitarianism, consists in its rejection of consequences as an adequate basis for ethics” 
                                               
159 Linzey, AT, 51-52. 
160 This position is a development in Linzey’s thought. See Linzey, CRA, 71-72. On how this 
claim distinguishes Linzey from Tom Regan, see CRA, 82-83. See also Angus Taylor, Animals and Ethics: 
An Overview of the Philosophical Debate, third edition (Buffalo, NY: Broadview Press, 2009), 66. 
161 Linzey, WASM, 1-3. 
162 See also, Linzey, AG, 95. It seems to me that Linzey has missed the mark on the notion of 
intrinsically evil acts. The very fact that he must make the obvious exception to his law of non-harm when 
the harm ultimately helps an individual animal renders the act of causing harm not intrinsically evil. For an 
act to be intrinsically evil, the context can make no difference. There can be no exceptions.  
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(AG, 88).  These claims suggest an affinity with deontology and a definitive break with 
utilitarianism.
163
  Indeed, in his later thought Linzey intimates that animal 
experimentation is intrinsically wrong.
164
      
However, for Linzey, rights are neither absolute nor inviolable.
165
  While he does 
maintain that “taking pleasure from the cruel death of an animal is nothing less than 
morally evil” (WASM, 86),166 he also acknowledges that “in practice…we are always 
inevitably speaking of rights which may be overridden if there is sufficient moral 
justification” (CRA, 91).  For Linzey, while the violation of rights may be justified, such 
violation still incurs guilt.  We are all guilty because evil has become a necessity in 
creation.
167
  Thus, he notes that “circumstances, benefits, or compensating factors may 
limit the offense [i.e., causing animals suffering], but they can never make the practice 
morally licit” (WASM, 106).168  These claims detract from a deontological worldview.  
After all, Kant simply would not have been Kant if he maintained it was acceptable to lie 
in cases of vital necessity!   
                                               
163 Regarding utilitarianism, Linzey states, “whatever may be the usefulness of this theory, when it 
comes to considering some aspects of the moral treatment of humans and animals, it obviously fails to 
recognize that certain actions are intrinsically wrong in themselves whatever the circumstances” (WASM, 
93). On this point, see also Linzey, WASM, 61. See also his critique of the English government’s report on 
hunting (the Burns Report) in 2000. WASM, 78-83. In Why Animal Suffering Matters, Linzey writes that he 
rejects the pursuit of utilitarian calculation to establish the good because such calculations always reflect 
the good of the subject that calculates. That is, they are “inevitably anthropocentric” (WASM, 162). 
Furthermore, “the inevitable result of such calculation is permissive, i.e., it allows some form of suffering” 
(WASM, 162). 
164 Linzey, WASM, 156. 
165 Linzey, AR, 33-34; CRA, 89-91, 101-102; AG, 48-49.  
166 For Linzey, the term “cruel” denotes any form of harm caused to a sentient creature that is not 
for the benefit of that individual creature. See Linzey, WASM, 85. 
167 Linzey, AR, 33-34; CRA, 89-91, 101-102; AT, 107-112, 129. 
168 It is odd that in the same work Linzey writes that “accepting that animal life has value, and that 
it should not be destroyed without good reason, is not the same as accepting that it is always wrong to kill” 
(WASM, 159).  
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In my view, Linzey’s view is best described as proportionalism.169  Contra 
deontology, he acknowledges that “some element of calculating the good as we see it is 
inevitable in moral evaluation” (AT, 109).  Yet he distances himself from Singer in that 
he refuses to appeal only to utilitarian calculations to establish proper actions.
170
  He 
acknowledges that there are utilitarian values for animal abuse, including 
experimentation.  But he also warns that “once our moral thinking becomes dominated by 
crude utilitarian calculations, then there is no right, value or good that cannot be 
bargained away, animal or human” (CRA, 120).  Thus, while calculation helps us to 
choose a route to take, these calculations do not render an action good in itself.  Perhaps 
killing may be necessary and therefore rights violable; but necessity does make the action 
of killing good.
171
  Linzey would be better served to say, with regard at least to sentient 
creatures, that killing is never justified; but it is at times necessary.  For “we have no 
biblical warrant for claiming killing as God’s will.  God’s will is for peace” (AT, 130).   
The Sentience of Nonhuman Animals 
As already noted, Linzey emphasizes sentience as a morally relevant distinction 
even in his later works.  But how does one tell whether or not a creature is sentient?  For 
Linzey, “this is in part a scientific question” (AR, 27).172  However, he recognizes the 
                                               
169 Within his Roman Catholic context, David F. Kelly describes proportionalism as a shift “from 
traditional (deontological) method to proportionality…from legalism to at least a moderate form of 
situationalism—though it is certainly not a radical situationalism, because rules are still of great 
importance.” David F. Kelly, Contemporary Catholic Health Care Ethics (Washington, DC: Georgetown 
University Press, 2004), 90. Of particular import is the balance of law and consequence. An act may be at 
once evil (i.e., it violates a good law) and yet necessary and permissible on account of the extraordinary 
context of the act.  
170 Linzey, AT, 38; WASM, 152-155. 
171 I will offer a critique on Linzey on this point below. 
172 However, he does draw certain self-evident lines: “This criterion [i.e., sentience] should 
certainly not include plant life and forms of life such as insects. Response to stimuli…does not constitute 
sentience” (AR, 27). 
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limits of science in establishing the sentience of certain nonhuman animals.
173
  That is, 
some who engage in allegedly cruel practices against nonhuman animals claim that such 
practices should continue until absolutely clear scientific evidence proves the sentience of 
these creatures.
174
   
In Why Animal Suffering Matters, Linzey engages five arguments that reject the 
significance of the sentience of nonhumans for matters of moral concern.
175
  First, there is 
the agnostic claim that we cannot ultimately know the reality of nonhumans and therefore 
cannot build a case of moral concern from their experience of suffering.  Linzey replies 
that there are some things we can know “at least as reasonably as we know them in the 
case of most humans” (WASM, 50).  Aside from this point, it would seem rather odd 
indeed to default to a position of abuse where sentience seems possible on account of 
epistemic uncertainty.  If animal rights cannot be established because of agnosticism, 
why can animal abuse?  Second, there is the claim that we must wait for clearer data.
176
  
Linzey’s response is that the appeal to complexity of suffering and self-consciousness 
could also apply to infants.  Third, there is the claim that the ascription of human qualities 
to nonhumans muddles the discussion.  To this claim Linzey responds that describing an 
animal as “unhappy” fits the animal’s experience of its own natural life such that 
practices that deprive animals of the ability to act on their instincts by definition violates 
their pursuit of the good.  Fourth, regarding the possibility that all things are sentient, 
including plants, Linzey appeals to scientific evidence that establishes a distinction.  The 
                                               
173 Linzey also warns against the notion that facts constitute argument. Facts, like all claims, 
require a hermeneutic:  “All facts have to be interpreted and seen against a larger backdrop” (WASM, 60). 
174 Linzey engages this view in his discussion of the Farm Animal Welfare Advisory Committee’s 
“Codes of Recommendation for the Welfare of Livestock.” See AR, 62-66. Also, WASM, 51. 
175 See Linzey, WASM, 49-55. 
176 See ibid., 80. 
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difference is not that there is ambiguous evidence, but rather that there is no evidence that 
plants suffer.  Finally, regarding the possibility that animal suffering is not comparable to 
human suffering on account of the higher mental capacities of human beings, Linzey 
argues (1) that scientific evidence suggests otherwise and (2) such arguments would 
apply to less-developed humans as well.  Ultimately, Linzey maintains that, in the face of 
scientific evidence that suggests sentiency, “we have to make ethical decisions and give 
animals the benefit of the doubt” (AR, 65).177   
The Right to Life versus the Right to Non-Suffering 
In Animal Rights, Linzey suggests that the position of many animal-friendly 
Christians is as follows: “it is immoral to inflict suffering upon animals, but it is not 
wrong to kill them humanely” (AR, 29).  This position “lies at the centre of the Christian 
attitude towards animal welfare” (AR, 29).  Linzey assents to Rosalina Godlovitch’s 
notion that such a position is incoherent in that it would necessitate ending all nonhuman 
animal life humanely inasmuch as this action would relinquish the evil of suffering by a 
non-evil means (humane killing).
178
  Linzey thus maintains that “issues of life and 
suffering are fundamental to any discussion of animal rights” (AR, 58).  He muses that 
the rejection of this connection of life and suffering is likely “due to the problematic 
consequences of maintaining a ‘no killing’ principle” (AR, 31).179       
 
 
                                               
177 See also Linzey’s thoughts on the burden of proof with regard to animal capacity. Ibid., 47. 
178 Linzey, AR, 30; WASM, 158. I am not convinced this logic necessarily holds primarily because 
it does not make the distinction between necessary and unnecessary suffering.     
179 In the final chapter, I will explore how such a principle is also problematic for Linzey as he 
seems to maintain only the intrinsic value of sentient life. But it is a fair question as to why, with regard 
only for the right to live, that such a line should be drawn.  
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PRACTICES OF PROLEPTIC WITNESS  
Given Linzey’s position, what will cosmocentric transfiguration look like in 
practice vis-à-vis individual, sentient, nonhuman animals?  What actions best represent 
humanity’s role to be a proleptic witness to the eschatological future?  Here, I seek to 
answer these questions.  I begin, however, with his caveat regarding the limits of moral 
practice in a fallen and sinful world.   
Living in a Fallen World 
Linzey recognizes the contradictions of the present state of reality.
180
 He 
maintains that “the kind of world, cursed as it is, in which we live does make it 
impossible to respect all kinds of life all the time” (CRA, 19-20; emphasis mine).181  
Human sin makes it so that “no human being can live free of evil” (CRA, 101).  It is this 
admission that leads him to disavow self-righteousness, by which he intimates the feeling 
of superiority of animal activists because they engage in certain actions that lessen the 
presence of harm in the world;
182
 for in his view, “we are all sinners when it comes to 
animals” (CSG, xv).   
Thus, Linzey does not “desire to be part of unrestrained attacks on science or 
scientists” (AT, 112) or the demonization of his opponents.183  He does not advocate any 
form of hate or violence.
184
  Rather, he claims that “if the goal is peace, then that goal 
must dictate the means, and one means that cannot logically be utilized is violence” (AG, 
                                               
180 Linzey, CSG, 34-35. 
181 For example, see Linzey’s position on self-defense. Linzey, WASM, 24-25. 
182 Linzey acknowledges that even a vegetarian/vegan lifestyle results in the death of animals 
during the farming process. Linzey, AT, 132; AG, 77-79; CSG, xiv-xv. See also AG, 123, where Linzey 
recalls his personal experience with fishing.  
183 Linzey, AG, 123-125. 
184 Ibid., 21-24. 
278 
 
86).
185
  In light of these views, Linzey acknowledges that he is disquieted by certain 
aspects of the animal rights movement, in particular the self-righteousness of some 
members and the violent tactics of others.
186
  In the face of these failures, he notes, “It is 
as difficult for me to remain a part of the animal movement as it is for me to remain a 
member of the Church of England” (CSG, xviii).    
The balance Linzey seeks is, on the one hand, the recognition that life as we know 
it necessitates suffering and death and therefore leads to moral conflicts for someone who 
seeks to alleviate and prevent such realities, and, on the other, the call to avoid 
normalizing suffering and death institutionally on the basis that they are, in certain 
situations, necessary for either human existence or the ongoing well-being of the 
cosmos.
187
  Said theologically, humanity’s Spirit-filled, imaginative witness to the 
eschatological future remains a witness.
188
  It is not the province of humans to construct 
the kingdom.  
When discussing the issue of self-defense, Linzey maintains, “When there is a 
direct choice between the life of an individual human and an individual animal, we may 
rightly choose to save the human agent” (CRA, 138). He also maintains that it “is difficult 
to resist the need to kill” in situations where animals, including insects, jeopardize food 
supplies for the human community (CRA, 139).  His view is therefore not that humans 
“can easily turn to live in some Edenite harmony with other creatures” (AT, 58).  The 
tensions of a fallen world require eschatological redemption.  On the path toward that 
                                               
185 See Linzey’s discussion on the necessity of animal rights activists to use moral (e.g., non-
violent) means to work toward their aims. Linzey, AG, 86-91.  
186 Linzey, CSG, xiv-xviii. For a critique of this point, see Kemmerer, In Search of Consistency, 
280-281. 
187 Linzey, AR, 33-42. 
188 Linzey, CRA, 35. 
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redemption, humans can live in solidarity with other creatures caught up in the same 
“structures of disorder” (AT, 58).  But “there is no pure land” in a fallen world.189  There 
may even be instances in which humane killing is in the best interest of a creature (e.g., 
euthanasia).
190
   
Nonhuman Animal Experimentation 
Even though utilitarian value does not in itself constitute moral propriety,
191
 
Linzey holds that the question of necessity is crucial when discussing animal 
experimentation.  More specifically, he writes that “it is important to distinguish what 
human beings want and what they need”; for “many of the necessities for animal 
experimentation turn out not to be necessities at all” (AR, 53-54).  An example Linzey 
offers is testing cosmetic products on animals.
192
   
Generally speaking, two criteria are imperative to establish necessity for 
Linzey.
193
  The first is whether or not the end entailed by the action constitutes actual 
necessity.  The second form is, provided the first criterion holds, whether or not the 
means (i.e., animal experimentation) is the only way to procure the actual necessity.   
Regarding the first criterion, I believe the concept of necessity is more 
complicated than Linzey’s work permits—an issue I will address in chapter 4.  Here, it 
suffices to note that he seems to assume that only one’s survival constitutes necessity.194  
Thus, looking beautiful—even though an acceptable goal—is not a necessity and cannot 
                                               
189 See Linzey, AT, 132, AG, 90; CSG, xiv. 
190 Linzey, WASM, 159. Linzey suggests that not only animals, but also humans provide these 
problems (in the cases of infants and comatose patients). 
191 Linzey, WASM, 61. Linzey notes the common utilitarian justifications that have been offered 
regarding experiments not only on animals but also embryos (stem cell research) and developed humans 
(e.g., prisoners of war). Linzey, CRA, 114-120; AG, 93-94, 109-110. 
192 “Only a cynical view of human nature could argue that humans need (as opposed to want) 
cosmetics, invariably tested on animals” (AR, 53).  
193 See Linzey, AT, 145. 
194 Linzey, Linzey, AR, 53; CSG, xi; WASM, 156-157. 
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justify violating the rights of nonhuman animals.  Neither is scientific knowledge a 
necessity: “To say…that the gain of new knowledge is more important than the 
preservation of moral rights, whether human or animal, is to raise curiosity above 
morality” (AR, 51).195   
Regarding the second criterion, necessary ends, in order to require means that 
violate the rights of creatures, must have no other viable means.  On this point Linzey 
rightly notes that the supposed necessity for certain experiments (e.g., curing ailments) at 
times arises from unhealthy living.
196
  There is an irony here in that humans may gorge 
themselves on animal flesh, open the door for an endemic of a particular ailment, and 
then justify experimenting on the very kind of creatures they gratuitously eat by claiming 
it is necessary for their health.  In order words, in some cases, a better (preventative) 
means of achieving human health is healthy living.   
Ultimately, Linzey is consistent in his claim that nonhuman animals do not exist 
solely or primarily for the betterment of humanity.  Therefore, a justification for 
utilization of animals—especially where harm is incurred—must include more than an 
appeal to an anthropocentric worldview.
197
  For “to cause animals avoidable injury, either 
through death, deprivation, or suffering, must be seen as morally wrong” (AT, 107).  
Justification must establish a vital necessity.  Such instances of necessity are rare.  And 
even in these cases, Linzey notes that,  
for some of us…would be as disinclined to support painful experimentation on 
animals as we would be disinclined to suppose the torture of human subjects, no 
matter how ‘beneficial’ the results might be. (WASM, 156)   
 
                                               
195 Linzey, AT, 109. 
196 Linzey, AR, 54-55. 
197 Linzey, AT, 107. 
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At the very least, then, he maintains that animal experimentation should be proscribed by 
law so that it does not become institutionalized.
198
  At most, in Animal Gospel—in light 
of the notion of Christ as the “good shepherd”—Linzey delineates a “Christian answer” 
to the issue of animal experimentation.  As Christians  
deeply conscious of our divinely given stewardship over creation and our special 
bond of covenant with animals in particular, we should elect to bear for ourselves 
whatever ills may flow from not experimenting on animals rather than be 
supporting an institution which perpetuates tyranny. (CRA, 124-125)
199
  
 
Hunting 
“Hunting represents the anti-gospel of Jesus our Predator” (AT, 114).  This quote 
represents Linzey’s basic position with regard to hunting.200  Yet, as already noted, he is 
aware that the world is full of contradictions.  Thus, he cedes provisions to his ethics of 
non-suffering and non-killing.   
Has man the right to kill animals whenever his own species or other species or the 
welfare of the species concerned is endangered through over-population or 
aggression?  There is no logical reason, I believe, why such a principle should not 
be accepted as long as the method of killing is as humane as possible and that no 
persons are receiving pleasure from such activity. (AR, 38; emphasis mine) 
 
Here, Linzey acknowledges the possibility of necessary killing.  More 
importantly, he claims that such killing can be viewed as a right.  However, he qualifies 
this view by stating that no pleasure should be derived from such killing, intimating that 
                                               
198 See Linzey, CRA, 118. Linzey bases this argument on Anthony Flew’s view on torture. See AR, 
55-57; WASM, 156-158.  
199 Also, Linzey, AG, 149-150. Linzey refers to animal experimentation as “un-godly sacrifice.” 
Linzey, AT, chapter 6. Hence, his view of experimentation corresponds to Linzey’s claim that the Christ-
event reveals the true nature of Christian sacrifice, which “involves the sacrifice of the higher for the lower 
and not the reverse” (CRA, 43). Such a view reconfigures sacrifice, both religious and in general: “We 
think of [animals] as existing for us, where it seems to me that the truer, spiritual notion is that we are made 
for them. It is our task to sacrifice ourselves not for our own sake but for the sake of him who seeks to unite 
things to himself” (CRA, 44). For more on Linzey’s view concerning animal sacrifice, see Linzey, AT, 71, 
103-110; Kemmerer, In Search of Consistency, 236-238. 
200 For a contextual and specific example of Linzey’s view on hunting, see his detailed exploration 
of the Burns Report in Why Animal Suffering Matters. Linzey, WASM, chapter 3. 
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the killing itself is still an evil, albeit a necessary one.  But can one really have the right 
to commit evil?   
At any rate, Linzey maintains that 
hunting offends two basic moral principles.  The first is that it is intrinsically 
wrong to deliberately inflict suffering on a sentient mammal for purposes other 
than its own individual benefit…But there is a second, even more fundamental 
principle, namely, it is intrinsically wrong to deliberately cause suffering for the 
purposes of amusement, recreation, or in the name of sport” (WASM, 83-84).201    
   
Such a position leads to an unequivocal rejection of hunting for sport.
202
  Indeed, 
Linzey refers to hunting for sport as “one of the least justifiable, and the most 
objectionable, of all current practices” of animal cruelty (WASM, 95).  His position also 
leads to a moral challenge both to those who enjoy hunting for food and those who hunt 
for food where meat-eating is no longer a contextual necessity for human survival.  For 
hunting is only “justifiable” in cases of vital human need.  Thus, for Linzey, most modern 
practices of hunting falls under the category of “wanton injury.”203  They are not 
necessary for survival, self-defense, or essential benefit.  
Even species control does not constitute a genuine justification in Linzey’s view.  
In his earliest work, he states that “a great deal more of research needs to be conducted in 
this area of moral necessity for animal control” (AR, 38) and that we should “always 
reject… ‘control’ of animals when this is inspired by man’s selfish interests alone” (AR, 
39).  In his later work, Linzey takes a stronger stance on this issue, arguing that the case 
for hunting based on control fails for three reasons.  First, “nature is an essentially self-
regulating system” (WASM, 91).  Second, it is unclear what balance ought to look like in 
                                               
201 As already noted, for Linzey these founded in reason—most notably that animals are innocent 
and cannot give consent to human use. 
202 Linzey, AR, 39-42; AT, 114-118.  
203 Linzey, CRA, 104-110. On this point, see also Linzey’s engagement with William H. Ammon’s 
justification of hunting. Linzey, AT, 114-119. 
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nature, especially when humans encroach on an ecosystem.  Third, nature has a way of 
compensating human efforts to cull a species.
204
   
Linzey also denies that the human practice of hunting is justified because nature 
requires predation.  Such appeals to an amoral system to establish the propriety of the 
actions of moral agents constitute a fallacy.
205
  Indeed, that humans are moral creatures 
ought to open the possibility for the opposite interpretation.
206
  Contrarily, “only if 
parasitical nature is to be celebrated as divinely-purposed existence can hunting for 
amusement be justified” (AT, 114).  Yet neither Linzey’s eschatology nor his christology 
can permit such an affirmation of nature.  For him, hunting violates the eschatological 
vision of creation and the role that humans are meant to play within that vision—a role 
which entails that they “live free of needless misery” (CRA, 108).  If Jesus affirmed the 
mechanisms of evolutionary progress as the good means of authentic development, he 
would have been “the butcher par excellence” (AT, 120).  Such a Jesus would not have 
advocated the image of a good shepherd who dies for the sake of his sheep, a vision that 
strikes at the heart of survival of the fittest.  He would have advocated self-preservation 
(e.g., the hired hand who flees) and benefit through predation (e.g., the slaughter of 
sheep).
207
   
In sum, Linzey finds very few genuine justifications for hunting.  Even so, he 
advocates a gradual approach to culling the practice of hunting, supporting even 
                                               
204 It is interesting that the Burns Report recognizes the lack of success in culling. See Linzey, 
WASM, 92. 
205 Linzey, AR, 40-41. 
206 On this point, see Linzey’s engagement with Schweitzer. Linzey, AR, 43. 
207 Linzey, AT, 120. Linzey acknowledges that his presentation of Jesus’s life-affirming gospel is 
not the only strand of thought in the New Testament. Ibid., 121. However, he rightly notes that Jesus’s life 
and teaching present issues for advocates of any conservationist moral theology that approves of the 
mechanisms of evolution.  
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compromises based on contextual opportunities and limitations.
208
  His foundational 
view, however, remains that hunting, even when justified, still violates eschatological 
hope and christological ethics.   
Fur-Trapping and Farming  
Regarding the logistics of trapping, Linzey holds that “almost all methods 
involved are inherently painful” (CRA, 125).  This argument seems to extend also to other 
forms of killing animals for their products.
209
  Yet he notes that the majority of Christian 
voices—and all of them until very recently—that have spoken about fur-trapping have 
defended the practice.
210
 
For Linzey, the arguments in favor of fur-trapping, including that it protects 
indigenous cultures, facilitates economic well-being, and aids conservation, are all 
faulted.  Regarding indigenous cultures, Linzey states, “Human traditions and ways of 
life may be generally worth defending, but not at any cost and certainly not when they 
depend upon the suffering of thousands if not millions, of wild animals every year” 
(CRA, 127).  But aside from this position, Linzey notes that there is a “distinction 
between what is genuinely indigenous and what are indigenous skills exploited for our 
[non-indigenous peoples’] benefit” (CRA, 127).211  As Linzey notes in a later work, the 
aboriginal contribution to fur-trapping constitutes lower than 0.1% of global fur trade.
212
  
Regarding conservation, Linzey rightly notes these arguments tend to be directed toward 
                                               
208 See Linzey, AG, 133-134. 
209 On this point, see Linzey’s detailed critique of the practice of sealing, in which he 
acknowledges how often regulations are violated and the lack of moral justification for the practice. Linzey, 
WASM, chapter 5. Linzey addresses trapping and fur farming in chapter 4. 
210 Linzey, AG, 116-117. 
211 Linzey brings up cultural practices (e.g., human sacrifice) that are not preserved simply for the 
sake of reverencing a way of life. See Linzey, AG, 120-121. 
212 Linzey, AG, 119; also WASM, 134-136. 
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human benefit in relation to the whole as opposed to any concern for the suffering of 
individual animals.
213
  
Linzey argues that fur farming includes particular forms of deprivation of natural 
living for animals, including “the level of stress and suffering when wild animals are 
restricted to small, barren cages” (AG, 118).  His view is backed by the findings of the 
Scientific Committee on Animal Health and Animal Welfare of the European Union in 
2001, which claims that animals kept for fur are not provided suitable opportunity to 
follow basic instincts of well-being.  With more confidence, Linzey writes, “it is now 
unreasonable to hold that fur farming does not impose suffering on animals” (WASM, 
102).
214
  Even so, “around 50 million mink…and 7 million foxes…are bred each year to 
meet the world demand for their skins” (WASM, 97).   
Linzey’s dominant critique against fur-trapping and farming is that the practices 
do not constitute a necessity for human well-being.
215
 For most humans, fur is not 
necessary for survival or well-being.
216
 Because there is no vital justification for the 
practices and because they violate the hope for all sentient creatures, Linzey finds them to 
represent an unchristian ethics.   
Vegetarianism 
“Of all the ethical challenges arising from animal theology, vegetarianism can 
arguably claim to have the strongest support” (AT, 125).  This support is, for Linzey, 
grounded in scripture and systematic theology.  It furthermore challenges a majority of 
                                               
213 Linzey, CRA, 126. 
214 Linzey notes that the harm of deprivation is greater in fur-farming than other farming practices. 
Linzey, WASM, 101. 
215 Ibid., 106-107. 
216 Linzey, AG, 121. 
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contemporary meat-eating practices—all instances where it is not vitally necessary—by 
claiming that they fail to proclaim the gospel to sentient creatures.   
Linzey notes the biblical ambiguity regarding meat-eating.  Humans are limited to 
a diet of vegetation in Genesis 1 but permitted to eat flesh in Genesis 9.
217
  Ultimately, he 
suggests that the permission to eat meat is an accommodation to cosmic fallenness.
218
  It 
is furthermore limited by the mandate not to take in an animal’s blood, which Linzey 
rightly claims denotes, in the passage’s original context, the animals’ life.  Thus,  
even within this permissive tradition, human beings are not given an entirely free 
hand.  They do not have absolute rights over the lives of animals…the fact that 
man kills is a necessary consequence of sin but the act of killing itself must not 
misappropriate the Creator’s gift. (CRA, 142). 
 
In different writings, Linzey compares the human consumption of meat to 
vampirism—not in terms of evil, but rather in terms of nature.  Drawing on Anne Rice’s 
Interview with the Vampire, he notes the arguments therein in which vampires justify 
consuming human blood by an appeal to the natural order.  Similarly, he muses whether 
or not vegetarians are “opposing the nature of things as given” (AT, 80).  Yet drawing on 
Genesis 1-3, he claims that God’s original intent for creation was not survival of the 
fittest, but rather “a state of perfect Sabbath harmony within creation where humans and 
animals are both prescribed a vegetarian diet” (AT, 80).  
                                               
217 Linzey, CRA, 141-142  
218 See especially Linzey, AT, 127-129. Kemmerer intimates that Linzey’s solution is still 
potentially problematic: “There is much an atheist or Hindu might say about such a God” who 
accommodates human sin by promulgating nonhuman suffering. Kemmerer, In Search of Consistency, 242. 
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Linzey may overstep exegetical bounds when he suggests that “Genesis 1 clearly 
depicts vegetarianism as a divine command” (AT, 125).219  However, he stands on strong 
exegetical grounds when he writes that  
even though the early Hebrews were neither pacifists nor vegetarians, they were 
deeply convicted of the view that violence between humans and animals, and 
indeed between animal species themselves, was not God’s original will for 
creation. (AT, 126)   
 
I also believe Linzey’s position is, while overstated, viable when he writes that “the ideal 
of the peaceable kingdom was never lost sight of” in Israel (AT, 129).  That is, the 
protological claim of edenic peace finds a prophetic counterpart in the Isaianic hope of 
the peaceable kingdom.   
Eschatologically speaking, the new possibilities that Christ opens for creation and 
to which the Spirit enables humans to witness makes vegetarianism “an implicitly 
theological act of greatest significance” (AT, 90).  Says Linzey:  
By refusing to eat meat, we are witnessing to a higher order of existence…By 
refusing to go the way of our ‘natural nature’…by standing against the order of 
unredeemed nature we become signs of the order of existence for which all 
creatures long. (AT, 90-91).   
 
Even if refusing to eat meat stands against what appears to be natural in evolutionary 
history, Linzey maintains that, “from a theological perspective no moral endeavor is 
wasted so long as it coheres with God’s purpose for his cosmos” (CRA, 146). 
As already noted, eschatology facilitates a divide between eco-theologians and 
animal theologians regarding vegetarianism.
220
  Many from the former camp do not 
embrace vegetarianism as a mode of living out the peace for which we hope because they 
                                               
219 The text does claim that humans are given vegetation for food. I agree that vegetarianism is 
implied in this gift—and that therefore one can rightly claim that God does not will meat-eating in Genesis 
1. But an actual divine command is never given.  
220 Linzey, CSG, 37-39. 
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accept predation as a mechanism consummate with the cosmic common good.  For the 
latter, vegetarianism is a facet of living out the imago Dei.
221
  It furthermore bears an 
“anticipatory character” (CSG, 38); it is a proleptic witness to a maximally inclusive 
eschatological hope, “an act of anticipation of the peaceable Kingdom that we seek” 
(CSG, 50).  In this vein, Linzey challenges Matthew Fox’s “Eucharistic law of the 
Universe”—which embraces as good the notion that all life must eat and be eaten—by 
noting that Jesus’s sacrifice reverses survival of the fittest. “The significance of the 
eucharistic meal, therefore, is not the perpetuation of the old world of animal sacrifice but 
precisely our liberation from it” (AT, 122).  The Eucharist is a foretaste of eschatological 
hope.
222
  I believe more can be said here.  The Eucharist, as the meal of communion par 
excellence, is a meal without animal meat.  Christ takes the place of the main course, 
freeing humans to new encounters of peace with animals.    
It should be noted that Linzey’s position is not that meat-eating is never 
permissible.  He contextualizes his vegetarianism, arguing that killing for food “may be 
justifiable, but only when human nourishment clearly requires it, and even then it remains 
an inevitable consequence of sin” (CRA, 142).  Linzey further acknowledges that, “given 
the confusing interrelationship of light and darkness, blessing and curse, it is difficult to 
hold out for any truths so self-evident that people who fail to see them are somehow 
morally culpable” (CRA, 145).  In a similar vein, he claims that  
the biblical case for vegetarianism does not rest on the view that killing may never 
be allowable in the eyes of God, rather on the view that killing is always a grave 
matter.  When we have to kill to live we may do so, but when we do not, we 
should live otherwise. (AT, 131)   
 
                                               
221 See Linzey, WASM, 28-29. 
222 Linzey, AT, 122. This claim is similar to Orthodox claims noted in chapter 1. 
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For whenever one refuses to cause harm and incur the consequence—whether that be 
forfeiting entertainment or even aspects of well-being—she witnesses to the 
eschatological kingdom for which creation longs.
223
   
This claim is theologically necessary on account of Jesus, whom Linzey notes 
was not a vegetarian.
224
  He attributes this point to the divine concession to a fallen world 
in Genesis 9.  It is this concession that draws Jesus, as a person historically located in 
first century Palestine, to consume meat.
225
  In this manner, Linzey emphasizes the 
importance of acknowledging Jesus’s context and the limitations implicit in that 
context.
226
   
God incarnates himself or herself into the limits and constraints of the world as 
we know it.  It is true that one of the purposes of the incarnation was to manifest 
something of the trans-natural possibilities of existence, but no one human life 
can demonstrate, let alone exhaust, all the possibilities of self-giving love. (AT, 
86)   
 
True, Jesus was apparently no vegetarian.  But neither did he campaign against slavery.  
He was not necessarily a visionary with regard to women’s welfare—in fact he 
derogatively referred to a Gentile woman as a dog (see Matthew 15:21-28).  In short, 
Jesus is neither a complete “accommodation to nature” nor the exhaustive answer to 
every moral query that arises in history.  Jesus is “a birth of new possibilities for all 
creation…the beginning of its transformation” (AT, 87; emphasis mine).227  
                                               
223 See Linzey, AT, 132. 
224 On this point, and Jesus’s likely participation in the sacrificial system, see Richard Bauckham, 
“Jesus and Animals II: What Did He Practice?” in Animals on the Agenda: Questions about Animal Ethics 
for Theology and Ethics, Andrew Linzey and Dorothy Yamamoto, editors (Chicago, IL: University of 
Illinois Press, 1998), 50-54. 
225 Linzey, CRA, 47-48. 
226 See Linzey, AT, 134-137. 
227 Bauckham seems to make similar claims in his essays on Jesus in Animals on the Agenda (see 
59-60). Even so, Linzey is uncomfortable with Bauckham’s findings (see 5-6). 
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At any rate, Jesus’s context was very different from the context of most Western 
Christians today.  “For the first time in history of the human race vegetarianism has 
become a publically viable option, at least for those who live in the Western world” (AT, 
83-84).  For most of these people, meat-eating is necessary for neither survival nor 
optimal health.
228
  Furthermore, the mass consumption of animal protein renders other 
food sources unusable for humans, resulting in a net loss of available food for the human 
community.
229
  Based on his view of the importance of sentience, Linzey maintains that  
once it is perceived that satisfactory alternatives to animal protein exist, and are 
sufficiently plenteous to cope with the increased world demand for food, then 
vegetarianism becomes a moral necessity. (AR, 36)
230
  
 
Most of Linzey’s arguments culminate in his eschatology.  He writes, “Those 
individuals who opt for vegetarianism can do so in the knowledge that they are living 
closer to the biblical ideal of peaceableness than their carnivorous contemporaries.”  For 
“to opt for a vegetarian life-style is to take one practical step towards living in peace with 
the rest of creation” (AT, 132).231   
Letting Be  
One of the most basic points of Linzey’s ethics at first glance seemingly strikes 
against transfiguration.  Humans ought to let the nonhuman creation be.
232
  This “letting 
                                               
228 Linzey, AR, 34-37. 
229 Linzey, AR, 35-36. 
230 Here, again, Linzey does not do the best job in his earliest work of making evident the religious 
foundations to his claims. After all, even if there are other viable options to consume protein, if God has 
ordained all creatures for human use (even other sentients), then such options do not make a difference 
regarding the morality meat consumption. Linzey makes a stronger case on this point in later works.   
231 Also, Linzey, CSLTA, 76-77. 
232 Linzey, CSG, 17. While this aspect of Linzey’s ethics initially appears to support 
conservationism, he actually critiques eco-theology’s form of conservation. “In the interest of the ‘whole’ 
(for they often claim to know what the interest of the whole is), they appear only too eager to sacrifice one 
species for another, even if this means ruthless and indiscriminate killing and the infliction of considerable 
suffering” (CSG, 40). Linzey uses two examples from his nation—that of the ruddy duck and the grey 
squirrel—to substantiate this critique. Linzey, CSG, 40-42. To clarify, Linzey is not here suggesting that 
one species is sacrificed to extinction for another’s survival. Rather, he means that individuals from one 
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be” is the “attitude with which we begin” (CRA, 19).  Practically, it entails “respecting at 
least some of the natural instincts which animals possess” (AR, 2-3).   
The concept of “letting be” is a complicated one for Linzey.  He is suspicious of 
conservationist efforts.  For  
the thinking behind attempts at conservation are often anthropocentric (i.e., 
human beings conserve other species not because they have recognized the value 
and rights of other animals but because they themselves will be deprived if some 
other species becomes extinct). (AR, 41)   
 
This suspicion immediately separates Linzey’s earliest thought from the anthropocentric 
conservationism I outlined in chapter 1.  Linzey furthermore separates his position from 
those cosmocentric voices that value the whole over the individual when he claims, 
“From the standpoint of theos-rights, it makes some difference but not much whether it is 
the very last tiger, or one of many thousands, that is gratuitously killed” (CRA, 109).  
Said differently, the value of an individual creature is never subsumed into the value of 
the whole.  Each sentient creature bears the theological dignity that grounds theos-rights.   
 “Letting be” does not mean inactivity or refusal to interact with nonhuman 
nature.
233
  Linzey is adamant that it does not negate our “active responsibilities to animals 
in particular” (CRA, 19).  Nor does letting be intimate blithe participation in the 
mechanisms of the evolutionary process (e.g., the justification of meat-eating).  Letting 
                                                                                                                                            
species that is not near extinction are sacrificed on behalf of individuals from a species that is near 
extinction. 
233 Indeed, there is a place even for control in Linzey’s thought. As I have already noted, he 
acknowledges the validity of self-defense against animals and the protection of food supplies. Linzey, CRA, 
138-139. These situations notwithstanding, Linzey argues, “We must not allow the legitimate justification 
that applies in some limited situations to be extended indiscriminately. Every case of control needs to be 
scrutinized” (CRA, 139). And even those are legitimately grounded in human need must be performed in a 
manner that is humane. Linzey, CRA, 140. Furthermore, situations in which human need (i.e., human 
survival) is not genuinely at risk, methods of control are theologically ungrounded. As an example, Linzey 
notes how humans will overcrowd an area, leaving no room for the wildlife to flourish, and then 
exterminate animals like rabbits, referring to them as encroaching pests. He maintains that the earth is a 
space given to humans and animals. Humans must limit their expansion accordingly. Linzey, CRA, 140-
141. 
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be denotes a reverence for the blessing God has given to the nonhuman creation.
234
  It 
means letting creation be free and significant without reference to human value.   
What does “letting be” look like?  One dimension of it that Linzey emphasizes is 
the issue of captivity, most particularly zoos and circuses, which entail “the curtailment 
or frustration of the animal’s basic instincts and freedoms” (AR, 58).235  Linzey 
categorizes such uses of animals—alongside hunting for sport—under the heading 
“wanton injury.”236  Also, on farms animals must be permitted to act out their natural 
inclinations, including appropriate sustenance and an open environment that permits 
natural movement.
237
  Linzey later argues that the notion of theos-rights renders these 
permissions necessary; for “animals have a God-given right to be animals” (CRA, 112).238  
Again, “the de-beaked hen in a battery cage is more than a moral crime, it is a living sign 
of our failure to recognize the blessing of God in creation” (CRA, 112).   
In Animal Rights, Linzey also intimates keeping animals companions as a 
violation of the letting be of animality.  On this point, he differentiates between “moral 
dominion,” which is “an attitude of respect for life and regulating human existence in 
such a way as to exploit as little of other sentient life as possible”, and “human 
patronage,” which “invites us to patronize animals as if they were in need of our moral 
protection” (AR, 67).  In this early stage of his thought, Linzey maintains that “animals 
are not in need of our charity” (AR, 67).  There is a large shift in Linzey’s later thought.  
                                               
234 Linzey, CRA, 18-21. 
235 See also, Linzey, CRA, 130-131. 
236 Linzey, CRA, 104-110. 
237 See Linzey, AR, 64-66. 
238 Such an argument would apparently apply to predatory animals as well. In a discussion on 
cloning, Linzey asks whether or not humans should not be able to “manipulate animals genetically—that is, 
to change their God-given nature” (AG, 114). It is unclear, in Linzey’s theological framework, how much 
of a predatory animals’ nature is God-given. Moreover, it is unclear what exactly constitutes the nature of 
such an animal, especially if their inclusion in the eschaton entails the dissolution of their predatory habits.   
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This shift is evident in his emphasis on animals actually being in need of human moral 
protection—and indeed, such is a central role of humans.239  It is also evident in the 
adjustment regarding his view of companion animals.  In Christianity and the Rights of 
Animals, while he maintains that there are many drawbacks to keeping pets,
240
 he softens 
his view by claiming that only “some forms of pet-keeping may well be immoral” (CRA, 
136).
241
   
Another dimension of “letting be”—and one that, in my opinion, is crucial to 
Linzey’s view—is his claim that “human beings are not responsible for what the natural 
world may bequeath to animals in the forms of drought, disease and death, except 
perhaps to alleviate the suffering caused whenever the situation arises” (AR, 58).  The 
significance of this claim suggests that peaceful actions that serve as witnesses to 
eschatological hope can never become scientific attempts to create Eden on earth.   
Yet another dimension of “letting be” concerns genetic manipulation.  In Animal 
Theology, he “rejects absolutely the idea that animals should be genetically manipulated 
to provide better meat-machines or laboratory tools” (AT, 138).  When it comes to 
manipulating creation, Christian theologians and ethicists must be more specific than 
“fashionable talk of the ‘integrity of creation’” divorced from more precise guidelines 
(AG, 99).  Later he writes that “genetic engineering represents the concretization of the 
absolute claim that animals belong to us and exist for us” (AT, 143).  He rightly notes that 
animal formulas—or more correctly, actual animals that have been formulated—have 
                                               
239 Oddly, Linzey seems to make this point in his earliest work with reference to Paul’s vision of 
cosmic redemption in Romans 8. AR, 74.  
240 See also CRA, 133-138. 
241 Also, Linzey, CSG, 86. 
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even been patented as property.
242
  In the face of such developments, Linzey notes our 
new context in which “we now have the absolute technology to reduce animals to things” 
(AG, 101).   
Linzey wants to balance “letting-be” with the claim that humans are instrumental 
in witnessing to—or even contributing to—the eschatological redemption of the world by 
action performed in the power of the Spirit.  So what is the criterion for adjudicating 
between these two poles?  Human interaction must accord with God’s desire for the 
created order without disrupting the good integrity, which exists alongside the corruption 
of creation, already in place in the cosmos.
243
 
Against Institutionalized Suffering 
As already noted, Linzey acknowledges the necessity—indeed in many cases the 
unavoidability—of violence.  However, rare acts of violence driven by necessity are not 
the same as the institutionalization of violence.  It is this legal justification of the 
common practice of causing millions of animals an immense amount of suffering that 
Linzey seeks first and foremost to restrict and ultimately eliminate.   
  In Animal Gospel, Linzey advocates six steps toward this end.
244
  First, humans 
must be provided with a “space for an ethical appreciation of living creatures” (AG, 127).  
For Linzey, this step entails encouraging the childlike intuition to protect nonhuman 
animals.  Second, advocates must bring light to cruel practices of the various forms of 
institutionalized suffering.  Third, animal rights scholars must engage in interdisciplinary 
dialogues and debates concerning their positions; for “we shall not change the world for 
animals without also changing people’s ideas about the world” (AG, 130).  Fourth, animal 
                                               
242 Linzey, AT, 143; AC, 101-102. 
243 See Linzey, AT, 144-145. 
244 Linzey, AG, 126-139. 
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advocates must seek, as consumers, “to institutionalize informed ethical choice” (AG, 
131).
245
  This step entails accurate labeling of products and transparency about how the 
various dimensions that go into that product come to reach the aggregate whole that 
consumers purchase.  For instance, are eggs from free range chickens?  Are the chickens 
genetically modified?  Are the chickens permitted other natural tendencies (e.g., 
vegetarian feed)?  These questions help consumers make informed choices concerning 
the animal products they purchase.  Fifth, there must be legislation that is both gradual 
(i.e., not all or nothing for animals) and truly progressive (i.e., that entails more than 
cosmetic changes to institutionalized suffering).  In a later work, Linzey notes that “only 
changes in laws secure lasting protection” (WASM, 66).  Sixth, though Linzey is critical 
of capitalism, he argues that there are enough people who would seek alternative products 
if they were offered.
246
  
SOME ISSUES IN LINZEY’S THEOLOGICAL ETHICS 
In the last chapter, I intimated some problems with Moltmann’s ethics with 
reference to individual nonhuman animals.  Here, I want to consider some potentially 
problematic areas of Linzey’s thought.  Because these areas include both his theology and 
his ethics, I have designated them a separate section of this chapter.  The problems I will 
address include Linzey’s identification of his thought as theocentric as opposed to 
anthropocentric or cosmocentric; his emphasis on creation as belonging to God in 
conjunction with his notion of creation as a gift; and his application of christology, 
pneumatology, and eschatology to sentient creatures but not to non-sentient life and the 
                                               
245 Also, Linzey, WASM, 66-67. 
246 See Linzey, AG, 136-137. Linzey offers reported numbers of public opinion regarding cruel 
practices to support his thesis.  
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resulting exclusion of the non-sentient creation from theos-rights.  While these issues are 
significant, they do not deprive Linzey’s work of the heart of its impact.     
AN INADEQUATE APPEAL TO THEOCENTRISM 
 Like Moltmann and many other thinkers, Linzey attempts to appeal to 
theocentrism in order to dislodge the anthropocentric tendencies of Western thought.
247
  
The first foundation of his theos-rights is that “creation exists for its Creator” (AT, 24).  
Linzey couples this claim with the belief that God is also for creation, even to the point of 
self-sacrifice.  However, the problematic claim here is that God’s main interest in 
creation seems to be a self-service.  Is God only for creation because creation is for God?  
Does a theocentrism that claims the value of creation is completely reducible to its value 
for God really reflect the self-emptying triune God of other-affirming love?
248
  It seems 
to me that, if pressed, Linzey would answer both questions negatively.  For while it is 
true that humanity is “not the centre of all that is valuable” (CRA, 17), neither is God—
which the juxtaposition of theocentrism and anthropocentrism here seems to suggest.  
God does not hoard value.  Yet such is a possible interpretation of Linzey’s work, as 
Kemmerer evinces: “Linzey’s theory protects the environment and anymals from human 
abuse and plundering, and this is done for the sake of God, not for the sake of the land, 
seas, plants, or animals including all people.”249  This reading is not, in my view, what 
Linzey intends.  But his appeal to theocentrism does permit it.   He should thus more 
plainly acknowledge that God’s love of creation is not centered on what God gets out of 
                                               
247 See Linzey, AT, 24, 66-67; CRA, 76. Kemmerer, In Search of Consistency, 230-231. Michael 
Northcott also categorizes Linzey as theocentric rather than humanocentric or ecocentric. See The 
Environment and Christian Ethics, 146. 
248 On these questions, see Wennberg, God, Humans, and Animals, 185-87. 
249 Kemmerer, In Search of Consistency, 270-271. Kessemer uses the term “anymal” as a 
contraction of “any” and “animal” in order denote an inclusive view of all animals that also captures the 
complexity and diversity of the animal kingdom. 
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it.
250
  God is the origin of all value.
251
  Yet because God values that which is other than 
God as that which is other than God, a value-based theocentrism is as inappropriate 
theologically as anthropocentrism.  In my view, only a value-based cosmocentrism 
couched within a theocentrism—that is, couched within the claim that it is God who 
establishes and upholds that all creation is valuable in itself before God—can capture the 
position Linzey advocates.
252
        
THEOS-RIGHTS AND THE LANGUAGE OF “GIFT” 
Linzey’s view of theos-rights is predicated upon the notion that creation is God’s 
creation.  It does not properly belong to humans.  Yet this view of God’s ownership over 
creation is problematic when placed in relation to his claim that creation is a gift.  This 
problem is best expressed in the following quote: “All life, nephesh, is a gift from God.  
It belongs to him alone” (CRA, 30).  If life is truly a gift from God, how can it belong to 
God alone—unless it is a gift from God to God?  If not, does not the giving of a gift 
entail a forfeit of ownership?
253
   
This problem seems linked to Linzey’s appeal to theocentrism.  He wants to avoid 
anthropocentrism, so he undermines human ownership with an appeal to divine 
ownership.  Yet if God has truly given creation its own space to be, then it seems to me 
Linzey would be better off to state that God forfeits absolute ownership over life in 
                                               
250 Linzey comes close to this claim, but does not make it explicitly. See Linzey, AT, 25. 
251 Linzey, CRA, 77. 
252 Linzey, CSG, 18; WASM, 56. At any rate, appeals to theocentrism do not solve anything. For 
contra Linzey’s implication, there is no inherent contradiction in claiming that animals serve the glory of 
God by existing for human use. On this implication, see Linzey, CRA, 24. After all, Thomas Aquinas was 
theocentric as well. 
253 John Hart offers a very similar (if not identical) critique of the use of the term “gift” in 
magisterial documents of the Catholic Church. See John Hart, What Are They Saying about Environmental 
Theology? (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 2004), chapter 2.  See especially his discussion of the U. S. 
Bishops’ pastoral letter on climate change and their use of the “somewhat contradictory concepts” of “gift” 
and “stewardship.” Ibid., 35-36. For a good discussion and exploration of the problematic and promising 
notion gift with relation to the created order, see Mark Manolopoulos, If Creation is a Gift (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 2009). 
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gifting living creatures with nephesh in the hope that will be returned to God anew as a 
free gift.  The original gifting is not, however, God giving creation to humanity, but 
rather the gifting of creation to itself.  Thus, the return gift would not entail humanity 
offering creation to God, but rather the creation as a whole returning to God—to 
participate in God’s own life.254       
THE INCARNATION, THE ESCHATON, AND NON-SENTIENT DEATH 
As I have already noted, Linzey excludes non-sentient creatures from theos-rights.  
His christological, pneumatological, and eschatological foundations for these rights do 
not apply to creatures that cannot suffer.  Christ’s suffering bears no concrete meaning 
for those that cannot suffer.  Non-sentient life does have the nephesh.  These creatures do 
not require any eschatological compensation for their plight in history.   
Still, one wonders what the eschatological telos of fish and insects might be.  
They are alive and they will die.  Christ’s suffering notwithstanding, does not his death 
and resurrection have redemptive meaning for these creatures?  Should humans, in the 
power of the Spirit, not bear witness to this redemption in a manner similar as Linzey 
calls them to do so for sentients?   
It appears not.  For Linzey, the distinction of sentience is a morally relevant 
one.
255
  He argues that “lettuce do not possess responding capacities for self-awareness 
and are therefore not capable of being injured as we know to be true in the case of 
mammals and humans to say the least” (AT, 74).256  He does acknowledge that there are 
“grey areas” such as “slugs, snails, earthworms and the like” (AT, 74).  While he is 
                                               
254 In this sense, this view would be different from many Orthodox theologians’ view of natural 
priesthood. 
255 See Linzey, WASM, chapter 1. 
256 Again, “there is no evidence of reason…to suppose that plants are sentient” (WASM, 53). See 
also WASM, 137-138.  
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agnostic concerning the possibility of their sentience, he still maintains, “I would oppose 
the gratuitous slaughter of any of them” (AT, 74).   
Even so, the killing of individual non-sentient creatures does not seem to be an 
issue for Linzey.
257
  Yet it seems problematic to me that death is not morally relevant for 
Linzey.  If Christ conquers death in the resurrection, then why should not this theological 
claim apply to all creatures that die?      
CONCLUSION 
It seems to me that the basic question of Linzey’s entire moral theology is this: 
“How could it be that a God who out of love creates animals would delight in their 
gratuitous destruction?” (AT, 104).  The question is rhetorical.  The trinitarian God whose 
very nature is love and whose character is most fully revealed in the Son’s incarnational 
kenosis and the Spirit’s fellow-suffering with all sentient creatures suggests that human 
relations with those creatures, in order to be just, must seek their well-being in the form 
of the alleviation of suffering and promulgation of rights.  God’s desire must be for 
peace, not predation; harmony, not bloody competition; kenotic love, not self-
aggrandizing power.   
This desire grounds the rights of all creatures relationally, for they are all 
creatures before the God who created them and seeks their well-being.  The completion 
                                               
257 Northcott, in my view, misreads Linzey on this point, offering an overly positive evaluation of 
Linzey’s ethics vis-à-vis non-sentient life. See The Environment and Christian Ethics, 146-147. Better is 
Kemmerer’s reading (and critique) of Linzey’s exclusion of plants from theos-rights. See Kemmerer, In 
Search of Consistency, 271-279. Linzey critiques Singer’s utilitarian ethics because it supports late term 
abortion and early infanticide. This view “necessitates in turn the rejection of the view that killing 
innocents is always wrong” (WASM, 153). Here Linzey reveals his deontological leaning. However, he also 
reveals the tension in his own position. Singer’s view is predicated upon sentience—including self-
awareness—which he doubts fetuses and extremely young infants possess. Linzey rejects this position by 
appealing to innocence—it is wrong to take innocent life. Yet when it comes to plants and supposedly non-
sentient animals, Linzey sets aside the notion of innocent life and appeals to sentience. Thus, Linzey is 
forced to argue that the potential for sentience makes a difference. So, his position is not that it is wrong to 
kill innocent life, but rather that it is wrong to kill innocent sentient and sentient-to-be life. WASM, 154.  
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of the ultimate vision of God remains an eschatological hope that remains out of the 
reach of human striving and political programs.  In world that is fallen and incomplete, 
there can be no edenic state.  Nonetheless, that hope has broken into the history of the 
cosmos with the incarnation and the new loosing of the Spirit.  This breaking-in opens up 
the possibility for humans to more fully become the imago Dei by practicing peace 
toward nonhuman animals.  Forms of this practice include the culling of animal 
experimentation, the fur industry, hunting, and meat-eating.  They also include working 
toward a more just society for animals through the establishment of legal protection.   
In short, the rights of God are best recognized when God’s desires for the creation 
to which God has given space are taken up and honored by humans in the power of the 
Spirit.  When humans act in this manner, they become sacraments of the eschaton—the 
peaceable kingdom in which all creatures will be freed from the darker mechanisms of 
evolution, most notably suffering and death.  Therefore, seeking the rights of sentient 
animals—among other forms of seeking animal welfare—constitutes a proleptic witness 
to cosmic eschatological hope within history.  Such is the responsibility of humans in the 
wake of Christ’s salvific movement and the Spirit’s empowering presence.    
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CHAPTER 4  
TOWARD A VISION OF COSMOCENTRIC TRANSFIGURATION:  
THEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS, CHALLENGES, AND ETHICAL PRINCIPLES   
 
To this point I have explored the theological foundations and ethical principles for 
all four paradigms of eco-theological ethics by dialoguing with particular Christian 
thinkers.  As I wrote in the introduction, delineating and exploring this taxonomy of 
paradigms constitutes one of the central interests of the present work.  However, I also 
noted that I believe cosmocentric transfiguration remains an under-engaged and under-
developed paradigm in the field.  As such is the case, another significant aim of the 
present work is to develop constructively a coherent eco-theological ethics of 
cosmocentric transfiguration.  This task is the focus of this final chapter.   
To accomplish it, I will first offer a comparative analysis of Moltmann and Linzey 
with regard to both theology and ethics.  At this intersection, I will propose a set of 
theological claims that can serve as the foundation for cosmocentric transfiguration.  
With this foundation in place, I will explore possible critiques of the paradigm, drawing 
on central tenets of the other paradigms.  Next, in order to frame the practical application 
of cosmocentric transfiguration, I will propose, in an introductory fashion, that a 
proportionalism qualified by an emphasis on virtue is the most promising ethical 
framework for the paradigm.  Lastly, I will suggest concrete ethical principles with 
regard to both the micro- (i.e., individual sentient and non-sentient life forms) and the 
macro- (e.g., species, eco-systems, and the cosmos at large) levels of creation.  
Ultimately, at the intersection of concern for individuals and concern for groups, systems, 
and the whole I will suggest cosmocentric transfiguration is best summarized by two 
poles of tension: preservation and protest.    
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JÜRGEN MOLTMANN AND ANDREW LINZEY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
The tensions evident among the four paradigms provide valuable insights into the 
promises and challenges of cosmocentric transfiguration.  Before addressing these 
insights, however, I must first establish with greater specificity what the paradigm might 
look like.  To this end, I will compare and contrast—with an ultimate view toward 
synthesizing—the work of Moltmann and Linzey on both a theological and an ethical 
level.   
As far as I can tell, Moltmann never cites Linzey in his work.  Linzey does 
infrequently cite Moltmann, though at times only to critique a perceived anthropocentric 
deficiency.
1
  Given this dearth of interaction, I here seek to examine the convergences, 
divergences, and ambiguities that exist between their thought.  In my view, Moltmann 
tends to provide a more thoroughly developed theological foundation for cosmocentric 
transfiguration while Linzey is far better for establishing how these foundations translate 
into practice with regard to (at least sentient) nonhuman animals. 
THEOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 
Moltmann’s doctrine of the social Trinity is a well-developed theological vision 
that draws heavily on trinitarian conversations throughout the history of Christianity.  
Linzey’s emphasis on God’s nature as love is emblematic of Moltmann, who also 
maintains that God’s nature is best described as love.  This view grounds for both 
theologians the nature of God’s love for creation, which includes a stark challenge to 
divine impassibility inasmuch as God suffers in that love.
2
  Yet Moltmann’s expression 
                                               
1 See, for instance, Linzey’s assessment of The Crucified God and God in Creation. Andrew 
Linzey, Animal Theology, (Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1994), 191. 
2 On Moltmann, see Jürgen Moltmann, The Crucified God: The Cross of Christ as the Foundation 
and Criticism of Christian Theology, translated by R. A. Wilson (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1993); 
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of the Trinity as a divine community of persons whose perfect unity is established by a 
self-emptying perichoretic love is much stronger theologically than Linzey’s more basic 
appeal to God as love.
3
  This strength correlates to a clearer expression of what trinitarian 
love means for creation—most particularly that the divine nature is intimated in the very 
act of creation, which entails a divine kenosis of withdrawal in order to seek genuinely 
communion with that which is other than God.
4
      
At any rate, both Moltmann and Linzey claim that the Trinity desires communion 
with the world.
5
  Yet the world does not seem to reflect the perichoretic union of the 
divine.  Rather, it reflects the mechanisms of evolutionary development which, while 
including dimensions of harmony, balance, and symbiosis on the level of eco-systems, 
still throughout history and in the lives of individual creatures entails competition, 
gratuitous suffering, and death.   
Moltmann and Linzey both evince a level of ambiguity regarding the etiology of 
these mechanisms—and also some tension with one another.  Linzey seems more anxious 
to maintain the traditional doctrine of the Fall, even if it must be initially relegated to an 
angelic corruption prior to the existence of humanity.
6
  While Moltmann desires to 
maintain that the mechanisms of evolution cannot be the final word from God regarding 
the fate of the cosmos, he is more willing to discard an historical Fall that results from 
                                                                                                                                            
Jürgen Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom: The Doctrine of God , translated by Margaret Kohl 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), chapter 2. On Linzey, see Andrew Linzey, Animal Theology, 
(Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1994), 48-52. 
3 See Moltmann’s Trinity and the Kingdom.  
4 See Jürgen Moltmann, God in Creation: A New Theology of Creation and the Spirit of God, 
translated by Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), 75-86; Trinity and the Kingdom, 106-8. 
5 Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom, 57; Linzey, Animal Theology, 24. 
6 See Andrew Linzey, Animal Gospel (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1998), 15; 
Andrew Linzey, “C. S. Lewis’s Theology of Animals,” Anglican Theological Review 80/1 (Winter 
1998),106. For more considerations on an angelic fall, see Robert N. Wennberg, God, Humans, and 
Animals: An Invitation to Enlarge Our Moral Universe (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans 
Publishing Company, 2003), 327-330. 
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sin.
7
  In my opinion, neither Linzey nor Moltmann are satisfactory here.  Linzey 
contributes something important in his refusal to credit (or blame) God for the shadowy 
sides of evolution.  Moltmann contributes something important in his refusal to attribute 
evolution to some evil will, such as humans or angels.  I believe there is a third 
possibility here that includes both contributions.  I will develop this option below.  At this 
point, it is enough to note that Linzey and Moltmann are in unity in maintaining that the 
mechanisms of evolution constitute an issue for divine love and justice and must be 
remedied through eschatological redemption.
8
   
As with theology proper, Moltmann’s christology is more developed than 
Linzey’s.  This point notwithstanding, both recognize the incarnation as significant for 
nonhuman animals, drawing on the import of Christ taking on flesh, suffering, and dying.  
Linzey emphasizes mainly Christ’s meaning for nonhuman creatures with flesh and blood 
that suffer.
9
  Moltmann does not neglect this dimension of the incarnation.  Christ 
experiences their transience as well as the disposition of humans.  He becomes the 
ultimate victim of evolution, the sufferer par excellence, and thereby draws their plight 
into the trinitarian life in order to secure redemption for all.
10
  However, Moltmann’s 
christology is more extensive than Linzey’s, for he also stresses the import of Christ’s 
death and resurrection for all living things that die.  Even more generally, Moltmann 
claims that Christ’s experience of transience bears salvific meaning for every bit of 
                                               
7 Jürgen Moltmann, The Coming of God: Christian Eschatology, translated by Margaret Kohl 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996), 91-92. 
8 Jürgen Moltmann, Sun of Righteousness, Arise! God’s Future for Humanity and the Earth, 
translated by Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2010), 221; Linzey, Animal Theology, 81. 
9 Andrew Linzey, Christianity and the Rights of Animals (New York, NY: Crossroad, 1987), 79-
80. 
10 Jürgen Moltmann, The Way of Jesus Christ: Christology in Messianic Dimensions, translated by 
Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1993), 296. 
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matter in the cosmos.
11
  In this sense, Moltmann fits within the category of 
“cosmocentric” somewhat easier than Linzey, whose theology tends more toward a 
sentiocentrism.
12
   
While Moltmann and Linzey both maintain that the Spirit bears a role as the 
vitalizing principle of life, as with christology, they diverge on the extent of this role.  For 
Linzey, the Spirit’s vitalizing presence is primarily located in sentient creatures of flesh 
and blood.  The Spirit suffers with suffering creatures.
13
  For Moltmann, the Spirit is the 
manner of divine immanence in the entire cosmos, from rocks to trees to antelopes to 
humans.  The Spirit suffers with suffering creatures, experiences death in all life that dies, 
and knows the transience of all transient creation.
14
  This pneumatological difference in 
Moltmann and Linzey correlates to a disparity regarding the eschatological presence of 
the Spirit in creatures.  In Moltmann’s framework, the Spirit renders present the advent of 
eternal life for all creation.
15
  Linzey largely limits the redemptive presence of the Spirit 
to sentient creatures.
16
  This difference aside, both Moltmann and Linzey agree that the 
Spirit’s eschatological presence has a unique meaning for human beings in that it 
establishes their ability to witness to eschatological hope within the flow of history.
17
  
However, they differ about the nature of this witness.  Linzey focuses on theos-rights, 
                                               
11 Moltmann, The Way of Jesus Christ, 253; The Coming of God, 92-93. 
12 Linzey acknowledges this point. See Linzey, Christianity and the Rights of Animals, 84-85. 
13 Andrew Linzey, Creatures of the Same God: Explorations in Animal Theology (New York, NY: 
Lantern Books, 2009), 14. 
14 Jürgen Moltmann, The Spirit of Life: A Universal Affirmation, translated by Margaret Kohl 
(Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1992), 51; God in Creation, 96-97. 
15 Jürgen Moltmann, The Church in the Power of the Spirit: A Contribution to Messianic 
Ecclesiology, translated by Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1993), 199-206; Spirit of 
Life, 74. 
16 See Linzey, Christianity and the Rights of Animals, 69. 
17 Moltmann, Church in the Power of the Spirit, 196; God in Creation, 101; Linzey, Christianity 
and the Rights of Animals, 75; Animal Theology, 56. 
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which he limits to sentients.  Moltmann focuses on the rights of the entire cosmos, though 
at times neglecting individual animals.     
Both Moltmann and Linzey expand the traditional scope of the eschatological 
community.  The common ground of this expansion entails the inclusion of every 
individual victim of suffering, human or nonhuman, that has ever lived in history.
18
  
Therefore, the eschaton necessitates a resurrection of every individual sentient creature 
that has ever graced the earth with its presence.  The two thinkers diverge on the issue of 
non-sentient life.  Linzey does not reject the possibility of their inclusion, but strongly 
emphasizes sentient creatures on this point.
19
  For Moltmann suffering is not the only 
significant problem that a just God must overcome.  God must also overcome transience, 
which includes death.
20
  Therefore all dying life (which is to say all life) must be 
resurrected and freed from its transience.
21
   
One major difference between Moltmann and Linzey is the issue of time.  The 
reason for this difference is that Moltmann develops a theology of time while Linzey 
does not.
22
  Moltmann juxtaposes phenomenological time with eternal time.  The latter is 
the gathering up of the all moments of the former into a perichoretic union of presence.  
Said differently, eternity renders each moment of history eternally significant.
23
   
Finally, both Moltmann and Linzey lay on Spirit-filled humanity the grace-
enabled potential and responsibility to witness to eschatological hope in the present.  
                                               
18 Moltmann, The Coming of God, 69-70, 306-308; Linzey, Creatures of the Same God, 133, n. 13. 
19 Andrew Linzey, After Noah: Animals and the Liberation of Theology (Herndon, VA: Mowbray, 
1997), 82-84. 
20 See especially Moltmann, The Way of Jesus Christ, 252. 
21 Moltmann, The Coming of God, 92. 
22 On Moltmann, see Richard Bauckham, “Time and Eternity,” in God Will Be All in All: The 
Eschatology of Jürgen Moltmann (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2001), 158-73; also, chapter 2 of the 
present work. 
23 While I believe Moltmann’s view on time requires adjustment—as I will do below—it 
nonetheless provides a powerful foundation for the ethical treatment of individual animals. 
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Moltmann does so through his theological appropriation of Ernst Bloch’s philosophy of 
hope.  Linzey does so through an appeal to christology, pneumatology, and the lives of 
saints in history.  The main tension of their thought here is how they express the relation 
between history and eschatology.  Moltmann’s creative expression of the categories of 
novum and adventus in conjunction with his detailed exploration of time helps to solidify 
both why and the manner in which eschatology informs ethics in the unfolding of history.  
That is, the eschatological future, which is God’s coming and arrival, does not burgeon 
out of history but rather accosts history as that which is genuinely new (novum).  This 
coming is already affecting history now, for history is in its adventus.
24
  In the advent of 
God’s coming and arrival, new possibilities manifest, if only as creatio anticipativa, 
within history.
25
  The distinction between creatio anticipativa and creatio nova distances 
Moltmann from all attempts to establish the kingdom on earth via human efforts and 
political programs.  Linzey at times struggles to achieve this distance.
26
   
ETHICAL ANALYSIS  
Moltmann’s theology grounds an ethics of transfiguration.  Yet his (somewhat) 
concrete application of that theology is oddly conservationist.  Linzey, while less 
theologically comprehensive than Moltmann, fares far better in my view with regard to 
the construction of an ethics that  is consistent with his theological claims—at least with 
regard to sentient life.   
As already noted, regarding the inanimate and non-sentient creation, Linzey 
remains somewhat silent.  He does not deny the value of these dimensions of the 
                                               
24 See Moltmann, The Coming of God, 21-29. 
25 Moltmann, God in Creation, 197-206. 
26 For example, Linzey, Christianity and the Rights of Animals, 104. 
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cosmos.
27
  Yet he does deny them theos-rights.
28
  He is furthermore less concrete 
regarding human action in this sphere of creation.  I have suggested that Linzey has no 
explicit ethical qualms with the death of individual non-sentient creatures—with the 
exception of gratuitous slaughter.
29
  He thus seems to accept implicitly a conservationist 
ethics for all non-sentient creation.   
Moltmann is adamant that the inanimate creation should have rights.
30
  Here he 
differs from Linzey.  Yet these rights, while more explicit, amount to a similar 
conservationist ethics.  Moltmann calls for preservation, including absolute protection of 
endangered or rare ecosystems and respect for the integrity of natural systems, including 
a letting be on the part of humans.
31
     
Regarding sentient nonhuman animals, Linzey and Moltmann evince a 
divergence.  Both speak of the importance of rights for nonhuman animals.
32
  Oddly, 
while Moltmann clearly suggests that a conservationist ethics is not sufficient 
theologically, it is just this sort of ethics that he delineates.  He hints at an eschatological 
ethics, but ultimately remains agnostic about its practical consequences.
33
  The only 
concrete ethics he offers regarding sentient creatures pertains to the preservation of 
species, the cessation of genetic manipulation, and the promulgation of an environment 
that meets the natural needs and desires of nonhuman animals.
34
 
                                               
27 Ibid.., 8-9, 85. 
28 Ibid.., 84. 
29 Linzey, Animal Theology, 74. 
30 Jürgen Moltmann, God for a Secular Society: The Public Relevance of Theology, translated by 
Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1999), 112-113. 
31 Jürgen Moltmann, Ethics of Hope, translated by Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress 
Press, 2012), 144-145. 
32 Moltmann, The Way of Jesus Christ, 256, 307-8; Linzey, Animal Theology, 19-23. 
33 Moltmann, The Way of Jesus Christ, 311. 
34 Moltmann, Ethics of Hope, 144. 
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With regard to sentient nonhumans, Linzey is more consistent than Moltmann 
with regard to praxis.  His concrete ethics follows the logic of his theological 
foundations.  If the eschatological future is breaking into the present in some manner and 
permitting new practices of peace, then those practices ought to reflect that future.  For 
Linzey (and Moltmann) that future is peace—the cessation of competition and violence 
and the end of suffering for each individual creature.  Based on this vision, Linzey 
suggests that rights should work towards more than preservation; they should work 
toward eschatological peace.
35
  Thus, he calls for the end of institutionalized suffering 
and the progressive disengagement of practices such as hunting, fishing, sealing, fur-
farming and trapping, experimenting on animals, and meat-eating.
36
   
THEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR COSMOCENTRIC TRANSFIGURATION  
In the introduction, I delineated three theological loci for establishing a taxonomy 
of eco-theological ethics: cosmology, anthropology, and eschatology.  Correlating to 
these loci, both Moltmann and Linzey concur on three foundational theological claims.  
First, God has created a good cosmos and desires communion with every single 
instantiation of life therein.  Second, God has appointed humanity with a special 
responsibility in this creation.  Third, the cosmos, while good, has become in some sense 
distorted (or at the very least remains incomplete and disoriented) and requires 
eschatological redemption, a redemption that includes every creature with which God 
desires communion.  While these three claims are the central tenets of cosmocentric 
transfiguration, they benefit from a broader theological framework.  Having examined the 
                                               
35 See Linzey, Christianity and the Rights of Animals, 86-89. I make this claim partly because 
Linzey writes that “Christian ethics is essentially eschatological.” Linzey, Animal Gospel, 17.  
36 See chapter 3 of the present work. 
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convergences, divergences, and ambiguities that arise at the intersection of Moltmann 
and Linzey, I can now develop this framework in greater detail.
37
    
THEOLOGY PROPER: GOD AS THE COMMUNITY OF LOVE 
The doctrine of the Trinity may not be necessary for an animal theology, but 
when developed in a certain manner, it is a powerful foundation for such theology.
38
  
While the biblical grounds for the doctrine are less than obvious, the historical 
appropriation of scripture is not.
39
  What remains undecided in contemporary recoveries 
of the doctrine of the Trinity is how to navigate the perpetual tension between God as a 
unity and God as a community.
40
  Yet this navigation has implications for all of theology, 
including ecclesiology and cosmology.
41
    
Moltmann’s social doctrine of the Trinity maintains that God’s oneness is 
constituted by the perichoretic relations of the three divine persons.
42
  Such a view 
provides a strong foundation for cosmocentric transfiguration.  It facilitates a manner of 
                                               
37 Two issues arise here: one of method and one of content. Regarding method, the reader may at 
this point ask how I am going about constructing these foundations. Why accept one interpretation and 
reject another? My constructive work is a thought experiment. At the intersection of Moltmann and Linzey, 
I am seeking to develop a systematic theological foundation for cosmocentric transfiguration. I will address 
the theological validity of this view, including the question of hermeneutics with regard to both the 
interpretation of scripture and tradition, below. 
Regarding content, the reader will note the absence of both soteriology and ecclesiology from the 
headings. As I noted in the introduction, my soteriological vision is implicit at the intersection of 
anthropology, cosmology, and eschatology. In its ultimate form, it is the perichoretic communion of 
creation with God and with itself. In its present form, it is the overcoming of isolation, both within the 
cosmos and between the cosmos and God, and the opening of the way toward communion. With regard to 
cosmocentric transfiguration and ecclesiology, my view is implicit in my anthropology. In short, the church 
is to be that community in which eschatological witness becomes most clear for the entire created order.  
38 On this point, see Catherine Mowry LaCugna’s work on the Trinity. God for Us: The Trinity 
and Christian Life (San Francisco, CA: Harper, 1993). She discusses the implications for the Trinity and 
animals briefly on page 396. 
39 See Franz Dünzl, A Brief History of the Doctrine of the Trinity in the Early Church, translated 
by John Bowden (New York, NY: T & T Clark, 2007). 
40 This tension is captured both in Moltmann’s Trinity and the Kingdom, 10-20 and Karl Rahner, 
The Trinity, translated by Joseph Donceel (New York, NY: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 2005). 
41 See LaCugna’s God for Us. See also Miroslav Volf, After Our Likeness: The Church as the 
Image of the Trinity (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Company, 1998); John Zizioulas, Being as 
Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church (New York: Crestwood, 1985).  
42 On this development, see Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom. 
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navigating the tension between God’s unity and community by suggesting the former is 
irrevocably constituted in the intensity of the latter.  In this constitution, the doctrine 
opens the space for an appropriation of a dynamic and relational ontology as opposed to a 
static and substantial one.  It also provides a basis for cosmology; for the love that 
constitutes God’s unity is the catalyst for the creation of that which is other than God and 
the pursuit of that other for the sake of communion.  On this point both Moltmann and 
Linzey concur.
43
  This cosmology suggests that it is insufficient to claim that the Logos 
as divine reason is both the ground and destiny of the cosmos.  Rather, the ground and 
destiny of the cosmos is the Logos as divine reason expressed as perichoretic love.  Thus, 
all that is created, all that exists, is the object of divine pursuit for the sake of perichoretic 
communion. 
COSMOLOGY: THE GOD OF SUFFERING AND PURSUING LOVE 
Metaphorically speaking, pursuit and alterity necessitate at least an initial 
distance.  Thus, for God to create and to pursue in love a cosmos that is truly other-than-
God mandates a distance between God and creation.  While the divine openness to 
creation entails divine immanence, pursuing love requires divine transcendence.  This 
distance means that God must be able and willing to suffer the cosmos its own reality.  
For this reason, God’s trinitarian love is, in the act of creation, suffering love.  
Moltmann’s creative appropriation of creatio ex nihilo captures just this point.44  Yet this 
suffering love is present not only at the origin of creation but also throughout the history 
of the relationship.  Thus, God’s love must suffer not only the integrity of creation but 
                                               
43 See Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom, 57; Linzey, After Noah, 77. 
44 Moltmann, God in Creation, 86-89. 
312 
 
also the ongoing cost of that integrity, including human sin.  Again, here both Moltmann 
and Linzey concur.
45
 
The social doctrine of the Trinity combined with the hope that God lovingly 
creates and pursues that which is other than God for the sake of communion enables a 
vision of the cosmos infused by divine love with genuine alterity and integrity.
46
  To 
draw on Moltmann’s imagery, God withdraws, leaving creation its own space and time in 
an original act of divine kenosis.
47
  The time and space of creation is at once apart from 
God and infused with the presence of the Spirit, who vitalizes it for its own freedom.  Yet 
both Moltmann and Linzey hold that the created order does not reflect God’s desire for it.  
There is at least some sense in which it is fallen.   
PROTOLOGY AND THE FALL: COSMIC CONSECRATION, COSMIC ISOLATION 
Denis Edwards writes that the “problem of natural evil” is “greatly intensified” by 
“a new understanding of the size and scope of the problem of creaturely loss.”48  The 
etiology of the evolutionary mechanisms that facilitate such loss is one of the most 
difficult questions in contemporary theology.
49
  It is also one of the most important and 
divisive issues in eco-theological thought.  Are the mechanisms of evolution part of the 
good creation?  Are they the result of a Fall from edenic harmony?  Are they necessary 
for some greater purpose in creation?   
                                               
45 See Moltmann, God in Creation, 198-200; Linzey, Animal Theology, 25. 
46 It also evinces the cosmocentric dimension of both Moltmann’s and Linzey’s theological 
framework. God desires the entire creation for its own sake—that is, not simply for the sake of humanity. 
See Moltmann, God in Creation, 89; Linzey, Animal Theology, 95.  
47 Moltmann, God in Creation, 86-89. 
48 Denis Edwards, “Every Sparrow that Falls to the Ground: The Cost of Evolution and the Christ-
Event,” Ecotheology 11/1 (2006), 106. 
49 This point is made well by Christopher Southgate in The Groaning of Creation: God, Evolution, 
and the Problem of Evil (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2008). 
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I have already expressed in the introduction (Table I – 1) that the crux of this 
issue is best expressed in the comparison of Genesis 1, the Enuma Elish, and a Darwinian 
worldview:  
TABLE I – 1 
 Divine Identity Creative Action Cosmic Identity 
Narrative/Myth 
“A” (Genesis 1:1 – 
2:3) 
Elohim 
Creates through 
peaceful divine fiat 
A world of empowered creatures 
absent of predation 
Narrative/Myth 
“B” (Enuma 
Elish) 
Marduk 
Creates out of a divine 
war for existence 
An enslaved and competitive world 
for divine benefit 
Narrative/Theory 
“C” (Darwinian 
Worldview) 
??? ??? 
A world that, while displaying high 
levels of cooperation among species, 
nonetheless requires suffering, 
predation, and death in order to 
function50 
 
How does one maintain the theological identity of “God A” in the face of 
scientific evidence that “World A” never actually existed?  
Linzey most often—though not always—does so by ambiguously maintaining 
some form of the historicity of “World A.”  However, he is unclear about how “World A” 
became “World C,” whether by an angelic Fall, a human Fall, or by the mere finitude of 
creation as other-than-God.
51
  Moltmann moves forward by proposing that “World A” 
constitutes the destiny of “World C” rather than its history.52  Yet Moltmann is not clear 
why “World C” is an acceptable method of creation by a just God.  Why does God create 
“World C” instead of “World A”?   
                                               
50 I intend here Sideris’s claim that, “despite disagreements about the details of evolution, few 
scientists would deny that suffering and struggle play an important role in evolution.” Lisa H. Sideris, 
Environmental Ethics, Ecological Theology, and Natural Selection (New York, NY: Columbia University 
Press, 2003), 19. Or again, Rolston’s claim that biologists “find nature stark and full of suffering, 
sometimes dreadful.” Rolston, “Does Nature Need Redeemed?” 207. 
51 On the angelic Fall, see Linzey, “C. S. Lewis’s Theology of Animals,” 70. On the human fall, 
see Christianity and the Rights of Animals, 18. On the finitude of creation, see Animal Theology, 81-85. 
52 Moltmann, The Way of Jesus Christ, 127-28. Linzey makes a similar claim in Animal Gospel, 
81. 
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What is needed here is a view that can account for, on the one hand, both the 
goodness of the natural world and the shadowy mechanisms of evolution, and, on the 
other hand, both the theological claims concerning the kind of world Elohim would create 
and the scientific evidence of natural history.  I believe that that a synthesis and 
development of Moltmann and Linzey, one which accepts both Linzey’s refusal to trace 
the etiology of suffering, predation, and death to God and Moltmann’s refusal to trace 
these mechanisms to angels or humans, provides a promising way forward here.   
The schema of creation-fall-redemption-consummation is perhaps the most 
common framework for salvation history.
53
  This schema, ultimately a hermeneutical key 
for reading the Bible deductively, evinces just how significant the concept of will is in 
Christian thought.  Every aspect of the narrative requires some intentional movement of 
will.
54
  Creation rests solely on the divine will.  The Fall requires a human and/or an 
angelic will.  Redemption requires the divine will with (in some cases) human assent.  
Consummation, like creation, rests solely on the divine will.  Linzey evinces this 
emphasis on will in his effort to place the Fall at the feet of anyone other than God.  
Moltmann is less adamant on identifying a willful culprit upon which to lay the 
responsibility for the mechanisms of evolution—though his thought is at times unclear on 
how these mechanisms arose outside of the will of a free agent.  Even so, I believe 
Moltmann provides the foundation for an alternative schema that can more easily house 
the tensions noted above concerning “God A” and “World C,” most significantly by 
                                               
53 The historical adequacy of this framework is debated. Peter Bouteneff, for instance, states that 
the schema is “difficult to trace before the eighteenth-century notion of Heilsgeschichte.” Peter Bouteneff, 
Beginnings: Ancient Christian Readings of the Biblical Creation Narratives (Grand Rapids: Baker 
Academic, 2008), 8.  
54 I am following Wennberg here in juxtaposing intentional will with permissive will. Wennberg, 
God, Humans, and Animals, 331-32. 
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lessening the importance of will at the stage of the Fall.  This lessening is facilitated by 
increasing the importance of creation’s integrity with regard to the notion of fallenness. 
As I have already noted, Moltmann speaks positively of God’s kenotic withdrawal 
in creation, which opens up a unique time and space for the creation to be.
55
  Yet this 
space entails a risk.  God’s refusal to be the “‘the all-determining reality’ of what he has 
created” suggests that “he has conferred on creation its own scope for freedom and 
generation.”56  This space for freedom and generation is the reason that the creation has 
“fallen victim to annihilation.”57  The creation “has isolated itself from the foundation of 
its existence and the wellspring of its life, and has fallen victim to universal death.”58  
Moltmann refers to this cosmic isolation as “the ‘sin’ of the whole creation.”59   
There are two important facets of Moltmann’s thought here.  First, when taken in 
conjunction with his claims that human sin is not the result of death, it strongly suggests 
that he describes the creation as engaging in “sin” prior to human existence.  Second, he 
links both sin and death to the notion of isolation.  This link is actually common in 
Moltmann’s thought.  He states that “death is the power of separation, both in time as the 
stream of transience, materially as the disintegration of the person’s living Gestalt or 
configuration, and socially as isolation and loneliness.”60  Or again, “Life is 
communication in communion.  And, conversely, isolation and lack of relationship means 
death for all living things, and dissolution even for elementary particles.”61  As this quote 
suggests, for Moltmann the opposite of isolation is communion.  Thus he writes: “If the 
                                               
55 Moltmann, God in Creation, 86-89. 
56 Moltmann, Sun of Righteousness, Arise, 205. 
57 Ibid.. 
58 Moltmann, The Way of Jesus Christ, 283. 
59 Ibid.. 
60 Moltmann, The Coming of God, 71. 
61 Moltmann, God in Creation, 3. 
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misery of creation lies in sin as separation from God, then salvation consists in the 
gracious acceptance of the creature into communion with God.”62  Bouma-Prediger 
affirms this reading of Moltmann, stating that his “understanding of salvation implies that 
sin is essentially the state of being closed off or closed down or isolated.”63          
Collectively, these points suggest that the original positive distance entailed by 
God’s withdrawal in the act of creation—which was necessitated in order for the creation 
to be other-than-God and therefore a viable partner for communion—becomes something 
altogether different (and negative) in the unfolding of creation’s integrity.  The original 
distance becomes isolation.  Yet Moltmann maintains that God, most specifically in the 
incarnation, traverses this negative distance in order to restore the hope for communion 
with creation.  All of these points are evident in the following passage, which is worth 
quoting at length: 
Remoteness from God and spatial distance from God result from the withdrawal 
of God’s omnipresence and ‘the veiling of his face.’  They are part of the grace of 
creation, because they are conditions for the liberty of created beings.  It is only 
for sinners, who cut themselves off from God, that they become the expression of 
God’s anger towards them in their God-forsakenness.  If God himself enters into 
his creation through his Christ and his Spirit, in order to live in it and to arrive at 
his rest, he will then overcome not only the God-forsakenness of sinners, but also 
the distance and space of his creation itself, which resulted in isolation from God, 
and sin.
64
 
 
In an attempt to develop and clarify Moltmann’s thought in a manner that 
maintains Linzey’s position that God not be the author of suffering and death, I here offer 
a revision to the traditional schema of salvation history by suggesting the creation is a 
willful act (on the part of God) of consecration—which requires distance.  The Fall is an 
                                               
62 Jürgen Moltmann, History and the Triune God: Contributions to Trinitarian Theology (hereafter 
HTG), translated by John Bowden (New York, NY: Crossroad, 1992), 87. 
63 Steven Bouma-Prediger, The Greening of Theology: The ecological Models of Rosemary 
Radford Ruether, Joseph Sittler, and Jürgen Moltmann (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1995), 241. 
64 Moltmann, The Coming of God, 306; italics mine. 
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event that results not directly from any will, but rather via chance in creation’s 
development within its own integrity.  Redemption is the concrete actuality of God’s 
desire for the cosmos in Christ, which restores the space of consecratory distance and 
enables new movement within that space.  Finally, consummation is the final 
communion—the perichoretic union between God and the creation, which was the 
original purpose of consecratory distance.  This vision provides a variation of the 
traditional understanding of salvation history (see Table 4 – 1). 
TABLE 4 – 1  
Traditional Schema Creation Fall Redemption Consummation 
Revised Schema Consecration Isolation Restoration Communion 
 
As I am here dealing with the question of protology and the Fall, I will focus on 
the first two terms, consecration and isolation.  To consecrate (from the Hebrew qdš and 
Greek hagios) something is to sanctify it, to make it holy, to set it apart.  Thus, there can 
be no consecration without separation—without distance.  But this separation, evident 
most clearly in the sacrificial system in the Hebrew Scriptures, is for the purpose of 
communion.  Thus the broad connotation of qdš is “the process by which an entity is 
brought into relationship with or attains the likeness of the holy.”65  That is, the telos of 
consecratory distance is relationship or communion.   
Isolation also denotes separation and distance.  It derives out of the Latin 
insulatus, denoting making something into an island.  Unlike consecration, which entails 
a separation for the sake of communion, isolation suggests the notion of alienation.
66
  
Whereas the distance of consecration has a positive telos (i.e., communion), isolation is 
                                               
65 K. E. Bower, “Sanctification, sanctify” in New Bible Dictionary, third edition, edited by D. R. 
W. Wood (Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 1996), 1058. 
66 Along with isolation, Moltmann refers to creation (or more properly “nature”) as alienated from 
God. See Moltmann, The Way of Jesus Christ, 253, 
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without purpose and meaning.  Said differently, it is distance merely for the sake of 
distance, not communion.   
Because there can be no communion with the divine without consecratory 
distance, distance is an essential prerequisite for communion between God and that which 
is other-than-God.  For without this distance, “creation would be itself divine.”67  Said 
differently, without the act of consecratory separation, union with the divine could only 
be possible as pantheism, which is not communion—the participation of others in union.  
Thus, the participation of creation as that which is other-than-God in God’s trinitarian life 
requires distance between God and the world.  God must be willing to suffer the created 
order its own space and integrity. 
Yet, as Moltmann notes, such a suffering entails divine risk.  Empowering 
creation to be itself by divine withdrawal opens the possibility that creation’s being and 
becoming itself will not cohere to the divine desire for creation.  This point is significant 
because, contra Deism and Descartes, the world is not a machine of static laws, but rather 
a dynamic and at times volatile system of interrelated components.
68
  There is no 
watchmaker, only one who gives birth to a dynamic creation—an artist who loses at least 
some control of his work when he creates it.  It is the consecratory distance that is 
necessary for communion that opens creation to the risk of isolation, which is creation’s 
embrace, anthropomorphically speaking, of its distance from God.   
                                               
67 Moltmann, The Coming of God, 301. 
68 Such a view is entailed in the scientific shift from a mechanistic (Newtonian) view of the world 
to a dynamic and relational (Einsteinian) one. On this point, see John Polkinghorne, “The Demise of 
Democritus,” in The Trinity and an Entangled World: Relationality in Physical Science and Theology 
(Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2010), 15-31; Mary Judith Ress, 
Ecofeminism in Latin America (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2006), 51-55; Arthur Peacocke, Theology for 
a Scientific Age: Being and Becoming—Natural, Divine and Human (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 
1993), 41-70. 
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The world does “fall” into isolation.  Though, a better image than falling would be 
that of wandering.  That is, instead of moving along the path to communion within the 
space that God has allotted to it, creation, in its integrity, strays from that path and 
wanders aimlessly in the open space God has allotted to it.  The creation does not move 
toward communion in dynamic growth but rather meanders in a form of stasis.  
Moltmann captures this image of wandering in isolation with his claim that the “‘time of 
nature’ is a kind of winter of creation.”  For “nature is frozen, petrified creation.  It is 
God’s creation, alienated from the source of its life.”69 In this state, the consecratory 
distance of creation becomes isolation as the divine hope for cosmic harmony and 
communion gives way to the tragic nature of the mechanisms of evolution.  Thus, in 
isolation, the developmental space and time allotted to creation by divine withdrawal 
becomes transience and death.  Says Moltmann: “Separation from God, the wellspring of 
life, leads us through our isolation to experience temporality as transience, and to see 
death as its universal end.”70   
The movement from consecratory distance to isolation does not entail that 
suffering, predation, and death were absent in some historical Eden from which humans 
strayed.  In conjunction with Moltmann, I do not see how one can affirm such a natural 
history in the face of science.
71
  For this reason, I accept that suffering, predation, and 
death can be referred to as “natural.”  The symbol of Eden expresses God’s desire for the 
cosmos, not its concrete history.
72
   
                                               
69 Moltmann, The Way of Jesus Christ, 253; italics mine. 
70 Moltmann, The Coming of God, 292. 
71 Ibid., 83. I also concur with Deins Edwards, who notes that evolutionary theodicy is 
complicated by the scientific “discrediting of the idea that pain and biological death can be explained as the 
result of human sin.” Edwards, “Every Sparrow that Falls,” 106. 
72 There are elements of this schema and its implied theodicy that are consummate with 
Drummond’s appropriation of Sergii Bulgakov’s notion of “shadow sophia.” As far as similarities go, 
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Even so, it is not necessary to claim that the naturalness of evolutionary 
mechanisms means God has ordained them.  Moltmann’s de-emphasis on the divine 
will—at least as I am developing it—suggests that God need not be the author of the 
mechanisms of evolution.  Contra Denis Edwards, who appropriates the work of Niels 
Gregersen, we need not accept that “biological death has to be attributed to the 
Creator.”73  God has ordained a dynamic creation and set it free for the sake of 
communion.  In its consecratory separation from God—a condition necessary for its telos 
of communion with God—the dynamism of the cosmos became a wandering in isolation, 
a system of suffering, predation, and death in which creatures survive at the expense of 
others.  In this state, even the positive dimensions of the cosmos, including its 
interconnectedness and symbiosis take the form of the death and suffering of individuals.  
Thus even these positive dimensions need redeemed.  Says Moltmann: “the very powers 
which have been perverted into what is destructive will themselves be redeemed; for their 
power is created power, and is as such good.  It is only their power of destruction that 
was evil.”74  On account of the relational reality of sin, even the beautiful needs 
redeemed.   
Perhaps the most significant contribution this revised schema contributes—aside 
from the arching theme of distance upon which it draws—is that cosmic “fallenness” is 
not the result of any intentional movement of will, whether angelic, human, or even 
                                                                                                                                            
Drummond maintains that the mythical symbol of the Fall “has repercussions both prior to and after the 
appearance of humanity.” The “prior to” entails that “the tendencies towards immorality were present long 
before [human existence], and seem to be constitutive of the possibility of creaturely sophia.” But shadow 
sophia “is not inherent in divine Sophia and exists as a latent possibility in creaturely sophia.” Thus, the 
risk of shadow is present in the expression of divine wisdom in the created order. This risk is necessary for 
the “teleological goal in creaturely Sophia,” which is the hope for “participation in divine Sophia.” See 
Drummond, Eco-Theology, 125-28. 
73 Edwards, “Every Sparrow that Falls,” 107. 
74 Moltmann, God in Creation, 169. 
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divine.
75
  I thus concur with Holmes Rolston that “human sin did not throw nature out of 
joint; nature does not need to be redeemed on that account.”76  Rather, it is the result of 
creation’s own integrity—of randomness and chance.77  As Polkinghorne states, “God no 
more expressly wills the growth of cancer than he expressly wills the act of a murder, but 
he allows both to happen.  He is not the puppetmaster of either men or matter.”78  It is as 
if the very instant God creates the world God surrenders control over that world and 
holds to hope.
79
  Yet this surrendering is not a form of deism, because God remains 
present in the world, suffering its fate and in some sense guiding and curbing its 
development through the Spirit.
80
   
                                               
75 I am here offering an alternative route to that of both Southgate and Wennberg in which God 
ordains evolution for a greater good—in the case of Southgate, complexity and diversity and in the case of 
Wennberg, a world fit for fallen humanity. Southgate, The Groaning of Creation, 15-17; Wennberg, God, 
Humans, and Animals, 334-41. This alternative also applies to Willis Jenkins’ claim that God ordains the 
goodness of creatures (e.g., the ferocity of a lion) with the indirect “evil” effect that the lion then devours 
the gazelle. Willis Jenkins, Ecologies of Grace: Environmental Ethics and Christian Theology (New York, 
NY: Oxford University Press, 2008), 137, 144–145. The main distinction, as I understand it, between my 
view and that of both Southgate and Jenkins is that they want to link the origin of evolution to the divine 
will (i.e., divine ordination).  
76 Holmes Rolston III, “Does Nature Need to be Redeemed?” Zygon 29 (1994), 207. 
77 This point builds upon Moltmann’s cosmology in which he argues that God withdraws to give 
creation its own integrity. See Jürgen Moltmann, Sun of Righteousness, 205; Jürgen Moltmann, “God’s 
Kenosis in the Creation and Consummation of the World” in God and Evolution: A Reader, Mary Kathleen 
Cunningham, editor (New York, NY: Routledge, 2007), 273-283. See also Neil Ormerod, Creation, Grace, 
and Redemption (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2007), 15-16.  
78 John Polkinghorne, Science and Providence: God’s Interaction with the World (West 
Conshohocken, PA: Temple Foundation Press, 2005), 78. Polkinghorne is here similar to Moltmann’s 
claim that God is not the “‘the all-determining reality’ of what he has created.” Moltmann, Sun of 
Righteousness, Arise, 205.  
79 On this point I bear a similarity to John Haught’s kenotic notion of God and the evolutionary 
process. See John F. Haught, God after Darwin: A Theology of Evolution, second edition (Washington DC: 
Georgetown University Press, 2008), 49-60. Such a view requires a thorough revision to the doctrine of 
God’s omniscience. After all, one cannot hold to hope (or hope at all!) if one knows the future 
exhaustively. I am aware that “such an a-gnosis in God is outside the normal range of theologizing about 
creation.” Southgate, The Groaning of Creation, 7.  
80 I intend this point in a thoroughly trinitarian framework. Regarding theology proper, I accept 
Moltmann’s notion of God suffering the cosmos its own space. Regarding pneumatology, I accept 
Moltmann’s position that the Spirit is divine immanence in the unfolding of history. Lastly, regarding 
christology, I accept Edwards’s appropriation of Holmes Rolston III’s understanding of nature as 
cruciform. Says Edwards: “In light of the cross, we can begin to speak of God’s identification with the 
struggling emerging life of a creaturely world.” Edwards, “Every Sparrow that Falls,” 108. This claim 
coheres with Moltmann’s understanding of Christ as the ultimate victim (and thus redeemer) of evolution.  
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The divine surrendering permits the “big bang,” which I hold to be the first 
expression of beauty through violence.
81
  It is here already in the very forming of the 
laws of thermodynamics that consecratory distance fails to develop toward communion 
and instead becomes a wandering in isolation.  Here, my own voice becomes more 
prominent in an effort to alleviate Moltmann’s ambiguity.82  But it seems to me that if 
there is going to be a “sin” of the cosmos in which it strays from the path toward 
communion with the divine, the structuring of the laws that require violence and 
destruction (and eventually suffering, predation, and death) is a fine place to look.   
At any rate, the Fall is the risk of creation—that consecratory separation could 
become isolation—coming to fruition.  For this reason, the shadowy side of evolution, the 
naturalness of suffering, predation, and death pertains only to creation in isolation.
83
  
These mechanisms of evolution must be overcome in a restoration of consecration, which 
                                               
81 My position is, in some sense, even more radical than that of the process theologian Jay 
McDaniel. He acknowledges, as is standard for process theology, that God takes a risk in forming the 
cosmos out of chaos; for God can only lure creation toward the telos God desires for it. However, at the 
inorganic level, God’s will is “for the most part irresistible.” Therefore, “much of what has happened in 
cosmic and chemical evolution may be attributed to divine intentions.” Jay B. McDaniel, Of God and 
Pelicans: A Theology of Reverence for Life (Louisville, KY: John Knox Press, 1989), 40. For McDaniel, it 
is not until more complex creatures appear that “the capacities for resistance, as well as co-creativity, 
increase, and the divine purposes become much more like divine hopes.” It is only here that “what 
Christians have traditionally called a ‘fall’ becomes possible.” Ibid.. My position is more radical because, 
unlike McDaniel and in conjunction with Moltmann, I argue that the space God allots the creation, even the 
inanimate creation, entails a great risk and the possibility of a “Fall.” Thus I reject that notion that cosmic 
and chemical evolution reflects divine intentions. 
82 I do not know whether or not Moltmann would accept my claim about the big bang and the laws 
of thermodynamics. 
83 By this claim, I do not intend to argue that the mechanisms of evolution are not necessary for 
biological life as we currently experience it. The cosmos is adapted to its isolation. Furthermore, I 
acknowledge Edwards’s claim that, scientifically speaking, “suffering death and extinction are now seen as 
intrinsic to the process of evolutionary emergence. They are not simply unfortunate side-effects.” Edwards, 
“Every Sparrow that Falls,” 106. My claim is that evolutionary emergence itself is not an “unfortunate side-
effect” (that is, a necessary corollary of some other condition) but rather the unfortunate outcome of the 
divine risk taken in the act of creation itself. Edwards differs from this position, maintaining that God must 
be the author of biological death, which serves the purpose of rendering possible the great diversity of 
flourishing life, including humanity. Ibid., 107. 
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opens the created order to its telos of communion, which in turn requires a final, 
eschatological divine intervention.
84
  
This revised approach to the traditional schema of salvation history provides an 
opening to affirm both the naturalness of evolution alongside the “kernel of truth” 
underlying the doctrine of the Fall.
85
  Nature, including the mechanisms of evolution, is 
not the result of sin or some evil will.
86
  Yet neither is nature, in its current state, the 
direct result of its Creator’s will.87  Nor does it reflect the Creator’s ultimate desire.  
Nature is not evil.  But neither is it complete.  It is not fallen in the sense of some 
ontological deficiency (i.e., essentially “ungood”).  But it is relationally distorted, isolated 
from its Creator and, in some sense, itself.  In its integrity it has deviated from the path 
toward communion.  Like a family dog that, through no fault of its own, strays into the 
wilderness and becomes wild, the good creation is wandering in isolation and 
experiencing the full effects of that disposition.  Creation’s disposition requires a 
restoration of the telos of its integrity—communion with the divine.  Christ achieves this 
restoration.   
 
 
                                               
84 Thus, whereas the import of will is mitigated with reference to the Fall, it returns in full strength 
with reference to eschatological redemption. This return, because it entails the centrality of the divine will, 
protects eschatology from lapsing into a natural evolution within cosmic time or a social program 
predicated upon human will.  
85 By this statement I in part intimate Linzey’s description of the “complex truth” of the doctrine 
of the Fall. Namely, that “parasitism and predation are unlovely, cruel, evil aspects of the world ultimately 
incapable of being reconciled with a God of love.” Linzey, Animal Gospel, 28. 
86 In fact, there is much good in nature, including levels of cooperation and symbiosis. Though, 
Rolston would argue that the values of nature are only possible in light of the disvalues. See Holmes 
Rolston III, “Disvalues in Nature,” The Monist 75 (April 1992), 250-78. 
87 I make this claim contra Rolston, who writes that the “groaning in travail is in the nature of 
things from time immemorial. Such travail is the Creator’s will, productive as it is of glory.” Holmes 
Rolston III, “Naturalizing and Systematizing Evil,” in Is Nature Ever Evil? Religion, Science, and Value, 
Willem B. Drees, editor (London, UK: Routledge, 2003), 85. 
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CHRISTOLOGY: VICTORY OVER ISOLATION, THE RESTORATION OF CONSECRATION 
Hans Urs von Balthasar describes the Son incarnate as the door that opens the 
way for creation to participate in the divine.
88
  Kallistos Ware echoes a similar notion: 
“God’s incarnation opens the way to man’s deification.”89  This aspect of christology is 
appropriate for cosmocentric transfiguration as I am delineating it.  Along with 
Moltmann, I maintain that the incarnation is the concrete realization of eschatological 
hope.  In my own words, the incarnation is already that communion—between God and 
that which is other than God—which constitutes the divine desire for the entire cosmos.  
Thus the incarnation at once reveals and, in a concrete but incomplete manner, 
accomplishes the telos of creation.  In Christ, the destiny of the world is manifested in 
history—the door is open.   
What then is the significance of the cross?  It is first essential to say that the cross 
has no significance apart from the incarnation (or apart from the resurrection).  In his 
passion and death, Christ draws into the divine all the transience of the entire cosmos.
90
  
In his resurrection, he transfigures that transience.  Linzey and Moltmann agree on this 
point.  But Moltmann goes further, reading Christ’s cry of dereliction—his claim to be 
forsaken by God—in conjunction with the notion of his descent into hell.91  On account 
of Christ’s forsakenness, all God-forsaken places are filled with divine presence in a new 
                                               
88 See Hans Urs von Balthasar. The Last Act. Theo-Drama, Volume 5. Translated by Graham 
Harrison. Ignatius Press: San Francisco, 1988, 374-375, 442. 
89 Kallistos Ware, The Orthodox Way (Crestwood: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1995), 74. 
90 Again, here Drummond’s “shadow sophia” and my view overlap. She states that “the weight of 
shadow sophia is born by Christ on the cross.” Drummond, Eco-Theology, 127. Similarly, I intend that the 
Christ becomes lost—the isolated One—in the wandering of creation. 
91 See Jürgen Moltmann, “The Logic of Hell,” in God Will Be All in All: The Eschatology of 
Jürgen Moltmann, Richard Bauckham, editor (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2001), 46-47. 
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manner.  For Moltmann, this claim necessitates that even hell is now a place of hope.
92
  
Thus Christ draws not only transience, but also forsakenness, into the trinitarian love and 
thereby opens the way to communion.   
Using the language of my own framework, the cross evinces that Christ not only 
enters into the wandering isolation of creation but also experiences its full sting—
including both the dark mechanisms of evolution and the reality of divine forsakenness 
that persist when consecratory distance becomes isolation.  Christ is the Wandering 
One—the divine in isolation from the divine.  Yet as the concrete communion of 
eschatological hope in his very person, Christ’s presence opens the possibility of 
restoring the state of isolation to a state of consecration.  That which is restored remains 
separate from God, but no longer in isolation.  There is distance, but no longer 
forsakenness.  The way home is made known—the trail is blazed out of the wilderness.93   
Thus, as the crucified human, Christ draws the extent of creaturely being and its 
isolation into the life of the Trinity.  As the crucified God, he draws the presence of the 
divine into creation’s isolation.  The Son has become the world, wandering into the 
darkest corners of isolation, including death and, in some sense, hell.  In doing so, he 
restores consecratory distance, which is nothing other than the way to communion.  
Christ is hence the offer, for an isolated creation, of the way to communion.
94
  In short, 
Christus victor over isolation.
95
          
                                               
92 Moltmann states, “If hell was the place of God-forsakenness, ever since Christ’s descent into 
hell it has been this no more.” Jürgen Moltmann, Jesus Christ for Today’s World, trans. Margaret Kohl 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1994), 66. 
93 In the words of Southgate, “the Cross and Resurrection inaugurate a great era of redemption of 
the nonhuman creation leading to the eschaton.” In this sense the Christ-event “begins the final phase of the 
creation in which the evolutionary process itself will be transformed and healed.” Southgate, The Groaning 
of Creation, 76.  
94 In the words of Ware, “The incarnation…is God’s supreme act of deliverance, restoring us to 
communion with himself.” Ware, The Orthodox Way, 70. I would revise this statement to suggest that 
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PNEUMATOLOGY: THE SANCTIFYING BREATH OF ETERNAL LIFE 
Both Moltmann and Linzey affirm the Spirit as the vitalizing principle of (at least 
sentient) life.  This claim has its exegetical issues, not the least of which is the 
identification of ruach with the person of the Spirit.  The position also has its theological 
issues.  Linzey is somewhat unclear on the exact distinction between the Spirit’s role 
prior to and after the Christ event.  Moltmann makes this distinction more clearly, but is 
forced to struggle with the tension of divine withdrawal and the presence of the Spirit in 
all creation.  Moltmann’s vision of the Spirit as the source of life, while problematic, is 
nonetheless a beautiful manner of safeguarding divine immanence, including the 
providential presence of God.    
I have particular interest in the sanctifying role of the Spirit—more specifically, 
the role of the Holy Spirit in opening creation up to the triune community of love by 
permitting consecratory distance.  This sanctifying presence is significant in the original 
act of creation.  The Spirit rests in the created order, in some sense separating it from the 
divine, for the divine.  There is thus a dual movement of God away from creation in 
divine withdrawal and toward creation in the presence of the Spirit.  Moltmann captures 
this image by connecting God’s Shekinah with the Spirit.96  In the Spirit, God is within 
the creation while remaining distant from it.
97
  The Trinity experiences a sort of 
separation in order that God may be the immanent source of life for a creation that is at 
                                                                                                                                            
Christ restores the consecratory distance that enables communion. Still, I believe Ware and I are making a 
similar claim.  
95 By this phrase, I purposefully reconfigure the notion of atonement to extend beyond the bounds 
of forgiveness for human sin to its cosmic dimension. See Edwards, “Every Sparrow that Falls,” 108. 
Atonement’s cosmic dimension is the same for all creatures: God overcomes all that sustains isolation—
which certainly includes human sin—in order to make communion possible.  
96 Moltmann, God in Creation, 97. 
97 Ibid., 9. 
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once genuinely other-than-God.  It is the Spirit that permits consecratory distance without 
isolation—life that is other-than-God but not God-forsaken.   
But the cosmos ends up in isolation.  What is the role of the Spirit in this 
isolation?  The Spirit safeguards against annihilation; for it is the Spirit’s unique presence 
in the world that ensures creation can never be fully isolated from God.
98
  The Spirit 
remains present in the midst of the creation’s wandering in isolation.  The Spirit suffers in 
the suffering of the cosmos, sighing and groaning within the mechanisms of evolution.  
“The divine Spirit itself, which fills the whole world, is seized by a driving force and 
torment, for it is beset by the birth pangs of the new creation.”99  In a manner of speaking, 
the Spirit is lost with the world.  Or, as Moltmann notes concerning Israel’s exile, the 
divine Shekinah was in exile from God with the people.
100
  Similarly, on account of 
Moltmann’s association of the Spirit with the Shekinah, it is permissible to say that the 
Spirit experiences isolation from God with the world, and indeed groans for 
eschatological communion in that isolation.
101
   
However, in the Christ event, the cosmos is reopened to its consecratory state.  
Yet the world is now divided.  On the one hand, the presence of the Spirit-filled saints 
elicits a glimpse, even in the wilderness, of the future communion for which all creation 
longs.
102
  In Moltmann’s words, “The experience of the Spirit does not separate those 
affected by it from the ‘the rest of the world.’  On the contrary, their experience brings 
them into open solidarity with it.  For what they experience is…the beginning of the 
                                               
98 In the incarnation, the Son solidifies this assurance as well. But the Son’s role is better defined 
as restoring hope for communion by achieving it rather than keeping the cosmos from annihilation in 
isolation. 
99 Moltmann, Sun of Righteousness, Arise, 206. See also Linzey, Creatures of the Same God, 14. 
100 Moltmann, The Spirit of Life, 48-49. 
101 See Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom, 60.  
102 See, for examples, Tim Vivian, “The Peaceable Kingdom: Animals as Parables in the Virtues of 
Saint Macarius,” Anglican Theological Review 85, 3 (Summer 2003), 477-491. 
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world’s future.”103  Similarly, Linzey writes that the Spirit enables humans to become 
“active participants” in creation’s redemption.104  On the other hand, the world remains in 
some sense isolated, trapped within the cycle of suffering and death.   
So the Spirit now fulfills a triple role.  First, the Spirit remains the immanent 
presence of the divine, suffering cruel atrocities alongside an isolated cosmos to which 
restoration has been opened but not completed.  Second, the Spirit consecrates those who 
step into the way opened in Christ.  Third, the Spirit works through those who are 
consecrated to facilitate sacramental moments of eschatological communion in the midst 
of cosmic isolation.  In this manner the Spirit facilitates the restoration of consecration in 
the midst of isolation.  If Christ is the way, the restoration of the consecratory path 
toward communion, then the Spirit is the wind blowing down that path, sweeping up 
weary travelers and directing them home. What Christ gathers, the Spirit leads toward 
transfiguration.
105
    
ESCHATOLOGY: COSMIC RESTORATION AND COMMUNION 
All that God creates, God consecrates for communion through separation.  The 
world was made other-than-God so that it could become the other-with-God.  When the 
risk entailed by the consecratory alterity of the cosmos comes to fruition (i.e., when it is 
isolated from the divine), restoration of that consecration becomes a necessity.  While 
both Christ and (in the wake of the Christ-event) the Spirit open the space for restoration, 
this space is not yet nor can it be complete restoration.  The cosmos is adapted to its 
                                               
103 Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom, 124. 
104 Linzey, Animal Theology, 56. 
105 Edwards, “Every Sparrow that Falls,” 111. 
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isolation.  Indeed, natural existence is predicated upon the very mechanisms facilitated by 
isolation.  Such is the world as it has come to be.
106
 
It is this very world, adapted to its isolation, with which God seeks communion.  
The penultimate consecration of the world, which is required for communion, remains 
irrevocably an eschatological act.  In Moltmann’s terms, the penultimate restoration of 
consecratory separation is judgment, in which all will be set right.
107
  Death will be 
destroyed and suffering will end.  This final and definitive consecration makes possible 
the ultimate communion that God desires.  It is in this movement that, per Moltmann’s 
famous appropriation of Paul, God will be all in all.   
Eschatology, in terms of the “last things,” thus entails the completion of Christ’s 
work.
108
  It is the penultimate act of consecration and the ultimate communion between 
God the cosmos.  This communion must either include all that God has created or, if not, 
must mean that God’s original desire for creation will be eternally unfulfilled.  As von 
Balthasar intimates, if there is a hell for any human, it is tragic for God who desires that 
human in love.
109
  But the same must be said about all creatures, every sentient and non-
sentient being and every inanimate part of the cosmos.  Every creature with a narrative, 
regardless of their awareness of that narrative, must be swept up into the divine narrative 
                                               
106 While there is some level of ambiguity in their thought, both Moltmann and Linzey recognize 
this reality. Moltmann, The Coming of God, 78; Linzey, Christianity and the Rights of Animals, 61. 
107 Moltmann, The Coming of God, 235-237; “The Logic of Hell,” 43-47. On this point see also 
Hans Urs von Balthasar, “Some Point of Eschatology” in The Word Made Flesh: Explorations in Theology 
I (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1989), 263-264. 
108 This point is consistent with Karl Barth’s christology in which Christ’s return is the completion 
of Christ’s revelation. See Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics IV/3/2, translated by G. W. Bromiley 
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1962), 910-912. 
109 See Nicholas J. Healy, The Eschatology of Hans Urs von Balthasar: Being as Communion 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 215. 
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if God is the Creator who seeks communion with the creation.
110
  Thus eschatology 
intimates the resurrection and transfiguration of every speck of the cosmos.  
But as Moltmann and Linzey both acknowledge, the eschaton is not simply the 
end of history.  It is, in Moltmann’s words, “God’s coming and his arrival.”111  
Eschatology cannot remain merely a doctrine of “last things” if the communion that God 
seeks and for which creation longs has been concretely realized in the incarnation.  Nor 
can it remain so if the way of consecration has been restored in Christ and the Spirit set 
forth in a new manner in this restoration.  Metaphorically, the Fall is a straying from the 
path toward communion and a wandering in isolation.  In Christ, the path has been blazed 
anew.  As such, new possibilities exist in history.  Yet because the cosmos remains 
adapted to isolation, trapped in the mechanisms of evolution, history itself must be 
transfigured.  That is, no amount of human will or political striving can facilitate ultimate 
consecration or communion.  But those who are made holy by the Spirit can consecrate 
the isolated creation and witness to the future communion of all things.  To sum up these 
ideas: consecration is distance without forsakenness.  Isolation is distance as alienation.  
Restoration is alienation with the possibility of consecration.  Communion is alterity 
without distance.  
The final communion between God and the creation will make the creation new—
transfigured.  As Moltmann starkly maintains, this transfiguration does not intimate a 
numerically different creation.
112
  However, it does denote discontinuity between the 
present state of creation and its state in eschatological communion.  Drummond notes that 
                                               
110 Keith Ward is correct, in my view, when he states that “immortality for animals as well as 
humans is a necessary condition of any acceptable theodicy.” Keith Ward, Rational Theology and the 
Creativity of God (New York: Pilgrim, 1982), 202. 
111 Moltmann, The Coming of God, 22. 
112 Ibid., 84-85.  
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“the closest analogy here is with the resurrection event itself, so that there are lines of 
continuity and discontinuity.”113  Yet because the resurrection is present now in the 
power of the Spirit, so also moments of proleptic witness are possible—most especially 
in the work of those who are already, if only incompletely, being made new.  
TIME AND ETERNITY: THE ETERNAL SIGNIFICANCE OF EVERY MOMENT  
My engagement with the notion of isolation has centered mainly on its spatial 
(i.e., physically relational) dimension.  To understand the full extent of isolation, 
however, it is important to understand it in a manner that includes the corollary of 
spatiality: temporality.  Isolation bears a temporal dimension.  I here draw on Moltmann 
to make this point.   
As noted in chapter 2, for Moltmann, God’s eternity is not without time.  It is 
rather all time gathered together diachronically into a cyclical and enduring present.
114
  
He also maintains that the participation of the cosmos in God’s eternity entails the 
gathering together of all the times of creation into an eternal time.  This new time—the 
time of creatio nova—is a time of future possibility without transience.  That is, time that 
is realized in the present does not then become the past but remains forever in 
perichoretic union with all other times in the present.  Thus, Moltmann claims that this 
time entails “change without transience, time without past, and life without death.”115  
The unique time of nature, however, is the “winter of creation” in which all events—
including death—after occurring, slip into an irretrievable past.116   
                                               
113 Drummond, Eco-Theology, 167. As already noted, this point is important for Moltmann. See 
Moltmann, The Coming of God, 84-85. 
114 Moltmann, Sun of Righteousness, Arise, 62-63; The Coming of God, 280-81, 291. This view of 
eternity as cyclical time in a diachronic present also applies to the cosmic experience of eternity. The 
Coming of God, 71.  
115 See Moltmann, God in Creation, 213. 
116 Moltmann, The Way of Jesus Christ, 253; The Coming of God, 286. 
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In this time, each time is cut off from others.  Humans can remember the past; but 
they cannot retrieve it.  They can experience the present; but they cannot sustain it.  They 
can anticipate the future, but it is ultimately beyond their grasp.
117
  Thus Moltmann looks 
forward to “the future of time itself,” which is God’s future transfiguring time and 
drawing it into perichoretic union with itself (diachronically) in eternity.
118
 
Moltmann’s vision of time and eternity bears two facets I would like to develop 
here.  The first is that cosmic time (as well as cosmic space) must be understood in its 
totality, which includes its future redemption.
119
  The second is that each moment of time, 
while fleeting in the “winter” of creation’s transience, will nonetheless be resurrected and 
participate in God’s eternity.120  Thus, each moment of time—and more specifically each 
moment of each creature’s life—bears eternal significance. 
Regarding the first point, the theological separation of creation and redemption 
constitutes a temporal isolation.  If we unequivocally affirm the unfolding integrity of the 
cosmos (what Moltmann refers to as “nature”), then we isolate creation from redemption.  
If, on the other hand, we completely reject this integrity and flee from it, then we isolate 
redemption from creation.  In a similar manner, if we unequivocally embrace and 
celebrate death, then we isolate it from resurrection.  If we refuse to preserve the system 
that depends on the mechanisms of evolution, we isolate resurrection from death.  In 
these forms of isolation, the past, present, and future are isolated from one another.  
                                               
117 I draw this point from Moltmann’s differentiation between actual eternity and relative eternity. 
See Moltmann, The Coming of God, 287. 
118 Moltmann, “The Liberation of the Future and Its Anticipations in History,” in God Will Be All 
in All: The Eschatology of Jürgen Moltmann, Richard Bauckham, editor (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 
2001), 265. 
119 Moltmann refers to this broader understanding in which one “sees creation together with its 
future” as “messianic.” Moltmann, God in Creation, 5. 
120 See Moltmann, The Coming of God, 75; Richard Bauckham in The Theology of Jürgen 
Moltmann (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995), 210. 
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When this isolation is dismantled, the way is opened for a preservation of the present (in 
light of its necessity) and a protest of the present (in light of its eschatological future).   
Regarding the second point, the isolation of the present from its future (and its 
past) translates into an isolation of the present self from totality; for the self subsists in a 
narrative of divided moments.  In this scenario, finitude becomes tragedy—the cage set 
against the possibility of wholeness.  Likewise, death appears as the end of one’s 
experience of the present, of one’s potential for the future, and his or her inescapable 
relegation to a past that memory can recall only imperfectly.  This temporal facet of 
isolation returns us to the spatial/relational dimension, for it intimates the isolation of the 
self from its own narrative.     
The redemption of temporal isolation is well captured in Moltmann’s notion that, 
at the eschaton, all times of creation will be gathered up diachronically into a perichoretic 
union.
121
  It is thus time itself that is redeemed in its deliverance from temporal 
isolation.
122
  That is, the Trinity’s enduring openness to the unique time of the cosmos 
ensures that this time will be delivered from its temporal isolation to a temporal 
communion in which time is no longer lost to the past.  In short, God’s victory over the 
present slipping into the past is the temporal analogue of God’s victory over life slipping 
into death.  
Moltmann’s view is significant for cosmocentric transfiguration because it 
suggests that God will overcome isolation on both the spatial and the temporal levels.  
Bauckham makes this point in addressing the extent of resurrection for Moltmann.  He is 
worth quoting at length. 
                                               
121 Moltmann, Coming of God, 295. 
122 Ibid., 287. 
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All death in nature Moltmann regards not as natural, but as a tragic destiny, whose 
reversal at the end is anticipated in Christ’s resurrection.  At this point one may 
want to ask questions.  Does death really have the same significance for every 
kind of creature?  For elephants, who mourn their dead, it is a tragic destiny, as it 
is for us.  But for this year’s marigolds, which die in the annual cycle of death and 
new life that will produce next year’s marigolds, is death tragic?  Need we mourn 
the individual marigold as we certainly would the species, should it become 
extinct?  The apparent implication of Moltmann’s view that every individual 
creature that has ever lived—every marigold, every termite, every smallpox 
virus—will be resurrected in the new creation may seem bizarre, but this problem 
is alleviated by the novel concept of resurrection which Moltmann introduces in 
[The Way of Jesus Christ].  It is that the whole of history (the history of nature 
and human beings) will be redeemed from evil and death and transformed in the 
eschatological eternity in which all its times will be simultaneous.  So not simply 
creatures in what they have become in their temporal history, but all creatures as 
they are diachronically in the process of their history and in all their temporal 
relationships with other creatures, will be resurrected and transfigured in 
eternity.
123
       
 
Moltmann’s “novel concept of resurrection” is, in my own words, the overcoming of both 
spatial and temporal isolation in the perichoretic union of all creatures with themselves 
(diachronically) and with one another (relationally) within the divine.  This vision of 
eschatological hope, predicated upon Moltmann’s understanding of time and eternity, 
suggests not only that the life of every individual creature bears eternal importance, but 
also that every moment of every individual creature’s life is of eternal significance.   
ANTHROPOLOGY: PRIESTS OF RESTORATION, SACRAMENTS OF ESCHATOLOGICAL 
COMMUNION 
Both Moltmann and Linzey draw on the Orthodox notion of humanity’s cosmic 
priesthood.
124
  As I have already noted, there is no single view about what this priesthood 
entails.  For some Orthodox writers, it means offering creation back to God by utilizing it 
                                               
123 Bauckham, The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann, 210. 
124 See Moltmann, God in Creation, 189-90; The Way of Jesus Christ, 307-12; Linzey, Animal 
Theology, 54-55; After Noah, 94-95. 
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reverently.  This reverent utilization facilitates communion between God and humans.
125
  
This anthropocentric image is obviously insufficient for cosmocentric transfiguration.  
The communion God desires extends beyond humans.  Indeed, when humans use creation 
to achieve communion with other humans and God while at once denying communion 
with creation, they perpetuate isolation.  For cosmocentric transfiguration—at least as I 
am delineating it—the cosmic priesthood of humanity is following the way of Christ in 
taking the presence of the divine into the isolated parts of the cosmos so that God can be 
more fully present there also.
126
  It is a matter of quite literally being the imago Dei in the 
world.
127
  It entails being in the midst of creation the proleptic presence of its 
eschatological hope.   
Humanity’s cosmic priesthood thus does not fully relegate the world to its 
sacramental role for humanity—though it need not deny that the cosmos is sacramental.  
It entails a sacramental reciprocity between humans and the nonhuman creation.  For 
humanity’s part, humans are sacraments of eschatological communion.  This phrase, 
which I believe offers both a synthesis and development of Moltmann and Linzey, entails 
that humans are to become symbols of eschatological hope for others—whether human or 
nonhuman—by witnessing to the hope for cosmic peace within history.  Such a view 
seems consummate with that of John Chryssavgis, who writes:  
                                               
125 See Dumitru Staniloae, The Experience of God: Orthodox Dogmatic Theology, Volume 2 (The 
World: Creation and Deification), translated and edited by Ioan Ionita and Robert Barringer (Brookline, 
MA: Hold Cross Orthodox Press, 2000), 21-27. 
126 In Moltmann, this christic function is most evident in Jesus’s cry of dereliction, which evinces 
that Christ experienced the depths of hell and, in doing so, brought hope to all the forsaken. Moltmann, The 
Crucified God, 204-5. 
127 I thus accept a primarily functional interpretation of the imago without denying the intrinsic 
reality of the imago or the unique human capacities necessary to facilitate its function. This position is 
congruent with both Moltmann and Linzey. See Moltmann, God in Creation, 188-90; Andrew Linzey, Why 
Animal Suffering Matters: Philosophy, Theology, and Practical Ethics (New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press, 2009), 28-29.  
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If we reject the world of darkness and accept living in the light of Christ, then 
each person and each object becomes the embodiment of God in this world.  The 
divine presence is revealed to every order and every particle of this world.
128
   
 
When the nonhuman world encounters consecrated humans, it should 
sacramentally encounter peace, not terror.  This point is captured well in W. Sibley 
Towner’s discussion of the functional interpretation of the imago Dei:  
When the other creatures look upon adam as a royal or even god-like figure, what 
will they see?  A tyrant, an exterminator, a satanic figure?  Or will they 
experience the ruling hand of adam as something as tender and gentle as that of 
their Creator?
129
   
 
Humanity’s sin and ongoing participation in the mechanisms of evolution 
augments isolation of the cosmos.  But humanity’s role as priest is to be a sacrament of 
the eschatological peace.  Thus Linzey writes that humans “must let the Spirit, that is the 
Spirit of all suffering creatures, pray through us so that we may become a sign of the 
hope for which all creation longs.”130  Likewise, Moltmann states that Christian hope 
entails “resistance against the forces of death and unconditional love for life.”131  This 
resistance of death and love of life, whether it is directed toward ourselves, other humans, 
nonhuman sentients, ecosystems, or the land itself, is what I intimate by the notion of 
sacraments of eschalogical communion.  When humans affirm the life of creatures and 
actively seek their well-being, those creatures experience sacramentally the 
eschatological communion in the priesthood of humanity.  Thus I affirm with Paul that 
the redemption of humanity bears significant meaning for the nonhuman creation.
132
  The 
                                               
128 John Chryssavgis, “The Earth as Sacrament: Insights from Orthodox Christian Theology and 
Spirituality,” in The Orthodox Handbook of Religion and Ecology, Roger S. Gottlieb, editors (New York, 
NY: Oxford University Press, 2006), 107. 
129 W. Sibley Towner, “Clones of God: Genesis 1:26-28 and the Image of God in the Hebrew 
Bible,” Interpretation, 59, (2005), 348. 
130 Linzey, After Noah, 109. 
131 Moltmann, Ethics of Hope, 55. 
132 See Romans 8:18-21. 
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consecration of humanity opens the possibility for proleptic experiences of 
communion.
133
 
POSSIBLE CRITIQUES OF COSMOCENTRIC TRANSFIGURATION  
In the above section, I set out in an exploratory thought experiment to delineate in 
brief a set of theological foundations, based on the thought of Moltmann and Linzey, for 
cosmocentric transfiguration.  Here, I turn to common critiques of Moltmann and Linzey 
that also apply to my foundations.  First, I will address the hermeneutics of cosmocentric 
transfiguration with regard to both scripture and tradition.  Second, I draw out my already 
adumbrated response to the critique that an affirmation of fallenness and redemption 
denigrates science and the nonhuman creation.  Third, I will address the question of 
whether the peaceable kingdom constitutes the dissolution of certain species.  Finally, I 
will clarify the ethical issue regarding the manner in which eschatology informs practice 
within history.     
COSMOCENTRIC TRANSFIGURATION AS UNBIBLICAL  
In 2003, at the annual meeting of the National Association of Baptist Professors 
of Religion, a panel reviewed Linzey’s book, Animal Theology, from the perspective of 
the Hebrews Scriptures, the New Testament, and theology in general.  These reviews, 
along with a response offered by Linzey, are printed in 2005 in Review and Expositor.
134
  
                                               
133 Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom, 124; I would not go as far as Linzey to suggest that 
humanity is necessary for the salvation of the cosmos. Such a move seems too anthropocentric (in a 
functional sense). While I am amenable to a functional role of human beings in the cosmos, I believe it is 
also important to maintain the integrity of the nonhuman creation’s relationship with God. For 
considerations on this balance, see H. Paul Santmire, “Partnership with Nature According to the Scriptures: 
Beyond the Theology of Stewardship,” Christian Scholar’s Review 32/4 (Summer 2003), 381-412.  
134 David M. May, “A Review of Andrew Linzey’s Animal Theology from a New Testament 
Perspective,” Review and Expositor, 102 (Winter 2005), 87-93; Mark McEntire, “A Review of Andrew 
Linzey’s Animal Theology from an Old Testament Perspective,” Review and Expositor, 102 (Winter 2005), 
95-99; Sally Smith Holt, “A Review of Andrew Linzey’s Animal Theology from a Theological 
Perspective,” Review and Expositor, 102 (Winter 2005), 101-9; Andrew Linzey, “The Divine Worth of 
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Mark McEntire, while noting the blurry lines between eisegesis (reading meaning into a 
text) and exegesis (drawing meaning out of a text), nonetheless concludes that “the major 
ideas of Animal Theology seem utterly foreign to the Old Testament.”135  He 
acknowledges that the same could be said for the abolition of slavery, but maintains that a 
hermeneutic against slavery is much more easily identifiable than one that justifies 
Linzey’s agenda in Animal Theology.136  David May offers positive words concerning 
Linzey’s agenda, but pejoratively defines his use of scripture as “a proof-text method” 
that does not account for “social and cultural context.”137  May ultimately claims that 
Linzey’s work, if it is “to be recognized by biblical scholars…will need to find a voice 
that is more thorough in biblical exegesis and more biblically integrated.”138    
These two reviews, when viewed with reference to the present project, raise the 
question as to whether or not the central tenets of cosmocentric transfiguration are 
biblically sound or merely derived from an agenda-based eisegesis.  In conjunction with 
Linzey, I would not claim that the paradigm of cosmocentric transfiguration is the 
biblical view.
139
  We are both unconvinced there is any such thing as the biblical view on 
most issues, ecology included.
140
  Scripture, as a collection of variegated genres written 
                                                                                                                                            
Other Creatures: A Response to Reviews of Animal Theology,” in Review and Expositor, 102 (Winter 
2005), 111-24.   
135 McEntire, “A Review of Andrew Linzey’s Animal Theology from an Old Testament 
Perspective,” 99. 
136 Ibid.. 
137 May, “A Review of Andrew Linzey’s Animal Theology from New Testament Perspective,” 88. 
138 Ibid., 90. 
139 On this point, see Linzey’s response to critiques of his use of scripture in Animal Theology. 
Andrew Linzey, “The Divine Worth of Other Creatures: A Response to Reviews of Animal Theology,” in 
Review and Expositor, 102 (Winter 2005), 112-13. 
140 For example, Linzey is clear that there appears to be no unanimous biblical view on the matter 
of the morality of predation and meat-eating. Linzey, Christianity and the Rights of Animals, 141-142. 
Concerning the variety of ecological readings of scripture, see H. Paul Santmire’s differentiation between 
the more traditionally accepted “spiritual motif” of interpreting scripture and the new option of an 
“ecological motif.” Paul Santmire, The Travail of Nature: The Ambiguous Ecological Promise of Christian 
Theology (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1985), 185-215. 
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by many different authors over a period of hundreds of years and subsequently redacted, 
copied, and translated, presents a unique challenge of interpretation.
141
  Even so, along 
with Linzey, and contra McEntire’s report from the Hebrew Scriptures, I believe that 
there are voices in scripture that provide the possibility of developing an animal-friendly 
hermeneutic.
142
  It is true that many biblical voices focus on human beings in relation to 
God.
143
  But there are also passages that echo a discontent with this focus.  Animals do 
share the sixth day of creation with humans (Genesis 1:24-31).  In Genesis 2:18-19, 
animals are not created for utilitarian use for humans, but rather companionship.  In 
Genesis 9, animals, as well as the earth itself, are included in the Noahic covenant.  The 
Psalmist does claim that God saves humans and animals alike (Psalms 36:6).
144
  Jesus 
does claim that his love for his followers is emblematic of a shepherd who cares deeply 
for his sheep (John 10:1-16).  Jesus does maintain that humans are worth more than 
sparrows—but not that sparrows have no worth (Matthew 10:29-31).  Regarding the 
                                               
141 I am speaking here of the inevitable issue of hermeneutics. Both the issue of hermeneutics and 
the questions it elicits are particularly important for liberation theologies. On the methods and hermeneutics 
of liberation theology, see Leonardo Boff and Clodovis Boff, Introducing Liberation Theology (Maryknoll, 
NY: Orbis Book, 1987). These theologies often attempt a critical retrieval of scripture, identifying its 
helpful dimensions without disregarding the less helpful ones. Feminist theologies often apply a 
hermeneutic of suspicion, which attempts to draw out liberating notions for women (and often the 
environment) from passages written in a patriarchal society. See Rosemary Radford Ruether, Sexism and 
God-Talk: Toward A Feminist Theology (Boston: Beacon Press, 1983), chapter 1 (especially 17-33); 
Susanne M. Decrane, Aquinas, Feminism, and the Common Good (Washington DC: Georgetown 
University Press, 2004), chapter 1 (especially 39-41). It is this same kind of hermeneutical key—for 
instance what Rosemary Radford Ruether calls “the Prophetic Principle”—that cosmocentric 
transfiguration must adopt. Ruether makes a similar point about nonhumans in Sexism and God-Talk, 20. 
On the prophetic principle, see 22-26. Celia Deanne-Drummond offers a hermeneutical key for a 
conservationist eco-theological ethics. See Celia Deane-Drummond, Eco-Theology (Winona, MN: Anselm 
Academic, 2008), 88-95. However, her key dismisses far too easily transfigurative dimensions of the Bible 
(e.g., Isaiah’s peaceable kingdom, which she refers to as “more obviously metaphorical”). Ibid., 88. 
142 Both Linzey and Moltmann draw on similar scriptural passages, most notably Paul’s image of 
cosmic longing in Romans 8:18-22. Linzey also draws heavily upon the edenic harmony of Genesis 1, the 
cosmic covenant of Genesis, the vision of the peaceable kingdom in Isaiah 11:6-9, and the image of the 
good shepherd. 
143 Linzey does not deny this reality. Linzey, “The Divine Worth of Other Creatures,” 114. 
144 This passage is important for Barth’s theology of animals. Linzey, Christianity and the Rights 
of Animals, 8. 
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transfiguration of the cosmos, Isaiah does present an edenic vision of cosmic harmony 
(Isaiah 11:1-9).  Paul does suggest that the entire groaning creation will participate in the 
glory of the liberated children of God (Romans 8:18-22).  The cosmic christologies of 
Colossians 1:15-20 and Ephesians 4:4-10 do suggest a cosmic reconciliation.
145
  These 
claims are made despite the dominantly human-centered context in which they arose.  
Linzey notes this point well with reference to the prescribed diet of Genesis 1:29-30:  
It is remarkable that people who were not pacifists, vegetarians or opponents of 
capital punishment, felt so keenly the incongruity between violence and their 
belief in a holy, loving Creator—so much so that they conceived that God must 
have created a world free of it.
146
   
 
I concur that the above passages require further exegetical exploration to establish 
the extent of their validity regarding cosmocentric transfiguration.  While such an effort 
would constitute a separate project,
147
 for now I can say that they least reveal that 
scripture is not unambiguously unfriendly toward the value of animals and their 
participation in redemption.  Thus, the central tenets of cosmocentric transfiguration, 
while not the biblical view, nonetheless have biblical support.   
COSMOCENTRIC TRANSFIGURATION AS A REJECTION OF TRADITION  
As far as I can tell, cosmocentric transfiguration as I am describing it in 
conjunction with Moltmann and Linzey is nowhere explicit in the early Christian 
tradition.  This tradition is, in my reading, dominantly anthropocentric with regard to 
                                               
145 See Drummond, Eco-Theology, 100-107. 
146 Linzey, “The Divine Worth of Other Creatures,” 114. 
147 And indeed, some have offered projects in this vein, whether by challenging anthropocentrism 
or conservationism separately. See, for example, the collection of essays—which address both biblical and 
historical perspectives on ecology—in Ecological Hermeneutics: Biblical, Historical and Theological 
Perspectives, David G. Horrell, Cherryl Hunt, Christopher Southgate and Francesca Stavrakopoulou, 
editors (New York, NY: T & T Clark, 2010); Richard Bauckham, Bible and Ecology: Rediscovering the 
Community of Creation (Waco: TX, Baylor University Press, 2010); Norm Phelps, The Dominion of Love: 
Animal Rights According to the Bible (New York, NY: Lantern Books, 2002); Stephen H. Webb, Good 
Eating (Grand Rapids: Brazos Press, 2001). 
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value and divided with reference to the extent of eschatological redemption.  Thus it is 
appropriate to anticipate the critique that cosmocentric transfiguration entails a rejection 
of tradition, for the tradition itself is often blamed for providing the very foundations for 
ecological degradation and lack of concern for nonhumans.
148
  Indeed, regarding the 
resurrection of nonhuman animals—one of the central tenets of cosmocentric 
transfiguration as I am delineating it—Moltmann acknowledges: “It is true that the 
patristic church’s acknowledgement of ‘the resurrection of the flesh’ (or body) was 
always reduced to human beings alone.”149   
Moltmann’s claim may be overstated.  For as with scripture, there are minority 
traditions from the beginning of Christian history that challenge anthropocentrism and 
suggest that the nonhuman world will participate in the eschaton.  As with scripture, these 
voices provide an opportunity to engage in a critical retrieval of a largely patriarchal and 
anthropocentric tradition that is consummate with cosmocentric transfiguration.  This 
retrieval is further solidified in the hagiographies of many saints.     
The consistently theocentric framework of the Christian tradition has grounded an 
anthropocentric worldview.  Irenaeus claims that “creation is suited to [the wants of] 
man; for man was not made for its sake, but creation for the sake of man.”150  Augustine 
assigns animals value inasmuch as they aid humanity’s progress toward God.151  I have 
                                               
148 See the introduction of the present work. 
149 Moltmann, The Coming of God, 70; italics mine. 
150 Irenaeus, Against Heresies, 5.29.1. On this point, see also Denis Minns, Irenaeus (Washington 
D. C.: Georgetown University Press, 1994), 57. Bouteneff, Beginnings, 77. Michael Steenberg challenges 
this reading, suggesting it is does not account for the manner in which humanity and the nonhuman creation 
mutually move toward their teloi, symbiotically, as it were. Steenberg, Irenaeus, 149. Steenberg’s point is 
significant regarding soteriology and eschatology. Yet it is difficult to hold that Irenaeus’s position is not 
anthropocentric when he writes that all creation exists for the sake of the human beings. It might be more 
accurate here to claim that Irenaeus’s position is consummate with anthropocentric transfiguration. 
151 Augustine, City of God, 1:20. His utilitarian view of the nonhuman cosmos is further evinced in 
his differentiation between use and enjoyment. Augustine defines enjoyment as that which “consists in 
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already discussed Aquinas at length on the issues of both anthropocentrism and 
conservationism.  Here I will only note that the magisterial teachings of the Catholic 
Church maintain his theocentric anthropocentrism.  On this point I concur to a high 
degree with Linzey’s assessment of the most recent Catechism,152 which states that 
“animals, like plants and inanimate beings, are by nature destined for the common good 
of past, present, and future humanity.
153
  Thus, it is not wrong to use nonhuman “animal 
resources”154 for food, clothing, and experimentation as long as these actions justly 
benefit the human community, both past and present.
155
  This point is further evident in 
Papal messages and statements by bishops around the globe.
156
 
As I have already noted, the tension between conservation and transfiguration 
with regard to the cosmos is more ambiguous in the Christian tradition.  Both Augustine 
and Aquinas reject the presence of animals in the eschaton.
157
  Yet Irenaeus accepts it.
158
  
                                                                                                                                            
clinging to something lovingly for its own sake.” Augustine, Teaching Christianity (I/11), ed. John E. 
Rotelle, introduction, translation, and notes by Edmund Hill (New York City Press, 1996), I.4 (107). In his 
view, only God is to be enjoyed. But humans can be enjoyed in God in the manner of companionship. But 
animals and the rest of the cosmos are to be used with reference to humanity and God. Augustine, 
Miscellany of Eighty-Three Questions, The Works of Saint Augustine, Part I Volume 12, ed. Raymond 
Canning, introduction, translation, and notes by Boniface Ramsey (New York City Press, 2008), XXX (44). 
Mary Clark sums up Augustine well on this point: “[T]he love of neighbour as one to be enjoyed is the 
right use of neighbour; subordinating non-human realities to oneself by loving them as instruments is the 
right use of material things.” Mary T. Clark, Augustine (New York: Continuum, 2000), 44. Augustine’s 
theocentrism grounds his anthropocentric worldview. 
152 Linzey, Animal Gospel, 56-63. 
153 The Catechism of the Catholic Church: With Modifications from the Editio Typica (New York: 
Doubleday, 1995), 2415. 
154 Ibid.. 
155 Ibid., 2417. 
156 In Populorum Progressio, Paul VI states that “the whole of creation is for man…to complete 
and perfect it by his own efforts and to his own advantage.” Therefore, “every man has the right to glean 
what he needs from the earth.”156 Also Gaudium et Spes, 22, 69. In a pastoral letter, the Canadian Bishops 
write that “the bible… teaches about an equitable distribution of resources, including sharing land, animals 
and water. This insistence on justice is often directed towards distributing the bounty of the earth and 
providing for those who are marginalized.” A 2003 pastoral letter, “You Love All That Exists… All Things 
Are Yours, God, Lover of Life…” Available online at 
http://www.cccb.ca/site/Files/pastoralenvironment.html. Internet; accessed September, 2009.  
157 On Augustine, see Miscellany of Eighty-Three Questions, XXX (44); Augustine on Romans, 
edited by P. F. Landers (Chico: Scholars Press, 1982), 23. Also, Steiner, Anthropocentrism and its 
Discontents, 117. On Aquinas, see chapter 1.  
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Indeed, as I showed in chapter 1, the Orthodox tradition traces its hope for the 
transfiguration of the cosmos through the Christian tradition.  The presence of animals in 
the eschaton is evident even in Orthodox iconography.
159
  This alternative tradition has 
been taken up by many contemporary theologians.
160
  John Wesley, in a sermon based on 
Romans 8:19-22, writes “The whole brute creation will then, undoubtedly, be restored, 
not only to the vigour, strength, and swiftness which they had at their creation, but to a 
far higher degree of each than they ever enjoyed.”161  C. S. Lewis accepts the possibility 
(and indeed likelihood) of animals at the eschaton.
162
  Stanley Hauerwas and John 
Berkman also accept this possibility and derive ethical corollaries from it.
163
  In her 
thought experiment on the cosmos as the body of God, Sallie McFague writes,  
We live with the hope against hope that defeat and death are not the last word, but 
that even the least body in the universe, the most insignificant, most vulnerable, 
most outcast one will participate in the resurrection of the body.
164
  
  
Hans Ur von Balthasar critiques Aquinas’s rejection of the presence of animals at the 
eschaton: 
                                                                                                                                            
158 See Irenaeus, Against Heresies, 5.33.4; Irenaeus’ Demonstration of the Apostolic Preaching: A 
Theological Commentary and Translation, Iain M. Mackenzie with the translation of the text of the 
Demonstration by J. Armitage Robinson (Burlington: Ashgate, 2002), 193; Steenberg, Irenaeus, 149.  
159 See Reed, Esther D. “Animals in Orthodox Iconography.” Creaturely Theology, Creaturely 
Theology: On God, Humans and Other Animals. Celia Deane-Drummond and David Clough, Editors. 
London, UK: SCM Press, 2009: 61-77 
160 For a collection of writings addressing the general issue of an eternal telos for particular 
nonhumans, see Animals and Christianity: A Book of Readings (Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 1990), Part 3 (pp. 
81-109). 
161 John Wesley, “The General Deliverance,” available online at http://wesley.nnu.edu/john-wesley/the-
sermons-of-john-wesley-1872-edition/the-sermons-of-john-wesley-alphabetical-order/; Internet, accessed 
March, 2010. See also Thomas C. Oden, John Wesley’s Scriptural Christian: A Plain Exposition of His 
Teaching on Christian Doctrine (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1994), 126-129. 
162 Linzey, “C. S. Lewis’s Theology of Animals,” Anglican Theological Review, 80 (Winter 1998), 
60-81. 
163 Stanley Hauerwas and John Berkman, “A Trinitarian Theology of the ‘Chief End’ of ‘All 
Flesh’” in Good News for Animals? Christian Approaches to Animal Well-Being, edited by Charles Pinches 
and Jay B. McDaniel (New York: Orbis Books, 1993), 62-74 
164 Sallie McFague, The Body of God: An Ecological Theology (Fortress Press: Minneapolis, 
1993), 201-202. McFague derives from this hope a conservationist ethics that works for the good of the 
system by evoking compassion for its components.  
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This cruel verdict contradicts the Old Testament sense of the solidarity between 
the living, subhuman cosmos and the world of men (Ps 8; Ps 104; Gen 1, and so 
on), the prophetic and Jewish ideas of divine salvation in images of peace among 
the animals (Is 11:6-9; 65:25).
165
   
 
What remains more difficult with regard to the tradition is the hope for the 
resurrection of all individual animals for their own sake.  Yet even here a retrieval of the 
tradition from its anthropocentric roots in conjunction with an emphasis on cosmic 
eschatology opens the door for the possibility of such a claim.  If God cares for all 
creatures for their own sakes and seeks to redeem the cosmos from the mechanisms of 
evolutionary development, the hope entailed in cosmocentric transfiguration is the logical 
outcome.  
But what about the ethical claims of cosmocentric transfiguration?  Is it a slight of 
tradition to claim that eschatological hope should inform how we engage animals in 
history?  I believe that such is not the case. To suggest this point, I will consider the lives 
of saints.
166
 
Saint Isaac of Nineveh writes that Christ has returned the possibility of peace 
between humans and animals.
167
  He further suggests that the merciful heart  
is not able to bear hearing or examining injury or any insignificant suffering of 
anything in creation.  And therefore even in behalf of the irrational beings…at all 
times he offers prayers with tears that they may be guarded and strengthened.
168
  
Isaac suggests that, in Christ, the “humble man” and the “merciful heart” are 
drawn to see creation differently.
169
  This new vision is evinced by the countless 
                                               
165 Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Last Act, Theo-Drama, Volume 5, translated by Graham Harrison 
(Ignatius Press: San Francisco, 1988), 420-21.  
166 For a good collection of narratives about saints and animals, see Jame Schaefer, Theological 
Foundations for Environmental Ethics: Reconstructing Patristic & Medieval Concepts (Washington, D.C.: 
Georgetown University Press, 2009), chapter 6.  
167 The Ascetical Homilies of St. Isaac the Syrian, edited by Dana Miller (Boston: Holy 
Transfiguration Monastery, 1984), p. 383. 
168 Isaac of Nineveh, Mystic Treatises, translated from Bedjan’s Syriac text with an introduction 
and registers by A. J. Wensinck (Wiesbaden: 1969), LXXIV (341).  
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narratives of saints experiencing miraculous harmony with animals.
170
  These examples 
begin with Jesus’s own narrative, both in canonical and non-canonical writings, and 
continue in the hagiographies of the saints.
171
  Some, like Anselm and the later Silouan 
the Athonite, wept at the plight of animals.
172
  Other saints, such as Denis and Giles, 
provided animals with safety from human hunters.
173
  Still other saints administered 
healing practices toward animals.  Saint Jerome removed a thorn from a lion’s paw and in 
return received the creature’s faithful service.174   
In an article exploring animals in the Virtues of Saint Macarius, Tim Vivian notes 
how peace between the saint and animals evidences proleptically the peaceable kingdom. 
Macarius, through God’s enlightenment and grace, [enacts] the peaceable 
kingdom, where he lives in peace with antelopes, hyenas, sheep—and even 
snakes.  The chief virtue of this kingdom, it appears, is compassion: not dogma, 
                                                                                                                                            
169 This notion of seeing is picked up by Linzey. See Linzey, Creatures of the Same God, chapter 
4. 
170 The examples I delineate here tend toward relationships of individual saints with individual 
animals. For another, more communal, consideration of the monastic order with the nonhuman creation, see 
Michael Northcott, “‘They Shall not Hurt or Destroy in All My Holy Mountain’ (Isaiah 65.25): Killing for 
Philosophy and A Creaturely Theology of Non-Violence” in Creaturely Theology: On God, Humans and 
Other Animals, edited by Celia Deane-Drummond and David Clough (London: SCM Press, 2009), 246-47.  
171 Linzey emphasizes these narratives in his work. See Andrew Linzey, Animal Rights: A 
Christian Assessment of Man’s Treatment of Animals (London: SCM Press, 1976), 74-75; Christianity and 
the Rights of Animals, 33, 49; After Noah, 62-70; Animal Gospel, 26-27. Per my effort of critical retrieval, I 
am here focusing on the more positive examples from the hagiographies. The whole tradition bears more 
ambiguity on this matter. For instance, see Ingvild Sælid Gilhus, Animals, Gods and Humans: Changing 
Attitudes to Animals, in Greek, Roman, and Early Christian Ideas (New York: Routledge, 2006), chapters 
9-10. 
172 On Silouan, see Kallistos Ware, “The Soul in Greek Christianity” in From Soul to Self, ed. M. 
James C. Crabbe (New York: Routledge, 1999), 65. On Anselm, see Dominic Alexander, Saints and 
Animals in the Middle Ages (Rochester: The Boydell Press, 2008), 1. 
173 In Denis’ case, the animal found refuge in the vicinity of his shrine after the saint’s martyrdom. 
See Deirdre Jackson, Marvelous to Behold: Miracles in Medieval Manuscripts (London: The British 
Library, 2007), 35. On Giles, see Jackson, Marvelous to Behold, 38-40. Jackson includes a miniature of 
Giles and the doe he protected. The picture takes up two pages from the Book of Hours. The contrast on the 
two pages is worth noting. On the right, the anxious hunter looks toward his prey with anticipation, having 
released an arrow in the doe’s direction. On the left, the doe sits nuzzled against St. Giles, who, pierced by 
the hunter’s arrow, rests against a flowering tree topped by a bird. The picture seems to present two very 
disparate views toward nature. The first is the hunter who anxiously seeks to kill for his benefit; the second 
is the saint who is pierced for an animal’s protection and sits with the creature in peace.   
174 Jackson, Marvelous to Behold, 40. 
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not orthodoxy, not orthopraxis, but love and empathy and mercy for others, even 
non-human others.
175
     
 
Based on these narratives, among others, Vivian concludes: 
Although monks lived in close proximity with spiders, snakes, scorpions, 
jackals, wolves, and lions, most of them appeared to have lived quite 
peaceably with their animal companions in the desert.  Such peaceful 
coexistence, and even community, has the power, therefore to point our 
age, made ecologically sensitive by necessity, to the possibility of better 
relationship with the nonhuman creature with whom we share God’s 
creation.  Just as importantly, the monks can guide us toward the 
possibility of a peaceable kingdom, one created by God in the Garden and 
reenvisioned by the prophets.
176
  
  
Based on these various factors, my anticipated critique that cosmocentric 
transfiguration entails a rejection of the Christian tradition is unconvincing.  It is without 
doubt a critical retrieval of the tradition.  But a retrieval of a tradition is not tantamount to 
its rejection.  
FALLENNESS AND ESCHATOLOGY AS A REJECTION OF SCIENCE AND DENIGRATION OF 
NATURE 
Lisa Sideris, following the lead of Holmes Rolston, argues that a rejection of the 
goodness of evolutionary mechanisms such as suffering, predation, and death entails a 
rejection of scientific evidence and therefore a denigration of nature.  She writes that 
“Rolston’s rejection of redemptive, eschatological improvements to nature is one of the 
chief strengths of his position, both scientifically and theologically.”177  Similarly, she 
argues that eschatological “hopes for nature are misguided when they distort our 
understanding of what nature is; more important, they obscure the issue of how much and 
                                               
175 Vivian, “The Peaceable Kingdom,” 489. 
176 Ibid., 479. 
177 Sideris, Environmental Ethics, 189. 
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what sort of responsibility humans have toward nature.”178  The hope for a transfigured 
cosmos is tantamount to a denigration of nature.
179
   
Sideris is extremely critical of Moltmann on this point: “The denial of the given 
order in Moltmann’s argument in favor of a new creation (established by the spirit of God 
who dwells in creation) expresses his preference for a world devoid of evolutionary 
forces that produce struggle and strife.”180 Furthermore, Moltmann’s eschatology reveals 
both his anthropocentrism and his “inadequate and incomplete understanding of natural 
processes such as evolution.”181  Thus, it seems that anything supernatural or 
eschatological is by default anthropocentric and scientifically incorrect because it does 
not embrace the mechanisms of evolution as fully good.  Therefore, she maintains that, 
“although the desire to heal environments whose health has been compromised by human 
actions points to a worthy imperative, natural processes themselves cannot be seen as 
wrong, evil, or in need of redemption in an eschatological sense.”182   
In line with Sideris’s critique—and as I have already shown in the introduction 
and chapter 1—theologians and ethicists whom I classify under the paradigm of 
cosmocentric conservation often argue that the Christian emphasis on the need for 
redemption of nature inevitably desacralizes the cosmos.
183
  To claim that nature needs to 
be redeemed is to criticize the very reality that enables life, including human life, to exist.  
These critiques concur that the notion of fallenness and the hope for eschatological 
                                               
178 Ibid., 200. 
179 Sideris claims that “ecotheologians are unsure of what constitutes nature’s true nature.” Ibid., 
103. 
180 Ibid., 213. 
181 Ibid.. 
182 Sideris, Environmental Ethics, 200. 
183 See Thomas Berry, The Dream of the Earth (San Francisco, CA: Sierra Club Books, 1990), 25. 
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transfiguration in terms of overturning the darker mechanisms of evolution amount to the 
denigration of nature.     
Is this critique valid?  I do not believe so.  My exploration suggests that the 
“fallenness” of the cosmos is not located in the distortion of some ontological substance 
but rather a relational disposition—a wandering in isolation.184  Yet it is the good creation 
that wanders in isolation.  There is no denigration of any single creature or species in 
nature—such as predators—for all creatures are bound in this isolation.185  Nor is the 
whole itself fully denigrated, for the interrelated system is itself good and evinces many 
good qualities. What is not good—what is incomplete and still requires the grace that 
perfects—are the mechanisms of the system that gratuitously sacrifices its individual 
components.  Said differently, creation (including its consecratory distance) is good, but 
its wandering in isolation and the dispositional effects of that wandering are not good.  
And why should such a claim entail the denigration of either science or nature?  It 
seems to me that Sideris’s claim to hold the high ground here constitutes a logical leap.  
In conjunction with Gustafson’s critique of Moltmann, Sideris claims that “Moltmann’s 
God…is expected to reorder creation in ways that better conform to human hopes.”186  
Thus, Sideris maintains that anything contrary to the “is” of current nature constitutes a 
wishful-thinking “ought” of human sensibilities.  Yet it is unclear why her own thinking 
                                               
184 Ware offers such a view of original sin in his work, The Orthodox Way, 62-63. 
185 I thus believe Sideris is somewhat missing the mark when she contends that many eco-
theologians, including Moltmann, are “often deeply ambivalent about science, both critiquing and 
embracing it as suits their purposes.” Sideris, Environmental Ethics, 92. For many theologians, the question 
is not whether or not to embrace the findings of science, but rather whether or not to accept that the “is” 
that science reveals constitutes a moral “ought.” Such was the position of the American botanist Asa Gray. 
On Gray’s position, see Peter J. Bowler, Evolution: The History of an Idea, revised edition (Los Angeles, 
CA: University of California Press, 1989), 223. 
186 Sideris, Environmental Ethics, 212. She offers a similar critique of ecotheology in general: 
“The considerations that guide ecotheology are not drawn from a study of nature but are merely a human 
set of concerns and interests grafted onto nature.” Ibid., 179. 
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is not also a presupposition demanding God to conform to human sensibilities. After all, 
theologically it is unclear why either a value judgment about evolution’s mechanisms or a 
hope for a supernatural transfiguration of nature in line with Christ’s own supernatural 
resurrection from the dead constitutes an “inadequate or incomplete understanding of 
natural processes such as evolution.”187  Both Moltmann and (in most cases) Linzey 
affirm the reality of the mechanisms of evolution without lapsing into an unbridled 
affirmation of their goodness.
188
  I wonder if James Gustafson’s caution that “those who 
argue from various observations about nature tend to think they have captured the 
essence of the Deity in their concepts” could apply, in some modified sense, to the 
certitude that Sideris evinces regarding the impropriety of theological concepts such as 
eschatology.
189
     
At any rate, Sideris’s critique about nature and wishful thinking seems 
inconsistent to me.  She refuses to apply the same line of thinking to humans.  Following 
Rolston, she states that there is a stark ethical distinction between culture and nature.
190
  
She thus contends, as does Rolston, that an ethical analogy between human communities 
and ecological communities does not hold because “environmental ethics cannot ensure 
the well-being of each individual member of the community, regardless of those beings’ 
degree of sentience or mental sophistication.”191  But does this claim not hold true in 
human communities as well?  What human community can guarantee the well-being of 
                                               
187 Ibid., 213. 
188 I confess I do not understand why Sideris rejects the possibility that a theological position 
could affirm the findings of science regarding certain aspects of reality (e.g., predation) but refuse to accept 
the goodness of those findings. Sideris, Environmental Ethics, 201. 
189 James Gustafson, Ethics from a Theocentric Perspective (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago 
Press, 1981), 1:34. 
190 See Sideris, Environmental Ethics, 252-61; Holmes Rolston III, Environmental Ethics: Duties 
to and Values in the Natural World (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1988), 181-82. 
191 Sideris, Environmental Ethics, 179; Rolston, Environmental Ethics, 59-62. 
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all its members?  In the best of human societies, people still die young and in horrible 
fashions.  For nature reaches into the human community.  There is no sharp divide 
between culture and nature.  Even if the community has laws and welfare programs to 
protect individuals from other humans and economic strife, it cannot stop disease in all 
cases and for all of its members. It cannot guarantee safety for all individuals from 
pestilence, drought, earthquakes, and hurricanes.  
Furthermore, it seems because such activity is “natural,” there is no reason why, 
in Sideris’s logic, humans should not simply accept this suffering and death for 
individuals.  Why work toward curing cancer?  Why eliminate smallpox and other 
viruses?  Are not these occurrences examples of predation of the nonhuman upon the 
human?  This question also exists on the level of law.  Social order protects one 
individual from others by law and thus is different from nature.  But is such an exhaustive 
ethics for individuals conducive to evolutionary development? After all, Sideris notes that 
“the struggle for existence is the most severe among members of the same species.”192  
To respond to this dilemma, Sideris aligns herself with Rolston in claiming that 
humans occupy a “post-evolutionary position” and are thus “no longer subject to the 
same selection pressures from nature that wild animals are.”193  This argument, in my 
view, makes very little sense.  Are not humans still evolving?  If they not still pressured 
by natural selection, why do mutations like cancer continue to haunt the human species?  
Why are humans still preyed upon by viruses and bacteria?  In reaction to this predation, 
could not another species arise still?  At any rate, is not creating a special moral category 
                                               
192 Sideris, Environmental Ethics, 295, n. 13. 
193 Ibid., 192. For an instance of Rolston’s position, see Environmental Ethics, 335-41. 
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for creatures that are “postevolutionary” simply another criteria for the limits of an 
extensionist ethics—at least with regard to a form of that ethics?   
Furthermore, Sideris accepts Gustafson’s claim that “the source and power and 
order of all nature is not always beneficent in its outcomes for the diversity of life and for 
the well-being of humans as part of that.”194  Yet it is unclear how claiming concern for 
all individual human beings based on their “post-evolutionary” status is in harmony with 
Gustafson’s position.  This problem is confounded when Sideris makes the accusation 
that “Moltmann’s account of the stages of creation assumes that God necessarily shares 
his particular hopes for the casting out of all forces that create struggle and strife in 
human and nonhuman life.”195   
It seems to me that Sideris is wildly inconsistent here.  First, Moltmann is as 
aware of his context and finitude as Gustafson.  Second, Sideris seems to assume that 
God necessarily shares her particular vision that the forces of struggle and strife are 
completely good.  To disagree with this position is, in her view, tantamount to denying 
theocentrism.
196
  The only reason she considers her assumption better than Moltmann’s 
(or rather not an assumption at all) is that it is based on empirical observation of nature 
(or general revelation).  Moltmann’s presuppositions are no doubt experimentally (that is, 
subjectively) grounded.  However, his vision also finds affirmation in scripture (which 
Sideris acknowledges). Yet Sideris maintains that this biblical ground is insufficient.
197
  
Inexplicitly, then, she approvingly notes Gustafson’s claim that humans ought to be 
                                               
194 James Gustafson, A Sense of the Divine: The Natural Environment from a Theocentric 
Perspective (Cleveland, OH: The Pilgrim Press, 1996), 47; Sideris, Environmental Ethics, 203-4. 
195 Sideris, Environmental Ethics, 214. 
196 Ibid., 228. 
197 See, for instance, ibid., 189-91. 
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concerned about the rights and wellness of other humans because these concerns are 
biblically grounded!
198
  
THE RESURRECTION AND ETERNITY OF INDIVIDUAL ANIMALS AS NONSENSICAL  
Christopher Southgate says of his creative engagement with evolutionary 
theodicy: “When I have presented the thesis of this book in various places it is always the 
eschatological dimension of the argument, in particular the notion that there might be 
animals (and even dinosaurs) in some version of ‘heaven,’ that has attracted the most 
controversy.”199  This controversy would surely be augmented with Moltmann’s claim 
that all life must be resurrected at the eschaton.
200
  Such controversy is not without 
warrant.  After all, what would a dragonfly do with eternity?  Where should one draw the 
line for individual resurrection—at humans, mammals, vertebrates, arthropods, bacteria, 
protozoa?
201
   
This question intimates the critique that most nonhuman creatures, as individuals, 
are not fit for eternal existence.
202
  Anthropocentric transfiguration does not have as much 
of an issue with regard to this critique of their cosmocentric counterparts.  If the inclusion 
                                               
198 Ibid., 214. See also 192.   
199 Southgate, The Groaning of Creation, 78-79. 
200 Indeed, Moltmann does receive critique on this point. See John Polkinghorne, The God of Hope 
and the End of the World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 122-23. Bauckham, The Theology of 
Jürgen Moltmann, 211. 
201 Wennberg notes that the issue of drawing a line applies also to humans. What about infants, 
miscarriages, a “newly fertilized ova…that perishes”, and the severely mentally handicapped? See 
Wennberg, God, Humans, and Animals, 323-24.  
202 See Wennberg, God, Humans, and Animals, 322. As John Polkinghorne writes, “What are we 
to expect will be the destiny of non-human creatures? They must have their share in cosmic hope, but we 
scarcely need suppose that every dinosaur that ever lived, let alone all of the vast multitude of bacteria that 
have constituted so large a fraction of biomass throughout the history of terrestrial life, will have its own 
individual eschatological future.” See John Polkinghorne, The God of Hope and the End of the World (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 122. Southgate similarly concedes that “simple organisms may 
possess little distinctive individual experience and agency, and they may be represented in the eschaton as 
types rather than individuals. However, to assume that that is the situation of all creatures, including higher 
animals, runs the risk of not doing full justice either to the richness of individual animal experience, or to 
the theodicy problems that evolutionary creation poses.” Southgate, The Groaning of Creation, 84. 
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of the nonhuman creation, including animals, in the eschaton is for the sake of 
humanity’s relationship with God, it does not require the animal’s awareness or 
appreciation of this function.  But if cosmocentric transfiguration maintains that every 
individual animal will participate in the resurrection and eternal life for their own sakes, 
it faces the critique that such a claim is nonsensical.  
What exactly makes the claim nonsensical?  First, regarding animals that are not 
self-aware and thus, though they may experience the stimulus of pain, do not suffer (but 
still die), what significance would a participation in eternity have for them?  If a creature 
lacks self-awareness, how can it appreciate eternal life?  Second, even though sentient 
nonhuman animals are self-aware and experience both suffering and death, do they have 
the necessary facilities to appreciate eternity?  Would animals that are self-aware but do 
not seem to be able to appropriate and interpret universal concepts understand their 
presence in eternal life?   
Linzey argues that Christians must accept the possibility that, because grace 
perfects nature rather than destroys it, all creatures will find their eschatological place in 
a manner consummate with their transfigured being.  Humans also require transfiguration 
to be fit for eternal life.  Why then not also animals?  Says Linzey: 
All that is vital is that Christians do not eclipse the possibilities for the non-human 
creation by insisting that while God can transform human existence, he is sadly 
incapable of doing the same to animal existence…We do not know precisely how 
God in Christ will restore each and every creature.  But we must hold fast to the 
reality witnessed in Christ that our creaturely life is unfinished reality—that God 
is not yet finished with us.
203
 
 
                                               
203 Linzey, Christianity and the Rights of Animals, 62. 
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Thus Linzey advocates an inclusive eschaton while remaining agnostic about the details 
of how various creatures will be included as those creatures.
204
   
In my view, this line of reasoning is promising.  After all, is not some agnosticism 
required in the face of a human resurrection?  Concerning the future hope of humans, 
John writes that “what we will be has not yet been revealed” (1 John 3:2).  Aquinas 
acknowledges that humans require grace to be fit for eternal life.
205
  The notion of the 
transfiguration and deification of humanity has a long tradition in Orthodox thought.
206
  
The point is that humans require a change in form (a trans-formation or trans-figuration) 
in order to be fit for eternity.  Regarding just this point, Paul states that all flesh “will be 
changed.  For this perishable body must put on imperishability, and this mortal body must 
put on immortality” (1 Corinthians 15:52-53).  Or, as Wolfhart Pannenberg states,  
The participation of creatures in the eternity of God is possible, however, only on 
the condition of a radical change, not only because of the taking up of time into 
the eternal simultaneity of the divine life but also and above all because of the sin 
that goes along with our being in time, the sin of separation from God, and of the 
antagonism of creatures among themselves.
207
  
 
Given these radical transfigurative claims, it is important to acknowledge the 
limits of human knowledge regarding both the extent and nature of the eschatological 
community—both human and nonhuman.  Yet these limits should not facilitate a view 
that tends to discredit maximally inclusive views.  But such is often the case.
208
 Denis 
                                               
204 Linzey, Creatures of the Same God, 133, n. 13. 
205 See Jean Porter, The Recovery of Virtue: The Relevance of Aquinas for Christian Ethics 
(Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1990), 53. 
206 See Norman Russell, The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition (New York, 
NY: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
207 Wolfhart Pannenberg Systematic Theology, volume 3, translated by Geoffrey W. Bromiley 
(Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1991), 607. 
208 See, for instance, Drummond, Eco-Theology, 173.  
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Edwards leans in this direction.
209
  He claims that “redemptive fulfillment of any creature 
will be specific to the creature involved.”  But “such a fulfillment will be one that fits the 
nature of each creature.”  Thus he concludes, “While I think it can be argued that the 
fulfillment of a human being will necessarily be a personal one, the fulfillment of a 
mosquito may be of a different order.”210  Yet it is unclear why the “transformation” (the 
term Edwards uses) of a creature, if it truly entails a trans-formation (i.e., a radical 
change in form or nature), must fit “the nature [or form] of each creature” that is being 
radically changed.  Why must the change in form (i.e., the trans-formation) adhere to the 
form that is being changed?
211
  Why should we question—and here “question” really 
takes the connotation of doubt—“whether bodily resurrection is necessarily the most 
appropriate fulfillment for bacteria or a dinosaur” based on those creature’s natures?212     
By this claim I do not mean to suggest that people should simply avoid any talk of 
eschatological hope.  I concur with Southgate’s claim that a “scientifically informed 
eschatology must try to give some sort of account of what might be continuities and 
discontinuities between this creation and the new one.”213  It must also  
                                               
209 See Edwards, “Every Sparrow that Falls,” 117-19. Edwards is, to his credit, cautious to make 
only suggestions about the exclusion of certain individual creatures from the eschatological community. 
210 Ibid., 119. 
211 I am not here advocating that there need not be any continuity between the present form of a 
creature and its transfigured form. Indeed, Moltmann is adamant that there be a strong continuity. But this 
continuity need not be assigned to some nature that transfiguration can in no way alter. It is in fact exactly 
here that the notion of transfiguration becomes essential, for it maintains the narrative continuity and 
ontological discontinuity of creatures from temporal existence to eternal existence. I will address this point 
further in the next section. 
212 Ibid.. Perhaps here it is important to note that I find Edwards’s claim that the “future of creation 
remains obscure and shrouded in mystery” is overextended on account of his christology. He claims that 
“The future of creation is not something about which we have information. What we have in the 
resurrection of Jesus Christ is a promise. The promise does not give a clear view of the future.” Ibid., 117. 
Here, Moltmann’s critique of Pannenberg is important. See Moltmann, The Coming of God, 195. The 
resurrection is not simply a promise—it is the fulfillment of a promise and the continual unfolding of that 
fulfillment. As such, the resurrection of Christ from the dead reveals the future of the cosmos: resurrection 
from death. 
213 Southgate, The Groaning of Creation, 81. 
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try and relate the great final transforming act of God, of which the resurrection of 
Christ is usually regarded as the beginning, not just to continuities and 
discontinuities in human life but also to our understanding of God’s relation to 
living creatures other than human beings.
214
   
 
It seems to me that the best path forward is a cautious use of the Christ-event as the 
hermeneutical key of new creation.  Christology must be the litmus test of eschatological 
assertions.
215
  Such is the route both Moltmann and Linzey claim.
216
  Christ rose from the 
dead, thus conquering death.  Bacteria, dinosaurs, and plants all die.  Why should Christ’s 
victory in resurrection not have literal meaning for these creatures?
217
   
Furthermore, it seems to me an anthropocentric hubris to argue that human 
existence is so naturally fit for eternity while all nonhumans (including advanced 
primates) have no business being included in such hope.  It is simply not the place of 
humans to exclude creatures from eschatological life based on philosophical and 
scientific distinctions.  We simply do not know the nature of these creatures’ relationship 
with God.
218
  Neither do we know the extent to which divine grace might transfigure their 
existence and make them fit for eternity.
 
 If we can recognize the human need for 
                                               
214 Ibid., 81-82. 
215 I sense here a disparity between Moltmann and Linzey’s eschatological hermeneutic and that of 
Karl Rahner. For Rahner, eschatology begins with theological anthropology. And anthropology, within the 
confines of salvation and grace, provides the proper hermeneutic to adjudicate eschatological assertions. 
Says Rahner, “We do not project something from the future into the present, but rather in man’s experience 
of himself and of God in grace and in Christ we project our Christian present into its future.” Karl Rahner, 
Foundations of Christian Faith: An Introduction to the Idea of Christianity, translated by William V. Dych 
(New York, NY: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 1998), 432. Thus, the future must cohere with 
humanity’s experience of salvation in the present. For Moltmann, Christ is the future concretized in history. 
Says Moltmann, “If we look at nature from the perspective of Christ’s resurrection, then the sphere in 
which nature is experienced moves into the horizon of expectation of its new creation.” Moltmann, The 
Way of Jesus Christ, 252. Thus, as the hermeneutical key of eschatological assertions, Christ draws human 
experience into the future, reversing Rahner’s dictum.  
216 See Moltmann, The Crucified God, 126-27; The Coming of God, 28-29; Linzey, Christianity 
and the Rights of Animals, 33-34; Animal Gospel, 14-15. 
217 Though, as already noted in chapter 3, Linzey stops short of assigning any clear significance to 
Christ’s death with regard to individual non-sentient creatures. 
218 Edwards, “Every Sparrow that Falls,” 117-18. 
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transfiguration, why not, as Linzey suggests, accept the possibility that other creatures 
can be made fit for eternity through the same process?
219
    
At any rate, science can tell us that certain creatures suffer.  And basic sense 
perception makes us aware of the reality that all creatures, both sentient and not, die.  
If—as Moltmann and, to some extent, Linzey both maintain—Christ overcomes in his 
passion the suffering of the sentient by drawing their unique pain into the Godhead and 
healing it; if Christ overcomes death by dying the death of all the living and defeating the 
“last enemy” (1 Corinthians 15:26) in his resurrection; then it seems theologically viable 
to claim that neither suffering nor death can be the final word for any creature.
220
  As 
Moltmann states, in Christ “the experiences of life’s transience and the unceasing 
suffering of all living things no longer end only in grief, but also already lead to 
hope…This eschatological reinterpretation of transience has to be concentrated on a 
single point: death; for death is the end of all the living.”221       
THE HOPE FOR VEGETARIAN LIONS AS THE DISSOLUTION OF THE LION SPECIES 
In his work, The Problem of Pain, C. S. Lewis states:  
I think, under correction, that the prophet [Isaiah] used an eastern hyperbole when 
he spoke of the lion and the lamb lying down together.  That would be rather 
impertinent of the lamb.  To have lions and lambs that so consorted…would be 
the same as having neither lambs nor lions.
222
   
 
                                               
219 It seems to me that such hubris on the part of humans is a form of return to the emphasis on the 
immortality of the human soul over and against the resurrection of the flesh. How else could one maintain 
that infants can attain eternal life while advanced primates cannot? The transfiguration of material 
existence permits an affirmation of an individual animal (and plant) resurrection. The immortality of the 
human soul rejects this possibility by locating the propriety of eternal existence in the esse of the humanity, 
an immaterial soul. For some considerations, see Wennberg, God, Humans, and Animals, 324-25. It would 
therefore be rather odd for theologians who emphasize the resurrection of the flesh and embrace a dynamic 
and relational ontology to reject the possibility of the resurrection of individual nonhuman life. 
220 Moltmann, The Coming of God, 132. 
221 Moltmann, The Way of Jesus Christ, 252. 
222 C. S. Lewis, The Problem of Pain (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 1996), 147. 
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This quote highlights an important question.  Even granting the continuity and 
discontinuity of creaturely existence in transfiguration, how much discontinuity can a 
creature or species bear without becoming something else altogether?  Would a 
vegetarian lion still be a lion?  Or, would being vegetarian deny a lion its true “heaven”?  
As Lewis states, “If the earthly lion could read the prophecy of that day when he shall eat 
hay like an ox, he would regard it as a description not of heaven, but of hell.”223 Moule, 
engaging the vision of the peaceable kingdom in Isaiah 11:6-9, polemically raises this 
critique:   
No one with a grain of sense believes that… Isa. xi is intended literally, as though 
the digestive system of a carnivore were going to be transformed into that of a 
herbivore. What blasphemous injury would be done to great poetry and true 
mythology by laying such solemnly prosaic hands upon it! If we believe at all in 
God as Creator, and in the evolution of species as part of his design, it seems we 
must accept universal predation as integral to it. Indeed, it would be a catastrophic 
dislocation of the whole ecology if the lion did begin to eat straw like the ox―or, 
for that matter, if the microscopic defenders within the body gave up attacking the 
invaders which may cause disease.
224
  
 
In a similar fashion, Lisa Sideris critiques Northcott’s eschatological outlook, 
writing that  
an environmental ethic that seeks harmonious and peaceful relations among all 
beings surely cannot take seriously the particular needs, the specific ways of life, 
of animals—take for example the needs of predators, whose means of survival 
[and, as others would argue, their flourishing] will apparently be revoked when 
the original goodness of creation is restored.
225
  
  
Linzey responds to such critiques by stating that “it is not animality itself that is to 
be destroyed by divine love, rather animal nature in bondage to violence and 
predation.”226  It is in this sense that grace perfects rather than destroys nature: “It is 
                                               
223 Ibid.. 
224 Moule, Man and Nature in the New Testament, 12. 
225 Sideris, Environmental Ethics, 88. 
226 Linzey, After Noah, 75. See also, for a rebuttal, Wennberg, God, Humans, and Animals, 295. 
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against the order of nature, we may say, for one species to trust another in a world that is 
fallen and disordered, and yet we do well to remember that grace perfects nature.”227  
Grace restores the nature of predatory animals to the state that God originally intended 
for them.  It is as if, for Linzey, the lion and the gazelle are both victims of predation.  
The gazelle is eaten.  But the lion is bound to its need and desire to eat.  In this sense, 
both are in need of redemption.  This point is similar to Moltmann’s claim that divine 
justice must redeem both the victim and the victimizer.
228
   
Many eco-theologians, including Thomas Berry, would find little satisfaction in 
Linzey’s appeal to true nature over and against distorted nature.229  Is there another way 
forward?  I offer three responses to the issue.   
First, it seems to me that the critique that a lion would no longer be a lion if it did 
not hunt is a rather reductionist view of a lion’s being.  It appears to rely on a Platonic or 
Aristotelian reduction of lion to some esse (which is predation of all things!) that cannot 
be overcome without the dissolution of the lion-ness of the lion.
230
  It also assumes that 
trans-figuration (again, the radical change of a creature’s nature, form, or figure) cannot 
entail any change in its digestive system or predatory instincts.  But if such were the case, 
could not the same critique be applied to the hope for human transfiguration?  Will 
humans eat in eternity?  Will they experience sexual drives?  Will they sleep?  Will they 
experience the past as past?  Will they suffer and die?  Will they cry?  Will they 
experience temptation?   
                                               
227 Linzey, After Noah, 100. 
228 See Moltmann, The Spirit of Life, 129-37. 
229 See Thomas Berry, The Christian Future and the Fate of the Earth, Mary Evelyn Tucker and 
John Grim, editors (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2009), 39. 
230 See Marc Fellenz’s musing on the ongoing “species essentialism” of Western thought. Marc R. 
Fellenz, The Moral Menagerie: Philosophy and Animal Rights (Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press, 
2007), 37-40.  
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Polkinghorne suggests that “the ‘matter’ of [the] resurrected world will be the 
transformed matter of this dying universe…It will have new properties, consistent with 
the end of transience, death and suffering.”231 If this new matter enables any of the above 
dimensions of human existence to be overcome in transfiguration, would a human still be 
a human?  If the “perishable body must put on imperishability” (1 Corinthians 15:53), is 
it the same species?  If so, then it seems the same argument for continuity could apply to 
vegetarian lions.  If not, then the continuity of human identity is as questionable as that of 
lions with regard to eternal life.   
Thus, Southgate is somewhat inconsistent when he claims that  
it is very hard to imagine any form of being a predator that nevertheless does not 
‘hurt or destroy’ on the ‘holy mountain’ of God…What could the life of a 
predator look like in the absence of the second law of thermodynamics, and the 
imperative of ingesting ordered energy to ward off the ever-present slide of 
decay?
232
   
 
Why would such issues not also apply to humans, who are currently predators 
themselves?   
Or again, Southgate notes that the notion that carnivores will eat straw is “most 
difficult of all for the biochemically minded.”233  But is it not also biochemically 
problematic to claim that humans will neither defecate nor die?  Why should the 
transfiguration of a nonhuman animal from carnivore to herbivore pose such vast 
problems when the transfiguration of a human does not?
234
  
                                               
231 Polkinghorne, Scientists as Theologians, 54. 
232 Southgate, The Groaning of Creation, 88. 
233 Ibid., 89. 
234 Southgate does not explore this problem. To his credit, though, he does not let the issue of 
transfiguration exclude individual nonhuman animals from the eschatological community. He does note: 
“That we find it so difficult to picture these states of being may reduce confidence in their reality.” But he 
also maintains that both scripture and theodicy require the affirmation of some inclusion of individual 
nonhumans. Ibid., 89. 
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Perhaps some eco-theologians would respond that the notions of transfiguration 
and eternal life are altogether incoherent for all creaturely life, including humans.
235
  
Such a reply is, in my view, perfectly viable and consistent.  However, if one wants to 
maintain that humans will experience eternal life, the issue of continuity in the midst of 
transfiguration (including the alteration of biological factors such as digestion) poses as 
much a problem here as it does for nonhumans.  For a vegetarian lion is no more an 
oddity than a human who does not defecate, suffer, or die.  Should the advocate of eternal 
life for humans appeal to mystery or remain agnostic about the exact manner of 
continuity and discontinuity in the midst of human transfiguration, the animal theologian 
should be offered the same option without ridicule.   
Second, the question of the continuity of a lion’s nature seems to be predicated 
upon the prominence of the lion species over and against the individual lion.  The 
advocate of cosmocentric transfiguration has an advantage here in emphasizing the 
importance of the individual creature.  For if one emphasizes the species, then the 
potential loss of the general notion of “lion,” including its carnivorous nature, is tragic.  
But if one emphasizes the individual creature, then the resurrection of all lions and the 
transfiguration of their individual bodies ensures the continuity of that creature even if 
the qualities that humans identify as “lion nature” are transfigured.  Thus, while some 
who affirm cosmic transfiguration are satisfied with the notion that a generic 
representation of each species will endure in eternity,
236
 they have no concern for the 
continuity of individual creatures with that generic representation.  What matters is that 
the qualities of the species be preserved by means of some eschatological representative 
                                               
235 Ruether seems to go in this direction. See Sexism and God-Talk, 257-258. 
236 John Polkinghorne suggests that species representatives might be the manner of animal 
presence in the eschaton. See The God of Hope, 122-123.  
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as opposed to the individual instantiations of the species.
237
  If the representative 
eschatological lion had two legs, ate straw, and enjoyed playing chess, then the critique 
that such a representative fails vis-à-vis the species of lion would hold.  However, for 
those, like Moltmann and Linzey, who affirm the resurrection of every instantiation of 
flesh, the continuity of a species is preserved in the common continuity of all individual 
instantiations of that species.  Just like an exhaustive resurrection of individual humans 
who no longer suffer or sleep and who can teleport (see John 20:19, 26) and experience 
the past as present is not tantamount to the dissolution of the human species—but rather 
its transfiguration—so also the exhaustive resurrection of all lions as vegetarians is not 
paramount to the dissolution of the species of lion.  As Webb writes, “Just as Christians 
believe that humans will be fully transformed in the afterlife, our proclivity for violence 
being washed away as we are made into the image of Christ, animals too will be liberated 
from their habits of aggression and violence.”238   
Finally, this critique again highlights the question of ontology.  What is it that 
safeguards the continuity of an individual creature throughout its existence?  Is it some 
static esse buried underneath its accidental qualities?  Or is it the narrative of a creature’s 
body-self?  It seems to me that the shift to dynamic and relational ontology renders the 
issue of the lion-ness of a lion less viable with regard to eschatological existence; for it is 
the very same body-self that is transfigured.  Moltmann makes this claim with regard to 
Jesus’s resurrection.  In the resurrection, Jesus is at once the same body-self who was 
                                               
237 Wennberg refers to this position as creation de novo. That is, God does not resurrect creatures 
that once lived, but creates a new individual creature that will represent the entire species in eternity. Thus, 
whereas all the lions that actually existed in history are not resurrected, a new lion is created to maintain the 
presence of lion-ness in eternal life. Such a view does not do justice to the sufferings of the individual 
creatures who are left in their graves. See Wennberg, God, Humans, and Animals, 321-24.  
238 Stephen Webb, “Ecology vs. The Peaceable Kingdom: Toward a Better Theology of Nature,” 
Soundings 79/1-2 (Spring/Summer 1996), 245. 
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crucified (continuity) but without suffering, anxiety, and the fear of looming death 
(discontinuity).  It is the transfiguration of a body-self that permits radical discontinuity 
alongside radical continuity.  Just as Jesus can be resurrected as immortal and beyond 
suffering without losing his identity as human, so also could a lion be resurrected as 
vegetarian without losing its identity as lion. 
ESCHATOLOGICAL ETHICS AS A SOCIAL PROGRAM DOOMED TO FAILURE 
The final critique I want to address is the tension between eschatology and 
history, specifically with regard to ethics.  Regarding eschatological vegetarianism, Karl 
Barth writes:  
It may well be objected against a vegetarianism which presses in this direction 
[i.e., a caution against killing animals based on the eschatological hope of 
creation] that it represents a wanton anticipation of what is described by Is. 11 and 
Rom. 8 as existence in the new aeon for which we hope.  It may also be true that 
it aggravates by reason of inevitable inconsistencies, its sentimentality and its 
fanaticism.  But for all its weaknesses we must be careful not to put ourselves in 
the wrong in face of it by our own thoughtlessness and hardness of heart.
239
   
 
Barth seems here to embrace the critique that eschatological vegetarianism is a 
sentimental, idealistic, and quixotic approach to the complexities of history.  His 
eschatology grounds such a critique because history is thoroughly divorced from an 
ultimately transcendent eschaton.
240
  This divorce makes anticipations of that eschaton 
unfeasible.  It furthermore renders the killing of animals a “priestly act of eschatological 
character” that “can be accomplished with a good conscience” if it is done with a 
                                               
239 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, III/4, translated by A. T. Mackay, T. H. L Parker, Harold 
Knight, Henry A. Kennedy, John Marks (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1961), 355-356. 
240 See Moltmann, The Coming of God, 13-16; Joseph Ratzinger, Eschatology: Death and Eternal 
Life, second edition, translated by Michael Waldstein (Washington DC: The Catholic University of 
America Press, 1988), 47-48. 
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penitence that acknowledges such killing is only permissible within the confines of a 
history subjected to futility.
241
  
In this manner Barth situates himself in the vast milieu of possibilities regarding 
the relationship between eschatology and history.  On his end of the spectrum, 
eschatology is wholly other than history.  On the other end of the spectrum is what 
Moltmann refers to as futurist eschatologies, which transport eschatology into time, 
whether as a completed reality, a kingdom achievable through human effort, or that 
which remains “not yet” despite the existing “already.”242 
Sideris provides a similar critique, though from the perspective of a complete 
rejection of the need for eschatological redemption in nature.  She states that “an 
environmental ethic must be rooted in biological realities.  We cannot hope to change 
nature by engaging it as though it were, or could become, a perfect ecological 
community.”243  Thus, any form of eschatological ethics is extremely problematic.244   
As I have already noted, it is at times unclear where Linzey fits into this tension.  
I therefore find Moltmann’s notions of adventus and novum, both of which permit a 
proleptic creatio anticipativa without lapsing into political attempts to construct the 
kingdom, more helpful.  It is not simply the individual creatures within time that require 
redemption, but time itself.  It is not merely the victims of evolution that require 
                                               
241 Barth, Church Dogmatics, III/4, 355. 
242 Moltmann, The Coming of God, 7-14. 
243 Sideris, Environmental Ethics, 83. 
244 In general, Sideris is extremely critical of any appropriation of eschatological theology into 
ecological ethics. See, for example, Sideris, Environmental Ethics, 189-93. But she seems to almost always 
misrepresent uses of eschatology in both theology and ethics. She seems unable to separate the hope for 
eschatological redemption from the belief in an historical Eden. She also consistently fails to understand 
the tensions within eschatology concerning its relationship to both history and ethics. Her exploration of 
Moltmann highlights this deficiency. See Ibid., 191. I would venture to say that Sideris’s critique of eco-
theology’s inadequate understanding of evolutionary science applies equally to her own understanding of 
eschatology.  
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transfiguration, but evolution itself.  Eschatology is neither a progression within history 
nor a fully transcendent a-historical future; it is rather God’s eschatological future that 
happens to history.
245
  Because time exists in the adventus of the coming God and that 
God’s future, it is open, as history, to novum.  This novum is nothing other than creatio 
anticipativa of the creatio nova, which is the very transfiguration of history itself.   
Human beings cannot control the adventus of God’s coming.  They cannot 
construct the creatio nova anymore than they can overturn the creatio continua.  But they 
can embrace the creatio anticipativa by witnessing to the hope of all creation.  This 
witness is by the very nature of history’s disposition incomplete and imperfect.  It is 
indeed doomed to “inevitable inconsistencies.”  Such is the nature of witnessing to that 
which remains other.  But these inconsistencies do not negate the validity of the witness 
itself.    
As I noted above in the section on anthropology, I maintain that humans are 
implored by the Spirit in the wake of the Christ event to become sacraments of the 
eschaton.  As priests, humans offer themselves to the created order and in that offering 
become the symbol of the redemption of the mechanisms of evolution.
246
  When a human 
promotes the well-being of an individual nonhuman animal instead of causing harm, that 
animal encounters the eschaton sacramentally from a Spirit-filled priest.          
TOWARD AN ETHICS OF COSMOCENTRIC TRANSFIGURATION 
Given all that has been said to this point, what are the logistics of an eco-
theological ethics of cosmocentric transfiguration?  What I offer here is nothing more 
                                               
245 Moltmann, The Coming of God, 22. 
246 I thus concur with Linzey that Christ has revealed the true nature of priesthood and priestly 
sacrifice. The Christ-event reveals that the true nature of Christian sacrifice “involves the sacrifice of the 
higher for the lower and not the reverse.” Linzey, Christianity and the Rights of Animals, 43. 
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than suggestions of how one might move toward answering this question.  I make no 
claims to comprehensiveness.  Here, my thoughts should be understood as a place to 
begin—a direction for future research.  I will begin by considering the tensions of 
temporal existence and the qualifications I believe these tensions mandate.  I will then 
consider how cosmocentric transfiguration might translate into practice for individual 
sentient nonhuman animals.  Next, I will consider the concrete application of 
cosmocentric transfiguration for individual non-sentient life forms.  Finally, I will 
consider how the ethics might be applied to the cosmos at large.   
THE TENSIONS OF A CREATION IN VIA AND THE ETHICS THAT PERTAINS TO IT 
In a good creation that wanders in isolation, there can be no perfect living.  In 
Linzey’s words, “there is no pure land.”247  In the world as we experience it, suffering, 
predation, and death are necessary.  Without these aspects, the biosphere and all of its 
eco-systems would fail.  Our present existence could not endure the dissolution of the 
mechanisms of evolution without a transfiguration of time, space, matter, and energy.   
As both Moltmann and Linzey intimate, there must therefore be the recognition 
that all transfigurative ethics are anticipatory in nature.  They facilitate sacramental 
moments of the eschaton without constituting its definitive arrival.  For this reason, I am 
hesitant to translate transfigurative ethics into rights.  For it is not simply that these ethics 
must be violated on occasion, but rather that participation in the mechanisms of 
evolution—and more often than not non-volitionally— is the norm of human existence in 
this morally ambiguous and complex world.
248
  However, transfigurative ethics, in 
                                               
247 Linzey, Animal Gospel, 90. 
248 See Wennberg, God, Humans, and Animals, 51-54; William C. French, “Subject-centered and 
Creation-centered Paradigms in Recent Catholic Thought,” The Journal of Religion, 70/1 (January 1990), 
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assenting to a particular telos of all creatures, does ground certain legal protections for 
them.  To better understand the nature of these protections, I will here explore the notion 
of necessity and the ethics of proportionalism.  
What Does “Necessity” Mean? 
Linzey argues that only genuine human need can justify the violation of another 
creature’s theos-rights.  For him, genuine need denotes that which a human cannot live 
without and that which humans can obtain by no other means than by the violation of said 
rights.
249
  Thus, if a human cannot survive by any other means than eating meat, as is the 
case in certain contexts even today, then the violation of a creature’s right to life and 
freedom from suffering is justified.  Moltmann seems to hold a similar position.  While 
he maintains that individual nonhuman animals have “infinite value” and a “right to 
live,”250 he also accepts that this value and right can be violated in cases such as animal 
experimentation and consumption of meat.
251
    
This line of thinking—that the well-being of nonhuman animals and plants can be 
violated in the case of necessity—seems almost ubiquitous in eco-theological thought.  
Michael Northcott claims that “the moral problem is not in the eating of animals but in 
the avoidance of unnecessary cruelty, indignity and pain.”252  Note it is acceptable to kill 
and eat animals provided no unnecessary cruelty is inflicted.  Christopher Southgate’s 
evolutionary theodicy maintains that suffering and death are necessary in order to achieve 
the kind of world of diverse and complex life that God desired to create.
253
  Jame 
Schaefer recovers from early and medieval Christian thought the “admonitions that 
                                               
249 See Linzey, Animal Theology, 145. 
250 Moltmann, The Way of Jesus Christ, 256. 
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Christians should use God’s creation moderately to provide the necessities of life.”254  
Based on these admonitions and in conjunction with more recent ecclesial statements, 
Schaefer argues that “the faithful will distinguish between necessary and unnecessary 
uses of other animals and plants, land, and waters.  They will choose to use only what 
they need to sustain their temporal lives as they aim for eternal life with God.”255  Note 
here that necessity is better defined, taking on the meaning of the necessities to sustain 
temporal life.  Finally, the most recent Catechism of the Roman Catholic Church states 
that humans, as stewards, must show animals kindness.  But animals “may be used to 
serve the just satisfaction of man’s needs.”256  These needs include food, clothing, 
domestication for work and leisure, and “medical and scientific experimentation” 
provided it “remains within reasonable limits and contributes to caring for or saving 
human lives.”257   
What is true in all of these examples, from Linzey to the Catechism, is that need 
either establishes the good (i.e., it is good to kill animals if it serves human need) or 
justifies a violation of the good (i.e., it is permissible to kill an animal to save a human 
life provided there is no other manner of achieving this end).  In my view, the notion of 
need is more complicated than these assessments acknowledge.  To further clarify this 
point, and by way of suggesting a path forward in adjudicating the propriety of violations 
of the tenets of cosmocentric transfiguration in the face of the inevitable contradictions of 
history, I here offer a more thorough reflection on need.   
Humans need (X) in order to (Y). 
                                               
254 Schaefer, Theological Foundations, 197. 
255 Ibid., 213. 
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The (X) here represents that which is necessary.  But I seek to argue that necessity 
points toward a (Y), which is the result sought that makes the X a necessity.  I therefore 
submit that this statement—which is an expression of Immanuel Kant’s hypothetical 
imperative—is the inevitable formula of contingent need; for such need is inherently 
teleological.  That is, inasmuch as any one individual creature or even any one individual 
ecosystem (or perhaps even any one particular planet) is not essential to the functioning 
of the cosmos at large or the life of the divine, it is not needed in and of itself.
258
  
However, it may be needed for some purpose, some “in order to”—that is, needed to 
achieve a telos.   
For instance, consider the following claims:  
The earth’s particular atmosphere (Xa) is necessary  
in order for humans to survive (Y
a
). 
 
Human survival (X
b
) is necessary  
in order to ensure the well-being of the cosmos (Y
b1
) or the divine life (Y
b2
). 
 
This first claim is accurate.  Without earth’s atmosphere, biological human life as 
we know it would not be possible.  The validity of the second claim is another issue.  If 
all humans died, the cosmos would likely continue on largely undisturbed.  Furthermore, 
God would not cease to be God in the absence of human life.   
These claims suggest that the appropriate question in adjudicating ethics vis-à-vis 
the contradictions of history is not whether or not something is “necessary.”  For 
anything can be necessary by way of a simple tautology: 
I need to be rich (X
c
)  
in order to be rich (Y
c
). 
 
One could also say:  
                                               
258 Indeed, perhaps only God is needed in this manner—that is, non-contingently. 
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I need to eat meat (X
d
)  
in order to be fully satisfied with my meal (Y
d
). 
 
In both of these cases, the (X) itself might warrant a negative response (e.g., “You do not 
need to eat meat”).  But once the (Y) is added (“in order to be fully satisfied with my 
meal”), the necessity is established; for the (X) is, at least in theory, needed in order to 
obtain the (Y).  The necessity of (X) is thus contingent upon a desired telos.    
Because necessity is contingent in this manner, attempts to establish eco-
theological ethics based on necessity alone fail.  It is not enough to claim that necessity 
justifies.  If it were, then the formula of contingent need would be followed by a simple 
“therefore, (X) is good and/or justified.”  But such is surely not the case.  For example, 
virtually no (if not literally no) eco-theologians would accept the following claim of a 
hunter: 
I need to kill an endangered creature (X
e
)  
in order to complete my taxidermy collection (Y
e
); 
therefore, killing the endangered creature is good and/or justified. 
 
There should be no doubt that the formula of contingent need is valid.  But who could 
accept that the action is justified?  The point is that need does not in itself justify; for 
every need points to some desired end.  Thus the question cannot be that of necessity 
alone, but rather whether or not the end (Y) to which the necessity (X) coheres with a 
particular notion of the good.  That is, the important thing to establish is both necessity 
and the good that is implied by the necessity.  Consider a more complicated claim:   
Humans need to kill animals (X
f
)  
in order to eat meat (Y
f
); 
therefore, killing animals is good and/or justified. 
 
It is in fact true, sans the possibility of laboratory-created meat or taking bites out 
of live animals or eating carrion, that killing animals is necessary to eat meat.  But does 
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eating meat cohere with the good?  Of course the answer here depends upon one’s view 
of the good.  Inasmuch as the good is a teleological term, the answer in this case must be 
predicated upon the telos of both humans and animals.  For cosmocentric transfiguration, 
the ultimate telos of both humans and animals is participation in the divine life, which 
entails peace (including the lack of predation) among all creatures.  This telos is breaking 
into history.  In doing so, it creates a new temporal telos for humans: becoming 
sacraments of the eschaton by witnessing against the shades of transience that will be 
overcome in eschatological communion.  Thus human actions should, to whatever extent 
possible, adhere to this eschatological good within history.   
The phrase “to whatever extent possible” brings me back to the issue of 
contingent necessity.  Yes, humans need to kill animals in order to eat meat.  But why is 
eating meat necessary?  What is the “in order to” of the necessity of meat consumption?     
It depends.  The “in order to” could be, as was the case with (Yd), a higher degree 
of satisfaction.  But there could be other (Y’s) as well.  Furthermore, because in this 
world we inevitably kill and we will inevitably die, the various teloi of creatures are 
bound to clash.  Thus, there could be a (Y) that is in fact good while also predicated upon 
an (X) which constitutes a violation of the good of another creature.  Consider the 
following: 
Humans need to eat meat (X
g
)  
in order to survive (Y
g1
); 
therefore, eating meat is good and/or justified. 
 
(X
g
) is not true of all humans.  But it is true of some.  I have already noted that, 
according to the teloi established by cosmocentric transfiguration, eating meat is a 
violation of the eschatological good God desires for all the creatures eaten inasmuch as it 
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entails their death.  But human survival is good.  So here we have a conflict of 
teleological necessities and an inevitable violation of the good.  If humans eat meat, thus 
killing a creature and probably causing it suffering, they violate God’s desire for that 
creature.  If they do not eat meat (under conditions in which doing so is necessary for 
their survival), they will die of lack of care for their own body, which violates God’s 
desire for them.  At this juncture, a violation of the good is inevitable.   
Proportionalism and Virtuous Violations of the Good
259
  
Two important questions arise here.  First, how does one adjudicate which good is 
to be violated in such cases?  Second, in what manner should the good be violated?  To 
answer the first, I will offer, as a direction that I think cosmocentric transfiguration ought 
to go in the future, a brief reflection on proportionalism.  To answer the second 
question—again only in an introductory fashion for future development—I will offer a 
briefer reflection on virtue.     
I believe proportionalism provides the best form of ethics for cosmocentric 
transfiguration.  Within his Catholic context, David F. Kelly describes proportionalism as 
a shift  
from traditional (deontological) method to proportionality…from legalism to at 
least a moderate form of situationalism—though it is certainly not a radical 
situationalism, because rules are still of great importance.
260
   
 
Proportionalism thus maintains the laws of deontology while recognizing the complexity 
of contexts and the importance of consequences.  It introduces the possibility that a 
                                               
259 This section is far from exhaustive and actually only scratches the surface of the issues it 
addresses. It is meant only as a reflection on the way forward vis-à-vis my reflection on necessity. 
260 David F. Kelly, Contemporary Catholic Health Care Ethics (Washington, DC: Georgetown 
University Press, 2004), 90. Kelly’s claim notwithstanding, the validity of proportionalism as a viable 
system of ethics that escapes the dangers of consequentialism is not without dispute. See, for instance, 
Benedict M. Ashley, Jean Deblois, and Kevin O’Rourke, Health Care Ethics: A Catholic Theological 
Analysis, fifth edition (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2006), 15-17. 
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violation of the law is acceptable if that violation is necessary to produce some equal or 
greater good.  That is, when dealing with a valid formula of contingent need in which the 
(X) represents a violation of the good and the (Y) represents the proportionately greater 
good that cannot be achieved by means other than the (X), it is acceptable to choose the 
lesser evil for the greater good.  However, significantly, the goodness of the (Y) does not 
alter that the (X) is a violation of the good.  That is, the (Y) renders the (X) acceptable, 
but not necessarily justified.    
But how does one makes such a decision within cosmocentric transfiguration?  
Richard Bauckham argues that Moltmann’s theological ethics fails just here.  His 
“theological basis is plainly inadequate for the ethical distinctions that need to be made… 
It makes death as such an undifferentiated evil in the face of which all creatures have the 
right to life.”261  As will be evident below, I disagree with Bauckham’s assessment.  To 
claim that death is a common evil for all life does not necessitate that the death of one 
creature could not be more tragic than the death of another.  It does, however, mean that 
all death is tragic.  
In light of this proportionalist approach, I will consider one more example of 
need: 
  Humans need to eat meat (X
g
)  
in order to be better satisfied (Y
g2
); 
therefore, eating meat is justified and/or good. 
 
Whereas survival (as is the case with Y
g1
) constitutes a good that is at the very least 
proportionately equal to the violation of the good in (X
g
), I do not believe this case can be 
made about greater satisfaction (as is the case with Y
g2
).  That is, from the perspective of 
                                               
261 Richard Bauckham in The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995), 211. 
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cosmocentric transfiguration, human satisfaction is not a good proportionately equal or 
greater to the necessary means of attaining meat, the killing of a nonhuman animal.   
One more qualification is necessary here.  Stephen Pope notes the teleological 
nature of Aquinas’s virtue ethics.  For Aquinas, “to understand anything, humanity 
included, depends on comprehending its end or purpose.”262  In Aquinas’s estimation, 
which reflects Aristotle’s understanding of virtue, to act virtuously is to act in a manner 
that reflects the telos of humans and the world.
263
  Thus, my discussion of necessity and 
the good in which each is predicated upon teleology suggests the influence of virtue 
ethics in my thought.  Taking my lead from Aquinas, I maintain that a virtue is not 
established merely with reference to the end.
264
  Rather, the end expresses how a virtue 
ought to be manifested.  One’s journey is not justified by the end one achieves; rather, the 
end proper to one’s nature informs how one ought to engage in taking the journey.  In 
short, the end does not justify the means; the end makes clear the distinction between 
good and not good means.  To undergo the journey in a manner unbefitting one’s nature 
(and thus one’s telos) is already a violation of virtue—a vice.   
This point leads to a qualification of my proportionalism.  It is highlighted in the 
question Robert Wennberg asks concerning “how the morally good person should 
respond to those tragic elements in our world and in our life, about which we and others 
can do absolutely nothing.”265   There is a radical difference between one who, in the face 
                                               
262 Stephen J. Pope, “Overview of the Ethics of Thomas Aquinas,” in The Ethics of Aquinas, (ed.) 
Stephen J. Pope (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2002), 32. 
263 See Aquinas, SCG, III.148. Also, Thomas Hibbs, “Interpretations of Aquinas’s Ethics Since 
Vatican II” in The Ethics of Aquinas, (ed.) Stephen J. Pope (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 
2002), 419. 
264 Consider Aquinas’ position concerning individual actions. For Aquinas, the end does inform 
the status of an action as good or evil, but only in conjunction with the action’s genus, object, and 
circumstance. See ST, I-II, Q 18 A 4. 
265 Wennberg, God, Animals, and Humans, xiii (see also 50). 
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of procuring a greater good, violates the good of a creature with ease or even joy and one 
who violates the good with grieving and sorrow.  This point is similarly stated by Karl 
Barth: 
A good hunter, honourable butcher and conscientious vivisectionist will differ 
from the bad in the fact that even as they are engaged in killing animals they hear 
this groaning and travailing of the creature, and therefore, in comparison with all 
others who have to do with animals, they are summoned to an intensified, 
sharpened and deepened diffidence, reserve and carefulness.
266
  
 
In a similar fashion, Wendell Berry writes: “To live, we must daily break the body 
and shed the blood of creation.  When we do this knowingly, lovingly, skillfully, 
reverently, it is a sacrament.  When we do it ignorantly, greedily, clumsily, destructively, 
it is a desecration.”267  The difference between Berry and Barth—and between Berry and 
Moltmann, Linzey, and me—is the whether or not this breaking of creation’s body is part 
of the goodness of the cosmos.   
The point is that proportionalism benefits from virtue.  There is a courageous 
manner, a good way, of violating the good when such a violation is necessary—one in 
which the violator is steeped in penitence and compassion.  There is also a cowardly 
manner of violating the good in necessity—one in which the violator derives pleasure 
from the actions.
268
  Thus it is not merely the interplay of act and consequence that 
establishes the good; it is also the character of the agent who acts.  Thus I concur with 
Linzey’s early thought in which he claims that killing can be acceptable in cases of vital 
                                               
266 Barth, Church Dogmatics, III/4: 355. Today, one might be prone to question whether or not 
vivisection can produce any good that proportionately outweighs the harm caused.  
267 Wendell Berry, The Gift of Good Land: Further Essays Cultural and Agricultural (San 
Francisco, CA: North Point Press, 1981), 281. 
268 The suggestion that one can violate the good in a virtuous manner is not the traditional position 
of virtue theory (or ethics in general).   
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necessity “as long as the method of killing is as humane as possible and that no persons 
are receiving pleasure from such activity.”269      
I believe this approach to ethics and the issue of necessity is the most promising 
path forward for cosmocentric transfiguration.  Though, it requires much more 
development.  Every violation of a creature’s telos is also a violation of the good.  These 
violations are never justified; but they may be necessary in order to procure a 
proportionately greater good.     
PRESERVATION AND PROTEST:  
COSMOCENTRIC TRANSFIGURATION AND ITS CONCRETE APPLICATION IN HISTORY 
Thus far, I have (1) delineated the theological foundations for cosmocentric 
transfiguration at the intersection of Moltmann and Linzey, (2) responded to potential 
critiques of these foundations, and (3) introduced the general form this ethics might take 
(i.e., virtue-proportionalism) in the face of the inevitable tensions of the world.  It is now 
possible to suggest how cosmocentric transfiguration might translate into concrete 
practice in history.   
I begin with what the ethics might mean for individual sentient animals, both 
humans and nonhumans.  I then consider individual non-sentient life forms such as 
insects and plants.  Lastly, I explore the meaning of the ethics for the cosmos as a whole.  
Collectively, these explorations will yield a tension between proleptic witness, which 
entails a protest of the larger systems of death by protecting individual creatures, and 
conservation, which entails the preservation of the very systems of death that elicit 
protest.   
                                               
269 Linzey, Animal Rights, 38. Later he writes that “taking pleasure from the cruel death of an 
animal is nothing less than morally evil.” Linzey, Why Animal Suffering Matters, 86. 
377 
 
In each area, I take as my launching point four theological claims germane to 
cosmology, anthropology, and eschatology that arise out of my synthesis of Moltmann 
and Linzey: 
(1) the triune God has created a world with which the Trinity desires to share its 
community; 
(2) this desire must overcome the isolation of the cosmos and the dispositional effects of 
that isolation (e.g., suffering, predation, and death);  
(3) that this overcoming is concretely accomplished in the incarnation of the Son, 
including Christ’s passion, death, and resurrection and is further manifested by the 
burgeoning future in the presence of the Spirit;  
(4) that human beings are sacraments of the eschatological hope that the mechanisms of 
evolution will be overcome in communion.  
 
What of Individual Sentient Creatures? 
Because a good practice/action is one that respects the teloi of creatures—and 
because the telos of individual sentient creatures is, on the one hand, freedom from 
suffering, predation, and death, and on the other hand freedom for communion—the 
following fundamental guideline can be formulated: any practice that witnesses to the 
hope of freedom from suffering, predation, and death is good while any practice that 
embraces suffering, predation, and death is not good.  Thus, regarding sentient creatures, 
both human and nonhuman, the following is clear:
270
 
1. Allowing a creature to live is good.  Taking a creature’s life is not good. 
2. Mending the wounds of a creature is good.  Harming a creature is not good. 
3. Permitting a creature its own space and way of life is good.  Going to war over space 
and a way of life is not good. 
4. Letting a creature live in peace is good.  Hunting a creature is not good. 
5. Allowing a creature to live out its natural life is good.  Slaughtering a creature for 
meat is not good. 
6. Healing a sick creature is good.  Experimentation that elicits suffering is not good. 
7. Permitting a creature the sustenance it needs for self-maintenance is good.  Trapping 
or farming a creature for fur is not good. 
                                               
270 I am indebted to Linzey’s work in the formation of these views. See chapter 3 of the present 
work. 
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8. Protecting a creature from harm is good.  Procuring animal products (e.g., dairy and 
eggs) by methods that are painful or disruptive to the creature’s well-being is not 
good.   
9. Living in harmony with a creature is good.  Keeping a creature in a manner that 
causes suffering by denying its natural inclinations is not good. 
 
These claims follow from the fundamental guideline above.  However, that 
guideline must be qualified by the following caveat: An action can be both necessary for 
witnessing to the telos of one creature while at the same time witness against the telos of 
another.  Such actions can never be justified—that is, they are never good—but they are 
acceptable (as not good) if the good they procure is proportionately greater than the good 
they violate.  In this manner, humans can participate in evil out of inevitability and 
necessity without calling that evil good.   
The heart of the issue with regard to concrete ethics is then the question of how to 
adjudicate greater goods and lesser evils.  I have already addressed this issue above.  My 
point here is to say that, within the paradigm of cosmocentric transfiguration, the good is 
always the promotion of life and the alleviation of suffering.  Whenever this good is 
violated even for a proportionately greater good that renders the violation necessary, that 
violation must be acknowledged as evil.
271
  It must be accompanied by penitence and 
grieving.  And if that good is violated for a good that is disproportionate to the evil, it 
requires repentance and conversion.   
It is therefore possible for an advocate of cosmocentric transfiguration to hunt for 
food and eat meat where there is no other option.
272
  Such actions remain a violation of 
the good, but are necessary to procure an (at the very least) equal good.  But hunting and 
                                               
271 Based on Linzey’s view, I affirm that, in situations in which human life is pitted against 
nonhuman life (e.g., self-defense), human life can be considered a proportionately greater good than 
nonhuman life. See Linzey, Christianity and the Rights of Animals, 138-39. 
272 Wennberg, God, Humans, and Animals, 55. 
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eating meat for pleasure cannot be commensurable with cosmocentric transfiguration.  
Harmful experimentation—even when it is necessary—will always be evil and 
unjustifiable.  But it may procure a good that could not be procured otherwise.  However, 
if the good procured through such practices could be procured otherwise but is not on 
account of profitability or some other paltry good, the means cannot be commensurable 
with cosmocentric transfiguration.    
What about Individual Non-Sentient Animals and Plants? 
For Moltmann, death is the ultimate reality that God must overcome.
273
  For 
Linzey, the fundamental reality God must overcome appears to be suffering.  What 
remains unclear in Linzey’s thought is the theological and ethical significance of Christ’s 
resurrection for creatures that lack sentience but are nonetheless alive.
274
  For such a 
strong emphasis on sentience entails that “an ecosystem consisting only of plants and 
nonsentient organisms would have no intrinsic value.”275  What remains unclear in 
Moltmann’s thought is how the killing of any individual creature—whether sentient or 
not—is not a violation of eschatological hope.   
The four theological claims I made above, when placed in conjunction with the 
fundamental guideline in which a practice is good if it witnesses to the hope of freedom 
from suffering, predation, and death, suggest that, in order to be consistent, I must claim 
that it is not good to kill any organism, whether sentient or not.  If Christ’s death is the 
death of all the living and his resurrection reveals the eschatological destiny of those life 
                                               
273 Moltmann, The Way of Jesus Christ, 252. 
274 Northcott, rightly in my view, critiques animal rights approaches like Regan because such 
approaches struggle to establish the rights of “non-mammalian species such as earthworms or non-sentient 
species such as trees.” Northcott further notes that such approaches “can give no moral value to 
collectivities or communities of life, such as ecosystems or the biosphere.” Northcott, The Environment and 
Christian Ethics, 102. This critique also applies to Linzey. 
275 Wennberg, God, Humans, and Animals, 38. 
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forms, then the promotion of insect and plant life is good.  The killing of insects and plant 
organisms is not good.  The abortion of a fetus, whether human or not, is not good.     
To further make this point, I turn to Lisa Kemmerer’s attempt to retrieve Linzey’s 
“Generosity Paradigm” from an alleged hierarchy—by which she means Linzey’s 
exclusion of non-sentient creatures from theos-rights.  She states that this paradigm, when 
retrieved from its sentiocentric hierarchy, “suggests that Christians ought to approach all 
of creation with an attitude of service and self-sacrifice.”  This vision “does not require 
equal treatment for a crystal, a chrysanthemum, a bacterium, a katydid, and a capybara, 
only equal regard for each, out of duty to God.”276   
The significance of Kemmerer’s point is crucial.  If Christ’s suffering and 
resurrection reveal that the telos of sentient creatures is freedom from suffering, then 
proper regard for those creatures means working to alleviate their suffering.  But if 
Christ’s death and resurrection also reveal that the telos of living things is eternal life, 
then proper regard for those life forms entails promoting their lives and avoiding killing 
them.   
Said differently, I would not strive for the freedom of speech for a cockroach.  
Neither would I do so for a human in a catatonic state.  I would not strive for a tree’s 
escape from pruning on account of its suffering.  But in all three cases, I would strive to 
protect the life of the cockroach, the comatose patient, and the tree.  Most generally, then, 
I am saying that to the extent that something which exists (whether rocks, plants, insects, 
fish, elephants, or humans) is capable of receiving my witness to the eschatological future 
that is breaking into history, my regard for their existence entails that I ought to so 
witness when I am able.      
                                               
276 Lisa Kemmerer, In Search of Consistency: Ethics and Animals (Boston, MA: Brill, 2006), 278. 
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Based on this reasoning, the inevitable thrust of the theological foundations for 
cosmocentric transfiguration as I have delineated them suggests the best dietary 
approximation of the kingdom is neither vegetarianism nor veganism.  It is rather 
fruitarianism.  This term has multiple meanings, so to clarify I intend by it a diet that 
consists of foods (typically seed-bearing) that do not kill the host organism.
277
  It is just 
this point—that the eating does not necessitate the death of the host organism—that 
makes the diet logically consistent with the theological framework of cosmocentric 
transfiguration.
278
  Interestingly enough, it is actually this diet that is prescribed in 
Genesis 1:29 for humans: “See, I have given you every plant yielding seed that is upon 
the face of all the earth, and every tree with seed in its fruit; you shall have them for 
food.”279         
What of the Cosmos, Species, Eco-Systems, and the Mechanisms of Evolution? 
Daniel Cowdin maintains that an “exclusive moral concern for individual animals 
becomes incoherent at the level of land management.”280 That is, concern for individual 
animals is inconsistent if it is not qualified by some concern for the system at large.  On 
par with this claim, Sideris notes that animal advocates like “Singer and (especially) 
                                               
277 Of course, this principle cannot apply to the microscopic level. 
278 This dietary aspect of cosmocentric transfiguration came as a surprise to me as I developed and 
researched this dissertation. I had originally thought vegetarianism (and veganism in situations where non-
vegan products entail the suffering of animals) was the most consistent “eschatological diet.” I must 
acknowledge that I am not a fruitarian. Nor am I sure that I will be one. Even so, it would be intellectually 
dishonest for me to deny the clear logic of my own theological position, which entails that one is a better 
sacrament of the eschaton if one does not take life when such actions are not required for some equal or 
greater good.  
279 For nonhuman creatures with the breath of life, God gives “every green plant” for food 
(Genesis 1:30). 
280 Daniel Cowdin, “The Moral Status of Otherkind in Christian Ethics,” in Christianity and 
Ecology: Seeking the Well-Being of Earth and Humans, Dieter T. Hessel and Rosemary Radford Ruether, 
editors (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 271. In a similar vein, Sideris notes that an 
ethics that emphasizes the good of the individual is inconsistent with nature because “nature simply cannot 
meet the individual, bodily needs of each member in the ecological ‘community.’” Sideris, Environmental 
Ethics, 222.  
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Regan are adamantly unconcerned with the moral status of larger aggregates of beings 
such as species or ecosystems.”281  Those who wish to emphasize the well-being of 
individual creatures tend to downplay the moral significance of the system that continues 
to give rise to such creatures.   
I have emphasized that the greatest forms of eschatological witness entail refusing 
the comfort that causing suffering and taking life brings when such actions are not 
required for some equal or greater good.  Thus refusing to hunt, to buy cosmetic products 
that are tested on animals, to eat meat, to eat living (non-microscopic) organisms, to wear 
fur, etc. are all form of eschatological witness.  Such refusals are good—that is, 
appropriate vis-à-vis teleology.  But these practices focus on the individual human, 
animal, or life form.  What of the cosmos as a whole?  What about the species of which 
the individual is a part?  What of ecosystems that require suffering and death to function?  
What of the general movement of life that likewise requires destruction in order to 
facilitate life?  What does cosmocentric transfiguration have to say about these 
macroscopic concerns?   
Sideris criticizes eschatologically-oriented ethics, much like the one I am here 
advocating, because they seek to “put an end to the very system that creates and 
maintains value, beauty, sentience, and even, perhaps, intelligibility in the world we 
inhabit.”282  Is this critique valid?  Are eschatological ethics seeking to “put an end” to 
the system of nature?  
                                               
281 Sideris, Environmental Ethics, 133. 
282 See Lisa Sideris, “Writing Straight with Crooked Lines: Holmes Rolston’s Ecological 
Theology and Theodicy,” in Nature, Value, Duty: Life on Earth with Holmes Rolston III, Christopher J. 
Preston and Wayne Ouderkirk, editors (Dordrecht, NL: Springer, 2007), 81-90. 
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I do not believe so.  It is my view that the paradigm must at once preserve and 
protest the system as a whole.
283
  Herein is the fundamental tension of cosmocentric 
transfiguration.  On the one hand, it is good to promote the life and well-being of 
individual life forms.  On the other hand, it is necessary to sustain the system that 
requires the suffering and death of those individual life forms for life to be possible at all.   
Based on this tension, I believe cosmocentric transfiguration is bound to a 
conservationist dimension.  Its advocates must seek to preserve eco-systems and the 
cosmos as a whole.  They must protect the lives of predators and permit those predators 
to take the lives of other creatures.
284
  They must allow herbivores to live and to eat other 
non-sentient organisms.  But this preservation is not tantamount to a moral or theological 
approval.  It is the preservation of that which they protest—the conservation of the good 
creation that sighs and groans for eschatological communion by maintaining the very 
mechanisms that reflect its isolation.   
To preserve will mean that advocates of cosmocentric transfiguration will protect 
even that which they find abhorrent.  They will engage in a gracious “letting-be” of and a 
difficult “living-with” the natural world.  These actions will include respecting the 
integrity of eco-systems and the natural inclinations of individual animals.  Thus, it will 
not entail an attempt to create Eden on earth by genetically engineering vegetarian 
                                               
283 Here Moltmann’s protest theology is important. Moltmann, Spirit of Life, xii. Linzey never 
protests God’s creation; he simply cannot lay at God’s feet the origin of evolutionary suffering. Moltmann, 
on the other hand, suggests that Jesus’s cry of dereliction is the appropriate response to the sighing of the 
created order. 
284 In response to Daniel Deffenbaugh, cosmocentric transfiguration need not consider predators 
“immoral.” But neither does it consider predation good. See Daniel G. Deffenbaugh, “Toward Thinking 
Like a Mountain: The Evolution of an Ecological Conscience,” Soundings 78/2 (Summer 1995), 248-49. 
See Webb, “Ecology vs. The Peaceable Kingdom,” 245-46. Though, I am a bit concerned with Webb’s 
claim that “animals do not need to exercise their predatory skills in order to live a full life.” Ibid., 249. 
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lionesses or killing all predators in order to protect their prey.
285
  It is bound to the sigh 
that Wennberg conveys in his consideration of Isaiah 11: “It would truly be better if there 
were no predation but sadly that cannot be.”286   
To protest will mean that these advocates will, when possible, witness to 
eschatological communion through their personal actions.
287
  Whereas preservation tends 
to happen on the holistic level, protest tends to happen at the level of individual life 
forms.  In Webb’s words, “We should not encourage or enhance the violence in 
nature.”288  Advocates of cosmocentric transfiguration will avoid hunting a deer, 
devouring a cow, or injecting shampoo into the eyes of a rabbit.
289
  Cosmocentric 
transfigurationists preserve the system without embracing its mechanisms.  For such an 
embrace would amount to, in the words of Webb, “a kind of Nietzschean celebration of 
the will to power, the recognition that the weak must be sacrificed to the strong (which is 
precisely the opposite of the message of Christianity, as Nietzsche well knew).”290  
Instead, advocates of cosmocentric transfiguration protest death in personal witness to 
individuals without trying to overthrow its hold on nature as a whole.
291
  To summarize 
                                               
285 On this point, see Wennberg, God, Humans, and Animals, 50-51. 
286 Ibid., 49. 
287 Jeremy Law sums up Moltmann in a manner that echoes this point: “Christian anticipation 
concerns the construction of representations of what is to come, resistance and protest against that which 
contradicts the future and solidarity with those who presently suffer.” Jeremy Law, “Jürgen Moltmann’s 
Ecological Hermeneutics,” in Ecological Hermeneutics: Biblical, Historical and Theological Perspectives, 
David G. Horrell Cheryl Hunt, Christopher Southgate, and Francesca Stavrakopoulou, editors (New York, 
NY: T&T Clark, 2010), 236.  
288 Webb, “Ecology vs. The Peaceable Kingdom,” 249. Webb goes as far as to claim that predators 
should not be protected at the expense of other species. Ibid.. 
289 I think Sideris would balk at my concern over hunting a deer because it extends a similar ethics 
to both wild and nonwild creatures and thus fails to note the important differences between these two 
general types. But I am not sure her division here works. She includes nonwild creatures in the ethical 
realm of human society. This inclusion gives them a different status because humans have, in some sense, 
tamed their nature. Thus humans have responsibilities to them. See Sideris, Environmental Ethics, 252-61. I 
have already noted the problem with her special exclusion of culture from the realm and laws of nature.  
290 Webb, “Ecology vs. The Peaceable Kingdom,” 242. 
291 Sideris would certainly decry this protesting eschatological resignation as more anthropocentric 
wishful thinking: “The inability to resolve conflict sometimes creates a longing, especially for religiously 
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this tension in a pithy alliteration: advocates of cosmocentric transfiguration preserve that 
which they protest by protecting its integrity while they protest that which they preserve 
by refusing to participate in predation to whatever extent possible, thus proleptically 
witnessing against it. 
CONCLUSION 
I have offered the beginning stages of a systematic construction of the eco-
theological ethics of cosmocentric transfiguration by way of exploring the tensions of two 
separate crossroads.  First, at the intersection of Moltmann and Linzey, I formulated a set 
of foundational theological claims that support an ethics of cosmocentric transfiguration.  
The paradigm maintains that the triune God has created a world with which the Trinity 
desires to share its community; that this desire must overcome the wandering isolation of 
the cosmos, including suffering, predation, and death, all of which result from the 
integrity God suffered the creation; that this overcoming is concretely accomplished in 
the incarnation of the Son, including Christ’s passion, death, and resurrection and is 
further manifested by the burgeoning future in the presence of the Spirit; and that human 
beings are sacraments of the eschatological hope that the mechanisms of evolution will 
be overcome in communion.  
Second, at the intersection of that set of claims and the three other eco-theological 
paradigms, I offered responses to potential tensions and critiques that might arise 
concerning cosmocentric transfiguration.  I did not find critiques that the paradigm is not 
biblical satisfactory as the paradigm is commensurable with particular passages that point 
to the potential of a hermeneutic that favors it.  Nor did I find the critique that the 
                                                                                                                                            
minded individuals, for a world in which all values can be brought into harmony, and benefits can be 
realized by all beings at once.” Sideris, Environmental Ethics, 224. 
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paradigm constitutes a denial of the tradition satisfactory as a critical retrieval of the 
tradition helps support its main tenets.  Suspicions that cosmocentric transfiguration 
amounts to the denial of science or the desacralization of nature are not necessarily true 
given the adjustment I made to cosmology, particularly protology and the Fall.  The claim 
that an individual animal or plant resurrection is nonsensical loses its strength once the 
necessity of humanity’s transfiguration is considered.  Likewise, the force of the claim 
that the resurrection of predators as non-predatory constitutes the dissolution of the 
species is mitigated by the hope for continuity of humanness amidst the discontinuity 
entailed by transfiguration.     
These explorations aided in giving the paradigm a definitive shape.  In order to 
further define it, I then proposed practical applications of the paradigm, including 
concrete principles for humanity’s engagement with individual sentient creatures, 
individual non-sentient life forms, animal species, entire eco-systems, and the cosmos at 
large.  I contended that, at the level of the individual, it is always a violation of the good 
to cause harm or death to a life form but that such a violation, while never justifiable in 
the sense of being right or good, is acceptable provided that it is necessary for the 
attainment of an equal or greater good.  At a wider level, including that of entire animal 
species and eco-systems, I suggested that cosmocentric transfiguration must 
simultaneously preserve and protect the very mechanisms of the system that they protest.  
The preservation occurs on the level of a “letting-be” of the natural world while the 
protest occurs on the level of a proleptic witness of eschatological hope via personal 
actions toward individual nonhuman life forms (e.g., refusing to eat meat or to hunt).  
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This vision of cosmocentric transfiguration respects the integrity of the natural 
world without embracing the mechanisms of evolution as a divinely-ordained law.  It 
opens up a space for a gracious letting-be while acknowledging that resurrection is the in-
breaking hope for nature and all the life forms therein.  It promotes practices of 
eschatological peace from humans without calling for the construction of the kingdom 
within history.  It thus my contention that cosmocentric transfiguration represents the best 
of both worlds—that is, the natural world of history and the eschatological new creation.  
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CONCLUSION:  
COSMOCENTRIC TRANSFIGURATION AS THE “BEST OF BOTH WORLDS” 
 
The aim of this dissertation was two-fold.  First, I set out to propose a taxonomy 
consisting of four paradigms of eco-theological ethics in an effort to better classify the 
field.  Second, I sought to develop constructively the paradigm of cosmocentric 
transfiguration in order to better represent it among the other paradigms.  Having 
delineated the taxonomy, its paradigms, and the contours of cosmocentric transfiguration, 
it is now necessary to restate and evaluate my findings, offer conclusions, and suggest 
possible directions for further development.         
RESTATING THE PARADIGMS 
In chapter 1, I explored three paradigms of eco-theological ethics.  In 
anthropocentric conservation, a paradigm I expounded through the work of Saint Thomas 
Aquinas, all human beings are essentially unique creatures of God with individual eternal 
teloi.  The nonhuman creation constitutes a good and ordered system of resources to aid, 
by way of bodily sustenance and spiritual revelation, humans in history on their journey 
toward communion with God.  Humans must learn to embrace their role, utilizing 
creation in a manner commensurable with their unique telos.  This manner includes 
distributing the resources of the cosmos justly, which also intimates preserving them for 
future humans.    
For cosmocentric conservation, a paradigm I examined through the work of 
Thomas Berry, the uniqueness of humans is extremely qualified.  For all of creation 
constitutes a community.  This community, including the evolutionary mechanisms that 
facilitate its development and ongoing existence, is fully good and in no need of 
redemption from the natural order that demands both suffering and death.  Humans must 
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learn to embrace their identity as part of the community of creation.  This embrace entails 
both a gracious sharing of the world with all creatures and letting the earth be itself, 
respecting the integrity of the natural order.   
For anthropocentric transfiguration, a paradigm I established by engaging certain 
Eastern Orthodox theologians, humans are essentially unique in dignity.  They constitute 
the focus of divine concern.  The nonhuman creation is a gift from God to all humans 
meant to facilitate sacramentally the relationship among humans and between humans 
and the divine.  This cosmic function is an eternal one, rendering the whole creation 
necessary even in eternity as the enduring sacrament.  Humans must learn to reverence 
the cosmos as priests, offering it back to God and thereby realizing its sacramental telos.  
Such a reverence mandates that utilization of the cosmos is a sacred affair and must never 
be subsumed into economic or political gain. 
In chapters 2 and 3, I explored the work of two theologians, Jürgen Moltmann and 
Andrew Linzey, both of whom, in different manners, highlight an often neglected fourth 
paradigm of eco-theological ethics: cosmocentric transfiguration.  Unlike the 
conservationist paradigms, this view maintains that the current order of creation, while 
good in many ways, does not represent God’s ultimate desire for the cosmos.  In 
particular, the shadowy dimensions of evolution (e.g., suffering, predation, and death) 
constitute the ultimate telos of neither the earth nor any of its inhabitants.  Thus those 
who fit in this paradigm maintain that God embraces the entire cosmos, which includes 
every individual creature that is yearning for God’s redemptive intervention in the midst 
of evolutionary emergence, in the purview of God’s eschatological vision.  This vision 
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entails the consummation of the cosmic community in which God invites all creatures to 
participate, for their own sake, in the peace and harmony of God’s triune life. 
Moltmann provides theological foundations for this ethics by advocating hope for 
an eschatological panentheism in which the Trinity and the world, including every 
individual creature, will interpenetrate one another in eternity.  Thus every instantiation 
of life will experience God’s eternal peace.  Furthermore, this future is, on the one hand, 
realized concretely in the incarnation, in which Christ becomes the redeemer of 
evolution, and, on the other hand, cosmically inaugurated through the presence of the 
Spirit.  Hope for this future motivates humans to witness proleptically to it in the present.   
Linzey likewise provides theological foundations for cosmocentric transfiguration 
by appealing to the dominant view in Christian history that the cosmos is in disarray.  For 
Linzey, all sentient creatures endure the consequences of sin, in particular suffering, and 
therefore long for redemption.  In Christ, God reveals a willingness to suffer with and for 
all creatures by taking on flesh, suffering, and death.  In doing so God dies the death of 
all sentient beings.  Yet his resurrection adumbrates their eschatological resurrection and 
thus their freedom from the effects of sin.  For Linzey, Christians who live peacefully 
toward individual animals, especially by engaging in vegetarianism, approximate the 
eschaton by way of a proleptic witness.     
Having explored representatives of all of the paradigms, I was able to identify 
their general distinctiveness.  They differed fundamentally with regard to anthropology, 
cosmology, and eschatology.  These differences elicited different understandings about 
what constitutes the primary unit of moral concern.  Collectively, the variations yielded a 
very different ethics for each paradigm.  Table C – 1 summarizes these findings: 
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TABLE C – 1 
THE PARADIGMS ACCORDING TO ANTHROPOLOGY, COSMOLOGY, AND ESCHATOLOGY  
AND THE ETHICS THEY FACILITATE 
 
Anthropocentric 
Conservation 
Cosmocentric 
Conservation 
Anthropocentric 
Transfiguration 
Cosmocentric 
Transfiguration 
Anthropology: 
Central Status/ 
Role of Human 
Beings 
Essentially 
unique moral 
dignity; 
Subject of 
ultimate divine 
concern 
Enhanced 
dignity; 
Member of 
creation 
community 
Essentially unique 
moral dignity; 
Microcosm, co-
creator, and priest 
Enhanced dignity; 
Co-creator with 
God and co-
traveler with 
nonhuman 
creation 
Cosmology: 
Central Status/ 
Role of the 
Nonhuman 
Creation 
Network of good 
and ordered 
resources/gifts 
for human well-
being 
Good and 
ordered 
interconnected 
community of 
intrinsic value 
Necessary and 
ultimate sacrament 
for divine-human 
drama 
Community in via 
toward shared 
eschatological 
telos 
Scope of the 
Eschatological 
Community 
God and 
humanity; 
Angels and 
elements/matter 
Eschatology de-
emphasized in 
favor of current 
order of world 
and its goodness 
The entire cosmos  
The cosmos; 
Individual 
instantiations of 
nonhuman life 
The Primary Unit  
of Moral 
Consideration 
(General or 
Particular) 
Particular 
humans; 
General 
nonhumans 
General   
Particular humans; 
General nonhumans 
Particular 
Ethical Human 
Engagement of 
the Nonhuman 
Creation 
Proper use in via 
toward uniquely 
human telos 
Balance of a 
“letting be” and a 
reverential 
“living-with” 
Reverential use as 
sacramental gift that 
facilitates 
communion with 
others and God 
Proleptic witness 
of the future 
peace God desires 
 
The theological tensions of the paradigms also included whether or not the 
nonhuman creation is, in its natural state, unambiguously good or in need of either 
eschatological completion or redemption.  When this tension was set beside the question 
of the intrinsic value of the nonhuman components of the cosmos, the paradigms 
naturally took shape.  This shape is evident in table C – 2:  
TABLE C – 2 
THEOLOGICAL TENSIONS OF THE PARADIGMS 
 
Why should humans take responsibility for the 
created order? 
For the sake of human 
beings 
For the sake of the 
cosmos and its 
creatures 
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What is the 
responsibility of human 
beings toward 
creation? 
Preserve the 
goodness and order 
of the unfallen 
cosmos. 
Anthropocentric 
conservation 
Cosmocentric  
conservation 
Guide the fallen 
and/or incomplete 
cosmos toward its 
eschatological telos. 
Anthropocentric 
transfiguration 
Cosmocentric  
transfiguration 
 
As these tables reveal, at the intersection of cosmology, anthropology, and eschatology, I 
was able to establish a new taxonomy of eco-theological that accounts for both the 
question of value and the question of eschatology/soteriological destiny.     
RESTATING THE SYSTEMATIC CONSTRUCTION OF COSMOCENTRIC TRANSFIGURATION 
In dialogue with both Moltmann and Linzey and in contradistinction with 
advocates and defenders of the other paradigms (or central principles of those 
paradigms), I have suggested the form a developed and systematic eco-theological ethics 
of cosmocentric transfiguration might take.  This paradigm refuses to accept suffering, 
predation, and death as good.  It thus seeks to affirm the life of every individual animal 
and plant.  It also seeks the well-being of inanimate nature.  It traces the etiology of the 
darker mechanisms of evolution—along with the cosmic laws that render these 
mechanisms necessary—to the unique space, time, and integrity allotted to creation by 
God.  The Fall is a symbol for the creation’s straying in isolation at the other end of the 
consecratory distance that was necessary for the possibility of communion in otherness.   
Thus, God has not directly willed mechanisms of evolutionary emergence such as 
suffering, predation, and death.  Nor are these mechanisms the result of an angelic or 
human Fall.  God has willed the creation’s consecratory distance for the sake of 
communion, not its isolation.  Thus God’s ultimate will, most evident in the Christ-event, 
is that these dimensions of transient existence entailed by the distance of isolation should 
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ultimately be healed in transfiguration, the path to which is opened anew in Christ and 
maintained by the Spirit.  Every single individual life and speck of matter will at the 
resurrection be brought into communion with God’s own triune life and there experience 
eternity in a manner consistent with its transfigured reality.   
This eschatological hope is proleptically present in history through the power of 
the Spirit when humans witness to it in their engagements with the nonhuman creation.  
This presence remains only a witness of eschatological hope.  Hence, humans should not 
expect to construct through their Spirit-empowered efforts Isaiah’s vision of the 
peaceable kingdom.  Such a vision requires the transfiguration of the entire cosmos, 
including its laws.  However, the proleptic witness of humans is nonetheless a symbol or 
sacrament of eschatological hope within history.  Thus, while humans should not seek to 
overturn nature with any sort of finality, neither should they celebrate and embrace the 
darker mechanisms of evolutionary emergence.   
The proper disposition of humanity toward suffering, death, and predation is one 
of simultaneous preservation and protest.  Preservation entails the conservation of the 
systems that make life possible, which means protecting the balance of life and death in 
the world.  Protest entails the refusal to participate in the darker mechanisms of evolution 
except when such participation is necessary to procure some equal or greater good.  But 
even in these instances, protest mandates an oxymoronic virtuous violation of the good in 
which one participates in suffering, predation, and death only and always with penitence 
and sorrow.        
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CONCLUSIONS BASED ON FINDINGS 
Having restated the findings of this project, I will here offer my conclusions.  
First, I will evaluate my proposed taxonomy.  Second, I will evaluate my systematic 
construction of cosmocentric transfiguration.   
Evaluation of the New Taxonomy 
As noted in the introduction, other taxonomies of eco-theological ethics tend to 
use a singular focus (e.g., value, salvation, geographical locale, etc.) to classify various 
voices in the field.  These approaches, in their singularity, often overlook central tensions 
in eco-theological thought.  An emphasis on value alone does not account for the variety 
of eschatological and soteriological views.  An emphasis on salvation alone does not 
account for the value creatures have within the cosmos.  Has my taxonomy addressed 
these issues? 
No taxonomy can be without remainder.  For this reason, no taxonomy should 
claim to be exhaustive or exact.  These acknowledgements notwithstanding, it is my 
judgment that my multi-leveled focus on the theological loci of cosmology, 
anthropology, and eschatology and the dual emphasis on value and eschatological hope 
that these theological loci elicit provide a better taxonomy to classify eco-theological 
ethics than other approaches.  It combines the strengths of other taxonomies and therefore 
creates larger and more nuanced categories for the field.  It furthermore gathers eco-
theology and animal theology under a larger umbrella of nonhuman ethics—thus 
revealing the divide between these schools of thought to be an “in house” dispute.  For 
these reasons, I consider the proposed taxonomy successful and believe it is a viable 
method for clarifying dialogue within the diverse field of nonhuman theology and ethics.     
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Evaluation of the Systematic Construction of Cosmocentric Transfiguration 
The systematic proposal I developed in chapter four, though heavily dependent on 
both Moltmann and Linzey, is my own thought experiment.  As such, I make no claim 
that either thinker would wholly—or mostly—identify with my constructive and 
admittedly speculative work.  Even so, I believe my proposal alleviates some of the 
inconsistencies evident in both Moltmann and Linzey’s work.  It draws heavily on 
Moltmann’s theology but is far more consistent in following that theology to its logical 
conclusion with regard to ethics.  This ethics is similar to that of Linzey, but built upon a 
more thoroughly explored theological foundation followed by a more detailed and 
consistent consideration of the non-sentient creation, including species, ecosystems, and 
the general system of evolutionary emergence.  
How does my construction of cosmocentric transfiguration fare vis-à-vis the other 
paradigms?  In my judgment, none of the paradigms—including my constructive work—
is without issue.  However, I believe cosmocentric transfiguration, as I have delineated it, 
provides a consistent vision of ecological ethics that is commensurable with both science 
and theology.   
It is consistent with science because it does not deny or downplay the troubling 
mechanisms inherent in evolutionary emergence.  Nor does it claim these mechanisms 
can be ultimately overthrown within history by human effort—even when that effort is 
aided by grace.  Furthermore, it reflects the challenges to anthropocentrism entailed in 
scientific thought.   
It is commensurable with theology because it refuses to ignore the eschatological 
slant of Christian thought within history.  It does not sanctify what is simply because it is.  
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It does not deny the hope of transfiguration because it challenges present biological 
realities.  It does not limit God’s desire of the cosmos to the laws of nature.  These laws 
will be overturned and their victims resurrected to eternal life.  Thus, cosmocentric 
transfiguration provides stronger responses to the problem of evil than its conservationist 
counterparts.   
Ultimately, I maintain that cosmocentric transfiguration represents the “best of 
both worlds” by providing grounds both to preserve the scientifically revealed realit ies of 
nature and to protest those realities (i.e., suffering, predation, and death) by way of 
proleptic witness.  It is inclusive of all creation, extending even to non-sentient life and 
inanimate matter.  It is inclusive of all time, ignoring neither the present realities of 
nature nor the eschatological possibilities of its future.  
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
Certainly, further work needs to be done in order to assess more accurately the 
validity of this paradigm as I have delineated it.  It is my hope that such work will 
constitute the subject of future writings.  My recommendation for further research along 
these lines is five-fold. 
First, it is pertinent to explore the congruency of cosmocentric transfiguration 
with the history of Christian thought.  This exploration entails two key endeavors.  On the 
one hand, work should be done with regard to the paradigm’s viability vis-à-vis Christian 
Scripture.  Such a task might take the form of exegeting passages that challenge 
anthropocentrism in favor of cosmocentrism and evince an eschatological hope for 
transfiguration.  It might also take the form of seeking to identify something along the 
lines of Rosemary Radford Ruether’s “prophetic principle,” which could provide a 
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hermeneutical key for seeing the propriety of cosmocentric transfiguration in salvation 
history.   
On the other hand, more work needs to be done in relation to the great theologians 
of church history.  There should be engagements with voices like Augustine and Aquinas 
that explore the extent to which they can, through critical retrieval, support an eco-
theological ethics of cosmocentric transfiguration.  Likewise, scholars should examine 
the great voices of Eastern thought like Irenaeus and the Cappadocian Fathers who 
already evince cosmic visions of transfiguration.  Less prominent voices should also be 
explored for their potential support of this ethics—for instance voices from mysticism 
such as Julian of Norwich.  Lastly, a great deal of work is yet to be done on the lives of 
saints and the theological and ethical significance of their relationships to nature, which 
often included transfigurative dimensions.   
Second, it will be obvious that I have emphasized theology more so than science 
in this project.  More detailed examinations are needed with regard to the viability of 
practices of proleptic witness (e.g., vegetarianism, refusing to hunt, and the cessation of 
animal experimentation) in the face of the realities of biological existence.  For if 
cosmocentric transfiguration is indeed a balance of preservation and protest, it cannot be 
blind to these realities, especially in situations where the very protest against death could 
lead to death on a larger scale by unduly disrupting natural systems.  At the same time, 
however, protest does entail that humans ought not to use the necessity of preservation as 
a license to revel in the ways of nature.  Scientific research should be done by scientists 
who remain agnostic about the goodness of the realities of biological existence with a 
398 
 
specific eye to the extent to which human violence against the nonhuman world, both 
domesticated and non-domesticated, is truly necessary for the well-being of the cosmos.      
Third, and in line with my second recommendation, further consideration needs to 
be given to the distinction between domesticated and non-domesticated (i.e., wild or free) 
nature.  How might the balance between preservation and protest apply in these different 
situations?  These considerations ought to take the form of general inquiries and specific 
case studies.   
With regard to non-domesticated nature, are practices such as hunting, fishing, 
and trapping truly necessary in most cases to procure some good that is equal to or 
greater than the violation of the nonhuman creature’s eschatological telos?  If so, how 
ought humans to violate this good virtuously?  What reforms might be made in cases of a 
necessary violation of the good in order to protect the dignity of the creatures involved?  
It is also important to explore what cosmocentric transfiguration might have to say about 
human intervention in nature.  Should stewards of wildlife preserves let animals suffer 
and die if the causes are natural?  Or, is it possible to witness to eschatological hope in 
these cases without disrupting natural cycles?    
With regard to domesticated animals, what forms might proleptic witness take?  
What would it look like with regard to farming?  Surely factory farming would be 
problematic.  But what about other methods of farming?  Is there ever a situation in 
which it is necessary—in the sense described in chapter four—to eat veal?  If not, do 
protest and proleptic witness suggest that Christians ought to refuse to buy food from 
farms that participate in the selling of such meats?  In addition to practices of farming, 
work could be done on pet-keeping from the perspective of cosmocentric transfiguration.  
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Also, case studies about what significance the underlying principles of the paradigm 
might hold for zoos would be beneficial.     
Fourth, further work needs to be done with regard to the viability of 
proportionalism and virtue vis-à-vis cosmocentric transfiguration.  In chapter 4, my work 
scratched the surface of what ultimately remains a much larger issue that ought to 
constitute a separate work.  In addition, this exploration must consider the 
appropriateness of the claim that there are inevitable and necessary evils and that one can 
commit these evils virtuously.  
Finally, the paradigm of cosmocentric transfiguration itself requires more careful 
theological scrutiny.  While I believe it is internally consistent, parts of it certainly 
require further development.  In particular, more work could be done with regard to the 
claim that the big bang is the beginning of creation’s wandering in isolation.  Is such a 
claim convincing?  How might such a claim affect theology proper?  Issues such as this 
should be the subject of critical engagement with the paradigm.     
THE FINAL ANALYSIS 
There are real and stark differences among eco-theologians in the areas of 
cosmology, anthropology, and eschatology.  It is my hope that identifying and classifying 
these differences will open spaces for better defined (and perhaps new) conversations 
within the field.  Even if scholars do not agree on my classifications of particular 
thinkers, at the very least the act of classifying can facilitate a dialogue.  In addition, 
other thinkers can consider their own thought with reference to this new taxonomy—or at 
least with reference to the issues it draws to the surface.   
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While there is still plenty of work to be done, I hope that my constructive 
proposal of cosmocentric transfiguration will further solidify its place at the table of 
discussion in eco-theological ethics.  It is my view that this line of thinking has been 
under-represented and under-engaged in the field.  Should such actually be the case, I 
hope this work, in conjunction with that of thinkers like Moltmann and Linzey, 
contributes to changing this dearth.   
Finally, I hope this work is able to facilitate conversations among those who are 
comfortable with the classification of cosmocentric transfiguration regarding possible 
tensions within the paradigm itself.  Such conversations will aid the development of the 
paradigm, particularly with regard to theological issues like the doctrine of God, the Fall, 
and eschatology.  It will furthermore highlight issues of the moral framework of this 
ethics, including whether proportionalism is an appropriate system for the paradigm.  
Here I wish to end this project with a quote that captures in its simplicity the heart 
of cosmocentric transfiguration.  It is offered by the great Albert Schweitzer.  His work, 
though largely absent in this project, has nonetheless been influential on my thinking for 
many years.   
 
“If I save an insect from a puddle,  
life has devoted itself to life,  
and the division of life against itself is ended.”1 
 
                                               
1 Albert Schweitzer, Civilization and Ethics, translated by Charles Thomas Campion, third edition 
(London, UK: A & C Black, 1946), 246. 
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